Riynaldo Gray v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-24-00320-CR
___________________________

RIYNALDO GRAY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 485th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1836099

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Bassel, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Appellant Riynaldo Gray challenges his conviction for arson. Appellant was

indicted for two counts of arson: Count One charged arson of a habitation, and

Count Two charged arson of a vehicle. A jury convicted Appellant of both counts

and also found the deadly weapon allegations to be true. On the first count, the jury

assessed Appellant’s punishment at fifty years’ confinement in the Texas Department

of Criminal Justice and a $10,000 fine. On the second count, the jury assessed

Appellant’s punishment at fifteen years’ confinement in the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice and a $5,000 fine. The trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance

with the jury’s verdicts.

The indictments 1 alleged that Appellant had committed the acts of arson with

alternative allegations of “knowing [the property] was within the limits of an

incorporated city or town[] or was located on property belonging to another.”

[Emphasis added.] In a single issue on appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence is

legally insufficient to establish either of these alternative allegations, including that the

City of Fort Worth is an incorporated city. Both the evidence offered at trial and

facts of which we may take judicial notice provide sufficient proof of the alternative

elements. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Although they were reindictments from prior cases, we use the term
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“indictments” for the sake of simplicity.

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II. Factual and Procedural Background

The complainant and Appellant met through a dating app. Their relationship

evolved, but the complainant eventually decided that she did not want to be

romantically involved with Appellant. Not relenting in his pursuit, Appellant took the

complainant shopping, paid her bills, and tried to give her money. The complainant

also started receiving random deliveries of food and gifts. The complainant again

tried to end her relationship with Appellant, but he continued to text and call her.

Appellant’s conduct then turned aggressive. Appellant threatened legal action

against the complainant for return of gifts that he had given her, and the complainant

received what purported to be a demand letter from a lawyer to return the items.

Appellant demanded that the complainant execute a promissory note to stop him

from moving forward with legal proceedings.

Over several months, the complainant’s property was repeatedly damaged, and

she began receiving troubling visits:

• Her car was vandalized three times.

• A person who identified himself as “Uncle Charles” visited the
complainant to retrieve the items that Appellant had given her, and
within minutes, the complainant received a text demanding that she
return additional items to the “uncle.”

• On the day of Appellant’s demand that the complainant return items to
the uncle, a fire was set at the door to the complainant’s apartment.
Appellant repeatedly called the Fort Worth Fire Department and insisted
that he be given a copy of an arson report for the fire.

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• A month after the apartment-door fire, someone broke out the window
of the complainant’s car and set its interior alight. Within hours of this
fire, the complainant’s brother received a text that he believed had come
from Appellant; the text stated, “Put some water on it[.]”

Fort Worth Fire Department arson investigators began examining the

occurrences. The investigation’s results were as follows:

• Appellant had documents in his possession that included the
complainant’s identifying information.

• A person named Michael was identified through a search of Appellant’s
phone and interviewed by investigators. That interview revealed the
following:

o The “Uncle Charles” dispatched to the complainant’s apartment
to pick up items was Michael.

o Appellant arranged transportation for Michael to the
complainant’s apartment so that he could use materials provided
by Appellant to set the door of her apartment on fire.

o Appellant later paid Michael to drive to the complainant’s
apartment, find her car, and place burning material in it. Michael
searched for the car and found a car with a license-plate number
that matched the one that Appellant had given him. Michael
called Appellant to verify the license-plate number and that
Appellant wanted the car burned, and Appellant affirmed that he
did. Michael then broke out one of the car’s windows and tossed
burning material in it. Appellant later told Michael that he had
dispatched another person to confirm that the car had been
burned.

• Shortly after the fire at the complainant’s apartment door, Appellant
conducted internet searches about apartment fires in Fort Worth.
Appellant later made similar searches. Appellant also searched for
information on how to set a car on fire, and after the complainant’s car
had been burned, he searched online for car fires and arson reports.

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Such was the record upon which the jury could rely to convict Appellant of the

two counts of arson.

III. Analysis

A. Standard of review

In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found

the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017).

This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to resolve

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences

from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789;

Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021). We may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute

our judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine

whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the evidence’s cumulative

force when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Braughton v. State, 569

S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a

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‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the

evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences

in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at

608.

To determine whether the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt, we compare the crime’s elements as defined by a

hypothetically correct jury charge to the evidence adduced at trial. Hammack v. State,

622 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see also Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568,

572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“The essential elements of an offense are determined by

state law.”). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or restrict the

State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which

the defendant was tried. Hammack, 622 S.W.3d at 914. The law as authorized by the

indictment means the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging

instrument’s allegations. Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021);

see Rabb v. State, 434 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“When the State pleads

a specific element of a penal offense that has statutory alternatives for that element,

the sufficiency of the evidence will be measured by the element that was actually

pleaded, and not any alternative statutory elements.”).

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B. We set forth the elements of arson.

The Penal Code defines the offense of arson as follows: a person commits an

offense when he “starts a fire, regardless of whether the fire continues after ignition,

or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage . . . any building, habitation,

or vehicle” and that person has certain alternatively described states of knowledge

about the property. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.02(a)(2). Two of the alternative states

of knowledge are “knowing that it is within the limits of an incorporated city or town”

and “knowing that it is located on property belonging to another.” Id.

§ 28.02(a)(2)(A), (D).

C. We overrule Appellant’s contention that the evidence is insufficient
to show that the City of Fort Worth is an incorporated city or town.

At the outset of his argument, Appellant contends that the evidence is

insufficient to prove that Fort Worth is an incorporated city or town. Whatever

deficiency there was at trial may be bridged by facts of which we may take judicial

notice.

On the question of whether Fort Worth is an incorporated city or town, the

record contains the following question and answer directed to a detective who was

assigned to the Fort Worth Fire Department arson and bomb squad:

Q. Okay. And is Fort Worth an incorporated city or town in the state
of Texas?

A. Yes, it is.

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Appellant claims that this evidence “is conclusory and should be considered no

evidence at all.” As we interpret it, Appellant’s argument is that the answer leaves a

gap in proof because it does not establish that Fort Worth was incorporated at the

time of the offense. We express no opinion on the question of whether an answer to

a question of such common knowledge is so conclusory that it has no evidentiary

value. Instead, we have two avenues to take judicial notice of the fact of Fort Worth’s

incorporation.

First, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the omission of an allegation

from an indictment—that arson was committed in an incorporated city or town—is

not a fatal deficiency in an indictment because the appellate court may take judicial

notice of that fact. Gonzales v. State, 723 S.W.2d 746, 750–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)

(“It would thus appear that courts of appeals may indeed take judicial notice of

incorporation, at least in the case of those towns or cities [that] have been

incorporated by special act of the [Texas] Legislature[] or under Art. XI, Sec. 5 [of the

Texas Constitution].”

As the State points out,

The [C]ity of Fort Worth was incorporated in 1873 by a special act of
the Texas Legislature. Act of February 17, 1873, 13th Leg., R.S., ch. 7,
art. 1[,] § 1, 1873 Tex. Spec. Laws 64, reprinted in 7 H.P.N. Gammel, The
Laws of Texas 1822–1897, at 747 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898). Per
the [A]ct, this [c]ourt shall take judicial notice that the [C]ity of Fort
Worth was incorporated in 1873. Id. at Misc. Prov. § 7, Gammel, at 764
(“This [A]ct shall have the force and effect of a public act, and all the
courts of the State shall take judicial notice of the same, and it may be

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used in all courts and places without being specially plead[ed] and
without proof.”).

We may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact when it is “not subject to

reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Tex. R. Evid. 201. Thus,

Rule 201 allows us to judicially notice the incorporation of the City of Fort Worth.

The alternative means available to establish the simple fact of Fort Worth’s

incorporation is discussed in Hadley v. State, Nos. 02-23-00317-CR, 02-23-00318-CR,

2024 WL 5083195, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 12, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication). In Hadley, the question was whether there was an

absence of proof that a peace officer was employed by an incorporated city—the City

of Aubrey. Id. The appellant argued that we could not rely on Rule 201 to take

judicial notice of the fact of incorporation because “the jury did not receive an

instruction under Rule 201(f) ‘that it may or may not accept the noticed fact as

conclusive.’ See Tex. R. Evid. 201(f).” Id. at *5. We concluded that we had an

alternative means of judicially noticing the city’s incorporation:

Rather than address the parties’ specific disagreement about Rule 201,
we resolve this issue through Rule 204(b)(1), which enables us to take
judicial notice of Texas municipal ordinances. See Tex. R. Evid. 201,
204(b)(1), 204(d) (“The court—not the jury—must determine municipal
and county ordinances.”). Accordingly, we judicially notice Aubrey’s
Ordinance 767-22, adopting its Home Rule Charter, which recognizes
and declares that Aubrey is an incorporated city. City of Aubrey, Tex.,
Ordinance 767-22 (Nov. 16, 2022); see Tex. R. Evid. 204(d) (“The court’s
determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.”); see also
Farahnak v. City of Southlake Bd. of Adjustment, No. 02-21-00202-CV, 2022

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WL 405899, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 10, 2022, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (taking judicial notice of City of Southlake ordinance
accessed on the city’s webpage); Gette v. State, 209 S.W.3d 139, 143–44
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (taking judicial notice on
appeal of city ordinance).

Id. (footnote omitted).

The City of Fort Worth’s ordinances are available on the following website:

https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/ftworth/latest/ftworth tx/0-0-0-8 (last

visited Aug. 5, 2025). The chapters in Part I are listed, followed by an italicized

editor’s note:

Part I contains the Charter of the City of Fort Worth, adopted by the
electorate at an election held December 11, 1924, and including all
amendments thereto to November 8, 1983. Amendments subsequent to
November 8, 1983, are indicated in the history note following the
particular section of the Charter affected.

Prior to November 8, 1983, the Charter had been amended on the
following dates: February 14, 1928 (Ord. 1377); July 21, 1931 (Ord.
1720); December 18, 1946 (Ord. 2379); January 31, 1964 (Ord. 5091);
April 8, 1975; January 26, 1976 (Ord. 7292 and 7293); April 4, 1981.
Material in brackets [ ] has been added where necessary to correct
obvious errors or to facilitate indexing, except that obviously misspelled
words have been corrected without notation.

See id. (italics removed). Part I, Chapter I, Section 1 is entitled “Creation of

Municipality” and states the following:

All persons, inhabitants of the City of Fort Worth, Tarrant County,
Texas, according to the boundaries and limits of said city as hereinafter set out,
and as the same may hereafter be extended by virtue of the provisions of
this Charter, or by virtue of the laws of the State of Texas applicable to
such matters, now or hereafter to be enacted by the legislature of the
State of Texas, be and they are hereby created and organized as a
municipal corporation and body politic, and as such subdivision of the

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State of Texas are incorporated and shall hereafter be known and designated as the
City of Fort Worth, with such powers, rights, authority, duties, privileges
and obligations as are hereinafter set out and prescribed.

See id. (emphasis added); see also Fort Worth, Tex., Ordinance 25328-02-2022, § 2, 2-8-

2022 (May 7, 2022) (stating, “WHEREAS, the Fort Worth City Charter was adopted

by election in 1924, creating the first home rule charter and the City Council/City

Manager form of government for the City of Fort Worth”). Thus, as in Hadley, we

take judicial notice of the ordinances referencing the incorporation of the City of Fort

Worth.

D. We overrule Appellant’s contention that the evidence is insufficient
to show that he knew that the complainant’s habitation or vehicle
was located “within the limits” of the incorporated City of Fort
Worth.

Appellant next argument within his sole issue is cursory at best: “[A]t trial,

there was no evidence that [Appellant] knew that either the apartment/habitation or

vehicle was within the limits of an incorporated city or town.” Rather, “the testimony

showed that [Appellant] had only ever been to [the complainant’s] apartment one

time.”

In response, the State marshals the evidence revealing that Appellant indeed

knew that the complainant’s property was in Fort Worth, including evidence that he

dispatched his instrument to commit arson on that property. We use bullet points to

list this evidence:

• Numerous witnesses, including the complainant, testified that her
apartment was in Fort Worth.

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• Appellant appears to have arranged for the delivery of items to the
complainant’s apartment.

• Appellant visited the complainant’s apartment on one occasion and
indicated on another that he planned to visit her to retrieve items that he
had given her.

• A document that was found in Appellant’s room contained the
complainant’s address.

• Appellant dispatched Michael to the complainant’s apartment on several
occasions to demand the return of the items that Appellant had given
her, to set the door of her apartment on fire, and to set her vehicle on
fire. Appellant arranged for Michael’s transport by Uber to the
complainant’s address. Before Michael placed burning materials in the
complainant’s car, he called Appellant to confirm the license-plate
number of the vehicle that he had found at the complainant’s apartment
complex and also to confirm that Appellant wanted him to go forward
with the arson of the vehicle. Appellant had a second person confirm
that the act of arson on the complainant’s vehicle had occurred.

• Appellant conducted numerous internet searches relating to arson and
reports of fires; the searches occurred during the times that the
complainant’s property was subjected to arson. Several of these online
searches were for arson reports and for fires that had occurred in Fort
Worth.

These facts create an inference that Appellant knew where the complainant

lived and kept her vehicle, that he had used this information to dispatch his

instrument to carry out acts of arson, that he had investigated the result by

dispatching another instrument to the location where the complainant lived, and that

he then searched online specifically for information from Fort Worth about the

results of his handiwork.

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In arson cases, we determine whether a defendant knew the property upon

which he committed arson was located within the limits of a particular city or town by

asking if knowledge “can be shown by independent facts and circumstances indicative

of such knowledge.” Hurts v. State, Nos. 01-16-00254-CR, 01-16-00255-CR, 2017 WL

2812498, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 29, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (quoting Mouton v. State, 627 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no pet.)). The evidence listed above is indicative of

Appellant’s knowledge that the complainant’s property upon which he orchestrated

acts of arson was located in Fort Worth.

We overrule Appellant’s first subissue.

E. We overrule Appellant’s contention that the evidence fails to show
that he committed arson “knowing that it is located on property
belonging to another.”

By overruling Appellant’s first subissue, we have concluded that the evidence is

sufficient to support his conviction. For the sake of completeness, we will address his

second subissue that challenges whether the evidence is sufficient to conclude that he

committed arson of a habitation and a vehicle “knowing that [they were] located on

property belonging to another.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.02(a)(2)(D). Applying

the proper standard of review to the question and examining the evidence contained

in the record, we conclude that Appellant’s second subissue fails.

The full extent of Appellant’s argument is as follows:

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The evidence is also insufficient to support any finding that the
apartment of [the complainant] or [the complainant’s] vehicle were
located on the property of another or that [Appellant] knew that they
were on the property of another. The evidence does not establish that
the Terrace Apartments or the surrounding area belonged to [the
complainant]. There is no evidence in the record as to who owned the
Terrace Apartments. Further, as far as the vehicle on November 25,
2020, the record reflects that it was parked near the leasing office.
Nothing in the record indicates if this location was part of the property
of the Terrace Apartments or who the owner of this property was. It is
immaterial that [the complainant] owned the vehicle as the relevant
determination is who owned the property that the habitation and vehicle
were on and whether [Appellant] knew the property was owned by
another. In Boykin[ v. State], the Twelfth Court of Appeals overruled a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence because evidence in the
record showed that the home was owned by another and Boykin knew
this. [No. 12-16-00003-CR, 2017 WL 2265686, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).] This
record simply does not contain any such evidence. Thus, the absence of
any such evidence renders the evidence at trial insufficient to support the
convictions in counts one and two of the reindictment. [Footnotes
omitted.]

Appellant’s argument is a study in misdirection. Its premise is that Appellant

must have had knowledge of who owned the underlying fee of the property where the

complainant’s habitation and vehicle were located. Not so. The question turns not

on title but on who has the superior right to possession of the property. As the San

Antonio Court of Appeals has explained,

In an arson prosecution, “[t]he allegation of ownership is merely to
indicate and identify the subject of the crime, and the title to the
property is not in issue.” Banks v. State, . . . 157 S.W.2d 360, 361 ([Tex.
Crim. App.] 1941). It “is permissible to charge ownership in the person
who was in actual possession and control thereof.” Id. Accordingly, the
Texas Penal Code does not restrict the definition of “owner” to title
holders; instead, an “owner” for purposes of the Penal Code “means a
person who[] (A) has title to the property, possession of the property,

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whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property
than the actor; or (B) is a holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument.” Tex. Penal Code [Ann.] § 1.07(a)(35). “Possession,” in
turn, “means actual care, custody, control, or management.” Id.
§ 1.07(a)(39). Thus, under the Texas Penal Code, the definition of
owner is “expansive” and “give[s] ownership status to anyone with a
rational connection to the property.” Garza v. State, 344 S.W.3d 409, 413
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also Ex parte Davis, 542 S.W.2d 192, 196 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1976) (“The Legislature [has] recognized the concept that
there are many types of possessory interests in property besides
ownership in title.”).

Because of the Penal Code’s expansive definition, in arson
prosecutions, a deed need not necessarily be admitted in evidence for
there to be sufficient evidence of ownership. See Tinker v. State, . . . 179
S.W. 572[, 573] ([Tex. Crim. App.] 1915) (explaining that possession of
property was sufficient to show ownership in arson prosecution and
evidence of a deed was not necessary). Ownership may be proven
through other means, including evidence of (1) possession through care,
custody, or management, or (2) a right to possession superior to that of
the defendant. See Eaton v. State, 533 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976) (explaining that the State may prove ownership under the arson
statute by presenting evidence of title[,] possession[,] or a right to
possession superior to that of the defendant).

Lopez v. State, No. 04-22-00545-CR, 2023 WL 8103176, at *2 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio Nov. 22, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Applying the principles of Lopez, it was not the State’s burden to establish who

held title to the apartment complex where the complainant resided. It was necessary

to show only that the complainant had the right to possess her apartment or held a

rational connection to it. The complainant occupied an apartment in a gated

apartment complex and had occupied it for eight years. The complainant felt that she

was safe when she occupied the apartment because it had a double lock on a steel

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door. Appellant had knowledge of the complainant’s possession of the property

because he had visited her there. Further, as we have already outlined, Appellant

directed his actions toward the property that the complainant occupied by sending

deliveries to her apartment and further directed his acts of arson to that property—

why else would he do so unless he knew that she occupied it?

With respect to the complainant’s vehicle, the same principle applies.

Appellant committed arson against the vehicle because of the complainant’s

connection to it. The complainant possessed the car; she testified that she loved the

vehicle, that she had filed a police report when it was damaged, and that she had

attempted to take care of it. Indeed, Appellant knew of the complainant’s rights in

the vehicle because he had made a payment on the outstanding note. Nothing in the

record indicates that Appellant ever claimed that he was entitled to possession of the

vehicle. Applying the test that an owner “has title to the property, possession of the

property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than

the actor,” the evidence supports the conclusion that the complainant had that greater

right. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35). It was not the State’s burden to

establish—as Appellant suggests—who held title to the ground upon which the

vehicle was parked when he directed and orchestrated the act of arson against it. The

evidence required proof that Appellant targeted property in which he knew the

complainant held a superior right to possession; in this regard, the evidence is

sufficient.

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We overrule Appellant’s second subissue.

IV. Conclusion

Having overruled both subissues raised in Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Dabney Bassel

Dabney Bassel
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 21, 2025

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