In Re Fort Bend County v. the State of Texas

Petition for Writ of Mandamus Conditionally granted and Opinion filed
February 24, 2026.

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-25-00102-CV

IN RE FORT BEND COUNTY

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
Harris County, Texas

and

NO. 15-25-00061-CV

FRANCESCA OKONKWO, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, DIVISION OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATOIN, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND FORT BEND
COUNTY, Appellants

V.
JOSHUA DAVID HEILIGER, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
THE ESTATE OF LAUREN BRITTANE SMITH, DECEASED, AND ON
BEHALF OF DEATH BENEFITS BENEFICIARIES JOSHUA DAVID
HEILIGER AND EMMA DESTINY HEILIGER, Appellees

On Appeal from the 11th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2024-78536

OPINION

This case presents the jurisdictional question of whether a district court may
intervene and enjoin an Administrative Law Judge’s issuance of a discovery
subpoena in a contested case about compensability under the workers’
compensation statutory scheme. We hold that because the parties did not follow
the procedural steps the Legislature requires for the district court’s involvement in
such a question, the district court impermissibly encroached on the agency’s
exclusive jurisdiction. We therefore conditionally grant mandamus relief, render
judgment dismissing the underlying suit in district court for lack of jurisdiction,
and dismiss the related interlocutory appeal of the district court’s temporary
injunction order as moot.

BACKGROUND
This workers’ compensation dispute began before the Texas Department of
Insurance-Division of Workers’ Compensation (Division). Real Party in Interest
Joshua Heiliger filed with the agency on his behalf as surviving spouse of his wife,
Lauren, and on behalf of their daughter, Emma, seeking workers’ compensation
death benefits. Lauren worked as a paramedic for Fort Bend County EMS. After
Lauren died while at home, Heiliger filed for benefits contending that Lauren died
in the course and scope of her employment because stress from working a 48-hour
shift was a factor in her death. Fort Bend County disputes compensability.
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Heiliger initiated a contested case proceeding at the Division. During the
course of this proceeding, Fort Bend County sought a subpoena for Lauren’s
mental health records from Dr. John Marcellus, the doctor who prescribed
Lauren’s ADHD medication. Fort Bend County argued that these records were
relevant and material because Dr. Marcellus might have taken into account
Lauren’s hypertension along with her complaints about stress. Administrative Law
Judge Francesca Okonkwo (ALJ) overruled Heiliger’s objections to the subpoena
and ordered it on September 19, 2024.
Heiliger then filed suit seeking a temporary restraining order against
issuance of the subpoena in district court on November 12, 2024, only three days
before the scheduled contested case hearing before the ALJ. The district court
granted the requested TRO. The district court later, on December 5, began a
hearing on Heiliger’s request for a temporary injunction. After Fort Bend County
filed a plea to the jurisdiction, the parties entered a Rule 11 agreement, and the
hearing was postponed. Fort Bend County then submitted a deposition on written
questions to Dr. Marcellus, but Heiliger and Fort Bend County could reach no
agreement on Heiliger’s objections to it.
On December 27, 2024, Fort Bend County filed a motion with the ALJ to
correct procedural defects of its deposition subpoena of Dr. Marcellus, to which
Heiliger objected. Fort Bend County then amended its request for a deposition
subpoena on January 24, 2025 (and withdrew its previous subpoena request),
which the ALJ granted on January 27.1 Fort Bend County served Dr. Marcellus
with the subpoena on February 10, 2025. That same day, Heiliger filed a second
request for TRO and a request to continue the hearing on his temporary injunction

1
Heiliger contends he objected to this amended request; Fort Bend County claims he did
not. Whether he did is of no import to our analysis and can be determined by the ALJ on
remand.

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request that was previously paused. Fort Bend County re-urged its plea to the
jurisdiction, and ALJ Okonkwo also filed a plea to the jurisdiction.
The district court ultimately granted the TRO and later the temporary
injunction, denied Fort Bend County’s plea to the jurisdiction, and denied in part
and granted in part ALJ Okonkwo’s plea to the jurisdiction. It also set the matter
for a trial on the merits on December 1, 2025. Both Fort Bend and ALJ Okonkwo
filed interlocutory appeals of the trial court’s temporary injunction order. Fort
Bend County also contemporaneously filed a petition for writ of mandamus
seeking relief from the order denying its plea to the jurisdiction. 2 At the joint
request by the parties, this Court stayed all proceedings in the trial court and the
administrative contested hearing until it could decide this mandamus proceeding
and the related interlocutory appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mandamus relief is appropriate if a trial court clearly abuses its discretion
and the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 712 S.W.3d 53, 58–59 (Tex. 2025) (orig. proceeding). A relator need not
show it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal, however, when the order it complains
of is void because the district court lacked jurisdiction. In re Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

ANALYSIS

We first address whether the trial court has jurisdiction over Heiliger’s suit
and conclude it does not. “The Division of Workers’ Compensation administers
the [workers’ compensation] system and has exclusive jurisdiction to determine
2
We consolidate the petition for writ of mandamus and the appeal for purposes of
efficiency.

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compensation entitlement and to award any benefits.” University of Tex. Rio
Grande Valley v. Oteka, 715 S.W.3d 734, 736 (Tex. 2025). This exclusive
jurisdiction and the procedures the Legislature mandated for a contested case
hearing before the Division apply, unless the Legislature provides an exception. In
a contested case hearing for workers’ compensation, the Legislature conferred on
an ALJ the authority to decide discovery disputes and evidentiary issues, including
the power to issue subpoenas for mental health records. Tex. Labor Code §
410.165; see also Tex. Health & Safety Code § 611.006(a)(11) (establishing
authorized disclosure of mental health records in judicial or administrative
proceeding where court or agency issued subpoena); 28 Tex. Admin Code § 142.2
(authorizing ALJ to issue subpoenas, rule on admissibility, and determine weight
and credibility of evidence). The party resisting issuance of the subpoena may
object, and the party that is the target of the subpoena may choose not to comply.
If that happens, then an exception to the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction may be
invoked to aid in compelling compliance with a subpoena issued by the ALJ. Tex.
Gov’t Code § 2001.201(a); 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 142.1 (mandating that Section
2001.201 of the Texas Government Code is the only provision of the
Administrative Procedure Act that applies to contested case concerning workers’
compensation compensability).
Either the ALJ or the party requesting the subpoena may seek an order
compelling compliance with the subpoena from a state district court. Tex. Gov’t
Code § 2001.201(a). They may do so either in the county where the proceedings
are pending or in Travis County. Id. And if such relief is sought, review by a
district court is limited solely to whether compliance with the subpoena is required
and whether a person should be held in contempt for failure to comply with its
order. Id. § 2001.201(b).
Conspicuously absent from the remedies the Legislature provided is the
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ability for the objecting party to seek relief from the subpoena in district court.
Instead, the Legislature provides that the objecting party may include its complaint
about the subpoena in its administrative appeal after the contested case hearing
concludes and in its later suit for judicial review, should it choose to file one. Tex.
Labor Code § 410.251 (requiring party to exhaust administrative remedies,
including appeals panel, before seeking judicial review).
In mandating this procedure for invoking a limited exception to the
Division’s exclusive jurisdiction, the Legislature made a policy decision that
neither this Court nor the district court should disturb. In essence, the Legislature
created a limited exception to the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction to aid in the
enforcement of subpoenas. If a party to a contested case before an ALJ objects to a
subpoena or the party subject to the subpoena fails to comply, then the ALJ or the
party requesting the subpoena may ask a district court to review the discovery issue
and potentially compel compliance. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.201(a). And, the
party seeking to compel production has the choice of filing the suit to compel
compliance either in Travis County or the county where the administrative
proceeding is being held. Id. In this case, that means if Heiliger objected to the
amended subpoena or the subpoenaed party did not comply, then the ALJ or Fort
Bend County—not Heiliger—would have the option to seek an order compelling
compliance from a district court in Travis County or Harris County. Instead,
Heiliger took matters into his own hands and filed a suit in Harris County to enjoin
the subpoena instead of waiting for the administrative process to play out.
Heiliger contends that the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Oteka
somehow undermines the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of
compensability and gave him the authority to seek a parallel judicial proceeding to
weigh in on the ALJ’s discovery decision. We disagree.
Oteka involved an unusual fact pattern, and the supreme court’s holding
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was expressly limited to the procedural posture of that case. Oteka filed suit in
district court for injuries and did not claim in any way that her injuries were work-
related. Oteka, 715 S.W.3d at 736. The University’s claim administrator initially
agreed, only to change course three years after Oteka’s injury and well after she
filed suit. Id. at 737–38. The University raised, as an affirmative defense, that
Oteka’s injury was in the course and scope of her employment with the University.
Id. at 737. Upon raising this affirmative defense, the University also claimed that
the Workers’ Compensation Division of the Texas Department of Insurance had
exclusive jurisdiction over Oteka’s claims, divesting the district court of
jurisdiction. Id. at 738.
The supreme court disagreed, while noting that the exclusive-remedy
provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act is “essential to the Act’s continued
success.” Id. at 744–45 (quoting Mo-Vac Serv. Co. v. Escobedo, 603 S.W.3d 119,
125 (Tex. 2020)). The court concluded that the Division does not have exclusive
jurisdiction when “(1) the employer raises the issue as an affirmative defense
outside the compensability context and (2) the employee’s requested relief does not
depend on any entitlement to benefits.” Id. at 744.
The procedural posture of this case is different than Oteka. Oteka filed her
suit to recover for injuries in district court and never contended that the issue of
compensability should be before the Division. Heiliger, conversely, filed his claim
with the Division, seeking a finding that he and his daughter are entitled to
workers’ compensation benefits because his wife died as a result of her work, a
contention her employer contests. Under Oteka, this is precisely the type of claim
over which the Division maintains exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 736. Heiliger has
submitted his claim to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Division, and there is no
parallel proceeding concerning his claim for benefits. Once the Division’s
exclusive jurisdiction has been invoked, as it was here, certain procedural
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requirements and safeguards are in place and must be followed. As the court in
Oteka noted, allowing simultaneous proceedings in this context “would inject
needless uncertainty and confusion due to the potential for conflicting rulings,
unfairly burden the parties with the complexity and expense of dual-track
litigation, and waste judicial and administrative-agency resources.” Id. at 746.
Instead of exhausting his administrative remedies through the administrative
proceeding that he initiated, Heiliger sought to create his own remedy over the
discovery dispute—a separate suit asking a district court to intervene in the
administrative process and quash a subpoena issued by the ALJ—without
legislative authority for that action. In doing so, Heiliger failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, and, in accepting jurisdiction in the discovery dispute, the
district court impermissibly encroached on the agency’s exclusive jurisdiction.
Tex. Labor Code § 410.251 (requiring party to exhaust administrative remedies,
including appeals panel, before seeking judicial review); see also In re Entergy
Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (“In short, if the PUC
has exclusive jurisdiction in this dispute, the judicial appropriation of state agency
authority would be a clear disruption of the orderly processes of government.”)
(citation modified). Because the district court had no jurisdiction to do so, its
orders are void, and the case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Heiliger nevertheless challenges this Court’s jurisdiction to review Fort
Bend County’s mandamus petition because he claims Fort Bend County could
have filed an interlocutory appeal of the jurisdictional issue presented under
Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See In re
Southwestern Bell, 35 S.W.3d at 605 (concluding that mandamus is inappropriate
when there is an adequate remedy by appeal). Fort Bend County, on the other
hand, contends that it had no ability to file an interlocutory appeal on the
jurisdictional issue because it waived its immunity for purposes of Heiliger’s
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compensation claim. Regardless of who is correct, Fort Bend County does not
have to show it has no adequate remedy by appeal because the trial court lacked
jurisdiction. Id.

Subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including on a court’s
own motion, and cannot be waived. See Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88,
95 (Tex. 2012) (holding that appellate court could consider issue of immunity,
which implicates subject-matter jurisdiction, for first time on appeal); Texas Ass’n
of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993) (holding
that because “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is never presumed and cannot be
waived,” issue of standing could be raised for first time on appeal). Because it had
no jurisdiction over Heiliger’s suit challenging the ALJ’s subpoena, the district
court’s orders in this case are void. A relator in a mandamus proceeding need not
show it does not have an adequate remedy by appeal when the complained-of order
is void. In re Southwestern Bell, 35 S.W.3d at 605.

Here, Fort Bend County noted this jurisdictional issue in its interlocutory
appeal but then informed the Court that it would file a petition for writ of
mandamus because it believed it was unable to raise the issue in its interlocutory
appeal of the district court’s temporary injunction under Section 51.014 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Whether Fort Bend County’s position is
correct, it raised the argument, and, regardless, this Court has the power to address
the issue both in the interlocutory appeal and in the mandamus proceeding. Id.; see
also State Bar of Tex. v. Jefferson, 942 S.W.2d 575, 575–76 (Tex. 1997) (granting
mandamus relief after concluding that trial court was without jurisdiction to issue
temporary restraining order staying administrative grievance proceeding).

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CONCLUSION
We conditionally grant mandamus relief and render judgment dismissing
Heiliger’s suit against Fort Bend County and Okonkwo, Cause No. 2024-78536,
pending in the 11th District Court of Harris County. We also dismiss as moot
Cause No. 15-25-00061-CV pending in this Court, in which the ALJ and Fort Bend
County challenge the district court’s temporary injunction order, which is void as a
result of this opinion.

/s/Scott K. Field
Scott K. Field
Justice

Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.

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