In Re Premier Small Business Services, Inc. D/B/A Payroll Vault v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-26-00284-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE PREMIER SMALL BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.
D/B/A PAYROLL VAULT

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina1

Relator Premier Small Business Services, Inc. d/b/a Payroll Vault (Premier) filed a

petition for writ of mandamus asserting that: (1) the trial court2 abused its discretion by

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R.
47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number C-5570-25-M in the 476th District

Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Nereida Lopez Singleterry. See id.
R. 52.2.
staying enforcement of a domesticated foreign judgment, and (2) Premier lacks an

adequate remedy by appeal to address this error. We agree with Premier, and we

conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 29, 2025, the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, signed an

“Order of Default Judgment” in Case No. 710CL25005927-00 in favor of Premier against

Arc Primary Care LLC (Arc) and Richard Troy Nelson. The order stated that Arc and

Nelson had been served but failed to timely file responsive pleadings, and the court thus

held that Arc breached two agreements with Premier—an “Employee Retention Credit

Refund Agreement” and an “Escrow Agreement”—and Nelson fraudulently induced

Premier to enter these agreements. The order entered judgment against Arc and Nelson

jointly and severally for $629,579.06 together with post judgment interest. The record

does not contain other information about the litigation underlying the default judgment;

however, it appears that Arc provides services to the elderly and to disabled children.

On November 17, 2025, in the 476th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas,

Premier filed a “Notice of Filing a Foreign Judgment” with an authenticated copy of the

Virginia order, an “Affidavit of Filing Foreign Judgment Pursuant to the Uniform

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,” and a “Proof of Mailing Notice of Filing Foreign

Judgment.” On November 21, 2025, Premier filed applications for writs of garnishment

against Driscoll Children’s Hospital, Centene Corporation, Lone Star National Bank (Lone

Star), and United Healthcare Services, Inc. d/b/a United Healthcare (United Healthcare),

on grounds that Arc and Nelson “do not possess property in Texas subject to execution

sufficient to satisfy the judgment.” On January 16, 2026, the trial court signed orders

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granting Premier’s applications and ordering the clerk to issue the requested writs of

garnishment. These orders stated that there was “reason to believe” that the garnishees

“may be indebted” to Arc and Nelson “or have effects belonging to” them. On February 3,

2026, the district clerk issued the writs of garnishment.

On February 9, 2026, Arc and Nelson filed a “Verified Original Counterclaim for

Declaratory Relief and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Temporary

Injunction.” Arc and Nelson sought declaratory relief regarding “the propriety, scope, and

effect of the domestication filings and the post-judgment garnishment process, including

whether all Texas requirements for notice, timing, procedure, and service have been

satisfied, and whether any exemption, ownership, or due process issues preclude

garnishment of specific property or debts.” They further sought a temporary restraining

order and a temporary injunction restraining and enjoining Premier, its agents, and any

garnishee from:

a. Demanding, receiving, or causing disbursement of any funds or
property of Arc or Nelson pursuant to any writ of garnishment issued
in this [c]ause;

b. Instructing or inducing any garnishee to freeze, transfer, or remit
funds or property of Arc or Nelson, including but not limited to
banking institutions and insurers or payors of accounts receivable,
pending further order of this [c]ourt; and

c. Taking any action to enforce any writ of garnishment in this [c]ause
that would alter the status quo as of the date of the [temporary
restraining order], pending a hearing on a temporary injunction.

That same day, the trial court granted the temporary restraining order in favor of Arc and

Nelson. This order prevented Premier and others from: (1) demanding funds from Arc or

Nelson pursuant to the writs of garnishment, (2) instructing any garnishee to freeze,

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transfer, or remit funds belonging to Arc and Nelson, and (3) taking any action to enforce

a writ of garnishment. The temporary restraining order set a bond of $300 and set the

application for a temporary injunction to be heard on February 19, 2026.

At the hearing, the parties debated whether the funds held by Lone Star belonged

to Arc’s employees as salaries and whether the funds were therefore exempt from

garnishment. The trial court requested the parties to provide briefing on this issue and

extended the temporary restraining order for two weeks.

On February 23, 2026, Premier filed notices pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 663a to Arc, Nelson, and the four garnishees. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 663a

(governing the service of a writ of garnishment and other documents on the defendant).

On February 25, 2026, Premier filed its brief regarding the propriety of garnishment, and

on March 2, 2026, Premier filed its original answer to Arc and Nelson’s counterclaim.

On March 3, 2026, Arc and Nelson filed a “Verified Motion to Stay Enforcement

and to Dissolve Writs of Garnishment.” They explained that Premier was enforcing a

foreign default judgment by obtaining post-judgment writs of garnishment against their

financial institutions and healthcare payors. They asserted that they were “in the process

of filing a direct attack on the foreign judgment, challenging its validity.” They alleged that

they would suffer irreparable harm if immediate relief was not granted because “vital

operating funds are being restrained before adjudication of the judgment’s validity.” Arc

and Nelson requested the trial court to stay all enforcement proceedings and to dissolve

the writs of garnishment currently in effect.3

3 We note that Arc and Nelson did not reference or otherwise seek relief under section 35.006 of

the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. This section provides:

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The parties thereafter entered a Rule 11 agreement scheduling the hearing on the

temporary injunction and the motion to stay for March 12, 2026, and agreeing to maintain

the status quo in the interim. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 11. On March 11, 2026, Premier filed a

response to Arc’s and Nelson’s motion to stay. The trial court held a non-evidentiary

hearing regarding these issues on March 12, 2026. Thereafter, on March 16, 2026, the

trial court signed an “Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Stay Enforcement”:

On this day, the Court considered [Arc’s and Nelson’s] Verified Motion to
Stay Enforcement and Motion to Dissolve Writs of Garnishment. After
reviewing the motion, any responses filed, and the arguments of counsel,
the [c]ourt finds that good cause exists to grant the motion to stay
enforcement.

The [c]ourt finds that [Arc and Nelson] have demonstrated that a
substantial challenge to the underlying judgment is pending, that [Arc and
Nelson] will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay of enforcement
proceedings, and that the balance of equities favors maintaining the status
quo.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that all enforcement proceedings in
the above-styled and numbered cause, including but not limited to all writs
of garnishment issued against [Lone Star], Centene Corporation, Driscoll
Children’s Hospital, and United Healthcare, are hereby STAYED for a period
of ninety (90) days.

(a) If the judgment debtor shows the court that an appeal from the foreign judgment is
pending or will be taken, that the time for taking an appeal has not expired, or that a stay
of execution has been granted, has been requested, or will be requested, and proves that
the judgment debtor has furnished or will furnish the security for the satisfaction of the
judgment required by the state in which it was rendered, the court shall stay enforcement
of the foreign judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the
stay of execution expires or is vacated.

(b) If the judgment debtor shows the court a ground on which enforcement of a
judgment of the court of this state would be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the
foreign judgment for an appropriate period and require the same security for suspending
enforcement of the judgment that is required in this state in accordance with Section
52.006.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 35.006. Nor did Arc and Nelson seek to supersede the judgment under
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24 (governing the suspension of enforcement
of judgment pending appeal in civil cases).

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that during the stay period [Arc and
Nelson] are to utilize all funds in any of the above accounts only in the
normal scope of their business operations.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [Premier] shall not initiate any new
enforcement actions, including but not limited to additional writs of
garnishment, writs of execution, or turnover proceedings, or direct any
garnishees to freeze any funds during the stay period.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a status conference be held on May
28, 2026, at 11:00 AM to determine the status of Defendants challenge to
the underlying judgment.

This original proceeding ensued. Premier claims that the trial court abused its

discretion by issuing the March 16, 2026 order and it lacks an adequate remedy by

appeal. Premier asserts, in summary, that the trial court’s order is void because it lacked

plenary power to issue the order. We ordered Arc and Nelson to file a response to the

petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4, 52.8, 52.10. They filed a response

asserting that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting a temporary stay of the

proceedings and that the trial court’s order is not void. Arc and Nelson allege that they

“face[d] irreparable harm absent relief, while [Premier] suffers only a temporary delay in

collection of the judgment.” Premier has filed a reply in support of its request for

mandamus relief.

II. MANDAMUS

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the trial court

clearly abused its discretion and the party seeking relief lacks an adequate remedy on

appeal. In re Ill. Nat’l Ins., 685 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re

Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential

Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer,

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827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). Alternatively, when “a trial court

issues an order ‘beyond its jurisdiction,’ mandamus relief is appropriate because such an

order is void ab initio.” In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Tex. 2020) (orig.

proceeding) (per curiam) (quoting In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000)

(orig. proceeding) (per curiam)). If the order is void, the relator need not show that it lacks

an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Tex.

2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d at 605.

III. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

The United States Constitution requires each state to give full faith and credit to

the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of other states. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1;

see Elec. Red Ventures, LLC v. RDF Agent, LLC, 721 S.W.3d 529, 538 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.). The enforcement of a foreign judgment in Texas is

governed by the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA). See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 35.001–.008. Under the UEFJA, “[a] copy of a foreign judgment

authenticated in accordance with an act of congress or a statute of this state may be filed

in the office of the clerk of any court of competent jurisdiction of this state,” and “[t]he clerk

shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the court in which

the foreign judgment is filed.” Id. § 35.003(a), (b).

“A filed foreign judgment has the same effect and is subject to the same

procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, staying, enforcing, or

satisfying a judgment as a judgment of the court in which it is filed.” Id. § 35.003(c). The

filing of a foreign judgment is in the “nature of both a plaintiff’s original petition and a final

judgment: the filing initiates the enforcement proceeding, but it also instantly creates a

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Texas judgment that is enforceable.” Couns. Fin. Servs., L.L.C. v. David McQuade

Leibowitz, P.C., 311 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. denied). After this

occurs, the defendant has the burden of collaterally attacking the judgment by

establishing a recognized exception to the full faith and credit requirements. Gilbert v.

Morgan, No. 01-24-00467-CV, 2025 WL 3165465, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Nov. 13, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); Russo v. Dear, 105 S.W.3d 43, 46 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2003, pet. denied). However, a proceeding to enforce a foreign judgment “may not be

used to relitigate the merits of the original controversy.” Gilbert, 2025 WL 3165465, at *2;

see Cash Reg. Sales & Servs. of Hous., Inc. v. Copelco Cap., Inc., 62 S.W.3d 278, 281

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (“[N]o defense may be set up that goes to

the merits of the original controversy.”).

IV. PLENARY POWER

In general, a trial court’s plenary power extends for thirty days after it signs a

judgment. See Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP v. Chevron Phillips Chem.

Co., L.P., 540 S.W.3d 577, 581 (Tex. 2018); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d). A party may

extend the time the trial court retains plenary power by timely filing a motion for new trial.

Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251, 253 (Tex. 2022). A motion for new trial must be

filed prior to or within thirty days after the judgment is signed. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a);

In re Moran, 635 S.W.3d 394, 401 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2021, orig. proceeding). When

a party timely files a motion for new trial, the trial court retains plenary power to grant a

new trial or vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment until thirty days after all such

timely-filed motions are overruled by order or operation of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e). If

a trial court does not rule on a motion for new trial within seventy-five days after the

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judgment is signed, it is overruled by operation of law. See id. R. 329b(c). A motion to

contest recognition of a foreign judgment is “in the nature of a collateral attack” but

“operates procedurally as a motion for new trial” for purposes of appellate timetables and

the trial court’s plenary power over the matter. Couns. Fin. Servs., 311 S.W.3d at 53; see

Gilbert, 2025 WL 3165465, at *3; Bhardwaj v. Pathak, No. 05-14-01030-CV, 2015 WL

4882522, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 17, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Generally, once plenary power expires, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to act and any

orders it may issue are void. Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., Inc. v. Panda Power

Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 619 S.W.3d 628, 640 (Tex. 2021); In re Sw. Bell Tel.

Co., 35 S.W.3d at 605. “When a trial court acts on a foreign judgment outside of its plenary

power, the action is a nullity.” Howell v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 682 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2023, no pet.); see Gilbert, 2025 WL 3165465, at *3; Willis v. Atistar Mortg.

Sols., LLC, No. 03-23-00377-CV, 2025 WL 1759099, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin June 26,

2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Jaycap Fin., Ltd. v. Neustaedter, No. 13-17-

00680-CV, 2019 WL 6793825, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 12, 2019,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (Tijerina, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (dissenting “to the extent

that the majority concludes that the trial court had jurisdiction” to enter a post-judgment

injunction).

However, after the expiration of plenary power, the trial court may still perform

certain duties such as correcting clerical mistakes in the judgment, enforcing the

judgment, and supervising post-judgment discovery to aid in enforcement of the

judgment. See, e.g., Arndt v. Farris, 633 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1982) (orig. proceeding);

In re RDF Agent, LLC, No. 14-23-00967-CV, 2024 WL 5252062, at *4 (Tex. App.—

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Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 31, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); Gloston v. Ellison, 651

S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.). However, the trial court

may not issue an order that is inconsistent with the original judgment or that otherwise

constitutes a material change in the substantive adjudicative portions of the judgment.

Gilbert, 2025 WL 3165465, at *3; In re RDF Agent, LLC, 2024 WL 5252062, at *4; Gloston,

651 S.W.3d at 641. Further, the trial court may not require the performance of obligations

other than those that were imposed by the final judgment. Gilbert, 2025 WL 3165465, at

*3; In re RDF Agent, LLC, 2024 WL 5252062, at *4; Gloston, 651 S.W.3d at 641.

V. ANALYSIS

Premier filed its “Notice of Filing a Foreign Judgment” in Texas on November 17,

2025. The filing complied with the UEFJA, and therefore the judgment became

enforceable as a Texas judgment on that date. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

35.003(b), (c). We treat a domesticated foreign judgment as a Texas final judgment; thus,

the trial court had plenary power over the foreign judgment for thirty days absent a timely

filed motion for new trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(1), 329b(d); Howell, 682 S.W.3d at 907

(collecting cases). A motion for new trial was due within thirty days, or by December 17,

2025. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a); In re Moran, 635 S.W.3d at 401.

Arc and Nelson did not file a motion for new trial or other motion contesting the

recognition of the foreign judgment within thirty days. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a); Couns.

Fin. Servs., 311 S.W.3d at 53; see Gilbert, 2025 WL 3165465, at *3; Bhardwaj, 2015 WL

4882522, at *3. Rather, Arc and Nelson did not file any pleading assailing the

domesticated foreign judgment until February 9, 2026, when they filed their “Verified

Original Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief and Application for Temporary Restraining

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Order and Temporary Injunction.” Accordingly, the trial court’s plenary power expired thirty

days after the foreign judgment was filed in Texas on November 17, 2025.

Arc and Nelson nevertheless assert that the trial court’s order is not void because

the trial court retains authority to enforce and supervise its judgments, even after plenary

power expires, and an order regulating enforcement, such as a temporary stay, does not

modify the judgment. They contend that because the trial court did not alter the

substantive rights adjudicated in the judgment, its order is valid.

The trial court’s March 16, 2026 order stayed all enforcement proceedings

regarding the foreign judgment, required Arc and Nelson “to utilize all funds in any of the

above accounts only in the normal scope of their business operations,” and prohibited

Premier from initiating any new enforcement actions. We conclude that the trial court

exceeded its authority by issuing this order after the expiration of its plenary power. The

order impermissibly imposed new obligations on Arc, Nelson, and Premier that were not

contained in the foreign judgment. See Gilbert, 2025 WL 3165465, at *3; In re RDF Agent,

LLC, 2024 WL 5252062, at *4; Gloston, 651 S.W.3d at 641. Further, the order prohibited

enforcement of the foreign judgment rather than facilitating it. The “extremely limited”

enforcement power that may be exercised by the court after the expiration of plenary

power is to “cause its judgments and decrees to be carried into execution.” Panda Energy

Corp. v. Allstate Ins., 91 S.W.3d 29, 32 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. granted, judgm’t

vacated w.r.m.) (citation modified); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 308; see also Transam. Life Ins. v.

Helmer, No. 05-18-00747-CV, 2019 WL 3026771, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 11, 2019,

no pet.) (mem. op.). The order at issue did not have the purpose or effect of enforcing the

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judgment and instead hindered it. See Panda Energy Corp., 91 S.W.3d at 32. This was

not a legitimate exercise of the trial court’s post-plenary power enforcement authority.

We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the March 16, 2026

order. Accordingly, the trial court’s order is void and has no effect. See Brys v. Cobb, No.

01-24-00726-CV, 2026 WL 1171120, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 30, 2026,

no pet. h.) (mem. op.); Malone v. Emmert Indus. Corp., 858 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (after trial court’s plenary power expired, it had no

jurisdiction when it signed order vacating foreign judgment). In these circumstances,

Premier need not show that it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Vaishangi,

Inc., 442 S.W.3d at 261; In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d at 605. We sustain both issues

presented in this original proceeding.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,

the response, the reply, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that Premier has met its

burden to obtain relief. Accordingly, we lift the stay previously imposed in this case. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. We direct

the trial court to vacate its March 16, 2026 order and to proceed in accordance with our

memorandum opinion. Our writ will be issued only if the trial court fails to promptly comply.

JAIME TIJERINA
Chief Justice

Delivered and filed on the
13th day of May, 2026.

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