Adam Horwitz v. City of Denton, Our Daily Bread, Inc., Sara Hensley, Jesse Kent, MacK Reinwand, Devin Alexander, Amanda Brown, Wendy McGee, Alva Santos, Melvin Franklin, Demone McClinton, Tricianne Brooks, Woody Graham, Mark Dotson, Ken Tesch, Mauricio Orozco, Jenna Edwards

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-26-00025-CV
___________________________

ADAM HORWITZ, Appellant

V.

CITY OF DENTON, OUR DAILY BREAD, INC., SARA HENSLEY, JESSE
KENT, MACK REINWAND, DEVIN ALEXANDER, AMANDA BROWN,
WENDY MCGEE, ALVA SANTOS, MELVIN FRANKLIN, DEMONE
MCCLINTON, TRICIANNE BROOKS, WOODY GRAHAM, MARK DOTSON,
KEN TESCH, MAURICIO OROZCO, JENNA EDWARDS, Appellees

On Appeal from the 442nd District Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. 25-7897-442

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Adam Horwitz, proceeding pro se, attempts to appeal the trial

court’s (1) “Order Granting Defendant City of Denton’s First Amended Plea to the

Jurisdiction” and (2) “Order Granting Defendant City of Denton’s First Amended

Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss.” Both orders were signed by the trial court on

October 13, 2025; therefore, the notice of appeal from these orders was due

November 3, 2025. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b) (providing that “in an accelerated

appeal, the notice of appeal must be filed within 20 days after the judgment or order is

signed”), 28.1(a) (“Appeals from interlocutory orders . . . are accelerated appeals.”),

(b) (stating that accelerated appeal is perfected by filing notice of appeal within time

allowed by Rule 26.1(b) and that motion for new trial will not extend time to perfect

accelerated appeal); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8)

(permitting appeals from interlocutory orders that grant or deny plea to jurisdiction by

governmental unit). However, Horwitz did not file his notice of appeal until

January 9, 2026, making it untimely. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b), 28.1(b).

“An interlocutory order that is not timely appealed is not reviewable by this

court.” CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Morrison Homes, 337 S.W.3d 437, 441 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied). Without a timely filed notice of appeal or

extension request, we do not have jurisdiction over the appeal, and we must dismiss it.

See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b), 26.1(b), 26.3; Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex.

1997); Howlett v. Tarrant County, 301 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009,

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pet. denied) (op. on reh’g); see also Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005)

(“[P]ro se litigants are not exempt from the rules of procedure.”).

We sent Horwitz two letters notifying him of our concern that we lack

jurisdiction over this appeal because his notice of appeal was untimely. We warned

him that we could dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction unless he filed a

response showing grounds for continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3.

Horwitz filed a response, but it does not show grounds for continuing the appeal.

In his response, Horwitz asserts that his notice of appeal was timely because he

had timely filed a motion for new trial in the trial court, thus extending the deadline to

file his notice of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a)(1); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(a)

(providing time for filing motion for new trial). But a motion for new trial does not

extend the deadline to file a notice of appeal from an interlocutory order. Tex. R.

App. P. 28.1(b). Thus, Horwitz’s motion for new trial did not extend the

November 3, 2025 deadline to file his notice of appeal, and his January 9, 2026 notice

of appeal was untimely.1 See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b), 28.1(b).

1
Horwitz contends that he “reasonably believed” that his motion for new trial
extended the deadline to file his notice of appeal because the trial court’s docket
labeled the orders as “Final Order/Judgment.” But the docket also labels these orders
as “partial case closing,” and the orders themselves dismissed Horwitz’s claims as to
only six of the seventeen named defendants, leaving unresolved parties and claims. See
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001) (concluding that a final
judgment is one that finally disposes of all claims and all parties). Accordingly, the
orders were not final, see id., and Horwitz’s belief to the contrary does not make his
notice of appeal timely. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b), 28.1(b); see also Wheeler, 157

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Because Horwitz’s notice of appeal was untimely, we dismiss this appeal for

want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

Per Curiam

Delivered: March 19, 2026

S.W.3d at 444 (noting that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural rules as
attorneys).

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