In the Estate of Lonnie K. Ledbetter Jr. v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00326-CV
___________________________

IN THE ESTATE OF LONNIE K. LEDBETTER JR., DECEASED

On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Hood County, Texas
Trial Court No. P10686

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Decedent Lonnie Ledbetter Jr. was wealthy, and much of his wealth was held in

trusts. Originally, the trusts were structured such that, upon his death, a significant

portion of his wealth would benefit his children, Appellees Lonnie “Trace” Ledbetter

III and Kendall Ledbetter Hohmann (together, the Children).

But then Lonnie, at age 81—while mourning the death of his wife of 44 years

and enduring the lingering effects of throat cancer—met and married Appellant Tawni

Jones-Ledbetter—a woman whose true identity is unclear, as she repeatedly invoked

the Fifth Amendment when asked about it during her testimony.1

Lonnie died just 16 months into the marriage. But during that time, things

changed. Lonnie allowed Tawni to control his finances; he gave her millions of dollars

in cash and real property interests;2 he grew estranged from his Children; he made

uncharacteristic business decisions and extravagant purchases; and he signed new wills

and trust documents that, among other things, disinherited his Children and appointed

Tawni as successor trustee.

The day Lonnie died, his Children filed suit to challenge his new wills and trust

documents, and they sought temporary orders to prevent Tawni from squandering

1
When asked whether a certified birth certificate for Andrea Jean Wirshup
belonged to her, Tawni invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

Tawni created a trust in her name—the Jones Ledbetter Family Revocable
2

Trust—and many of the assets transferred to her were placed in that trust.

2
Lonnie’s assets while the suit was pending. The trial court enjoined Tawni from

controlling certain assets—even to pay for ongoing expenses—and later,3 on the trial

court’s own motion “under the rules of equity,”4 it appointed a receiver to manage the

trust assets.5 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 64.001(a)(7).

Tawni appealed both orders.6 See id. § 51.014(a)(1), (4). We recently resolved

her first, injunction-related appeal, see In re Estate of Ledbetter, No. 02-25-00263-CV, 2025

WL 3559022, at *1–22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 11, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.),

and we now turn to what remains of her second: her challenge to the receivership

order.7

Initially, the trial court entered a receivership order within a few weeks of its
3

temporary injunction without holding a separate hearing on the receivership matter.
However, the trial court quickly stayed its receivership order and set the matter for a
hearing. After the hearing, the trial court entered a new order followed by an amended
receivership order.

The amended receivership order reflects that the trial court was acting “on its
4

own motion,” and it cites “Tex. Prop. Code § 114.008, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 64.001, and/or the Court’s inherent authority” for support. The trial court also
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Specifically, the receivership order extends to “all assets” of Lonnie’s trusts—
5

the Community Property Trust, Exempt Family Trust, Non-Exempt Family Trust, and
Marital Trust—and “all assets” of Tawni’s trust.

Later, the Ledbetter Family Foundation—another player in the mix, whose role
6

we need not detail here—filed a plea in intervention.
7
Tawni structures her appeal of the receivership order much like she structured
her appeal of the injunction; she raises two appellate issues challenging (1) the merits
of the order at issue and (2) the trial court’s jurisdiction to enter it. On the latter point,
Tawni argues—as she did in Ledbetter—that the statutory probate judge assigned to the

3
In her sole dispositive issue, Tawni argues that the trial court abused its discretion

by appointing a receiver because, among other things, (1) the facts of this case did not

warrant a receiver under the rules of equity and (2) the legal authority cited by the trial

court did not authorize a sua sponte equitable receivership over the fixed assets at issue.

See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 64.001(a)(7); Tex. R. Civ. P. 695. But the

record reveals that, if ever an equitable receivership was factually and legally warranted,

it was warranted here. We will affirm.

I. Standard of Review and Governing Law
Under Section 64.001(a)(7) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a trial

court “may appoint a receiver . . . in any . . . case in which a receiver may be appointed

under the rules of equity.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 64.001(a)(7). Generally,

a receiver may be appointed under the rules of equity “when it is necessary to preserve

the subject matter of the litigation during the pendency of the suit.” Whitson Co. v. Bluff

Creek Oil Co., 256 S.W.2d 1012, 1015 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1953, writ dism’d); see

Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 136 S.W.2d 800, 806 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.]

1940) (noting that Section 64.001(a)(7)’s predecessor statute “gave authority for the

appointment of a receiver ‘when no other adequate remedy [wa]s given by law for the

case lacked jurisdiction over the Children’s trust-related claims and thus lacked the
authority to issue the challenged order. We addressed and rejected that jurisdictional
challenge in Ledbetter, so we need not revisit the issue here. See Ledbetter, 2025 WL
3559022, at *6–11 (affirming trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction).

4
protection and preservation of property or the rights of parties therein, pending

litigation in respect thereto’” and that amendments “broaden[ed] the right to a receiver”

by authorizing it not only under these rules of equity but also in other enumerated

instances). And when the facts before the trial court justify such an equitable

receivership, the trial court may make the appointment on its own motion. See Krumnow

v. Krumnow, 174 S.W.3d 820, 828 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied) (“A trial court

may on its own motion appoint a receiver without an application by any party when the

facts justify the appointment to preserve or protect the property in litigation.”

(emphasis omitted)); Cross v. Cross, 738 S.W.2d 86, 87 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 1987, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (similar); see also Elliott v. Weatherman, 396 S.W.3d 224,

230 n.4 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (similar).

Appointing a receiver is a decision entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial

court. Peek v. Mayfield, No. 02-20-00107-CV, 2021 WL 3205061, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth July 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); A-Med. Advantage Healthcare Sys. v. Shwarts,

No. 10-18-00050-CV, 2019 WL 7374735, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 31, 2019,

pet. denied) (mem. op.); Templeton v. RKR Invs. Inc., No. 02-18-00024-CV, 2018 WL

2344675, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 24, 2018, no pet.); see Ledbetter, 2025 WL

3559022, at *11 (recognizing that a temporary injunction is similarly reviewed for an

abuse of discretion). Although the trial court cannot abuse its discretion by ruling

arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without supporting evidence, it is free to resolve conflicts

in the evidence and to believe one witness over another. See Ledbetter, 2025 WL

5
3559022, at *11; Templeton, 2018 WL 2344675, at *3. The trial court is the sole judge of

the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Ledbetter, 2025 WL 3559022, at *11

(recognizing in review of temporary injunction that “the trial court judges the credibility

of the witnesses and assigns the weight to be given to their testimony”); Elliott, 396

S.W.3d at 228 (reviewing receivership order and explaining that “we may not substitute

our judgment on factual matters for that of the trial court unless it is clear from the

record that the trial court could reach only one decision”); Lee v. Steele, No. 01-95-00237-

CV, 1995 WL 370264, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 20, 1995, no writ)

(not designated for publication) (reviewing sua sponte receivership order based on

evidence offered at temporary injunction hearing and noting that, “[i]n a temporary

injunction hearing, the judge is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the

weight to be given their testimony”). We review the trial court’s receivership order with

this in mind, construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the order. See Ledbetter,

2025 WL 3559022, at *11; Lee, 1995 WL 370264, at *4–5.

II. Discussion
Tawni argues that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing a receiver

because (1) the facts of this case did not warrant a receivership “under the rules of

equity,” see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 64.001(a)(7), and (2) the law did not

allow the trial court to rely on the statutory “rules of equity” provision or to appoint a

receiver over “fixed and immovable” property on its own motion, see id.; Tex. R. Civ.

P. 695.

6
A. The facts supported the receivership.
Tawni’s primary complaint is that the facts of this case were not sufficiently

extraordinary to warrant a receivership “under the rules of equity.” Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code Ann. § 64.001(a)(7). According to Tawni, rather than appointing a receiver,

the trial court should have restored her access to Lonnie’s assets so she could preserve

them.8 She argues that Texas courts have limited sua sponte equitable receiverships to

extraordinary circumstances in which no lesser remedy is available and that, here, the

trial court did not have sufficient evidence of either extraordinary circumstances or the

inadequacy of a lesser remedy. The Children dispute whether such findings—of

extraordinary circumstances and the inadequacy of a lesser remedy—were necessary.9

Regardless, assuming that they were, there was evidence to support them.

8
At the time of the trial court’s receivership order, Tawni had been enjoined from
exercising control over the trust assets, even to pay for ongoing expenses. See id. at
*12–13, *19–20. And it was undisputed that such expenses were necessary to preserve
the trust assets, e.g., by paying for yacht upkeep, for horse maintenance and shows, for
taxes, and for employee salaries. See id. at *19–20.
9
The Children argue that the trial court was not required to find extraordinary
circumstances, noting that such requirement has been recognized only in cases
involving the ex parte appointment of a receiver without notice. See, e.g., Elliott, 396
S.W.3d at 229 (“[T]he appointment of a receiver without notice . . . should be
exercised . . . only where great emergency or imperative necessity requires it.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Krumnow, 174 S.W.3d at 828 (“It has been held that
appointment of receivers on ex parte application is to be made only in exceptional and
extreme cases.”). They also argue that appointing a receiver under Section 64.001 does
not require a finding that lesser remedies are inadequate. Compare, e.g., In re Midland 1235
Inv. Tr., No. 11-24-00255-CV, 2025 WL 409042, at *5 n.1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb.
6, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (reaffirming court’s precedent that “[e]ven if a
specific statutory provision authorizes a receivership, a trial court should not appoint a

7
As we held in Ledbetter, the trial court was within its discretion to find that

Tawni’s control over the trust assets posed a threat of irreparable dissipation and that

Tawni “would not have adequate assets to satisfy a judgment.” Ledbetter, 2025 WL

3559022, at *16–18; cf. A-Med. Advantage Healthcare Sys., 2019 WL 7374735, at *4

(affirming order appointing receiver under “rules of equity” when appellants had

control over business owned by appellees and had changed the business name and

location, refused to provide financial records, failed to pay distributions, and allowed

business to be subjected to a tax lien). The trial court heard evidence10 that

• “Tawni [had] handled Lonnie’s finances after the marriage” and such finances
had been used to “ma[k]e several large purchases, including buying a jet and a
yacht,” Ledbetter, 2025 WL 3559022, at *17;

• a multi-million-dollar property that Lonnie had owned pre-marriage had, after
his marriage to Tawni, been deeded to her personal trust;

receiver if another remedy exists, either legal or equitable”), Elliott, 396 S.W.3d at 228
(“Even if a specific statutory provision authorizes a receivership, a trial court should
not appoint a receiver if another remedy exists at law or in equity that is adequate and
complete.”), and Benefield v. State, 266 S.W.3d 25, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2008, no pet.) (similar), with Bogle v. Bass, No. 03-23-00491-CV, 2024 WL 3446918, at
*6 (Tex. App.—Austin July 18, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[W]hen a receiver is
appointed pursuant to Section 64.001(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
the party seeking appointment of a receiver need not show that no other adequate
remedy exists.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and In re Estate of Trevino, 195
S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (similar).
10
Tawni acknowledges that, in ruling on the receivership issue, the trial court took
judicial notice of the evidence offered at the temporary injunction hearing. Although
she offhandedly complains of this in a footnote—saying that “[t]here is an argument
that the TI hearing could not be considered”—she does not brief the issue, so we need
not consider it.

8
• Lonnie’s ranch had been listed for sale for $18 million after his marriage to
Tawni, id.;

• Tawni had used “[s]everal million dollars” allegedly given to her by Lonnie to
purchase a mansion in another state in her name, see id.;

• she had “previously filed for bankruptcy in 2012,”11 id. at *18;

• there had been “some question” regarding whether she had fully disclosed her
financial information on her bankruptcy schedules, id.; and

• she had admitted to “tak[ing] $200,000 from someone else’s account without his
permission,” id.
Tawni argues, though, that if the trial court had concerns about her dissipation

of funds, it could have protected the trust assets with detailed orders micromanaging

her activities; it did not need to resort to the extreme remedy of a receivership. But as

the trial court explained at the end of the receivership hearing, the assets at issue

involved “multimillion-dollar business[es], and the [c]ourt just d[id not] have the

capacity to basically be a finance officer”; it was “[not] functional for the [c]ourt to kind

of play accountant in terms of getting receipts, approving [routine] sales, and then

coming back with that every time.”

More importantly, Tawni’s pattern of dishonesty and evasion supported a finding

that she was unlikely to comply with micromanaging orders anyway. See id. at *22

(observing that “the record reflects that Tawni engaged in deceptive behavior for her

11
An audio recording revealed that Tawni had told Lonnie and the Children that
she had filed “a business bankruptcy.” But her bankruptcy filings confirmed that she
had filed for bankruptcy as an individual.

9
own benefit”). Indeed, even as Tawni’s attorneys sought to assure the trial court that

she could be trusted to preserve the trust assets, she repeatedly lied to the trial court

under oath about mundane, easily disprovable facts:

• Tawni denied—in sworn testimony before the trial court—having told people
that she had served in the Swedish military, only to be impeached by an audio
recording that documented her telling Lonnie and others that she had served in
the “Swedish military through the U.S. Marines.” See id. at *4.

• She adamantly denied—three times in sworn testimony before the trial court—
having told Lonnie that she had sold her aviation company for $90 million, only
to be impeached by an audio recording that captured her telling Lonnie and
others just that. See id.

• She denied—in sworn testimony before the trial court—having taken $200,000
from someone else’s account and having admitted to it in a prior deposition, only
to be confronted with the deposition testimony in which she admitted that “[she]
stole $200,000” from another person’s bank account “or took [it] without his
permission.” See id. at *4, *18.

• She denied—in sworn testimony before the trial court—having “sworn under
oath in other legal proceedings that [she] ha[d] multiple college degrees,”12 only
to be impeached by prior deposition testimony in which she claimed to have
attended the “University of Hawaii,” “San Diego State,” the “University of
Florida in Gainesville,” the “University of Boulder,” and “Cal State,” among
others.13

Tawni admitted that, in reality, she had “no college background.” Ledbetter,
12

2025 WL 3559022, at *3.
13
In another portion of Tawni’s trial court testimony, she admitted having falsely
represented that she had earned a degree from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, but she denied telling people that she had earned any other degrees. Again,
she was impeached both with her prior deposition testimony—in which she claimed to
have attended the various schools listed above—and with copies of her LinkedIn page,
which claimed that she had earned a bachelor’s degree in engineering from Chalmers
University of Technology.

10
• She denied—in sworn testimony before the trial court—having heard of Buxton
University, only to be impeached by her testimony from two prior sworn
depositions in which she claimed to have earned a “bachelor’s degree in business
management” and “a master’s degree in . . . business administration and finance”
from Buxton University.

• When asked “every name [she] ha[d] gone by,” she testified—under oath—to
three names (Tohnni Jean Jones, Tawni Jean Ledbetter, and Tohnni Jean
Giannotti14), only to be confronted with a fourth last name that she had used on
a previous driver’s license (Whitt).15

• Later, the trial court took judicial notice of a Michigan Court of Appeals case
involving Tawni, and the style of the case listed a fifth name (Tohnni Reed-
Giannotti) that Tawni had not mentioned in her sworn testimony before the trial
court. See Jones v. Giannotti, No. 266568, 2007 WL 2051545, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App.
July 17, 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished);16 see also Ledbetter, 2025 WL 3559022,
at *3 n.6.

• At another point in Tawni’s sworn testimony before the trial court, she was
confronted with her birth certificate, which bore a sixth and entirely different
name: Andrea Jean Wirshup.17

• Tawni denied—in sworn testimony before the trial court—having ever used the
name shown on her birth certificate before invoking her Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.
Tawni’s responses to being caught in her lies were another cause for concern.

Although she occasionally admitted her dishonesty, she just as often attempted to justify

An audio recording admitted into evidence documented Tawni telling Lonnie
14

and others that she “was never married to Giannotti.”
15
Tawni testified that she had been married six times, and she admitted that a
seventh man had claimed that they had a common law marriage.
16
Tawni acknowledged “hav[ing] been in a lot of litigation.”
17
An audio recording admitted into evidence captured Tawni telling Lonnie and
others that she had “never changed [her] name,” even during her previous marriages.

11
it. See Ledbetter, 2025 WL 3559022, at *22 (observing that Tawni “minimized” her lies).

For example, to explain her deposition testimony that she had attended the University

of Hawaii and San Diego State, she stated that such testimony had not been dishonest

because, although she had not enrolled or earned a degree, she had taken “a side class”

at each school.18 See id. at *3. As for Buxton University, Tawni claimed that she had,

in fact, earned “a physical Master’s from Buxton” but that “it turned out to be a far[c]e”

and “the University . . . basically took all degrees away,” which is why she had denied

ever having heard of the school. She similarly denied responsibility for the false

representations on her LinkedIn profile, explaining that she “d[id] not handle [her] own

social media[; she] ha[d] a social media manager.” See id. at *3 n5. And when asked

about her inconsistent financial representations in her 2012 bankruptcy filings, she

testified that her attorneys had prepared the documents and that she “didn’t fill any of

[it] out” or “have anything to do with th[e] filing[s].” See id. at *4 n.8 (noting that, “[o]n

the first page of her bankruptcy filing, Tawni estimated that her assets were between $0

and $50,000 . . . [and] her liabilities were between $0 and $50,000,” but “[i]n a summary

of schedules attached to her petition, her assets were valued at $50,150, and her

liabilities were valued at $315,726”).

18
When the Children’s attorney asked Tawni if, by her logic, “it would have been
true [to say that she had attended the universities] if [she] just happened to drive up to
[the school] and see it and leave,” she confirmed, “[p]robably.”

12
Even when Tawni did not outright lie to the trial court, her answers were evasive.

She claimed that she could not remember a number of seemingly memorable events,

such as whether her 2012 bankruptcy trustee had accused her of concealing assets and

whether her bankruptcy discharge had been set aside.19 See id. at *4.

Furthermore, she asserted her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination

in response to more than 20 questions, including questions about her date of birth, her

name given at birth, the names of her mother and father, whether she was from Sweden,

why her United States passport had been seized, whether she had lied to Lonnie about

her age, and whether the date of birth on her marriage license had matched that on her

birth certificate.20 Id. at *2–3. “The trial court was permitted to draw negative

inferences from [these] repeated invocation[s] of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at *17; see

Tex. R. Evid. 513(c).

19
Tawni initially denied having been accused of defrauding the bankruptcy
trustee, but when she was questioned further on the issue, she stated that “[t]here was
some question as to whether or not . . . [a particular note] was supposed to have been
disclosed in her schedules, . . . [but] it was a long time ago and [she] d[id]n’t remember.”
Later, Tawni claimed that, in fact, she had been the one to notify the bankruptcy trustee
of the undisclosed note but that she “just didn’t do it properly.”
20
The certified birth certificate admitted into evidence—to which Tawni pleaded
the Fifth—listed a name and date of birth different from that shown on her marriage
license.

13
The evidence further showed that Tawni’s lies, excuses, and evasion were not

new. Indeed, she had lied in numerous prior sworn statements dating back several

decades. See Ledbetter, 2025 WL 3559022, at *18.

In 2007, the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed a child-custody order involving

Tawni’s son, and it affirmed the trial court’s findings that Tawni “exaggerate[d] on

everything”; that she was “a con artist,” a “scam artist,” and a “psychopathic liar”; and

that her life “resemble[d] a ‘soap opera.’”21 Jones, 2007 WL 2051545, at *5–8; see

Ledbetter, 2025 WL 3559022, at *3. And in Tawni’s deposition from that case, she had

lied about her educational background and invoked the Fifth Amendment in response

to basic identity-related questions—two decades before her testimony here.

Tawni downplays this evidence as routine mudslinging, calling it a “smear

campaign.”22 But the mud was hers, and it was not so much slung as it was brought to

21
The Michigan Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s finding that
Tawni had “taken a number of unreasonable positions in th[e] litigation.” Jones, 2007
WL 2051545, at *8. For example, it described how Tawni’s pleadings in the child-
custody proceeding had initially identified a second child as a product of her marriage
to Louis Giannotti, despite Tawni having obtained a paternity and child-support
judgment as to that child against a different man before she married Giannotti. Id. at
*1.
22
In Tawni’s statement of facts, she offhandedly complains that “[t]hese character
assaults should never have come into evidence at all.” Cf. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g)
(requiring an appellant’s statement of facts to be “without argument”). But she does
not identify which portions of the testimonial and documentary evidence she believes
should have been excluded, point us to her trial court objections to the evidence’s
admission, or otherwise brief the issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).

14
light. Tawni’s own testimony was a key part of the mud, as she demonstrated her

dishonesty for the trial court to witness firsthand. And this evidence supported the trial

court’s conclusions that a receivership was necessary to preserve the trust assets during

litigation and that lesser remedies—such as court orders attempting to micromanage

Tawni’s actions—were not realistic.23

Based on the evidence before the trial court, it was well within its discretion to

find that the extraordinary facts of the case warranted a receivership “under the rules

of equity.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 64.001(a)(7); see Ledbetter, 2025 WL

3559022, at *16–18. We overrule this portion of Tawni’s dispositive issue.

B. The law supported the receivership.
Tawni next argues that, even if the facts supported an equitable receivership, the

trial court’s order (1) could not rely on Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section

64.001(a)(7)’s “rules of equity” provision and (2) could not extend to “fixed and

immovable” property without violating Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 695.

23
The trial court’s findings of fact confirmed as much; the court found that
“Tawni was unwilling to provide the [c]ourt with information that would allow the
[c]ourt to understand her true identity,” and it listed several examples of Tawni’s
dishonest and evasive testimony.

15
1. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 64.001(a)

First, Tawni asserts that the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provision

providing for receiverships “under the rules of equity”—Section 64.001(a)(7)—was not

available here. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 64.001(a)(7).

Section 64.001(a) identifies certain circumstances in which a receivership is

authorized. See id. § 64.001(a). It enumerates several types of receivership-warranting

cases—e.g., “in an action between partners or others jointly owning or interested in any

property or fund”—and it ends with a catch-all provision authorizing a receiver “in any

other case in which a receiver may be appointed under the rules of equity.” Id. Tawni

argues that these subsections are mutually exclusive, meaning that a receiver may not

be appointed “under the rules of equity” if the case is one of the receivership-warranting

legal actions enumerated elsewhere in Section 64.001(a).24 And according to Tawni,

24
To support her argument, Tawni relies on our sister court’s opinion in Mueller.
See Mueller v. Beamalloy, Inc., 994 S.W.2d 855, 861 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999,
no pet.) (holding that trial court could not rely on Section 64.001(a)(7)’s “rules of
equity” provision “[g]iven the specific grant of authority to appoint a receiver for a
corporation under the circumstances listed” in another subsection of Section 64.001(a));
see also In re Estate of Martinez, No. 01-18-00217-CV, 2019 WL 1442100, at *3–4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 2, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (following Mueller but
noting split among courts of appeals). She has not cited any case law from this court
adopting Mueller’s interpretation. Cf. Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co., 136 S.W.2d at 806
(explaining that Section 64.001’s predecessor statute was amended in 1887 to
“broaden[] the right to a receiver” by “expressly specifying certain cases enumerated in
its Subdivisions . . . in which receivers may be appointed . . . without resort to rules of
equity”); Allen v. Allen, No. 02-17-00031-CV, 2018 WL 547586, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Jan. 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reviewing receivership order, noting that
property was jointly owned, rejecting as unpreserved appellant’s argument that Section
64.001(a)(3) governed, and later commenting that the trial court was authorized to

16
this case was an “action between partners or others jointly owning or interested in any

property or fund,” thus precluding the trial court from relying on “the rules of equity”

catch-all provision. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 64.001(a)(3), (7); Martinez,

2019 WL 1442100, at *4 (construing subsections as mutually exclusive and holding that

“rules of equity” provision did not apply because, in that case, “[t]he administrator, as

the representative of the estate, jointly owned the [relevant] property with [the opposing

parties] . . . [and t]hat made the underlying case ‘an action between . . . others jointly

owning . . . property’”).

Yet, in the same breath, Tawni undercuts her own argument.25 To avoid

endorsing the “joint[] own[ership]” provision as statutory authorization for the trial

court’s receivership order, she argues that, although the “joint[] owne[rship]” provision

applied enough to preclude the trial court from relying on the “rules of equity”

alternative, it did not authorize the receivership because this case was not “an action

between partners or others jointly owning or interested in any property or fund.” See

appoint a receiver to sell the property under the “rules of equity” provision); Whitson,
256 S.W.2d at 1014–15 (reviewing suit involving joint owners of property and
concluding that receivership was not supported by evidence because neither Section
64.001(a)(3)’s predecessor nor Section 64.001(a)(7)’s predecessor were satisfied).

Tawni acknowledges as much elsewhere in her brief, though she frames the
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matter differently, stating that we need only consider the trial court’s authority to order
a receivership “under the rules of equity” if we accept her argument that the “joint[]
own[ership]” provision does not apply. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 64.001(a).

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Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 64.001(a)(3), (7). In other words, Tawni tries to

have her cake and eat it, too. This she cannot do.

If we adopt Tawni’s interpretation of Section 64.001(a) and treat the subsections

as mutually exclusive, then the substance of Tawni’s argument renders her

interpretation irrelevant because, by her own account, no other receivership-authorizing

subsection applies, so the trial court was not precluded from relying on the “rules of

equity” provision. See id. § 64.001(a)(7). But if we reject Tawni’s interpretation of the

statute, then the issue ends there, as the trial court was free to rely on the “rules of

equity” provision whether or not one of the other subsections applied. See id. Either

way, Tawni’s challenge to the trial court’s reliance on Section 64.001(a)(7)’s “rules of

equity” provision fails. See id.

2. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 695

Tawni’s second legal challenge to the receivership order fares no better. She

claims that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 695 prohibited the trial court from acting on

its own motion to appoint a receiver over “fixed and immovable” property. Tex. R.

Civ. P. 695. That Rule provides:

Except where otherwise provided by statute, no receiver shall be
appointed without notice to take charge of property which is fixed and
immovable. When an application for appointment of a receiver to take
possession of property of this type is filed, the judge or court shall set the
same down for hearing and notice of such hearing shall be given to the
adverse party by serving notice thereof not less than three days prior to
such hearing.

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Id. Tawni emphasizes the Rule’s second sentence—the portion directing a trial court

to take certain actions “[w]hen an application . . . is filed”—and claims that this

language “requires filing an ‘application’ before a receiver is appointed.”26 See id.

But requiring certain actions “[w]hen” an event occurs is not the same thing as

requiring that the event occur. Id.; see Krumnow, 174 S.W.3d at 829–30 (reviewing

receivership order and concluding that the facts did not support a sua sponte

receivership before then turning to Rule 695 issue based on appellee’s subsequent

receivership application). Indeed, such construction is inconsistent with the plain

language of the Rule, and “[w]e are no more at liberty to ignore the plain language of

the Rules than we are to ignore binding precedent.” Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. v. Dollard,

679 S.W.3d 279, 289 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, no pet.) (noting that the Rules of

Civil Procedure are “promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court”); see Mandel v. Lewisville

Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 S.W.3d 65, 74 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied) (“We

apply [R]ules of [C]ivil [P]rocedure in accordance with their plain language.”).

Because the plain language of Rule 695 does not require an application for a trial

court to appoint a receiver over fixed and immovable property, the trial court did not

Tawni raises several related arguments as well, such as claiming that, because
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there was no application for the receivership, she did not receive three days’ notice of
an application and the trial court did not require an applicant’s bond. We need not
address these contingent complaints. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

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violate the Rule by acting on its own motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 695. We overrule this

final portion of Tawni’s dispositive issue.

III. Conclusion
Given the extraordinary facts of this case, the trial court was well within its

discretion to appoint a receiver on its own motion “under the rules of equity.” Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 64.001(a)(7). We affirm the receivership order. See

Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth
Chief Justice

Delivered: February 5, 2026

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