Ex Parte Robert Brimmer v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-25-00369-CR
___________________________

EX PARTE ROBERT BRIMMER

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 3
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. C-3-W012665-1779680-AP

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Robert Brimmer pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon and was placed on forty-eight months of deferred adjudication community

supervision. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2). Brimmer later filed a request for

habeas corpus relief under Article 11.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

complaining that his plea was invalid, which the trial court denied. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072. In one issue on appeal, Brimmer argues that the trial

court abused its discretion by denying his request for habeas corpus relief.

Specifically, he contends that he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he

was not competent to enter his plea and that his plea was not made voluntarily or

knowingly. We will affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Brimmer’s Indictment, the Trial Court’s Order for a Competency
Examination, and Dr. Kristi Compton’s February 9, 2024 Examination

In December 2023, Brimmer was indicted for aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon against a public servant. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(b)(2)(B). On

January 24, 2024, Brimmer’s counsel filed a notice of intention to raise evidence of an

insanity defense. A week later, the trial court signed an order for a competency

examination to be performed on Brimmer by Dr. Kristi Compton. The competency

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evaluation was originally scheduled for February 19, 2024; however, Dr. Compton

evaluated Brimmer on February 9, 2024, and found him competent.

B. Brimmer’s February 14, 2024 Guilty Plea

On February 14, 2024, Brimmer pleaded guilty to a lesser-included offense—

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—and was placed on forty-eight months of

deferred adjudication community supervision. See id. § 22.02(a)(2). In the plea

paperwork, the trial court gave Brimmer numerous admonishments regarding the

consequence of his plea. In the written waivers that were part of the plea paperwork,

Brimmer represented that he was “aware of the consequence of [his] plea,” that he

was “mentally competent,” and that his plea was “knowingly, freely, and voluntarily

entered.” His attorney also stated in the plea paperwork that he was satisfied that

Brimmer was “legally competent and ha[d] intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily

waived his rights and w[ould] enter a guilty plea understanding the consequences

thereof.”

C. Brimmer’s Subsequent Arrest and Habeas Application

In July 2025, the State filed a petition to proceed to adjudication, arguing that

Brimmer had violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision.

Brimmer was later arrested pursuant to a warrant. Thereafter, Brimmer filed an

application for writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of his guilty plea.

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D. The Hearing on Brimmer’s Habeas Application

In September 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on Brimmer’s habeas

application. Four witnesses testified at the hearing: Dr. Compton, Brimmer’s son,

Brimmer’s former attorney, and the court coordinator of the trial court. We will

summarize the pertinent testimony.

1. Dr. Compton’s Testimony

Dr. Compton testified that she was a clinical and forensic psychologist who had

been practicing for twenty-five years and who had completed over 3,000 competency

evaluations. She further stated that while Brimmer’s original competency

appointment was scheduled for February 19, 2024, it was “bumped up” to February 9,

2024.

Dr. Compton said that before she interviewed Brimmer, she had reviewed his

jail health records—which included “nursing records, psychiatric evaluations, and

MHMR follow-up”—and the offense report. According to the records, Brimmer had

been diagnosed with a “mild major depressive disorder” and was “restarted on

medication he had taken in the community,” including lithium. Dr. Compton stated

that Brimmer—who was a medical doctor—had no intellectual disabilities.

Dr. Compton testified that she had interviewed Brimmer and had conducted a

mental status examination. According to Dr. Compton, she was concerned about

“potential paranoid ideation related to his wife and [his wife’s] son.” However, Dr.

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Compton maintained that Brimmer understood “where he was, what had happened,

the charge, [and] who the different players [were] in the courtroom.”

Dr. Compton stated that she had never prepared a report pertaining to her

evaluation of Brimmer because the trial court had informed her on February 14, 2024,

that the evaluation had been canceled. When Dr. Compton told the trial court that

she had already seen Brimmer, the court asked her if he was competent, and Dr.

Compton responded that he was. Dr. Compton testified that “anyone who has any

type of mental illness, their mental state is going to wax and wane” and they could be

competent one month and not competent in another month. However, she

maintained that a competency evaluation “at the time” is going to be more accurate

than a “retrospective evaluation.”

2. Brimmer’s Son’s Testimony

Brimmer’s son testified that he bailed his father out of jail in May 2023. At that

time, Brimmer’s son was concerned about Brimmer’s ability to care for himself,

noting that Brimmer “had . . . kind of paranoid delusions.” When asked whether he

had an opinion as to whether Brimmer understood what was going on during the

guilty-plea hearing several months later, Brimmer’s son stated, “It’s really hard to say.

[Brimmer] didn’t seem like he had a great grasp of much of anything really.”

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3. Brimmer’s Former Attorney’s Testimony

Brimmer’s former attorney—Abe Factor—testified that he had represented

Brimmer when Brimmer had pleaded guilty.1 Factor stated that he had had no

concerns relating to Brimmer’s mental health or competency during his

representation. Factor said that Brimmer had expressed “some views about the case

that were . . . unreasonable,”2 but Factor “never got the impression that [Brimmer]

was delusional or that he was not able to understand [Factor’s] questions.” Factor

stated that he had spoken to Brimmer about pleading guilty to a lesser charge and

being placed on probation, and Factor indicated that Brimmer had “understood that.”

Factor also said that Brimmer had stated that he would “rather be out and fight the

case.” However, Factor made clear that Brimmer had “understood that he was

pleading to a lesser charge” and that “taking probation would allow him to be released

to the community under . . . rules.”

Factor testified that if he had had any concerns regarding Brimmer’s

competency at the time of the guilty plea, he would have raised those concerns with

the trial court. Factor stated that he went over every word of the plea agreement with

Brimmer and that he had explained the agreement “in great detail.” Factor testified

Factor did not represent Brimmer at the writ hearing, describing him as a
1

“former client.”
2
As to Brimmer’s alleged “unreasonable” views of the case, Factor stated that
Brimmer believed that he could not be prosecuted for an offense against a police
officer who had come on his property.

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that he was confident that Brimmer had been competent when he had pleaded guilty,

stating that Brimmer had “understood it.”

4. The Court Coordinator’s Testimony

The court coordinator of the trial court testified that typically a report is filed

after a mental health examination is conducted. The court coordinator stated that she

did not receive a report from Dr. Compton pertaining to Brimmer. She said that she

had received communication from Dr. Compton’s office on February 16, 2024,

indicating that Brimmer had been examined by Dr. Compton and had been found to

be competent.

E. The Trial Court’s Denial of Brimmer’s Habeas Application and the Trial
Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Following the hearing, the trial court denied Brimmer’s habeas application and

adopted the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. As pertinent

here, the trial court made the following findings of fact:3

1. On February 14, 2024, [Brimmer], pursuant to a plea agreement,
pleaded guilty to the second-degree felony of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon.

....

10. On January 24, 2024, [Brimmer’s] former defense attorney,
Mr. Abe Factor, filed a notice of intention to raise evidence of an
insanity defense.

3
The trial court’s findings include citations to the record. For ease of reading,
we do not include these citations in our quotations of the findings.

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11. On January 31, 2024, this Court appointed clinical and forensic
psychologist, Dr. Kristi Compton, to conduct a competency evaluation
of [Brimmer] on February 19, 2024, at 11:30 a.m.

12. On the order for competency evaluation, Mr. Factor observed
that [Brimmer] had “distorted thinking, does not understand process.”

13. Mr. Factor requested a competency evaluation because of
[Brimmer’s] unreasonable views about the law as applied to his case,
namely, that since he was on his own property, he could not be
prosecuted.

14. Prior to conducting the interview portion of her evaluation,
Dr. Compton reviewed [Brimmer’s] jail health records and the offense
report.

15. According to his jail health records, [Brimmer] was diagnosed
with mild major depressive disorder, was prescribed Lithium, and had
private outpatient psychiatric care for many years.

16. While he was in jail, [Brimmer] was prescribed 300 mg of Lithium
and 100 mg of Trazodone.

17. [Brimmer] does not have any intellectual disabilities.

18. Prior to her interview with [Brimmer], Dr. Compton spoke with
an officer at the jail who said [Brimmer] had been cooperative and had
not been a problem.

19. There were no indications in [Brimmer’s] jail records of any
mania, hypomania, or psychosis, and [he] had clear, organized, logical,
goal-directed thought processes and was adequately groomed.

20. On February 9, 2024, Dr. Compton conducted her interview with
[Brimmer].

21. Dr. Compton asked about [Brimmer’s] mental health history,
substance abuse, and personal history; assessed his symptoms at the time
of the evaluation; conducted a mental status examination; and assessed
[Brimmer’s] understanding of the court system, his case, the plea
process, and the potential penalties.

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22. [Brimmer] understood the court processes.

23. In addition to her competency questions, Dr. Compton
administered the St. Louis University Mental Status Examination, which
is used to detect neurocognitive impairment or dementia.

24. [Brimmer] scored solidly within the average range.

25. Dr. Compton had concerns about potential paranoid ideation
related to [Brimmer’s] wife and her son, but it was not related to the
underlying offense.

26. At the end of her evaluation of [Brimmer] on February 9, 2024,
Dr. Compton concluded that [he] was competent.

27. Dr. Compton’s conclusion was contingent upon [Brimmer] taking
his prescribed medication while in jail.

28. As of the date of [Brimmer’s] plea, Dr. Compton had not
completed her written competency report.

29. On February 14, 2024, Mr. Factor negotiated with the State to
lower the first-degree charge to a second-degree charge and place
[Brimmer] on probation.

30. Factor relayed the plea bargain offer to [Brimmer] while he was
still at the jail, and [Brimmer] said he understood the offer.

31. [Brimmer] stated he wanted to be released from custody and fight
his case.

32. Factor explained that because of [Brimmer’s] multiple bond
violations, he would not be released from custody while he waited for
trial on the first-degree charge.

33. When [Brimmer] was brought to court, Factor reviewed the plea
bargain offer with [him] and explained, in great detail, the rights
[Brimmer] would be waiving by pleading guilty.

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34. Factor has a general process of how he reviews the plea process
with his clients.

35. In this case, Factor went over every word of the plea process with
[Brimmer].

36. Factor reviewed every part of the plea bargain with [Brimmer] . . .

37. When Factor was explaining the plea bargain with [Brimmer], he
never denied his conduct but remained consistent that he wanted to
fight the charge.

38. [Brimmer] was also consistent in his perspective of the facts and
his theory of his case, though he was incorrect regarding the legal
ramifications of his actions.

39. Factor did not wait for the formal competency evaluation report
to come in because [Brimmer] was competent that day.

40. Factor has experience with people who are competent at one
moment but not competent at another.

41. Factor is confident that [Brimmer] was competent the day he
pled, as [Brimmer] understood the benefit of pleading to a lesser charge
and receiving community supervision.

....

43. The trial court signed the written plea admonishments and made a
finding that [Brimmer] was mentally competent without knowing that
the evaluation had been conducted.

44. On February 14, 2024, [Brimmer] acknowledged and signed the
Written Plea Admonishments, which included the following

a. That he was aware of the consequences of his plea.

b. That he was mentally competent and entered his plea
knowingly, freely, and voluntarily.

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c. That he was giving up and waiving all pretrial motions that
may have been filed in his case.

45. On February 14, 2024, [Brimmer’s] defense counsel, Abe Factor,
acknowledged by his signature that he

“fully reviewed and explained the above and foregoing court
admonishments, rights, and waivers, as well as the following
judicial confession to [Brimmer]. I am satisfied that [he] is legally
competent and has intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived
his rights and will enter a guilty plea understanding the
consequences thereof.”

46. On February 14, 2024, [Brimmer] signed a judicial confession in
which he pled guilty to the indictment and affirmed that he understood
the applicable punishment range and the State’s plea offer.

47. On February 14, 2024, the trial court found [Brimmer] mentally
competent and that his plea was entered intelligently, freely, and
voluntarily.

48. On February 14, 2024, the trial court informed Dr. Compton’s
office that the competency evaluation was cancelled.

49. Dr. Compton’s office informed the trial court that an evaluation
had already been conducted on February 9, 2024, and that [Brimmer]
was found competent.

50. The trial court has a general process for accepting pleas: calling
the defendant up, explaining the charges and the plea bargain, asking
every defense attorney if they believe their client is competent and the
plea is being voluntarily made, and going through the written plea
admonishments.

51. If this Court has any concerns regarding a defendant’s
competency while conducting a plea, the proceedings are stopped and
the defendant speaks with his or her attorney; if the issues are resolved,
the plea moves forward.

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52. If the trial court had had concerns about [Brimmer’s] mental
competency, it would not have accepted [his] guilty plea or rescinded its
Order For Competency Examination.

53. There is no credible evidence that, at the time of his plea,
[Brimmer] was mentally incompetent.

54. [Brimmer] was competent at the time of his plea.

As pertinent here, the trial court made the following conclusions of law:

16. [Brimmer] was found competent five days prior to his plea.

17. [Brimmer] has failed to prove that he did not have the sufficient
present ability to consult with his trial counsel with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding at the time of his plea.

18. [Brimmer] has failed to prove that he did not have a rational or
factual understanding of the proceedings against him at the time of his
plea.

19. [Brimmer] was competent at the time of his plea.

20. [Brimmer] has failed to prove that his plea was involuntary due to
incompetency.

....

22. [Brimmer] was properly admonished.

....

25. [Brimmer’s] written acknowledgement that his plea was freely and
voluntarily made establishes a prima facie case that his plea was knowing
and voluntary.

26. [Brimmer] has failed to overcome the presumption that his plea
was regular.

27. [Brimmer] has failed to prove that his plea was not freely,
voluntarily, or knowingly made.

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28. [Brimmer’s] sole ground for relief is DENIED.

This appeal followed the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief.

III. DISCUSSION

In his sole issue,4 Brimmer contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

denying his request for habeas corpus relief because he proved by a preponderance of

the evidence that he was not competent to make his plea and that it was not made

voluntarily or knowingly.

A. Standard of Review and Burden of Proof

Article 11.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure allows a defendant on

community supervision to challenge the legal validity of the order imposing

community supervision by filing an application for a writ of habeas corpus. See Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072. An applicant seeking habeas corpus relief under

Article 11.072 bears the burden of proving his claim by a preponderance of the

evidence. Ex parte Salim, 595 S.W.3d 844, 853 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2020, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (citing State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)).

We review a trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief for an abuse of

discretion. Ex parte Moreno, 382 S.W.3d 523, 526 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet.

ref’d). The trial court is the sole factfinder in cases involving applications for writs of

habeas corpus filed pursuant to Article 11.072, and “we afford almost total deference

While the State’s brief references two issues, Brimmer raised only one.
4

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to a trial court’s factual findings when they are supported by the record, especially

when those findings are based upon credibility and demeanor.” Ex parte Torres,

483 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1997) (setting out “as comprehensive a statement of the applicable

standards” of review as the Court of Criminal Appeals could provide). However,

when the resolution of any ultimate question turns on an application of legal

standards, we review the trial court’s ruling de novo. Doyle v. State, 317 S.W.3d 471,

475–76 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d); see Salim, 595 S.W.3d at 853

(stating that we review “de novo pure questions of law and application-of-law-to-fact

questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor”).

B. Applicable Law

A person is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have (1) a sufficient

present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding or (2) a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings

against him. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a). A defendant is presumed

competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved

incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. art. 46B.003(b).

A guilty plea must be made freely and voluntarily. Id. art. 26.13(b); see Ex parte

Christian, 714 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (“A guilty plea involves the waiver

of several constitutional rights and therefore must be entered knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily.”). “A guilty plea is valid only if it is ‘a voluntary and intelligent choice

14
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’” Ex parte Broussard,

517 S.W.3d 814, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d at 588).

We must examine the entire record to determine the voluntariness of a defendant’s

plea. Williams v. State, 522 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Dunn v. State,

No. 02-18-00082-CR, 2019 WL 1388546, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 28,

2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see Christian, 714 S.W.3d

at 5.

When a defendant has been duly admonished, there is a prima facie showing

that his guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Martinez v. State,

981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Perez v. State, No. 02-24-00160-CR,

2025 WL 494645, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 13, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication). A defendant who attested that he understood the

nature of his plea and that his plea was voluntary bears the “heavy burden” on appeal

to show that his plea was involuntary. Johnson v. State, No. 02-23-00090-CR, 2024 WL

1318238, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 28, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication); Thomas v. State, 615 S.W.3d 552, 569 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). To meet his burden, the defendant must

affirmatively show that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he

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was misled or harmed by the trial court’s erroneous admonishment.5 Johnson,

2024 WL 1318238, at *2; Thomas, 615 S.W.3d at 569.

C. Application of the Law to the Facts

In his brief, Brimmer argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying

his application because he “proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was

not competent to enter a plea of guilty on February 14, 2024.” We disagree.

In support of his argument that he was incompetent on February 14, 2024,

Brimmer points to evidence surrounding his mental state on numerous dates that

were not in February 2024—such as his previous diagnosis for “depression in the

1990s,” his “deluded thinking and paranoia surrounding his [May 2023] arrest,” and

subsequent competency proceedings involving him in 2025. Brimmer ignores the

relevant time frame. See Laflash v. State, 614 S.W.3d 427, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (order) (“The relevant time frame for determining a person’s

competence is at the time of the proceedings.”); Jackson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 139, 143

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (same).

Here, in the plea paperwork that was signed on February 14, 2024, Brimmer

represented that he was “aware of the consequence of [his] plea” and that he was

“mentally competent.” Factor also stated in the plea paperwork that Brimmer was

“legally competent” and had “voluntarily waived his rights and w[ould] enter a guilty

5
In his brief, Brimmer candidly states that he “does not suggest that he was not
properly admonished by the trial court regarding the consequences of his guilty plea.”

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plea understanding the consequences thereof.” Moreover, Factor testified that he had

had no concerns relating to Brimmer’s mental health or competency during his

representation of Brimmer. Factor maintained that he was confident that Brimmer

had been competent when he had pleaded guilty, stating that Brimmer had

“understood it.” And notably, Dr. Compton had determined that Brimmer was

competent on February 9, 2024—just five days before he pleaded guilty.6 See Laflash,

614 S.W.3d at 432; Jackson, 391 S.W.3d at 143.

Brimmer also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his

application because he “proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his plea was

not made knowingly and voluntarily.” We again disagree.

Brimmer’s plea paperwork reflects that he was admonished by the trial court,

which is prima facie evidence that his plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. See

Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; Perez, 2025 WL 494645, at *2. In addition, Brimmer

stated in the plea paperwork that his plea was “knowingly, freely, and voluntarily

entered.” Factor also indicated in the plea paperwork that he was satisfied that

Brimmer had “intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his rights.” Moreover,

6
In his brief, Brimmer states that “[t]he only evidence to suggest that [he] was
competent at the time of his plea is testimony during the evidentiary hearing from
Factor and Compton.” Brimmer argues that we should discount this evidence
because “the credibility of both of these witnesses was called into question during the
evidentiary hearing.” We disagree. As the reviewing court, we are to give almost total
deference to the trial court’s findings, especially when those findings are based on
credibility and demeanor. See Torres, 483 S.W.3d at 42; see also McDaniel v. State,
98 S.W.3d 704, 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“We cannot ignore the trial court’s first-
hand factual assessment of [the] appellant’s mental competency.”).

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Factor testified that Brimmer had “understood that he was pleading to a lesser

charge” and that “taking probation would allow him to be released to the community

under . . . rules.”7

After viewing the whole record and after giving deference to the trial court’s

factual findings that are supported by the record, we hold that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by denying Brimmer’s application for habeas corpus. See Torres,

483 S.W.3d at 42; Arreola v. State, 207 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (affirming denial of habeas relief when appellant failed to show

by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not aware of the consequences of his

plea); Valdez v. State, 82 S.W.3d 784, 788 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.)

(similar); see also Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“A

defendant’s sworn representation that his guilty plea is voluntary constitute[s] a

formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” (internal quotation

omitted)).

We overrule Brimmer’s sole issue.

7
In his brief, Brimmer argues that he did not understand the consequences of
his plea, pointing to Factor’s testimony that he had told Factor that he would “rather
be out and fight the case.” Brimmer’s argument ignores other portions of the record,
namely Factor’s testimony that Brimmer had understood that he was pleading to a
lesser charge and that Factor had told him about the consequences of making that
plea.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Brimmer’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s order denying

habeas corpus relief.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: February 19, 2026

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