Paul Lee Good v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-24-00239-CR
___________________________

PAUL LEE GOOD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1336150

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Paul Lee Good appeals his convictions for aggravated sexual assault

of a child and indecency with a child by contact of his stepson, Pete.1 See Tex. Penal

Code Ann. §§ 21.11(a)(1), 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (iii), (v). At trial, over Good’s objection,

the State was allowed to introduce evidence of Good’s having committed extraneous

offenses and other sexual acts involving children besides Pete. Some of these

extraneous acts allegedly took place in states other than Texas, and in one case, Good

was convicted of the offense of indecent behavior with a juvenile—his daughter

Farah—in Louisiana.

On appeal, Good raises only one issue: that the trial court reversibly erred by

admitting evidence of the out-of-state conviction for indecent behavior with a juvenile

to prove character conformity pursuant to Article 38.37 of the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure.2 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.37, § 2(b). Because we

To protect the complainant’s identity, see Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3), we refer to
1

him and his family members—except for Good—by pseudonyms.
2
Good phrases his sole appellate issue as, “The trial court reversibly erred in
admitting evidence and testimony pertaining to out-of-state extraneous offenses under
Article 38.37 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.” But in the argument and
summary of the argument sections of his brief, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h), (i), he
complains only about the admission of the Louisiana conviction under Article 38.37.

2
hold that any error Good raises was harmless, we overrule his issue and affirm the

trial court’s judgments.3

I. BACKGROUND

Good does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

convictions. To inform our harm analysis, however, we provide a summary of the

evidence at trial.

A. Pretrial Investigation

Although the exact timeline of events leading up to the charges against Good

in the present case are not clear from the record, it is apparent that in 2012, Good’s

then wife, Mary, decided to separate from him. In 2013, Farah made an outcry to

Mary, who reported it to the police. Michael Weber, at the time an investigator at the

Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office, was assigned to work on the case. During

his investigation, Weber interviewed Pete, who revealed that he too had sexually

abused Farah but also claimed that he had been sexually abused by his older

stepbrothers4 and, on one occasion, by Good. The District Attorney’s Office decided

to treat Pete as a victim rather than a perpetrator. They did not pursue charges

Although Good was charged, convicted, and sentenced under one cause
3

number, the trial court entered a separate judgment for each count.

Good and Mary had two biological children—Farah and Stephen—together.
4

Before Farah and Stephen were born, Good and Mary adopted Mary’s sister’s
children: Jordan, Stewart, and Ellie. Before his marriage to Mary, Good had been
married to Pete’s biological mother. Pete is younger than Jordan, Stewart, and Ellie
but older than Farah and Stephen.

3
against Pete for sexual abuse of Farah but instead obtained arrest warrants for Good

related to the allegations of sexual assault of Pete.

A grand jury later indicted Good on two counts of aggravated sexual assault of

a child, one count of attempted aggravated sexual assault of a child, and two counts of

indecency with a child by contact for his alleged sexual abuse of Pete. Prior to trial,

the State waived the attempted aggravated sexual assault count.

B. Pete’s Testimony at Trial

At trial, Pete testified that he was physically abused as a child. He explained

that, if he got a bad grade in school, then he “typically got whooped or something like

that.” Pete testified to one specific occasion when Good had checked his binder

when he came home from school and noticed that Pete had a bad grade. Good took

him to their bedroom5 in the very back of the house, sat Pete on the bed, and “gave

[him] an ultimatum, that [they] c[ould] either do it the hard way and [Pete] c[ould] get

[his] ass beat, or [they] c[ould] do it another[,] easier way.” Pete chose “the easier way

because [he] didn’t want to get beat[en].”

According to Pete’s testimony, Good then “left the room . . . and . . . came

back with something” that Pete identified as lubricant. At Good’s instruction, they

both fully undressed. Good then asked Pete to perform oral sex on him. At first Pete

“didn’t feel comfortable with it,” so Good then “proceeded to demonstrate on” Pete

Pete explained that, at the time, he, Good and Mary were living with Good’s
5

stepfather. Good, Mary, and Pete shared a bedroom in the “very back” of the house.

4
by grabbing Pete’s penis and putting his mouth on it. Good “then asked [Pete] to do

it” to him and “had [Pete] lean forward and put [his] mouth on” Good’s penis, but

Pete did not like this and got up. Good then “put on a small thing of lubricant[,] and

then he put [Pete] on top of him,” facing away from him and penetrated his anus.6

Pete recalled at trial that this “hurt” and that he “was complaining that it was hurting.”

After Good finished, he told Pete “not to tell anybody and that it was a secret

between” them. Pete testified that after this, nothing else happened sexually between

the two of them but that the physical abuse continued.

Pete testified that he was later sexually abused by Stewart and Jordan and that

Stewart was his primary abuser.7 Pete recounted that Good had “caught” him and

Stewart on one occasion. According to Pete, Good “asked [them] what happened

individually” and then told them that “everything was okay and it was perfectly

normal.”

Finally, Pete testified that after being sexually abused by Good, Jordan, and

Stewart, he had engaged in sexual contact with Farah, who was ten years his junior,

“[a]bout two or three times.” He could not remember how old Farah was when he

had this sexual contact with her but testified that “[s]he was walking and talking at the

6
While Pete did not expressly testify that Good penetrated his anus, in response
to the State’s question, “Does he say anything to you before he penetrates your anus?”
Pete testified, “He -- he said something. I just don’t remember exactly what he said.”
7
He testified that Jordan had abused him “three times in Fort Worth” and that
Stewart’s abuse continued until Stewart left the house.

5
time.”8

C. Evidence of Good’s Extraneous Offenses and Other Acts

At a hearing outside the jury’s presence, the trial court heard testimony from

three witnesses and received exhibits pertaining to Good’s extraneous conduct. The

first of the three witnesses to testify at the hearing was Corporal Abbas Safdar with

the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office. The State used him to authenticate Good’s

Louisiana conviction for indecent behavior with a juvenile.

Farah, 21 years old by the time of trial, was the next witness, and she provided

copious testimony related to extraneous offenses that Good had committed against

her. According to Farah, she was “[a]bout five” years old when Good started sexually

abusing her. She remembered sitting alone on the couch and watching TV in Good’s

master bedroom and looking over at Good, who “ha[d] this look on his face.” She

related that at the time she was “sucking on [a] lollipop,” and Good then “pull[ed] out

his cock” and told her “to suck it,” but when Pete walked into the room, Good

“quickly cover[ed] it up.” Once Pete left the room, though, she proceeded to

“[p]erform oral” by putting her mouth on his penis.

Farah testified that this became a frequent occurrence and that Good made her

perform oral sex on him until she was around nine or ten years old. She also recalled

8
He admitted that he had lied to Weber about sexually abusing Farah, first by
denying it altogether and then by telling him that it was only one time. Pete stated
that he was aware that what he did to Farah would have been considered aggravated
sexual assault of a child.

6
him once “performing anal,” clarifying that his penis went inside her anus. She

described being on her hands and knees and “just waiting for it to be over.”

Additionally, Farah testified that Good would touch her vagina with his hands and put

his mouth on her vagina and perform oral sex on her. She thought that this was

normal behavior and said that it got to a point where she started “instigating the

situation.”

Farah also related that Good had made her watch porn with him “multiple

times.” According to Farah, she “would just walk into his bedroom, he would have

[her] sit on his lap, and he would pull up porn. Sometimes it was adults on the videos.

Sometimes it was kids on kids or kids on older men. And [during this time] he would

have [her] spread . . . [her] legs and would rub” her.

Farah testified that Good sexually abused her in Texas, Louisiana, and

Arkansas, but Farah had difficulty remembering which acts occurred in which state.

She testified that “maybe the lollipop part” happened in Texas but that they had

“moved from Texas to Louisiana, back to Texas, and back to Louisiana a lot and --

back to -- Texas, Louisiana, back to Texas, and then [to] Arkansas.”

The final witness at the hearing Kaitlyn—the daughter of Mary’s best friend—

also provided abundant testimony regarding extraneous conduct on Good’s part.

Kaitlyn, who was 32 years old at the time of trial, testified that there were “numerous”

times when she was a child that Good did or said something inappropriate with or

around her. For example, she said that when she was about five or six, he would walk

7
around without his shirt on at the house and ask her if it made her feel

uncomfortable. She also said that there were times where she did not want to go

outside to play because it was hot, and “so the deal was that if [she] would sit in his

lap, [then she] didn’t have to go outside and play.” She estimated that she probably

sat in his lap “between 10 and 20” times before she stopped going over to that house.

Kaitlyn recalled another instance when she was about six years old when Good

saw her “sitting under a blanket with a male family friend around [her] age.” She said

that afterwards Good had told her mother what he had seen and that she had gotten

in trouble. According to Kaitlyn, Good later told her “that he had done that because

he was jealous of the little boy.”

Kaitlyn also testified that after both families had moved to Florida and were

living together,9 Good had had her sit in his lap and shown her “orgy porn.” She said

that she was in third grade at that time and “got really freaked out.” She further

testified that on about six occasions, when she was around “eight or nine” he would

make her change clothes in front of him.

Kaitlyn also testified that at the same home in Florida, she would get up in the

middle of the night and use the bathroom, “and [Good] would tell [her] the next day

While the details of their housing situation were not made clear at the hearing,
9

when Kaitlyn later testified before the jury, she explained how her family and Good’s
family moved to Florida and wound up living together because Good and Mary
“couldn’t find jobs.” She testified that in Florida, she and her mother and brother
shared a three-bedroom townhome with Good, Mary, and Pete.

8
that he [had] heard [her] going to the bathroom and that he [had] thought about [her]

while [he] and [Mary] were having sex.” Kaitlyn further testified that there was a hole

in the master bedroom closet, “almost like a safe had been there,” and he had told her

that he wanted her “to climb in there and listen to him and [Mary] have sex.”

Kaitlyn then testified to one incident when he had fondled her in a car:

We had been at the beach all day in Clearwater. We were going home.
My mom was driving. [Mary] was in the passenger [seat]. [Good] was
behind [Mary], then me, then the two boys. I had a romper on[,] and it
had buttons down the front. And we had changed out of our bathing
suits, so I didn’t have anything on underneath. And I woke up[10] and
the romper was completely unbuttoned[,] and his hands were on my
vagina.

She clarified that Good had made “skin-to-skin contact” with “the outside of [her]

vagina and labia.” As she explained, “the entire time [that they] were in Florida, he

was creepy.”

Finally, Kaitlyn testified that after they had moved back to Texas, at the same

house where Pete alleged Good had sexually abused him, Good “somehow pinned

[her] down to the bed [in the room where she was supposed to sleep] and rubbed

himself . . . on [her] lower half.”

At the conclusion of the hearing, Good objected to the admission of his

Louisiana conviction, all of Farah’s testimony except “the one potential lollipop

incident that might have happened in Texas where she described oral sex,” and all of

Kaitlyn later explained at trial that she had fallen asleep after having been at
10

the beach all day.

9
Kaitlyn’s testimony except “the incident . . . where he rubbed himself against her,”

which allegedly occurred in Texas. The trial court ruled all three witnesses’ testimony

admissible under Article 38.37, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 38.37, § 2(b), and

gave Good a running objection. Thereafter, Corporal Safdar, Farah, and Kaitlyn

provided essentially the same testimony in the jury’s presence.

D. Mary’s Testimony at Trial

At trial, Mary testified that she married Good in 1998. They adopted Jordan,

Stewart, and Ellie, who were her sister’s children, in 2003. Then they had Farah and, a

few years later, Stephen. She confirmed that Pete got in trouble at school a lot and

that Good was physically abusive to him “[a]t times.”

Mary related that she and Good “got in a fight” regarding infidelity in 2012 and

that she left him. A year later, Farah told her that Good had been sexually abusing

her, and Mary confronted Good via text message about the allegations. Redacted

copies of Mary and Good’s text message exchange from 2013 were admitted into

evidence. In those text messages, Mary made graphic, accusatory statements

regarding Farah’s allegations, and Good responded with tacit admissions and

apologies.11

11
In one of his texts to Mary, Good said, “I don’t recall any of that,” but
elsewhere in the same exchange, he made inculpatory statements in response to the
accusations. For example, in response to Mary’s text mentioning Farah by name and
asking him “why did u do it,” Good texted simply, “I did.” Elsewhere in the
exchange, Good responded to Mary’s accusations and questions about the alleged
abuse by stating that he had “stopped.”

10
After texting with Good, Mary met with Weber. In Weber’s presence, Mary

called Good on her phone. An audio recording of that phone call was admitted into

evidence, and a redacted version was played for the jury. In that recording, Good

admitted to sexually molesting Farah multiple times in Arkansas but denied having

molested Pete.

II. ANALYSIS

Central to Good’s lone appellate issue is the purpose for which the State

wanted his Louisiana conviction admitted into evidence: to prove that Good acted in

conformity with his bad character. Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) provides that

evidence of an extraneous crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible for this

purpose. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(1) (“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not

admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion

the person acted in accordance with the character.”). But Article 38.37 of the Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure provides an exception to this rule in cases involving

sexual or assaultive offenses alleged to have been committed against minors:

Notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, . . .
evidence that the defendant has committed a separate offense described
by Subsection (a)(1) or (2)[12] may be admitted in the trial of an alleged

12
Subsection 2(a) of the statute makes Subsection 2(b) applicable only to the
trial of a defendant for (1) an offense, including indecency with a child and aggravated
sexual assault of a child, under any of certain listed provisions of the Texas Penal
Code that criminalize sexual conduct involving a child or children or (2) “an attempt
or conspiracy to commit” such an offense. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.37,
§ 2(a).

11
offense described by Subsection (a)(1) or (2) for any bearing the
evidence has on relevant matters, including the character of the
defendant and acts performed in conformity with the character of the
defendant.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.37, § 2(b).

To support his argument that “the very text of Article 38.37 specifically

excludes the admission of foreign convictions under Article 38.37,” Good references

Texas’s other statutes that contain clauses allowing the use of convictions from other

states only if they are “substantially similar” to the listed Texas offenses, see Tex. Penal

Code Ann. § 12.42(c)(2)(B)(v); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.003(a), and points

out that Article 38.37 does not contain a similar clause. Good thus contends that

because the Louisiana statute under which he was convicted is not specifically listed in

Subsection 2(a)(1) or (2) of Article 38.37, his conviction was not admissible. See Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.37, § (2)(a)(1), (2).

But even assuming that the trial court erred by admitting Good’s Louisiana

conviction for character-conformity purposes under Article 38.37, we are not

persuaded that any such error is reversible.

Subsection 2(a) has been amended since Good’s trial. Act of May 23, 2025,
89th Leg., R.S., ch. 806, S.B. 1212, §§ 4, 6, art. 38.37 (codified at Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 38.37, § 2(a)). Because our analysis is confined to whether Good was
harmed by the admission of his extraneous conviction for character-conformity
purposes, we need not discuss the changes to the statute.

12
Because the error complained of here is not constitutional,13 we apply Rule

44.2(b).14 Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). That Rule requires us to disregard any

nonconstitutional error that does not affect Good’s substantial rights. Id. A

substantial right is affected when the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 518 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005); see King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing

Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1253 (1946)). Conversely, an error

does not affect a substantial right if the appellate court has a fair assurance from an

examination of the record as a whole that the error did not influence the jury or that it

had but a slight effect. Macedo v. State, 629 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

In deciding that question, we consider (1) the character of the alleged error and how it

might be considered in connection with other evidence, (2) the nature of the evidence

Generally, the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence is
13

nonconstitutional error governed by Rule 44.2(b) if the trial court’s ruling merely
offends the rules of evidence. See Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2001); see also Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
Because Good contends that Article 38.37 does not allow for admissibility of the
Louisiana conviction, his argument boils down to whether this evidence violates Rule
404(b)(1).
14
Good concedes that the “appropriate harm analysis is . . . the one set out in
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b).” See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). The State
does not provide a harm analysis, but under Rule 44.2(b) (nonconstitutional error),
neither the defendant nor the State has the burden to prove harm or harmlessness as
to whether the appellant’s substantial rights were affected; rather, the reviewing court
has the duty to assess harm by independently examining the record as a whole. Loch v.
State, 621 S.W.3d 279, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

13
supporting the verdict, (3) the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating

guilt, and (4) whether the State emphasized the complained-of error. Id.; Motilla v.

State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We may also consider the jury

instructions, the State’s theory and any defensive theories, closing arguments, and

even voir dire, if applicable. Haley, 173 S.W.3d at 518–19; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–

56.

Looking at the other evidence admitted at trial, it is difficult to conceive that

Good’s Louisiana conviction made the difference between the jury convicting him or

acquitting him on even one of the counts. The jury heard graphic testimony from

Farah and Kaitlyn that Good had performed multiple different sexual acts on them

when they were children and—in Farah’s case—had made her perform oral sex on

him, her own father.

The jury also heard on the recorded phone call that:

• Good admitted to Mary that he had instructed Farah to put his penis in her

mouth and that she had performed oral sex on him and touched his penis.15

• Farah was “around seven” when this happened, and Good had “fooled

around” with her “every so often.”

• Good admitted to rubbing her in her crotch and rubbing his penis “on her anal

Good objected at trial to the audio recording of the phone call but does not
15

complain about its admission on appeal.

14
[sic].”

• Good admitted to putting his “finger in her butthole” one time and that Farah

had caught him looking at pornography multiple times.16

• Good admitted to an incident in Arkansas in which he was asleep in bed with

his “underwear down” and, after having awoken to discover Farah playing with

his penis, he then “touched” Farah and “licked her.”

• Mary repeated Farah’s allegations of Good sexually abusing her in graphic

detail.

• Good admitted to looking at child pornography and that he and Pete “got

naked, and that’s about it.”

• Good alluded to having sex with Jordan.

Thus, from the phone conversation alone the jury not only heard evidence of Good’s

Louisiana conviction for indecent behavior with Farah but also heard extensive details

about his other extraneous conduct. In light of this and other evidence, it is unlikely

that the Louisiana conviction had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s guilty verdict.

Pete’s testimony at trial must also be considered. The State’s case against Good

hinged on Pete’s credibility. And although Pete’s testimony was the only direct

On the recording, Mary can be heard asking Good, “And . . . every time she
16

caught you with it, did you fool around with her?” Good’s immediate response was,
“Not every time, no.”

15
evidence the State had proving the charged offenses and no physical evidence

corroborated his allegations that Good had sexually assaulted him, Good’s only

attempts to impeach Pete—using a letter that Pete had purportedly written to

Good—were thwarted when neither Pete nor Mary authenticated the letter.17

Additionally, Pete provided testimony, without objection, that Good had reacted to

Stewart’s sexual abuse of Pete by telling them that “everything was okay” and that “it

was perfectly normal.”

And we must also consider Good’s defensive theory. At trial, Good advanced

the theory that Pete had fabricated his allegations against Good as a way to avoid

prosecution for his own confessed sexual abuse of his sister Farah. Good’s Louisiana

conviction did nothing to rebut or otherwise undermine this defensive theory or

bolster Pete’s credibility as to his own allegations against Good.

The parties’ closing arguments illustrate how Pete’s testimony—and hence, his

credibility—was the crux of this case. Both the State and defense spent the bulk of

17
Although the trial court refused to admit the letter into evidence when Good
offered it, it was included in the exhibit index of the reporter’s record. On cross-
examination, Pete testified that he “got in trouble when [he] was 16” and “had to go
back to Louisiana.” While he was living in Louisiana, Good wrote him some letters.
Pete denied that he had ever replied to those letters, and when shown the letter
marked Defendant’s Exhibit 1, Pete denied writing it, but he acknowledged that the
envelope he was shown was postmarked May 29, 2014, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
When shown the letter on cross-examination the following day, Mary testified, “This
doesn’t look like [Pete]’s handwriting now. It doesn’t sound like him either. . . . That
doesn’t look like my son’s handwriting. . . . He told me he’s never written his father
ever.”

16
their closing arguments discussing Pete and his allegations, as well as his having

sexually abused Farah but receiving an immunity deal from the State in exchange for

his testimony against Good. Although the State mentioned Good’s “plea of guilty”

and “what he got in Louisiana” in closing, it quickly moved on to other subjects,

including Pete. If anything, the State deemphasized any error in the admission of

Good’s Louisiana case when it argued to the jury at the merits phase of trial that “we

are not here to talk about the appropriate punishment right now, right, or [whether]

what he got in Louisiana was the appropriate punishment. That is for the next phase

[of the trial]. You are just here to simply say, I believe [Pete].”

In contrast, Good’s attorney took a more direct and emphatic approach. In his

closing argument, he acknowledged to the jury that Good had “pled guilty and

received 10 years in Louisiana for what he did to” Farah and later referenced “all

th[ose] horrible, disgusting things other than what [the jury had] heard [Pete] testify

about” and told the jury that “the law allows you to hear that under the theory that,

hey, somebody did it once, they’re more likely to do it again, right?”

We do not mean to suggest that Good’s concerns regarding the influence this

evidence would have had on the jury were unfounded. During voir dire, Good asked

the venire the following scaled question:

So a person who sexually abused a child will reoffend. So a 10 would be
strongly agree. That’s, yeah, you did it once, you’re absolutely going to
do it again, there’s no stopping you, okay? A 0 would be absolutely not,
you know, nobody is ever going to reoffend and then everything in
between there, okay?

17
The 12 venirepersons who ended up comprising the jury gave answers to this

question ranging from 6 to 8, indicating that they believed it more likely than not that

a person who had sexually abused a child would reoffend. However, this does not

mean that the admission of Good’s Louisiana conviction harmed him. We have no

way of knowing from the record how much weight the extraneous conviction carried

with the jury relative to all the other evidence of Good’s extraneous sexual conduct.

And the jury might not have considered the conviction at all. The jury charge

contained an instruction that forbade them from considering the Louisiana conviction

as evidence of character conformity—the very purpose for which the State sought

admission of the evidence under Article 38.37:

You are instructed that if there is any testimony before you in this case
regarding the defendant’s having committed crimes, wrongs or acts
other than the crime alleged in the indictment in this case, you cannot
consider said testimony for any purpose unless you find and believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed such other
crimes, wrongs or acts, if any were committed, and even then you may only
consider those other crimes, wrongs or acts in determining the proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identi[t]y, or absence of mistake or
accident, if any, in connection with the crimes alleged in the indictment in this case and
for no other purpose. [Emphasis added.]

Because we must presume that a jury follows a trial court’s instructions

regarding the consideration of evidence, Upchurch v. State, 656 S.W.3d 170, 182 n.6

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, no pet.), we would ordinarily presume that the jury

only considered the testimony about Good’s Louisiana conviction if they found and

believed beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed the offense of indecent

18
behavior with a juvenile against Farah in Louisiana.

But here there is an ambiguity in the jury charge. The next paragraph following

the instruction we have quoted above reads as follows:

You are instructed that if there is any testimony before you in this case
regarding the defendant’s having committed offenses, wrongs, or acts
other than the offenses alleged against him in the indictment in this case,
you cannot consider said testimony for any purpose unless you find and
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed such
offenses, wrongs, or acts, if any were committed, then (1) you may consider
these acts for any purpose on relevant matters, including the character of the
Defendant and acts performed in conformity with the character of the Defendant, or
(2) to consider the state of mind of the defendant and the child as well as
the previous and subsequent relationship between the defendant and the
child, if any. [Emphasis added.]

This instruction conflicts with the preceding instruction regarding the purposes for

which the jury could consider the Louisiana conviction. And we have no way of

knowing from this record how the jury resolved this ambiguity. If they followed the

first instruction, then they did not consider Good’s Louisiana conviction as evidence

that he acted in conformity with his character; if they followed the second instruction,

then they may have considered the conviction as such. But without more, the jury

charge does not support a holding that Good’s substantial rights were affected by the

admission of his prior Louisiana conviction.

We conclude our harm analysis by noting that Good did not object when

Weber testified regarding the Louisiana conviction on direct examination:

Q. Okay. Did you later come to find out that most of what happened
with [Farah] happened in Louisiana and Arkansas?

19
A. That’s correct.

Q. Okay. Is it your understanding the defendant was prosecuted
for that in Louisiana?

A. That’s correct.

Q. And what’s your understanding of what he received over
there?

A. I believe ten years.

Q. Okay. As a result of a plea deal?

A. Yes, ma’am.

A trial court’s erroneous admission of evidence will not require reversal when other

such evidence was received without objection, either before or after the complained

of ruling. Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).18

We conclude that, in the context of the entire case against Good, any error in

the trial court’s admitting Good’s Louisiana conviction for character-conformity

purposes under Article 38.37 did not have a substantial or injurious effect on the

jury’s verdict and did not affect Good’s substantial rights. See King, 953 S.W.2d at

271–73. Because we must disregard the error, if any, we overrule Good’s lone

appellate issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b).

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Although Good had received a running objection to Corporal Safdar’s,
Farah’s, and Kaitlyn’s testimonies about his extraneous conduct at the conclusion of
the hearing outside the jury’s presence, Weber did not testify at that hearing. Thus,
his trial testimony was outside the ambit of Good’s running objection.

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III. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Good’s issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth
Chief Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: February 26, 2026

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