Hays County, Texas, Ruben Becerra, Debbie Ingalsbe, Michelle Cohen, Morgan Hammer, and Walt Smith, in Their Official Capacities v. Leslie Carnes, Jim Camp, Cathy Ramsey, Gabrielle Moore, and Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas

ACCEPTED
15-25-00121-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/13/2025 3:51 PM
NO. 15-25-00121-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
FILED IN
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
15th COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/13/2025 3:51:54 PM
Hays County, Texas, Ruben Becerra,
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Debbie Ingalsbe, Michelle Cohen, Morgan Hammer, Clerk
and Walt Smith, in their official capacities,
Appellants

v.

Leslie Carnes, Jim Camp, Cathy Ramsey, and Gabrielle Moore,
Appellees

Appeal from the 126th Judicial District Court
of Travis County, Texas; Cause No. D-1-GN-25-002049

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Michael Shaunessy C. Robert Heath
State Bar No. 18134550 State Bar No. 09347500
Ian Davis BICKERSTAFF HEATH DELGADO
State Bar No. 24120793 ACOSTA LLP
MCGINNIS LOCHRIDGE LLP 1601 S. MoPac Expressway
1111 W. 6th St., Ste. 400 Suite C400
Austin, Texas 78703 Austin, Texas 78746
(512) 495-6000 (512) 472-8021
mshaunessy@mcginnislaw.com bheath@bickerstaff.com
idavis@mcginnislaw.com

Attorneys for Appellants
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.....................................................................................iv

STATEMENT REGARDING REFERENCES TO THE CLERK’S RECORD
AND REPORTER’S RECORD .............................................................................. vii
ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. 1

I. A TOMA Notice Defect—Even If One Occurred Here—Does
Not Justify Overturning the Results of a Free and Fair
Election................................................................................................1

A. Appellees’ Brief Misstates the Law of Election
Contests .......................................................................................1

B. TOMA Does Not Permit Enforcement of the Act through
an Election Contest. .................................................................... 4

C. Appellees Attempt to Expand the Scope of an Election
Contest by Relying on Dickson v. Strickland; However,
that Opinion Is Largely Irrelevant to the Issues in this
Case. ............................................................................................7

D. Appellees Improperly Dismiss the Supreme Court’s
Opinion in Scarborough v. Eubank. ........................................... 9

E. The Cases Cited by Appellees in Support of their
Contention that a Defective TOMA Notice Will
Invalidate an Election Do Not Stand for that
Proposition..............................................................................12

F. Appellees Entirely Ignore the Fact that Even If
There Were a TOMA Notice Violation, the Election
Order Would Be Voidable Rather than Void and
Was Presumed to Be Valid at the Time of the
Election, After Which the Issue Became Moot. ............. 15

II. The County’s August 13 Notice Complied with TOMA. ........ 16

ii
A. Appellees Continue to Conflate Passing the Election Order
with Authorizing the Bonds. .....................................................17

B. The Supreme Court Has Not Endorsed Appellees’ Sliding
Scale of Specificity. ..................................................................20

C. TOMA Notice Need Not Be Tailored to Reach Those
Specific Individuals Whose Private Interests Will Be Most
Affected by the Proposed Government Action. ........................24

D. The Court Can and Should Consider the Online August 13
Notice, Which Included a Draft of the Election Order. ............ 26

III. Limiting Each Citizen to Three Minutes of Public
Comment Is Not a Violation of TOMA. ......................................28

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .............................................................................32

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................34
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................35

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Carter v. Tomlinson,
227 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1950) .............................................................. 4, 5

In re City of Amarillo,
2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 6252 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 16,
2023, pet. dism’d) ................................................................................ 17

Cohen v. Clear Lake City Water Authority,
687 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no
writ) ..................................................................................................... 12

Cox Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Austin Indep. Sch. Dist.,
706 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. 1986) .............................................. 20, 21, 22, 23

Creedmoor Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Barton Springs
Edwards Aquifer Conservation Dist
784 S.W.2d 79, 86 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, writ denied) ..................... 22

Dickson v. Strickland,
265 S.W. 1012 (Tex. 1924) .......................................................... passim

Duncan v. Willis,
302 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1957) .................................................................. 4

Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Mulanax,
897 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, original
proceeding) ........................................................................................ 6, 7

Greater Beauxart Garden Municipal Utility Dist. v. Cormier,
596 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1980, no writ) ........ 13, 14

Honts v. Shaw,
975 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) .............................. 3

iv
In re International Profit Associates, Inc.,
274 S.W.3d 672 (Tex. 2009) .................................................................. 6

Markowski v. City of Marlin,
940 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no writ).............................. 17

Moore v. Edna Hospital Dist.,
449 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1969,
writ ref’d n.r.e.) ..................................................................................... 4

Rettberg v. Texas Dep’t of Health,
873 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ) ........................... 17

Rossano v. Townsend,
9 S.W.3d 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no
pet.) ................................................................................................. 8, 12

San Antonio v. Fourth Court of Appeals,
820 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1991) .................................................... 22, 23, 25

Scarborough v. Eubank,
53 S.W. 573 (Tex. 1899) .............................................................. passim

Tatum v. Collier,
1989 WL 111365, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 2473 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 28, 1989, no pet.) (not
designated for publication) ................................................................. 15

Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Rangel,
595 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2020) ................................................................ 27

Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson,
590 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. 2019) .............................................................. 6, 7

Webb Cnty v. Mares,
2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 8721 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] Dec. 17, 2024, no pet.) ............................................................... 18

Willet v. Cole,
249 S.W.3d 585 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.) ................................ 3

v
Statutes and Rules

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 3.005(c) ...................................................................... 23

TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 4.002-.004 ................................................................ 18

Tex. Elec. Code § 221.003 ................................................................ passim

Tex. Elec. Code § 221.003(a)(1) ............................................................... 14

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 551.007...................................................................... 31

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 551.007(c) ............................................................ 30, 31

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 551.041 ...................................................................... 27

TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 551.143-.146 .............................................................. 6

TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 1251.003(c), 551.043 ............................................... 23

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1251.052 .................................................................... 18

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7 .................................................................................. 15

Other Authorities

Amy Coney Barrett, Listening to the Law: Reflections on the
Court and Constitution 212 .................................................................. 2

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009) ............................................... 27

WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed.
1988) .................................................................................................... 27

Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0300 (2020) ................................................. 31

vi
STATEMENT REGARDING REFERENCES TO
THE CLERK’S RECORD AND REPORTER’S RECORD

• The Clerk’s Record is cited as [Volume #].CR.[Page #].

• Trial testimony contained in the Reporter’s Record is cited as
[Volume #].RR.[Page #].

• Hays County’s trial exhibits contained in the Reporter’s Record are
cited as [Volume #].RR.P.Ex-[Exhibit #]. For example,
4.RR.P.Ex-1a refers to Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 1a, which is contained
in Volume 4 of the Reporter’s Record.

vii
ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES

I. A TOMA Notice Defect—Even If One Occurred Here—Does
Not Justify Overturning the Results of a Free and Fair
Election.

As established in the record, Hays County1 recognizes the

importance of TOMA and its obligation to operate in conformity to that

statute. As discussed in Appellants’ Principal Brief and at pages 16-32 of

this Reply Brief, the County fully complied with TOMA in ordering the

challenged bond election. Nevertheless, even if it is determined that the

County did not substantially comply with TOMA, invalidating the

democratically expressed choice of almost 116,000 Hays County voters is

not an available remedy. That is a matter Appellees have failed to

effectively counter in their brief.

A. Appellees’ Brief Misstates the Law of Election
Contests.

Appellees characterize the County’s contention that even if a

“TOMA violation falls within the election contest parameters (Tex. Elec.

Code § 221.003) of ‘fraud, illegal conduct, or a mistake,’ the election

contest should be denied unless the evidence shows ‘that the result of the

1 Appellants incorporate by reference all of the capitalized and defined terms set forth

in their Principal Brief.

1
election was not the true result’” as being an “extreme” argument. See

Appellees’ Brief, at 16. Similarly, Appellees claim that the County’s

statement that “[a]n election contest can result in changing or dismissing

the outcome of an election only if there was a defect or mistake sufficient

to establish that the declared result was not the actual result” was

unsupported by any case authority. See id. at 9.

Far from being extreme and unsupported by authority, the County’s

position is mandated by the plain language of the Election Code:

(a) The tribunal hearing an election contest shall attempt to
ascertain whether the outcome of the contested election,
as shown by the final canvass, is not the true outcome
because:
(1) illegal votes were counted; or
(2) an election officer or other person officially involved in
the administration of the election:
(A) prevented eligible voters from voting;
(B) failed to count legal votes; or
(C) engaged in other fraud or illegal conduct or made a
mistake.
(b) In this title, “illegal vote” means a vote that is not legally
countable.

TEX. ELEC. CODE, § 221.003 (emphasis added).

The language of the statute could not be clearer.2 The issue before

2 United States Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett may have put it best when

she explained, “The basic rules of statutory interpretation are simple: ‘(1) Read the
statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the statute!’” Amy Coney Barrett, Listening to
the Law: Reflections on the Court and Constitution 212, Sentinel (2025) citing Henry

2
the court in an election contest is whether the canvassed result—here,

approval of Proposition A by more than 13,000 votes—is the true result.

See Honts v. Shaw, 975 S.W.2d 816, 822 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.)

(“The contestant bears the burden of proving that violations occurred

and that they materially affected the outcome of the election”)

(emphasis added); see also Willet v. Cole, 249 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2008, no pet.) (“An election contestant’s burden is a heavy

one, and the declared result of an election will be upheld in all cases

except where there is clear and convincing evidence of an erroneous

result”).

Appellees have never disputed the accuracy of the canvass in this

election. See, e.g., Appellees’ Brief, at 5 (“While the results of a voided

election [i.e., this election] are not at issue . . .”). Yet, under the statute,

the ultimate question to be determined in an election contest is whether

the canvassed result, which in this election is uncontested, is the true

result. See TEX. ELEC. CODE, § 221.003; Honts, 975 S.W.2d at 822; Willet,

249 S.W.3d at 589. The election contest statutes are designed to be final,

J. Friendly, Mr. Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in BENCHMARKS 196, 202
(1967) (quoting Justice Frankfurter).

3
exclusive, and to serve as limits on the courts. See Moore v. Edna Hospital

Dist., 449 S.W.2d 508, 521 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1969, writ

ref’d n.r.e.). Those limits exist because election contests present political

rather than judicial questions. See Duncan v. Willis, 302 S.W.2d 627, 630-

31 (Tex. 1957). The courts are able to hear such challenges because of

special constitutional and statutory provisions and are strictly limited to

the scope of inquiry set out in the election contest statute. See Carter v.

Tomlinson, 227 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. 1950). That statute defines and

restricts the issue to determining if the canvass reflects the true result of

the election.

B. TOMA Does Not Permit Enforcement of the Act
through an Election Contest.

Appellees suggest that anything can be for the basis of an election

contest unless specifically excluded by the election contest statute. 3 That,

however, ignores the history set out at pages 18-19 of Appellants’ Brief

explaining the great reluctance of the Supreme Court to assume

jurisdiction over election contests, which are political questions, in the

3 See Appellees’ Brief, at 8 (“Contrary to the County’s argument in its first issue, there

is no exception in TOMA saying it does not apply to an election contest, and there is
no part of the Election Contest statute (Tex. Elec. Code § 221.003) saying a TOMA
violation in ordering the election can be ignored.”).

4
absence of a constitutional amendment and a legislatively provided

statutory framework. That framework is exclusive and limited. See

Carter, 227 S.W.2d at 797. It is a special jurisdiction, and the general

legal and equitable powers of the courts do not apply. See id. at 799.

Section 221.003 of the Election Code sets out the scope of an election

contest. An additional ground for an election contest does not become

available simply because that ground is not specifically excluded by the

statute.

Appellees also fault the County’s Brief for not quoting subsection

(c) of section 221.003 which provides that: “This section does not limit a

provision of this code or another statute expanding the scope of inquiry in

an election contest.” Appellees’ Brief, at 8 (emphasis in original). Without

any support, Appellees then claim, “TOMA is such a statute.” Id. It is

not.

For one, TOMA does not mention election contests whatsoever. Nor

is there anything that even remotely suggests an election contest would

be a vehicle for enforcing TOMA. TOMA’s enforcement subchapter sets

out civil and criminal means of enforcing the statute. The subchapter

contains four sections that provide criminal penalties for various types

5
of violations of the Act. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 551.143-.146. In regard

to civil enforcement, section 551.141 provides that an action taken in

violation of the Act is voidable. The following section 551.142 sets out

the means for enforcing a violation of the Act, which is by filing a suit

for either injunction or mandamus. 4 Critically, the Supreme Court

recently rejected a declaratory judgment effort to invalidate an action

allegedly taken in violation of TOMA, and held that such a suit was

required to be brought by mandamus or injunction:

The Open Meetings Act generally provides that an action
taken in violation of the Act is “voidable” but goes on to state
very clearly the authorized mechanism to obtain that result:
a suit “by mandamus or injunction to stop, prevent, or reverse
a violation or threatened violation” of the Act. TEX. GOV’T
CODE §§ 551.141-.142(a).

Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 554 (Tex. 2019).

4 Appellees did initially file a suit for mandamus and injunction. (2.CR.428-450).

Mandamus is a remedy that can be obtained very quickly, including through
proceedings in the appellate courts if the relator is unsuccessful in the district court.
It must, however, be pursued in an expeditious manner as “delaying the filing of a
petition for mandamus relief may waive the right to mandamus unless the relator
can justify the delay.” In re International Profit Associates, Inc., 274 S.W.3d 672, 676
(Tex. 2009); Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Mulanax, 897 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 1995, original proceeding) (mandamus denied because relator filed its motion
on the day documents were due, which was four months after the oral ruling and one
month after the written order and there was no justification for the delay). Here,
Appellees filed their suit for mandamus more than two months after the
challenged August 13 Meeting and after early voting had already started. (2.CR.428-
450).

6
The Supreme Court went on to explain that “[TOMA] contains a

limited waiver [of immunity] for suits seeking certain types of relief and

is thus properly read to authorize only those types of relief.” Id. at

555 (emphasis added).5

Not only does Appellees’ statement that TOMA expands the scope

of inquiry find no support in the statute, but it is contrary to Supreme

Court authority recognizing the limits on enforcement mechanisms for

that Act.

C. Appellees Attempt to Expand the Scope of an Election
Contest by Relying on Dickson v. Strickland; However,
that Opinion Is Largely Irrelevant to the Issues in this
Case.

Appellees point to Dickson v. Strickland, 265 S.W. 1012 (Tex. 1924),

a case they claim “is on point.” Appellees’ Brief, at 10. Appellees note that

Dickson stands for the proposition that elections are a process and that

matters that occur before election day can be considered in an election

contest. Although Hays County does not agree with Appellees’

characterization of that point as the Court’s holding—because it was

5 It did note that courts in the past, including the Supreme Court, had granted relief

in declaratory judgment suits raising TOMA issues, but stated that the issue of the
propriety of a declaratory judgment action and whether its waiver of immunity
extended to a TOMA action was not raised. See id. and nn. 11 and 12.

7
dictum—the County does acknowledge that certain pre-election-day

occurrences may be considered in a contest. 6 What the County disagrees

with is any suggestion that a defect in an election order is necessarily

sufficient to invalidate an election, which is a matter Dickson did not

address.

Dickson is a somewhat unusual case. It was a response to six

certified questions from the Third Court of Appeals relating to the district

court’s jurisdiction to entertain the case and to issues relating to the

eligibility of a woman, Mrs. Miriam Ferguson, to be a candidate for

governor. 7 See Dickson, 265 S.W. at 1014-1015. The Supreme Court

determined that the judiciary had no jurisdiction over the underlying suit

and that Mr. Dickson had no standing. See id. at 1018-1019. Accordingly,

virtually everything else the Court said was dictum. Nonetheless,

6 Although the County does not challenge the Dickson court’s conclusion that a
contest is not limited to actions that occur on election day, it should be noted that
post-Dickson cases have frequently rejected that conclusion. This is apparent from
one of the cases cited by appellees, Rossano v. Townsend, 9 S.W.3d 357, 362 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.), which lists both cases that follow Dickson
on that issue and cases that reject Dickson’s position.
7 The plaintiff argued that (1) Mrs. Ferguson was ineligible to be a candidate for

governor by virtue of her sex, (2) she was ineligible by virtue of her status of a married
woman, (3) she was ineligible due to her status as wife of James Ferguson who had
been impeached and disqualified from holding office in Texas, and (4) James
Ferguson was the actual candidate and Mrs. Ferguson’s name was being used by him
to evade the effect of his impeachment.

8
whether dictum or holding, the opinion did not suggest that a contest

could be successful if it did not establish that the canvassed result was

not the true result.

D. Appellees Improperly Dismiss the Supreme Court’s
Opinion in Scarborough v. Eubank.

Scarborough v. Eubank, 53 S.W. 573 (Tex. 1899) was an election

contest challenging whether the county judge had authority to order an

election when the petition—a prerequisite to ordering the election—had

an allegedly insufficient number of valid signatures. The core teaching of

that case is that:

The important matter in every election is that the will of the
voters should be fairly expressed, correctly determined, and
legally enforced. Compared to this, the question of the manner
and time or ordering the election is of trivial moment.

Scarborough, 53 S.W. at 107.

Appellees dismiss Scarborough, saying (1) its holding is applicable

only to cases requiring a fact determination such as the one required to

verify petition signatures, (2) it does not address whether an election

contest can be sustained where there was no valid order for the election,

(3) it is irrelevant because it predates TOMA, and (4) the later opinion of

Dickson v. Strickland, is on point and inconsistent with Scarborough. See

9
Appellees’ Brief, at 9-10. Appellees are wrong on each of these four points.

The teaching of Scarborough is not limited to matters relating to

fact determinations. While Scarborough does say “the decision of the

officer ordering the election as to the competency of the signers of the

petition was intended to be final,” Scarborough, 53 S.W. at 575, the

reason for not questioning the fact determination, which the Court

explained earlier in that same paragraph, was that “[i]t is the vote of the

electors at the election, and not the signature to the petition, which

determines the location of the county seat” and to change the

determination of the validity of the signatures on the petition “after the

election is passed, and the change carried by the popular vote, would

certainly subserve no good purpose.” Id. The Court is saying on the last

page of its opinion what it set out on the first page—the important issue

in a contest is that the will of the voters is correctly declared and any

question regarding the ordering of the election “is of trivial moment.” Id.

Similarly, Appellees’ contention—that Scarborough does not

address whether an election contest can be sustained when there is no

valid order for the election—is incorrect. To the contrary, the Supreme

Court set out the question in the case as being whether, in an election

10
contest, “it was competent to contest the validity [of the election] upon

the ground that the county judge had no authority to order it, because of

the disqualification of the applicants for the election.” Scarborough, 53

S.W. at 574. In other words, it considered whether a defect in the order

calling the election was a valid consideration and determined that issues

relating to the method of calling the election were largely irrelevant—or

“of trivial moment”—because the overriding issue was whether the will

of the voters was fairly expressed and correctly decided.

Obviously, Scarborough predated TOMA, but that is irrelevant.

The lesson of Scarborough and its progeny is that a defect in ordering an

election is largely immaterial once the election has been held and the

people have spoken with their votes. Whether that defect is due to the

failure to have a petition with the required number of valid signatures or

an alleged TOMA posting error, the legal issue is the same, and the

question of the validity of the election order will not cause the result of

the election to be overturned.

As noted above, the doctrine in Dickson that pre-election day

matters can be considered in an election contest is both undisputed in

this case and is immaterial to it. The issue here is whether the pre-

11
election day action regarding posting notice of a commissioners court

meeting can be sufficient to overturn the result of an election. Dickson

did not address that issue, and under Tex. Elec. Code § 221.003,

Scarborough, and many other cases cited in the County’s Principal Brief,

it cannot serve as grounds for overturning an election where there is no

dispute as to the accuracy of the canvassed result.

E. The Cases Cited by Appellees in Support of their
Contention that a Defective TOMA Notice Will
Invalidate an Election Do Not Stand for that
Proposition.

Appellees cite five cases they contend lead to the conclusion that an

election can be overturned due to a TOMA violation. None of these cases

offer support, though, for ignoring the clear language of the election

contest statute or for overturning this election.

Three of the cases, Dickson (discussed above), Cohen v. Clear Lake

City Water Authority, 687 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

1985, no writ), and Rossano v. Townsend, 9 S.W.3d 357 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) essentially stand for the proposition

that an election contest is not necessarily limited to matters that occur

on election day. The County does not dispute that general proposition.

Only one of the three, Rossano, granted any relief, and that related to

12
violations of the city charter, not TOMA.

The sole case that involves TOMA is Greater Beauxart Garden

Municipal Utility Dist. v. Cormier, 596 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.—

Beaumont 1980, no writ). In their brief, Appellees claim that “the TOMA

meeting notice [in Beauxart Garden] was as clearly inadequate as the

Hays County notice in this appeal.” Appellees’ Brief, at 17. They go on to

claim that the court noted that the meeting notice there contained

specific language such as: “Take necessary action on all related business

to election” and “Discuss and take action on business pertaining to

upcoming election, January 20, 1979.” Id. at 17-18. Beauxart Garden,

however, does not attribute that language to the TOMA notice. Rather,

it comes from the board’s minutes as specifically noted by the court of

civil appeals. See Beauxart, 596 S.W.2d at 600, nn. 5 and 6.8

The only description of the notice comes in a quotation from the

district court’s findings:

4. The notice or agenda, under the Public Meeting Law,
concerning the meeting which attempted to call the election
of January 20, 1979, was not proper, nor was it timely filed
and posted.

8 Appellees cite to notes 3 and 5. From an examination of those footnotes, it seems

certain that they intended to refer to notes 5 and 6 rather than 3 and 5.

13
Id. at 599. In other words, Beauxart Garden did not identify what the

notice said, nor did it even clarify whether the notice was posted at all.

Further, while it is clear that the court believed the TOMA notice was

deficient, it is far from clear that the court determined a TOMA violation

by itself would lead to rejecting the election. Instead, there were myriad

deficiencies in this election: no election order was adopted, the election

judge was not given a proper poll list of eligible voters, the poll list that

was used was for a precinct whose boundaries did not coincide with those

of the district, the election judge had no map of the district boundaries

and was mistaken as to what those boundaries were, and the polling

place was located in a precinct that was not within the district. See id.

The mere fact that the votes were cast in a precinct located outside

the district was found by the court to prevent any of those votes from

being counted. See id. at 601. For that exact reason, the court concluded

that the canvassed result was not the true result because illegal votes

were counted, which under Tex. Elec. Code § 221.003(a)(1), is a specific

ground for a contest. See id. Here, unlike in Beauxart Garden, Appellees

have never suggested—and the District Court did not find—that illegal

votes were cast or that the canvassed result was not the true result.

14
The last of the five cases relied on by Appellees is Tatum v. Collier,

1989 WL 111365, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 2473 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] Sept. 28, 1989, no pet.) (not designated for publication). 9 The case

does not involve TOMA, but it did invalidate a disincorporation election

because it found that the signatures on the petition required to trigger

the election were insufficient. In that regard, it appears to be contrary to

the Supreme Court’s decision in Scarborough as well as the one other

Supreme Court case, three writ-refused cases, and two other court of civil

appeals cases cited in Appellants’ Principal Brief that follow

Scarborough. See Appellants’ Brief, at 24-26. In addition to the fact that

Tatum conflicts with higher judicial authority, because the case was

decided before January 1, 2003, and was not designated for publication,

it has no precedential value. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7.

F. Appellees Entirely Ignore the Fact that Even If There
Were a TOMA Notice Violation, the Election Order
Would Be Voidable Rather than Void and Was
Presumed to Be Valid at the Time of the Election, After
Which the Issue Became Moot.

On pages 27-29 of their Brief, Appellants discuss how an action

9 When citing the case, Appellees omitted the parenthetical that is required if a case

not designated for publication is cited. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7. The required
parenthetical phrase is a signal that the case has no precedential value.

15
taken in violation of TOMA is voidable (not void) and presumed to be

valid unless and until adjudicated and declared to be void. Here, there

was no adjudication until eight months after the election was held. By

that time, the County’s authority under the Election Order had ended,

and any challenge to it became moot. Tellingly, Appellees offer no

rebuttal or dissent to that point.

II. The County’s August 13 Notice Complied with TOMA.

Appellees attempt to hide the weakness of their TOMA arguments

by casting unsupported aspersions about Hays County. Initially,

Appellees claim that Hays County has a “lack of appreciation for” TOMA.

Appellees’ Brief, at 6. As set out in its Principal Brief, Hays County’s

actions demonstrate that it sees TOMA and open government as critical

components of representative democracy. Hays County fully complied

with TOMA but also seeks to uphold the will of its constituents, who

overwhelmingly voted to approve the $440 million County wide bond

package by an over 13,000-vote margin. (4.RR.P.Ex-14; 4.RR.P.Ex-15).

Defending the results of a free and fair election epitomizes honoring the

precepts of a representative democracy. The arguments in Appellees’

brief establish that their real complaint is with the outcome of the

16
election. But that alone does not establish a TOMA violation and/or an

illegal election.

Additionally, Appellees claim the County acted deceitfully in a

concerted effort to conceal the subject of the August 13 Meeting from the

public, but there is no evidence in the record to support this assertion.

See Appellees’ Brief, at 24-25, 29. In fact, Appellees can point to no

evidence to suggest that the County tried to mislead the public or

intentionally concealed the subject of the August 13 Meeting.

As explained below, Appellees’ rebuttal arguments do not establish

that the County’s August 13 Notice violated TOMA for lack of specificity.

This Court should therefore reverse the judgment below and hold that

the August 13 Notice substantially complies with TOMA’s notice

requirements.

A. Appellees Continue to Conflate Passing the Election
Order with Authorizing the Bonds.

Courts evaluate “substantial compliance” with TOMA’s notice

requirements by comparing (1) the content of the notice, with (2) the

action taken at the meeting. See Markowski v. City of Marlin, 940 S.W.2d

720, 726 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no writ); Rettberg v. Texas Dep’t of

Health, 873 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ); In re City

17
of Amarillo, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 6252, at *12 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

Aug. 16, 2023, pet. dism’d); Webb Cnty v. Mares, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS

8721, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 17, 2024, no pet.).

Both in this Court and the trial court, Appellees’ arguments hinge

on a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope and character of the

action taken at the August 13 Meeting. Appellees claim that “[t]he action

taken was to set in motion 31 road projects . . . at a cost of $778 million”

that “would require a property tax increase for 30 years of financing[.]”

Appellees’ Brief, at 7-8 (emphasis in original).

In fact, the action taken at the August 13 Meeting was far

narrower—the Commissioners Court passed the Election Order, the

effect of which was to place Proposition A on the ballot so that the citizens

of Hays County could make the ultimate decision on whether to provide

voter authorization for the bonds. (4.RR.P.Ex-8). 10 At the August 13

10 As the Texas Association of School Boards Legal Assistance Fund explains on page

5 of its amicus brief, Texas law imposes election notice obligations on Hays County
that are separate and distinct from notice under TOMA. See TEX. ELEC. CODE §§
4.002-.004, .009; TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1251.052. Appellees do not contend that Hays
County failed to provide lawful notice of the election for Proposition A. And in any
event, the record establishes that, in conformity with Texas law, the County (1)
posted the Election Order (4.RR.P.Ex-8) and a Voter Information Document
(4.RR.P.Ex-11) in four public places for more than 21 days before election day
(4.RR.P.Ex-12), (2) posted the Notice of the Bond Election (4.RR.P.Ex-9), the Voter
Information Document (4.RR.P.Ex-11), the Notice of Proposition A’s language
(4.RR.P.Ex-10), and a sample ballot on the County’s website for more than 21 days

18
Meeting, the Commissioners Court did not vote to authorize the bonds

or fund the various road projects. As the undisputed evidence established

at trial, Commissioners Court action to set the road projects “in motion”

would only come if the bond package was approved by the voters of Hays

County, and there would be subsequent notices and Commissioners

Court meetings related to the sale of approved bonds. (2.RR.94-95, 113-

114). None of those actions occurred at the August 13 Meeting.

In other words, Appellees continue to conflate (i) calling the bond

election with (ii) selling or authorizing bonds—which are two

procedurally and substantively different actions. Here, it is undisputed

that the action taken at the August 13 Meeting only called an election—

not the issuance of the bonds or the funding of the road projects.

(4.RR.P.Ex-4; 4.RR.P.Ex-8).

Moreover, the information that Appellees contend should have been

included in Agenda Item No. K-2—i.e., the number of road projects, the

amount of the proposed bonds, etc.—are potential consequences that

might flow from consideration of the Election Order. The Supreme Court

before election day (4.RR.P.Ex-12), and (3) published Notice of the Bond Election
(4.RR.P.Ex-9) in the San Marcos Daily Record (a newspaper of general circulation in
Hays County) on October 6 and 13, 2024. (4.RR.P.Ex-13).

19
has held in no uncertain terms that “[a]s long as a reader is alerted to the

topic for consideration, it is not necessary to state all of the

consequences which may flow from consideration of the topic.” Cox

Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 706 S.W.2d 956,

958 (Tex. 1986) (emphasis added).

At bottom, Agenda Item No. K-2 (i.e. “Discussion and possible

action to approve an order calling a bond election for November 5, 2024

to be held within Hays County, Texas”) fairly alerted the public that the

Commissioners Court would take the action that it ultimately did—

approving the Election Order. (4.RR.P.Ex-3a). On this basis alone, the

Court should reverse the decision below and hold that no TOMA notice

violation occurred.

B. The Supreme Court Has Not Endorsed Appellees’
Sliding Scale of Specificity.

Throughout their Brief, Appellees advance a “sliding scale”

standard for evaluating the adequacy of TOMA notice. They argue that

TOMA requires “greater specificity of the meeting notice when there is

greater public interest in the subject[.]” Appellees’ Brief, at 23; see

generally id. at 21-24.

For two reasons, the Court should decline to adopt this approach.

20
First, each of the cases relied upon by Appellees for the “sliding scale”

rule are based on faulty interpretations of the Supreme Court’s decision

in Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of AISD. And second,

Appellees’ “sliding scale” approach is unworkable and would have the

counter-productive effect of reducing public input during local

government decision making.

Appellees’ sliding scale standard is derived from a line of appellate

decisions that rely on the following sentence in Cox: “The Board did not

provide full and adequate notice, particularly where the subject slated for

discussion was one of special interest to the public.” Cox, 706 S.W.3d at

959 (emphasis added). Notably, the Supreme Court did not pronounce a

rule that specificity of notices must increase in proportion to the public’s

interest in a meeting. See id. To the extent that certain courts of appeal

have purported to derive such a rule from Cox, those decisions are based

on a liberal over-reading that has no basis in the opinion itself. The core

of Cox’s holding is simply that a notice must be “full and adequate” yet

need not be “as specific as it could be” or contain a description of “all the

consequences which may necessarily flow” from the meeting’s subject.

Cox, 706 S.W.3d at 959 (citing Tex. Turnpike Auth. v. City of Fort Worth,

21
554 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. 1977); Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of San

Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1975)).

Importantly, five years after Cox, when the Supreme Court

revisited TOMA’s notice requirements in San Antonio v. Fourth Court of

Appeals, the Court did not endorse a sliding scale approach, nor did it

clarify that Cox imposed such a rule. See 820 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex. 1991)

(summarizing the holding in Cox). 11 Moreover, it rejected the argument

in that case that greater specificity was required. See id.

Putting aside that the sliding scale approach is unsupported by Cox,

it is also unworkable and would potentially diminish public input in the

decision-making of governing bodies. Adopting Appellees’ “sliding scale”

approach would transform compliance with TOMA into subjective

guesswork. In many instances, the sliding scale approach would force

governing bodies to speculate about the degree of public interest of a

11 That the Texas Supreme has not adopted a “sliding scale” standard for specificity

of TOMA notices is best demonstrated by Supreme Court Justice Mauzy’s dissenting
opinion in San Antonio. Justice Mauzy cited Creedmoor Maha Water Supply Corp. v.
Barton Springs-Edwards Aquifer Conservation Dist. for the proposition that “[f]ull
disclosure” under TOMA’s notice provision “requires a correspondence between the
likely degree of public interest in a topic with the specificity with which the topic is
stated in the notice.” Id. at 779 (Mauzy, J., dissenting) (quoting 784 S.W.2d 79, 86
(Tex. App.—Austin 1989, writ denied)). The fact that Justice Mauzy’s dissenting
opinion discussed the sliding scale approach, while the majority opinion did not,
strongly suggests that the majority did not endorse the sliding scale approach or
intend for Cox to pronounce such a rule.

22
meeting topic before the governing body has any understanding of the

degree of public attention to the matter. The only recourse for governing

bodies would be to err on the side of greater specificity, which the

Supreme Court has recognized can oftentimes disserve the purposes of

TOMA. See San Antonio, 820 S.W.2d at 766 (“Far from serving the

purposes of the Act, this degree of specificity [in a pre-meeting notice]

would so overwhelm readers that it would prove even less informative

than the current notice.”).

Moreover, in the context of a bond election order, hyper-specificity

risks limiting the governing body’s discretion to debate and consider

modifying the scope and purpose of a bond election order during the

narrow window of time that State law mandates such deliberations must

occur. See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 3.005(c); TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 1251.003(c),

551.043. Adopting Appellees’ sliding scale approach could well transform

a county commissioners court’s meeting on a bond election order into an

“all-or-nothing” vote—which would be counter-productive to providing

public input as a means of influencing government decision making.

In sum, the Court should reject Appellees’ sliding scale test because

it (1) has no foundation in Cox or any other Supreme Court decision, and

23
(2) would be unworkable in practice and diminish public input in local

government decision making.

C. TOMA Notice Need Not Be Tailored to Reach Those
Specific Individuals Whose Private Interests Will Be
Most Affected by the Proposed Government Action.

Appellees—who undeniably opposed Proposition A on policy

grounds—dedicate substantial portions of their brief arguing that the

August 13 Notice should have been more specific because the projects

were controversial to certain citizens in Hays County. Apparently, to

prove this point, Appellees provide a map that depicts which County

precincts voted against Proposition A (largely in the western and

northern parts of Hays County). See Appellees’ Brief, at 5. 12 They also

complain that notice should have been more specific because the road

projects will allegedly have environmental and “lifestyle impacts to the

rural areas in western Hays County.” Id. at 22-23 (emphasis added).13

Appellees’ argument that the notice should have been tailored to

12 On page 5 of their Brief, Appellees also cite to their summary judgment Exhibit No.

P30a. See Appellees’ Brief, at 5 (citing 2.CR.759). Appellees fail to mention, however,
that the District Court sustained the County’s hearsay objection to Exhibit No. P30a
and struck it from the record. (3.CR.2113).
13 Of note, the supposed environmental and lifestyle impacts that Appellees claim will

result from the road projects are not supported by any citations to the record. See
Appellees’ Brief, at 22-23. That’s because the record contains zero evidence to back
up these unsupported claims. And in any event, Appellees’ policy concerns with the
road projects are wholly irrelevant to this appeal.

24
address the concerns of those Hays County residents that could be most

affected by Proposition A would create an untenable standard, that would

require governmental entities to determine who are “most affected” by

potential action and attempt to craft language that might give that group

adequate notice. Moreover, the Supreme Court has previously considered

Appellees’ argument, and soundly rejected it:

However, we need not go further and inquire
into whether a notice was tailored to reach
those specific individuals whose private
interests are most likely to be affected by the
proposed government action, as [petitioner]
would have us do. The intended beneficiaries of the
Act are not individual citizens, such as the
particular landowners affected by this
condemnation, but members of the interested
public. If a “reader” is given notice, the
requirement of the Act is satisfied and its
purpose served.

San Antonio v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 820 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex. 1991)

(emphasis added).

In fact, the intended beneficiaries of TOMA notice are all members

of the public. See id. Here, the August 13 Notice fairly alerted all

members of the public that the Commissioners Court would discuss and

possibly approve “an order calling a bond election for November 5, 2024,

to be held within Hays County, Texas[.]” (4.RR.P.Ex-3a). Which is exactly

25
what the Commissioners Court did at the August 13 Meeting – it passed

the Election Order, thereby empowering the citizens of Hays County to

decide whether the bond package should be approved. The fact that

Appellees or others opposed Proposition A on policy grounds is not a basis

to require the County provide more specific notice under TOMA.

D. The Court Can and Should Consider the Online August
13 Notice, Which Included a Draft of the Election
Order.

Appellees’ Brief confirms that their true TOMA complaint is simply

about the form in which the County posted notice. They effectively

concede that the information contained in the Online August 13 Agenda

satisfies their TOMA complaints, but nonetheless argue that the will of

their fellow Hays County citizens should be overturned because that

information wasn’t also posted on a piece of paper at the County

courthouse.

Thus, Appellees argue that the Court cannot even consider the

Draft Election Order that was hyperlinked to the Online August 13

Notice because it doesn’t appear within the four corners of the agenda.

See Appellees’ Brief, at 26-27. In so arguing, Appellees necessarily

conflate an “agenda” with the more general term used in the statute:

26
“notice.”

TOMA requires that “[a] governmental body shall give written

notice of the date, hour, place, and subject of each meeting held by the

governmental body.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 551.041 (emphasis added). The

term “agenda” does not appear anywhere in the statute’s notice provision,

nor does TOMA prescribe a specific form that written notice must take.14

The Court should therefore reject Appellees’ position that TOMA

requires the pre-meeting notice to be contained in the four corners of an

agenda. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 551.041 does not require notice-through-

agenda, instead using the far more general term “written notice.”

Because the Draft Election Order was easily available through the

Online August 13 Notice, it was part of the notice required under TOMA.

Assuming arguendo that the Physical August 13 Notice’s language

does not satisfy TOMA’s notice requirements, the Court should

nonetheless reverse because the statutorily required and much more

14 Because “notice” is undefined in TOMA, the Court can look to dictionary definitions

to determine its common, ordinary meaning. See Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v.
Rangel, 595 S.W.3d 198, 208 (Tex. 2020). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “notice” as
“legal notification required by law or agreement.” Notice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2009). Similarly, Merriam Webster defines “notice” as “warning or
intimation of something : announcement.” Notice, WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1988).

27
accessible Online August 13 Notice contained all the specific details

demanded by Appellees. This commonsense approach honors TOMA’s

purpose and prevents an outcome in which an election is overturned for

the mere fact that a notice was posted online rather than at a physical

location.

III. Limiting Each Citizen to Three Minutes of Public Comment
Is Not a Violation of TOMA.

As an initial matter, Appellees incorrectly claim that the trial court

“held that the Hays County Commissioners Court violated TOMA by

imposing an unreasonable time limit of 3 minutes on public testimony

for” Agenda Item No. K-2. See Appellees’ Brief, at 31 (emphasis added).

Appellees’ claim is demonstrably false. A plain review of the

summary judgment order (3.CR.2104-2105), final judgment (3.CR.2114-

2116) and findings of fact and conclusions of law (3.CR.2166-2169) show

that the District Court did not make a ruling on—or even discuss—

Appellees’ TOMA-time-limit argument.15

As explained in greater detail in Appellants’ Brief, the minutes of

15 Appellees did not even include a conclusion of law regarding their claim that the

three-minute time limit for public comment was unreasonable in the proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law they submitted to the trial court. (3.CR.2123-
2127).

28
the August 13 Meeting show that a total of 24 items were on the agenda—

meaning 23 items were unrelated to the Election Order. (4.RR.P.Ex-4).

Moreover, a total of 29 citizens took the opportunity to voice their

opinions regarding placing Proposition A on the November 5 ballot.

(4.RR.P.Ex-4). Limiting public comment to three minutes per speaker in

these circumstances was entirely reasonable.

Appellees complain that the three minute time limit gave members

of the public 5.8 seconds to discuss each road project. See Appellees’ Brief,

at 33.

This is a red herring. The subject in question at the August 13

Meeting was not the advisability of approving or funding the individual

road projects. Rather, the single subject was whether the Commissioners

Court should pass the Election Order to place Proposition A on the ballot

so that the citizens of Hays County could make the ultimate decision on

whether to provide voter authorization for the bonds. (4.RR.P.Ex-8).

Appellees offer no argument on why three minutes was inadequate to

address whether the Commissioners Court should call an election.

Moreover, Appellees’ analysis of why a three-minute limit was

inappropriate demonstrates the fallacy of their argument.

29
Conspicuously, Appellees do not offer a per-speaker time limit that they

contend would have been reasonable. Would one minute per road project

have been sufficient for Appellees? If so, that would mean each member

of the public wanting to discuss this agenda item would be entitled to 31

minutes to address the Commissioners Court. Because 29 citizens

addressed the Commissioners Court regarding the Election Order on

August 13, the Commissioners Court would have to allow up to a

whopping 14 hours and 59 minutes of public comment dedicated solely

to the Election Order.16

By permitting governing bodies to impose “reasonable” time limits

on public comment, the Legislature clearly recognized that governing

bodies must be able to balance the importance of public comment against

the need to conduct an orderly and efficient meeting. See TEX. GOV’T CODE

§ 551.007(c). At a meeting in which 24 items were discussed, and some

29 citizens exercised their right to address the Commissioners Court

about the Election Order for nearly 90 minutes, there is nothing

unreasonable or unlawful about limiting each speaker to three minutes.

16 Even a 30 second per road project time limit would have resulted in 15.5 minutes

per speaker, which equates to 7 hours and 29.5 minutes for all 29 speakers.

30
Appellees’ other argument hinges on a technical “gotcha.” They

claim that a free and fair election in which 115,857 Hays County voters

cast their ballot should be overturned because the Commissioners Court

didn’t formally adopt a written order in advance of the August 13 Meeting

that set forth a per speaker time limit. As explained in greater detail in

Appellants’ Brief, Appellees’ position lacks textual support in TOMA and

is a facially absurd interpretation of what the statute requires. See

Appellants’ Brief, at 52, 55-58. 17

At bottom, the only reasonable interpretation of TEX. GOV’T CODE §

551.007(c) is that governing bodies may adopt meeting-specific rules that

impose time limits on public comment, so long as those rules are

reasonable. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0300 (2020). Which is exactly

what the Commissioners Court did in this instance. The Court should

therefore reject Appellees’ argument that Hays County violated TOMA

17 Appellees’ position would also seem to present an unworkable dilemma for
governing bodies. According to Appellees, the Hays County Commissioners Court was
required to include an agenda item on the August 13 Notice regarding the adoption
of a formal written rule setting public comment time limits for that very same
meeting. Under TOMA, members of the public would then have the opportunity to
address the Commissioners Court regarding that subject. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §
551.007. But would the Commissioners Court be allowed to impose reasonable time
limits when the public was discussing that topic? According to Appellees, the answer
is no because, absent a formal written order, any time limit violates TOMA. This
demonstrates the absurdity of Appellees’ position.

31
when it limited public comment to three minutes per speaker at the

August 13 Meeting.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

For the foregoing reasons, Hays County respectfully requests that

the Court reverse the District Court’s Final Judgment in full and render

judgment in its favor. Specifically, the County requests that the Court

enter the judicial declarations set forth the “Conclusion and Prayer”

Section on pages 59-61 of its Principal Brief.

32
Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Michael Shaunessy
Michael Shaunessy, Lead Attorney
State Bar No. 18134550
mshaunessy@mcginnislaw.com
Ian Davis
State Bar No. 24120793
idavis@mcginnislaw.com
MCGINNIS LOCHRIDGE LLP
1111 W. 6th Street, Suite 400
Austin, Texas 78703
(512) 495-6000
(512) 495-6093 (fax)

C. Robert Heath
State Bar No. 09347500
bheath@bickerstaff.com
BICKERSTAFF HEATH DELGADO
ACOSTA LLP
1601 S. MoPac Expressway
Suite C400
Austin, Texas 78746
(512) 472-8021

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

33
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that Appellants’ Reply Brief complies with the word

count limit of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(B) and the

typeface requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)

because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than

14-point font and 12-point font for footnotes. Excluding the contents

listed in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1), this Brief contains

7,153 words, as counted by Microsoft 365 apps for enterprise.

/s/ Michael Shaunessy
Michael Shaunessy

34
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on November 13, 2025, a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing pleading was served on all counsel of record by the
Electronic Service Provider if registered, otherwise by email, as follows:

Bill Aleshire Lynn Saarinen, Assistant
bill@aleshirelaw.com Attorney General
ALESHIRELAW, PC Lynn.saarinen@oag.texas.gov
3605 Shady Valley Drive ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
Austin, Texas 78739 FINANCIAL LITIGATION
SECTION, GENERAL LITIGATION
DIVISION
William G. Bunch MC-017
bill@sosalliance.org P.O. Box 12548
Robert Levinski Austin, Texas 78711
bobby@sosalliance.org
SAVE OUR SPRINGS ALLIANCE Attorney for the Attorney
4701 Westgate Blvd, Ste. D-401 General of the State of Texas
Austin, Texas 78745

Attorneys for Appellees

/s/ Michael Shaunessy
Michael Shaunessy

35
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Envelope ID: 108029022
Filing Code Description: Response
Filing Description: Appellants' Reply Brief
Status as of 11/13/2025 4:20 PM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Ian M.Davis idavis@mcginnislaw.com 11/13/2025 3:51:54 PM SENT

Raymond Abarca Raymond.Abarca@oag.texas.gov 11/13/2025 3:51:54 PM SENT

Michael Shaunessy mshaunessy@mcginnislaw.com 11/13/2025 3:51:54 PM SENT

Julie Denny jdenny@mcginnislaw.com 11/13/2025 3:51:54 PM SENT

Amy Botelho abotelho@mcginnislaw.com 11/13/2025 3:51:54 PM SENT

Austin Jones ajones@mcginnislaw.com 11/13/2025 3:51:54 PM SENT

Bill Aleshire bill@aleshirelaw.com 11/13/2025 3:51:54 PM SENT

Bill Bunch bill@sosalliance.org 11/13/2025 3:51:54 PM SENT

Bobby Levinski bobby@sosalliance.org 11/13/2025 3:51:54 PM SENT

William Gammon firm@gammonlawoffice.com 11/13/2025 3:51:54 PM SENT

Lynn Saarinen lynn.saarinen@oag.texas.gov 11/13/2025 3:51:54 PM SENT

Rosemarie Kanusky rkanusky@mphlegal.com 11/13/2025 3:51:54 PM SENT

Matthew PhilipHines mhines@mphlegal.com 11/13/2025 3:51:54 PM SENT