Exxon Mobil Global Services v. State Office of Administrative Hearings, and Keneshia Washington in Her Official Capacity as Administrative Law Judge

ACCEPTED
15-24-00034-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
12/22/2025 5:20 PM
No. 15-24-00034-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTEENTH DISTRICT
AUSTIN, TEXAS
AT AUSTIN, TEXAS 12/22/2025 5:20:06 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk

EXXON MOBIL GLOBAL SERVICES,
Appellant,
v.

STATE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, AND KENESHIA
WASHINGTON IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the
419th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas
Cause No. D-1-GN-23-001403

APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

John Brusniak
State Bar No. 03261500
John@TexasPropertyTaxAttorneys.com

Brusniak Turner PC
P.O. Box 703238
Dallas, Texas 75370
Tel.: (214) 506-1073
Fax: (214) 593-5234

Attorney For Appellant,
Exxon Mobil Global Services
TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING ...................................................... ii
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... ii
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 1
I. The Statute Creates a Jurisdictional Predicate That Must Be
Resolved ............................................................................................... 1
II. Texas Law Requires Courts to Resolve Disputed Jurisdictional
Facts ..................................................................................................... 2
III. Section 41.41 Does Not Supply an Alternative Decisionmaker,
and Administrative Audit Labels Cannot Substitute for a
Jurisdictional Determination ................................................................ 3
IV. Rehearing Is Required to Complete the Statutory Analysis................. 6
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .............................................................................. 7
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................................... 10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 10

i
APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellant Exxon Mobil Global Services (“EMGS”) respectfully moves for

rehearing of this Court’s opinion issued December 5, 2025. Rehearing is warranted

because the Court’s analysis stops short of resolving the jurisdiction-defining issue

presented. When a disputed and dispositive jurisdictional fact determines a tribunal's

authority to act, the opinion addresses administrative limits but does not identify any

tribunal responsible for deciding that fact. This omission leaves a critical procedural

void and frustrates the legislative design of Texas Government Code § 2003.904.

INTRODUCTION

The Court’s opinion rests on the conclusion that the determination of whether

property is “industrial” lies outside SOAH’s limited jurisdiction. Proceeding from

that premise, the district court dismissed the case, and this Court affirmed, without

any tribunal resolving the disputed factual question on which jurisdiction turns.

That unresolved question matters. Government Code § 2003.904 excludes

only “industrial property” from SOAH’s valuation appeal jurisdiction. The statute

does not exclude property an appraisal district merely labels industrial, and it does

not authorize administrative classifications to operate as unreviewable jurisdictional

bars. Yet under the Court’s construction, access to the Legislature’s SOAH remedy

depends on a factual predicate that no court or tribunal is empowered to decide.

ii
Rehearing is warranted to complete the statutory analysis. When

administrative authority is found to be limited, Texas law requires courts to

determine how the jurisdictional predicate is to be resolved—not to leave it

undecided. As explained below, that analysis leads either to a remand for the district

court to resolve the disputed jurisdictional fact, or, given the uncontroverted record,

to resolution of that fact as a matter of law. Only then can the statute operate as the

Legislature designed.

iii
ARGUMENT

I. The Statute Creates a Jurisdictional Predicate That Must Be Resolved

Texas Government Code § 2003.904 grants SOAH jurisdiction over valuation

appeals for property “other than industrial property.” The exclusion turns on a factual

determination—whether the property is “industrial.” That determination is the

jurisdictional predicate for the Legislature’s chosen appeal remedy.

The Court held that SOAH may not decide whether property is used in an

industrial capacity because that determination lies outside SOAH’s limited

jurisdiction, which the Legislature confined to valuation and unequal-appraisal

disputes. The district court reached the same conclusion but likewise did not resolve

the disputed jurisdictional predicate itself, despite being a court of general

jurisdiction. This Court’s opinion stops at the same point.

As a result, the jurisdictional predicate on which authority turns remains

unresolved. By its terms, the statutory exclusion applies only to “industrial

property,” not to property an appraisal district merely labels industrial without

adjudication. Under the Court’s construction, no forum is empowered to determine

whether the statutory exclusion actually applies. The result is a procedural void:

access to a legislatively created remedy depends on a factual condition that no

tribunal is authorized to resolve.

1
That result is incompatible with settled principles of adjudication. As the

United States Supreme Court explained in Crowell v. Benson, jurisdictional facts are

those “whose existence is a condition precedent to the operation of the statutory

scheme.” 285 U.S. 22, 54–55 (1932). Whether this property is “industrial” is such a

jurisdictional predicate. It is not a question about valuation or tax owed. It is the

factual condition on which the Legislature conditioned access to the SOAH appeal

remedy. When such a jurisdictional predicate is genuinely disputed, it must be

resolved by a court authorized to determine jurisdiction.

II. Texas Law Requires Courts to Resolve Disputed Jurisdictional Facts

Whether property is “industrial” for purposes of § 2003.904 is not a merits

determination; it is a jurisdictional fact that determines whether the Legislature’s

chosen forum is available at all. When a plea to the jurisdiction implicates disputed

jurisdictional facts, Texas law requires the trial court to consider the evidence and

resolve the issue. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227–

28 (Tex. 2004); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000).

Texas law supplies the missing step when an administrative tribunal cannot decide a

threshold question that determines whether a statutory remedy is available.

Here, EMGS pleaded that the property was not industrial and supported that

pleading with sworn affidavit evidence. The appraisal district offered no contrary

evidence. The district court did not evaluate this evidence. It dismissed the case

2
based solely on SOAH’s inability to decide the classification issue. This Court

affirmed that approach. In doing so, both courts omitted the mandatory second step

of the jurisdictional analysis: resolving the disputed jurisdictional predicate upon

which authority depends.

Even if SOAH lacks authority to decide the classification question, that

limitation does not relieve the district court of its duty to decide the jurisdictional

predicate itself. The question—whether the property is industrial under §

2003.904—is purely jurisdictional. Its resolution does not expand SOAH’s

authority; it determines whether the Legislature’s grant of jurisdiction applies. A

court of general jurisdiction must resolve that question before dismissing the case.

III. Section 41.41 Does Not Supply an Alternative Decisionmaker, and

Administrative Audit Labels Cannot Substitute for a Jurisdictional

Determination

The opinion suggests that EMGS could have protested the “industrial”

classification under Tex. Tax Code § 41.41(a)(10) or appealed directly to district

court. Respectfully, those alternatives do not resolve the procedural problem

presented here. They rest on a misunderstanding of both the role § 41.41(a)(10) plays

in the Tax Code and the nature of the “industrial” classification at issue.

Section 41.41(a) enumerates merits-based grounds of protest—grounds that

apply to and adversely affect the property owner by altering valuation, appraisal

3
methodology, or tax liability. Subsection (a)(10) fits within that framework. By its

terms, it applies only to an action that “applies to and adversely affects the property

owner.” A value-neutral internal classification that does not affect appraisal

methodology or tax owed does not fall within that category.

The “industrial” designation here is an internal audit code used for

Comptroller reviews of appraisal district operations and school-finance compliance.

Those audits assess whether appraisal districts, in the aggregate, are valuing broad

categories of property close to true market value. The designation does not alter

valuation methodology. Identical property is valued the same way whether it is used

for industrial, commercial, or other purposes. Because the classification has no effect

on taxable value, it is not—and was never intended to be—a protestable action under

Chapter 41.

That conclusion is reinforced by the structure of Chapter 23 itself. Subchapter

A establishes market value under the willing-buyer/willing-seller standard as the

default method for determining a property’s “appraised value.” When the Legislature

intends to depart from that standard, it does so expressly in Subchapter B—by

defining “appraised value” and prescribing alternative valuation methodologies for

specific categories of property, including inventory, agricultural land, and

homesteads. Tex. Tax Code §§ 23.12, 23.41, 23.23. “Industrial” property is

conspicuously absent from that list.

4
Because “industrial” is not one of the property types addressed in Subchapter

B, property used for industrial purposes is valued under Subchapter A unless the

property independently qualifies for a different, expressly defined category subject

to alternative appraisal methods. And in that circumstance, any dispute over whether

the property was properly categorized—and therefore properly valued—would be

raised as a valuation protest under § 41.41(a)(1), which authorizes challenges to

“appraised value,” not merely market value. That provision encompasses valuation

disputes under both Subchapter A and Subchapter B. What it does not do is convert

an undefined, value-neutral administrative label into a jurisdictional exclusion from

SOAH review under the Government Code.

More fundamentally, neither the Tax Code nor Government Code § 2003.904

defines the term “industrial,” and nothing in either statute suggests the Legislature

intended administrative audit classifications to be determinative of SOAH’s

jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the district court treated the appraisal district’s use of the

word “industrial” for audit purposes as if it necessarily satisfied the Legislature’s

jurisdictional exclusion—without examining whether the two were intended to

align. That assumption finds no support in the statutory text.

In the absence of a statutory definition, the question whether property is

“industrial” is a familiar one for courts. It is resolved by applying the term’s ordinary

meaning to the evidence presented. That is a judicial determination, not an

5
administrative label, and it cannot be presumed rather than resolved. Both

alternatives suggested by the opinion still require some tribunal to decide the same

jurisdictional predicate: whether the property qualifies as industrial property for

purposes of § 2003.904.

The opinion does not identify a tribunal authorized to make that

determination. It suggests that a taxpayer must protest the label to an appraisal

review board and if unsuccessful, appeal to district court before learning whether it

is eligible for the SOAH appeal the Legislature created. The statutory scheme

contains no requirement that a taxpayer first litigate classification in district court,

and courts may not impose exhaustion requirements the Legislature did not enact.

IV. Rehearing Is Required to Complete the Statutory Analysis

Nothing in the statute suggests the Legislature intended appraisal districts to

defeat access to SOAH by invoking a label no one is permitted to test, or that courts

of general jurisdiction should stand aside when the threshold question controlling

access to a legislatively created remedy goes unanswered.

Rehearing is warranted because the Court’s opinion stops the analysis too

soon. It identifies the limits of administrative authority but does not complete the

inquiry required once those limits are reached. At minimum, this case should be

remanded to the district court to fulfill its duty under Miranda and Bland: to consider

6
the evidence and resolve whether the property is “industrial” within the meaning of

§ 2003.904.

In the alternative, and in the interest of judicial economy given the

uncontroverted state of the record, this Court may render judgment on the

jurisdictional fact. EMGS presented sworn affidavit evidence that the property—

computers located in a downtown office tower—is not industrial, and HCAD offered

no evidence to the contrary. Because the jurisdictional predicate can be resolved as

a matter of law on this record, this Court should hold that the property is not

industrial for purposes of § 2003.904.

Only then can the statute function as the Legislature designed—with

jurisdictional boundaries determined by evidence and reason, not by unchallenged

administrative notation.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

The Court’s opinion identifies the limits of administrative authority but does

not complete the analysis required once those limits are reached. When the

jurisdictional predicate on which a statutory remedy depends is genuinely disputed,

Texas law requires that predicate to be resolved by a tribunal authorized to determine

jurisdiction. Leaving it undecided causes the Legislature’s remedy to fail by default.

Rehearing is warranted to clarify how the statutory exclusion in Texas

Government Code § 2003.904 is to be applied when its triggering condition is

7
disputed. As explained above, that clarification leads either to a remand directing the

district court to resolve the jurisdictional fact, or—given the uncontroverted

record—to resolution of that fact as a matter of law.

For these reasons, EMGS respectfully requests that this Court grant rehearing,

withdraw its opinion of December 5, 2025, and either: (1) Remand this cause to the

district court with instructions to resolve the disputed jurisdictional fact of whether

the property is “industrial” under Texas Government Code § 2003.904; or (2) In the

alternative, render judgment that the property is not industrial property under §

2003.904 and reverse the district court’s dismissal. EMGS prays for such other and

further relief to which it may be justly entitled.

8
Dated: December 22, 2025. Respectfully submitted,

_____________________________________
John Brusniak

State Bar No. 03261500
Brusniak Turner PC
P.O. Box 703238
Dallas, Texas 75370
Tel.: (214) 506-1073
Fax: (214) 593-5234
John@TexasPropertyTaxAttorneys.com

Attorney for Appellant,
Exxon Mobil Global Services

9
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

As required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I certify that this
brief was produced on a computer using Microsoft Word and contains 1,919 words,
as determined by the computer software's word-count function, excluding the
sections of the document listed in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).

_____________________________________
John Brusniak

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing has
been electronically served upon the following attorneys of record in compliance with
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 21 and 21a and Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.5(b)(1) on December 22, 2025.

Karen L. Watkins
Karen.Watkins@oag.texas.gov
Rosalind L. Hunt
Rosalind.Hunt@oag.texas.gov
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Administrative Law Division
P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Attorneys for Appellees

Caroline Tom
ctom@olsonllp.com
Olson & Olson, LLP
Wortham Tower, Suite 600
2727 Allen Parkway
Houston, Texas 77019
Attorney for Real Party in Interest

_____________________________________
John Brusniak

10
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Lauren Brusniak on behalf of John Brusniak
Bar No. 3261500
Lauren@TexasPropertyTaxAttorneys.com
Envelope ID: 109388392
Filing Code Description: Motion for Rehearing
Filing Description: Appellant's Motion for Rehearing
Status as of 12/23/2025 7:18 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Rosalind Hunt rosalind.hunt@oag.texas.gov 12/22/2025 5:20:06 PM SENT

Jeff Lutz jeff.lutz@oag.texas.gov 12/22/2025 5:20:06 PM SENT

Karen Watkins karen.watkins@oag.texas.gov 12/22/2025 5:20:06 PM SENT

Jennifer Foster Jennifer.Foster@oag.texas.gov 12/22/2025 5:20:06 PM SENT

John Brusniak john@texaspropertytaxattorneys.com 12/22/2025 5:20:06 PM SENT

Tracy Turner tracy@texaspropertytaxattorneys.com 12/22/2025 5:20:06 PM SENT

Lauren Brusniak lauren@texaspropertytaxattorneys.com 12/22/2025 5:20:06 PM SENT

Kendal Carnley kendal@texaspropertytaxattorneys.com 12/22/2025 5:20:06 PM SENT

Caroline Tom ctom@olsonllp.com 12/22/2025 5:20:06 PM SENT