Christian Walter Rewoldt v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-25-00033-CR
No. 02-25-00034-CR
___________________________

CHRISTIAN WALTER REWOLDT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 371st District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 1795082, 1812979

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Bassel, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Christian Walter Rewoldt appeals his convictions for possession of

child pornography and tampering with physical evidence. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§§ 37.09(c), 43.26(d). In his sole issue, Rewoldt argues that the trial court erred by

denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to what he claims was an

illegal search warrant based on an affidavit that failed to establish probable cause.

Because we conclude that the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that

probable cause existed, we affirm.

I. Background

Rewoldt was suspected of possessing child pornography after the Mansfield

Police Department received a cyber tip that Google accounts and an IP address

associated with Rewoldt had been used to view, upload, and store files containing

child pornography. Detective Sheldon Peacock investigated the cyber tip and,

believing that Rewoldt was in possession of child pornography, prepared a search-

warrant affidavit requesting to search Rewoldt’s residence. The affidavit provided the

details of the cyber tip, described Detective Peacock’s investigation of the cyber tip,

and explained how Rewoldt had been identified as the suspect. Detective Peacock

averred that, based on his investigation, he “ha[d] probable cause to believe

that . . . Rewoldt or other persons unknown at the [residence] are in possession of

child pornography and have engaged in the distribution (promotion) of child

pornography.”

2
A magistrate determined that probable cause existed and issued a search

warrant for Rewoldt’s residence. When officers arrived at Rewoldt’s residence to

execute the search warrant, they found him deleting files from his computer. The

officers were able to stop Rewoldt and then seized the computer and other electronic

devices found inside the residence that ultimately contained child pornography.

Rewoldt was arrested and charged with five counts of possession of child

pornography and one count of tampering with physical evidence.

Before trial, Rewoldt filed a “Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained by Illegal

Search Warrant,” seeking to suppress all evidence found during the search of his

residence. He argued that the search was invalid and without probable cause because

the search-warrant affidavit had concluded without evidence that child pornography

could be found in the residence, that he was “in charge of and controlled” the

residence, and that he was in possession of child pornography at the residence. He

asserted that Detective Peacock had failed to link Rewoldt’s IP address to the

residence or to explain how he had identified the residence as Rewoldt’s physical

address. After hearing Rewoldt’s motion to suppress, the trial court denied it and set

the case for trial.

Rewoldt entered an open plea of guilty to each count. The trial court accepted

his guilty pleas and sentenced him to seven years on each of the five counts of

possession of child pornography with the sentences to run consecutively. On the

tampering count, the trial court sentenced Rewoldt to seven years with the sentence to

3
run concurrently with the possession-of-child-pornography sentences. This appeal

followed.

II. Discussion

Rewoldt argues that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence

obtained through the search warrant because the search-warrant affidavit failed to

establish probable cause that evidence of a crime would be found at his residence. We

disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Probable Cause

Probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant exists when, under

the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence

of a crime will be found in a particular location. State v. Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d 122, 130

(Tex. Crim. App. 2022). This is not a demanding standard. Id. A search-warrant

affidavit must be read in a commonsense and realistic manner, and a magistrate may

draw reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances contained in the four

corners of the affidavit. Martin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 749, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021);

see also Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 130 (“Reviewing courts should not invalidate a warrant

by interpreting an affidavit in a hyper-technical rather than a commonsense

manner.”).

When reviewing a magistrate’s determination of probable cause to issue a

search warrant, we apply a highly deferential standard of review because of the Fourth

Amendment’s strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant over

4
warrantless searches. State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271–72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011);

see Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 130 (“[R]eviewing courts give great deference to a

magistrate’s probable[-]cause determination to encourage police officers to use the

warrant process.”). We will uphold the probable-cause determination “so long as the

magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that a search would uncover

evidence of wrongdoing.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331

(1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S. Ct. 725, 736 (1960),

overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980));

see Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

Our duty is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for

determining that probable cause existed. See Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 130. When in

doubt, we should defer to all reasonable inferences the magistrate could have made

from the four corners of the affidavit, including the magistrate’s implicit findings. Id.;

McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271–72; see also State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2012) (noting that a reviewing court must review a search-warrant affidavit

“realistically[] and with common sense”). Just as the magistrate could look only to the

four corners of the affidavit in reaching its probable-cause determination, our review

is likewise limited to the four corners of the affidavit. Martin, 620 S.W.3d at 766 n.24.

B. The Search-Warrant Affidavit

In the affidavit, Detective Peacock identifies the property to be searched as

“[###] Moss Ct., Mansfield, Tarrant County, Texas 76063. The residence is a

5
single[-]story tan and multi[-]colored brick dwelling. On the left side of the garage is a

stone placard with the house numbers [###]. The roof has grey shingles with white

trim.” Attached to the affidavit is a photograph of the residence. Detective Peacock

attests that the residence is “in [the] charge of and controlled by” Rewoldt.

Detective Peacock also describes in the affidavit his tenure and experience as

an investigator:

Affiant (Det. Sheldon Peacock) is a [p]eace [o]fficer employed by the
Mansfield Police Department. Affiant has been a peace officer for
approximately eighteen (18) years and has investigated criminal
offenses . . . . Affiant is currently assigned as a Detective with the
Mansfield Police Department. During Affiant’s career as a peace officer,
[he] has gained experience and training with interview and interrogation
techniques, the preparation and execution of both probable cause arrest
and search warrants, and criminal investigations. Affiant is responsible
for the investigation of [p]ossession of child pornography and other
offenses involving the sexual exploitation of children. Affiant has
participated in all the normal methods of investigation, including but not
limited to the general questioning of suspects, victims, and witnesses.

Detective Peacock then begins describing the cyber tip from Google and his

investigation:

On Tuesday, August 23rd 2023[,] Det. Ramirez and I were assigned to
investigate Cybertip #160779870. A summary of the tip reported that
there were 5 files uploaded, 0 of them were viewed by the ESP and 0 of
them were made publicly available.

The submitted [sic] of the tip was listed as Google/Google
Reviewer.

The affidavit lists the five files by name, IP address, date, and time uploaded. All of

the files were uploaded via Google at the IP address

6
“2600:1700:f0e0:8do:dda9:e1d1:1121:c2c,” and all of the files were uploaded on April

21, 2023, between 4:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. After reviewing one of the files—a video—

Detective Peacock determined that it contained child pornography.1

Following his description of the files, Detective Peacock explains how Rewoldt

was identified as the suspect:

The suspect information provided in the Cybertip returned to Christian
Rewoldt. The cellphone number associated with Christian Rewoldt is
[XXX-XXX-XXXX] and a date of birth of 02/24/1958. The email
addresses associated with Christian Rewoldt are
captainwalterrabbit@gmail.com and crewoldt@netscape.net.

I ran a Texas Driver’s License check and found a male subject
with Texas Driver’s License #[XXXXXXXX] (REWOLDT,
CHRISTIAN WALTER W/M 02/24/1958, 6’02” 180 LBS) through
TCIC/NCIC.

On 8/23/2023 Crime Analyst Gross attempted to locate social
media connected to the emails of Christian Rewoldt. Analyst Gross was
provided with the following two email addresses:

captainwalterrabbit@gmail.com
crewoldt@netscape.net

Analyst Gross located Christian’s Facebook account and noted
the username was “crewoldt[.”] She searched other social media profiles
for this username and located numerous accounts which appear (based
on content) to belong to Christian. I was unable to confirm what email
addresses are associated with these accounts.

1
In the affidavit, Detective Peacock describes in detail what he saw in the video.
Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, and because Rewoldt does not challenge
whether the contents of the file constitute child pornography, we forgo a detailed
description of the video. There is no reason to lengthen this opinion with a graphic
description of child pornography.

7
Based on the information provided by Google that the Google
accounts associated with Christian Rewoldt were used to view, upload[,]
and[/]or store images or videos[, a]t least one of these videos [was]
confirmed to be child pornography.

Affiant has probable cause to believe that Christian Rewoldt or
other persons unknown at [### Moss Ct.] are in possession of child
pornography . . . .

....

[I]f a computer or electronic storage device is found [at ###
Moss Ct.], there is probable cause to believe those records and
information sought will be stored in that computer or electronic storage
device. This is due to the increasing tendency to store and transmit
documents in electronic form . . . and the nature of the alleged offense(s)
which directly employs computers . . . .

The rest of the affidavit provides definitions and other information about

computers, electronic storage devices, IP addresses, and child pornography, including

the following:

An Internet Protocol address (IP address) is a value assigned to a device
participating on a network utilizing Internet Protocol. It serves as a
device identifier and establishes a location on the network. IP addresses
are used for devices connected to the Internet as well as devices
connected to private networks such as home networks . . . .

Each device connected to the Internet is assigned an IP
address . . . .

....

. . . Messages sent over the Internet to devices on a private
network are addressed to the public IP address of the private network’s
router. Once received by the router, the messages are forwarded to
devices on the private network based on the configuration of the router.

8
Ranges of public IP addresses are assigned to specific entities
which in turn often assign specific IP address[es] to other entities. These
entities are generally able to provide details about a specific IP address
within their assigned range such as subscriber information or physical
location of the device or router utilizing the public IP address.

....

Affiant is aware through experience and training . . . that the
majority of individuals who intentionally access and possess child
pornography are persons who are sexually attracted to children. . . .

These individuals generally prefer to store child pornography in
electronic form on computers and electronic storage devices. This allows
for the inexpensive storage of large collections of child pornography
which are readily accessible to a computer for viewing, replication, and
sharing with others via the Internet or other computer network.

These individuals typically collect multiple images and/or videos
of child pornography and these collections are generally in excess of
what is initially detected by law enforcement. . . .

These individuals often store child pornography on more than
one computer or electronic storage device. Data is easily moved between
different devices and those who possess child pornography have
compelling reasons to do so, such as . . . transferring materials to a
device that can be transported and accessed outside their
residence . . . . In addition, many individuals utilize remote storage (cloud
storage) providers such as . . . Google Drive . . . .

....

In addition to child pornography, these individuals often have
collections of child erotica. These are materials or items that are sexually
arousing to persons having a sexual interest in children[] but are not
necessarily obscene or do not necessarily depict children in sexually
explicit poses or positions.

9
At the end of the affidavit, Detective Peacock explains that

[a]ll information noted in this affidavit for search warrant has
been related to Affiant by the person(s) and/or source(s) attributed or
referenced. . . . Because the sole purpose of this affidavit is to establish
probable cause that a criminal offense has occurred, not every relevant
fact known to me, or to other investigators, is included within. Rather,
only those facts necessary to establish probable cause have been
discussed.

C. Analysis

Rewoldt contends that the magistrate’s probable-cause determination was

based on impermissible inferences linking him to the physical address listed in the

search-warrant affidavit—his residence—and concluding from an IP address linked to

him that his residence contained evidence of the alleged crime.2 Specifically, he argues

that the affidavit failed to establish (1) “where any of the items identified in the

cyber[ ]tip came from or were otherwise located at” the residence; (2) that “any other

child pornography or other contraband would be found at” the residence; and (3) that

he resided at the residence, particularly how Detective Peacock “discovered” the

address.

Reviewing the affidavit in a commonsense and realistic manner and looking at

the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the search-warrant affidavit meets

2
In his reply brief, Rewoldt argues that the State waived its responsive
argument—that the magistrate’s inferences are “common sense”—by inadequate
briefing under Appellate Rule 38.1(i). But Rule 38.1 lists the requirements of an
Appellant’s brief, not an Appellee’s brief, and the “common sense” to which the State
refers in its brief is the requirement that reviewing courts read search-warrant
affidavits with common sense. See Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354.

10
the highly deferential standard requiring only a “fair probability” that child

pornography would be found at Rewoldt’s residence. See Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 130.

From the four corners of the affidavit, the magistrate could directly find the

following facts: (1) Detective Peacock was a detective with the Mansfield Police

Department and investigated possession-of-child-pornography offenses and other

offenses involving the sexual exploitation of children; (2) Detective Peacock had been

a peace officer for approximately eighteen years and had experience and training in

these types of criminal investigations, including the preparation and execution of

probable-cause search warrants; (3) on August 23, 2023, Detective Peacock was

assigned to investigate a cyber tip that had been submitted by Google; (4) the cyber

tip indicated that between 4:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on April 21, 2023, there were five

files uploaded by a Google account at IP address

2600:1700:f0e0:8do:dda9:e1d1:1121:c2c; (5) Detective Peacock reviewed one of the

files and determined that it was child pornography; (6) the “suspect information”

provided by Google in the cyber tip returned to Rewoldt; (7) the Google accounts and

IP address associated with Rewoldt were used to view, upload, and store child

pornography; (8) a crime analyst was provided with Rewoldt’s email addresses and

was able to locate his social media accounts; (9) Detective Peacock ran a Texas

Driver’s License check through TCIC/NCIC; and (10) Detective Peacock found

Rewoldt’s driver’s license information. Additionally, the affidavit included a

11
description of the Moss Court residence and attached a photograph of the front of

the house.

Given these direct facts, the magistrate could have reasonably inferred any of

the following: (1) Detective Peacock identified “[###] Moss Ct.” as Rewoldt’s

residence from county or public records; (2) Detective Peacock identified “[###]

Moss Ct.” as Rewoldt’s residence from his TCIC/NCIC search; (3) Detective Peacock

identified “[###] Moss Ct.” as Rewoldt’s residence because it was the address on

Rewoldt’s driver’s license; and (4) the computers or other electronic devices used by

Rewoldt to access his social media and Google accounts and to view and upload child

pornography would be at his residence. See United States v. Jackson, No. 20-30778, 2022

WL 1548669, at *4 (5th Cir. May 16, 2022) (noting that detective linked defendant to

property to be searched by address listed on his driver’s license and upholding search-

warrant affidavit even though it did not include that information); United States v.

Flanders, 468 F.3d 269, 271–72 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting, in review of probable-cause

determination that defendant’s home computer and electronic storage contained child

pornography, the “general observation that few places are more convenient than one’s

residence for use in planning criminal activities and hiding fruits of a crime” (internal

quotes omitted)); Griffin v. State, No. 03-19-00429-CR, 2020 WL 7640149, at *12 (Tex.

App.—Austin Dec. 23, 2020) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding

that, “[a]lthough the affidavit d[id] not explicitly set out how [the officer] learned” the

defendant’s address, the magistrate could have reasonably inferred from the officer’s

12
description of his training and experience in similar cases and from his use of the

defendant’s driver’s license in the investigation that the officer had identified the

address from county or public records), pet. ref’d, 662 S.W.3d 470 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021); Wrinkle v. State, No. 04-17-00715-CR, 2018 WL 6793529, at *5 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio Dec. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(upholding affidavit linking defendant to property to be searched when affidavit

provided the property’s address, stated that defendant had control of the property,

described the property in detail, and stated that defendant slept there); Aguirre v. State,

490 S.W.3d 102, 112–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (concluding

that, even though affidavit did not “expressly refer to” property as defendant’s

residence or explain how detective obtained vehicle-registration information linking

defendant to the property, magistrate could have reasonably inferred (1) that

defendant resided at and would likely possess evidence of offense at property to be

searched when affidavit averred that the property was a home “in the charge [of],

controlled by, or used by” defendant; provided descriptions, registration numbers,

and VINs of his vehicles; and stated that his personal vehicle was registered to the

property and (2) that the vehicle-registration information “was available to the

detective as a police officer”); Ex parte Jones, 473 S.W.3d 850, 856 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (concluding that magistrate could have

reasonably inferred that defendant possessed child pornography and that child

pornography could be found at his residence when affidavit stated that an individual

13
using a Hotmail.com email address had purchased monthly memberships to child-

pornography websites, that payment for the memberships had been made via PayPal,

and that PayPal had provided investigators with buyer contact information identifying

the Hotmail.com email address as defendant’s); State v. Duncan, 72 S.W.3d 803, 807

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. dism’d) (recognizing that records of sexual

activity, such as child pornography, would likely be kept in one’s home, “a place not

subject to the eyes of the public absent invitation”); see also United States v. Procopio, 88

F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 1996) (explaining that “[t]he focus in a warrant application is

usually on whether the suspect committed a crime and whether evidence of the crime

is to be found at his home” and recognizing that, while the defendant’s address is not

“unimportant[,] . . . it is easy to understand how both the officer applying for the

warrant and the magistrate might overlook a lack of detail on a point often established

by the telephone book or the name on a mailbox”); Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55,

64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“The proper analysis of the sufficiency of a search-warrant

affidavit is not whether as much information that could have been put into an

affidavit was actually in the affidavit.”).

Additionally, the magistrate could have reasonably inferred from Detective

Peacock’s description of the Moss Court house and the attached photograph that

Detective Peacock drove to the house as part of his investigation. See Griffin, 2020 WL

7640149, at *12 (reaching similar conclusion based on affidavit’s detailed description

of property to be searched).

14
Regarding Rewoldt’s complaints that the affidavit failed to establish the original

source of the child pornography, where in his house the child pornography was

located, or whether any other child pornography or contraband was in his house,

requiring such facts in this case would contravene the highly deferential standard we

must apply when reviewing a magistrate’s probable-cause determination, which we

will not do. See Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 64. Indeed, “[t]he issue is not whether there

are other facts that could have, or even should have, been included in the affidavit; we

focus on the combined logical force of facts that are in the affidavit, not those that are

omitted from the affidavit.” Id. at 62. And here, the combined legal force of the facts

in Detective Peacock’s affidavit established a fair probability that child pornography

would be found in Rewoldt’s home.

Similarly, we disagree with Rewoldt’s contention that Detective Peacock’s

investigation failed to “tie” the IP address provided by Google in the cyber tip to

Rewoldt’s physical address. In the affidavit, Detective Peacock stated that he

“participated in all the normal methods of investigation.” See Aguirre, 490 S.W.3d at

111 (permitting the magistrate to infer the source of the detective’s information when

affidavit did not specifically state how she obtained that information but stated that

she “recited the facts based on her ‘personal investigation’”); see also Rodriguez, 232

S.W.3d at 64 (“It is not necessary to delve into . . . contrary inferences that could have

been made by the magistrate.”). Moreover, the cyber tip had already revealed the

identity of the person associated with the Google account and IP address as Rewoldt,

15
so it was not necessary for Detective Peacock to take that investigatory step. Cf.

Bordelon v. State, 673 S.W.3d 775, 786 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.) (describing

how detective identified defendant as owner of the IP address provided by a cyber tip

reporting “an internet user” for child pornography); State v. Cotter, 360 S.W.3d 647,

652–53 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.) (concluding that magistrate could have

reasonably determined that child pornography would be found at defendant’s

residence when affidavit stated that officer had traced IP address associated with an

unknown user of a screen name to defendant and “his home address”). In any event, we

will not delve into all the facts that ostensibly could have been included in the

affidavit. See Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 64. 3

In light of the direct evidence in the affidavit and deferring to all the reasonable

inferences the magistrate could have made from that evidence, we conclude that the

magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by denying Rewoldt’s motion to

suppress.

3
Rewoldt cites Ansari v. State for the contention that Detective Peacock skipped
a “standard investigatory step” by not detailing in his affidavit how he linked an IP
address to a physical location. No. 02-22-00170-CR, 2023 WL 5615804, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
But Ansari did not analyze the sufficiency of or even mention a search-warrant
affidavit, and the investigatory details described in Ansari were provided during trial
testimony, not an affidavit as Rewoldt suggests. Id. at *1–4.

16
III. Conclusion

Having concluded that the trial court did not err by overruling Rewoldt’s

motion to suppress, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

/s/ Wade Birdwell

Wade Birdwell
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: January 8, 2026

17