In the Interest of A.M., J.M., and K.W., Children v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-26-00083-CV
___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF A.M., J.M., AND K.W., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 233rd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 324-751165-24

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant J.A. (Mother) challenges the termination of her parental rights to

three of her children: A.M. (Amy), J.M. (John), and K.W. (Kim).1 Mother argues that

the evidence was neither legally nor factually sufficient to support the trial court’s

termination findings (1) that she, among other things, endangered the children by her

course of conduct, and (2) that termination was in the children’s best interest. But the

evidence showed that Mother had a near-decade-long pattern of not only dating

abusive men but also downplaying their violent actions—even after an ex-boyfriend

killed one of her children. Because this evidence was sufficient to support the trial

court’s findings, we will affirm.

I. Background

The evidence at Mother’s termination bench trial showed that she had been in

a series of relationships with violent men since before the children were born.

• In approximately 2016 and 2017, Mother dated Amy’s father, D.M. (First
Boyfriend). Although Mother later claimed that First Boyfriend never
“physically” beat her, she admitted that they “had altercations.” And just a few
months after Amy was born in mid-2017, First Boyfriend pleaded guilty to
misdemeanor assault family violence for hitting Mother.2

• In 2018 and 2019, Mother dated John’s father, J.M. (Second Boyfriend). While
they were living together, Second Boyfriend violently beat Mother and left

At the time of trial, Amy was 8, John was 6, and Kim was between 3 and 4.
1

First Boyfriend was also convicted of misdemeanor assault for hitting
2

Mother’s sister around the same time.

2
visible injuries. At trial, Mother acknowledged that Amy and John3 had been
“in close vicinity when [Second Boyfriend] was beating [her],” and she further
admitted that Second Boyfriend had assaulted her “[m]any” other times during
their relationship. Second Boyfriend was ultimately convicted of misdemeanor
assault family violence for “kicking, . . . striking, grabbing, or pushing” Mother.
[Formatting altered.]

• After Mother and Second Boyfriend broke up, she attempted to pick up Amy
and John from a mutual friend’s home, and Second Boyfriend pulled a gun on
her outside the house while the children were steps away inside.

• By 2020, Mother had begun dating S.N. (Third Boyfriend). Mother later
admitted that she “had heard things” about Third Boyfriend being a violent,
“dangerous person” and that he “was disciplining the kids behind [her] back.”
But Mother insisted that she “was never shown any proof” of Third
Boyfriend’s violence and that she had no way of knowing that he would turn
out to be a murderer.

• After Mother and Third Boyfriend broke up,4 Mother had two additional
children: Z.A. (Zack)—who later died, and is thus not a party to this case—
and Kim. Mother later explained that Kim’s father was “a one-night
stand . . . in Las Vegas” and that she “ha[d] no way of knowing” who the man
was.

• In 2024, even though Mother and Third Boyfriend had broken up, Third
Boyfriend continued living with Mother’s mom (Grandmother).5 And Mother
routinely left her children at Grandmother’s home for extended periods of
time, knowing that Third Boyfriend lived there.6 Then, one day, while the

3
John was born in 2019 before the incident.
4
There was conflicting testimony regarding when Mother and Third Boyfriend
broke up. A Department investigator recalled Mother giving an end date in 2020, a
caseworker recalled her identifying an end date in 2022, and Mother testified to an
end date in 2021.
5
There was evidence that Grandmother was living in a hotel at the time.

A Department caseworker testified that, according to the children, they lived
6

with Grandmother. But according to Mother, her children spent about half their time
at Grandmother’s home due to Mother’s overnight work schedule. She later

3
children were staying with Grandmother—and Third Boyfriend—Third
Boyfriend murdered then-three-year-old Zack.

• When Zack died, he had bruises all over his body, and the surviving children—
Amy, John, and Kim—exhibited bruises as well. Amy, John, and Kim were
removed from Mother’s care.

• At the time of the children’s removal in May 2024, Mother was dating D.W.
(Fourth Boyfriend), who again, was abusive. Yet, even after Zack’s death and
the children’s removal, Mother remained in her abusive relationship with
Fourth Boyfriend.

• In July 2024, while Mother was pregnant with Fourth Boyfriend’s child,7
Fourth Boyfriend choked her and punched her in the stomach. But when a
Department caseworker asked Mother about Fourth Boyfriend a few months
later, she stated that “there[ had] been no domestic violence between [them].”

• Then, in September 2024, Mother began a relationship with M.T. (Fifth
Boyfriend).8 During their relationship—which continued for more than a year,
through the start of the termination trial—Fifth Boyfriend “kicked [Mother],
punched [her], bit [her], held a gun to [her],” and “held [her] hostage,” among
other things.

• In August 2025, Fifth Boyfriend confronted Mother at the door to her
apartment, accused her of cheating, dragged her by her dress into the
apartment, beat her with a cord, prevented her from accessing her phone to call
for help, held a loaded gun to her head, and threatened to kill her.9 But just

explained that, at the time, she worked for “a temp service” that sent her out to
“various jobs” in the “medical” field.
7
Mother testified that she later decided to terminate the pregnancy.
8
In July 2025, Mother gave birth to Fifth Boyfriend’s child: M.D.T. (Mike).
Mother’s parental rights to Mike were not adjudicated as part of this case and are
instead the basis of a companion case.
9
After Mother escaped to a local gas station and called the police, they arrested
Fifth Boyfriend and searched Mother’s apartment. Under a couch cushion, the police
found the weapon that Mother had described—a loaded miniature AK-47 with an
extended magazine and a live round in the chamber.

4
one day later, Mother pretended that Fifth Boyfriend’s assault had never
happened, telling a Department caseworker that it had been months since the
last incident of domestic violence between her and Fifth Boyfriend.

• Although Fifth Boyfriend was arrested for assaulting Mother and prohibited
from “[c]ommunicating [with her] in any manner,”10 Mother continued
communicating with him while he was in jail, telling him that she “loved him”
and “wanted to make the relationship work.”
When the termination trial began in November 2025, First Boyfriend was in

prison for robbery causing bodily injury (following earlier misdemeanor convictions

for assaulting Mother and her sister); Second Boyfriend was in prison for a drug-

related offense (following a prior misdemeanor conviction for assaulting Mother);

Third Boyfriend was in jail awaiting trial for Zack’s murder; Fourth Boyfriend was in

prison for his 2024 assault on Mother; and Fifth Boyfriend was in jail awaiting trial

for, among other things, his 2025 assault on Mother. Yet, Mother was still in contact

with Fifth Boyfriend and was still downplaying her other boyfriends’ violence.

But her attitude changed as the trial progressed. The trial testimony was spaced

out over several months, and by the time Mother testified in February 2026, she had

begun to change.

Mother explained that, in recent weeks, she had stopped communicating with

Fifth Boyfriend, had begun domestic violence classes, had taken trauma-related

10
The protective order prohibiting Fifth Boyfriend from communicating with
Mother provided, in bold capital letters, that “no person, including a person who is
protected by this order, may give permission to anyone to ignore or violate [it].”
[Formatting altered.]

5
intervention training, and had implemented a safety plan in case of future domestic-

violence-related emergencies.

But Mother admitted that her life was still unstable. She had been arrested at

least four times while the termination case was pending,11 including on the day she

was originally scheduled to testify. And when Mother testified on the rescheduled

trial date, she acknowledged that her recent arrest had been for driving without a valid

license12 and that, in fact, she had been driving without a valid license for years—

including while the children were in her care.13

Mother further admitted that she had worked as a prostitute in 2025 while the

termination case was pending.14 And although she insisted that her stint as a

prostitute had been short-lived, she acknowledged that some of her advertisements

11
Although the record is ambiguous regarding the reasons for Mother’s arrests,
she claimed that one of her arrests had been for failing to give accurate identification
to law enforcement and that the other three arrests stemmed from her failures to
respond to prior tickets or appear at scheduled court hearings.
12
Mother testified that she had received a ticket for driving without a license
and that “they had [her] sit out [the ticket] that day.”
13
Mother stated that she had “never had a valid driver’s license.”
14
There was also evidence that, during one of Mother’s arrests in 2025, she told
a law enforcement officer that she worked as a “dancer” and that such work was how
she had earned the large quantity of $1 bills in her purse. But when Mother testified,
she explained the $1 bills by saying that she had been hired to dance—clothed—at “a
bachelorette party” and that “they were just throwing money at the party.”

6
might still be posted online,15 and a family friend testified that Mother had been

posting prostitution advertisements on Facebook for years.

In addition to Mother’s concerning employment history, she admitted that she

did not have a physical home to offer the children. She had lived in various locations

during the case’s pendency, bouncing from a hotel to Grandmother’s home to an

apartment. At the time of trial, Mother had been evicted from her apartment and was

living with Grandmother again.

After hearing this and other evidence, the trial court found that (1) Mother had,

among other things, “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with

persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the[ir] physical or emotional

well-being,”16 and (2) termination was “in the children’s best interest.”17 See Tex. Fam.

Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (2).

II. Discussion

A trial court may terminate a parent–child relationship if it finds clear and

convincing evidence (1) that the parent committed at least one statutorily delineated

15
Mother explained that the advertisements “never come down, they stay up”
and that only the website host—not Mother—has the ability to remove them.
16
The trial court also found that Mother had “knowingly placed or knowingly
allowed the child[ren] to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger[ed]
the[ir] physical or emotional well-being.” See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D).

The trial court also terminated the parental rights of each child’s father, but
17

none of the fathers have appealed.

7
predicate act, such as “engag[ing] in conduct or knowingly plac[ing] the children with

persons who engage[] in conduct which endanger[s] the[ir] physical or emotional well-

being,” and (2) that termination is in the children’s best interest. See id.; In re A.C., 560

S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tex. 2018). Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of

these termination findings.

A. Standard of Review

When an appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of a trial court’s

termination findings, we assess whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a

firm belief or conviction that the challenged findings were true. A.C., 560 S.W.3d at

630–31; In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502–03 (Tex. 2014). Both legal and factual

sufficiency turn on this question; the distinction between the two “lies in the extent to

which disputed evidence contrary to a finding may be considered.” A.C., 560 S.W.3d

at 630–31.

For legal sufficiency, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the

challenged finding, and for factual sufficiency, we consider the disputed evidence that

a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding and weigh its

significance in light of the entire record. Id. at 631; A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 502–03; In re

P.P.-S., No. 02-23-00309-CV, 2024 WL 123654, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan.

11, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). Neither sufficiency analysis allows us to supplant the

factfinder’s credibility determinations with our own, though. In re J.D., No. 02-24-

00404-CV, 2025 WL 52128, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 9, 2025, no pet.)

8
(mem. op.). The factfinder—here, the trial court—remains the sole judge of the

witnesses’ credibility. Id.; P.P.-S., 2024 WL 123654, at *4.

B. Endangerment Finding18

Mother first challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to

support the trial court’s predicate finding of conduct-based endangerment, i.e., its

finding that she “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons

who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the[ir] physical or emotional well-being.”

See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

1. Law on Conduct-Based Endangerment

To support a trial court’s finding of conduct-based endangerment, the evidence

must demonstrate that the parent engaged in a “voluntary, deliberate, and conscious

course of conduct” that “jeopardize[d]” the children’s well-being or “expose[d] the

child[ren] to loss or injury.” E.A., 2025 WL 1085189, at *8–9; J.D., 2025 WL 52128,

at *11; see In re E.K.H., No. 09-21-00376-CV, 2022 WL 1037766, at *9 n.46 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Apr. 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re E.A.G., No. 14-01-01046-

CV, 2002 WL 31525633, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 14, 2002, no

pet.) (not designated for publication). Because this finding requires a “course of

18
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s
other predicate finding as well, but because a trial court’s termination judgment may
be sustained on just one predicate finding, we need not address Mother’s challenge to
the other finding. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; In re E.A., No. 02-24-00535-CV, 2025 WL
1085189, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 10, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

9
conduct” rather than a “single act or omission,” the factfinder may consider “actions

before the child[ren]’s birth[s], actions while the child[ren are] not in the parent’s

presence,” and actions that are not “directed towards the child[ren].” J.D., 2025 WL

52128, at *11; E.A.G., 2002 WL 31525633, at *3; see E.A., 2025 WL 1085189, at *8–

10.

2. Evidence of Conduct-Based Endangerment

Mother argues that her relationships with violent men did not amount to

conduct-based endangerment because (1) “there [wa]s no evidence that the children

were present during the[] incidents” of domestic abuse and (2) she “was the victim,

not the perpetrator.” But these arguments are not only (1) legally and factually

inaccurate but also (2) representative of Mother’s problematic mindset.

First, “[t]he factfinder may consider domestic violence . . . as evidence of

endangerment, even if the violence did not occur in the children’s presence, was not

directed at the children, or did not physically injure the children.” E.A., 2025 WL

1085189, at *9–10 (affirming endangerment findings based in part on evidence of

domestic violence); see E.A.G., 2002 WL 31525633, at *5 (explaining that the trial

court could consider abuse of other relatives or children in conduct-based

endangerment analysis “even if the child [at issue] was not always present”). Thus,

Mother’s “history of involving herself in relationships with violent men” could

constitute an endangering course of conduct even if the children had never been

present to witness the abuse. In re N.H., No. 02-22-00157-CV, 2022 WL 4374638, at

10
*10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming

endangerment findings in part based on evidence of domestic violence); see P.P.-S.,

2024 WL 123654, at *5 (reiterating that “[e]vidence that a parent ‘exposed her

children to domestic violence’ may also support a finding of [conduct-based]

endangerment”).

But the record reflects that Amy, John, and Kim were, in fact, present for some

of the domestic violence incidents. Mother acknowledged that, when Second

Boyfriend assaulted her in 2019, Amy and John were in the vicinity. And it is

undisputed that, when Third Boyfriend murdered Zack at Grandmother’s home in

2024, Amy, John, and Kim were at the home as well. See E.A.G., 2002 WL 31525633,

at *5 (noting that “violent acts directed towards one child can endanger other children

not the direct victims of the physical abuse in question”). Indeed, a Department

caseworker indicated that, when Zack died, the surviving children exhibited bruises

indicative of abuse and that “they opened up to [the caseworker] and told [her] what

was going on” the first time she met them.

Mother’s failure to acknowledge this evidence dovetails with her second

argument—and is symptomatic of her larger issue. Mother asserts that she “was the

victim, not the perpetrator” and insists that she should not be faulted for her “status

as a victim of domestic violence.” But while Mother may have started as a victim, at

some point she became a volunteer.

11
No doubt Mother was a victim of violence, but she was also an adult—an adult

mother with the responsibility of protecting her children. See E.A., 2025 WL

1085189, at *14 (rejecting similar argument in analysis of children’s best interest and

explaining that “[a] reasonable factfinder . . . could wholly agree with [m]other that

she was the victim of [f]ather’s domestic violence but fault her for remaining with

[f]ather”); In re C.H., No. 10-23-00402-CV, 2024 WL 2862135, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Waco June 6, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting similar argument in analysis of

children’s best interest and explaining that, while mother might be a victim, the

“children were victims as well,” and mother “[wa]s an adult who was responsible for

the[ir] physical and emotional well-being”); P.P.-S., 2024 WL 123654, at *6–7

(rejecting similar argument that mother “was the victim of [f]ather’s violence” and

explaining that, “[w]hile this may be true, [m]other took deliberate actions to maintain

contact with [f]ather”). Rather than recognizing and fulfilling her parental

responsibilities, the evidence showed that Mother chose to expose herself—and her

children—to a series of violent men while turning a blind eye to the threats those men

posed to her children:

• In mid-2019, Mother chose to have a romantic relationship with Second
Boyfriend and to allow him to live with her and her children. Amy and John
were directly exposed to Second Boyfriend’s violence when he beat Mother
while the children were nearby.

12
• From 2020 to 2021, Mother chose to date Third Boyfriend, despite hearing
warnings that he was violent. Rather than acknowledging the threat he posed,19
Mother chose to leave her children at Grandmother’s home while Third
Boyfriend lived there, directly exposing the children to a violent man who
ultimately killed her son Zack.

• In 2024, Mother chose to bring another abusive man into her and her
children’s lives: Fourth Boyfriend. And even after Amy, John, and Kim were
removed from Mother’s care, she chose to continue her abusive relationship
with Fourth Boyfriend.

• Later, when Mother became pregnant, she chose to expose her unborn baby to
Fourth Boyfriend’s violence. Fourth Boyfriend punched Mother in her
stomach and “strangled her,” yet when a Department representative asked her
about the assault, Mother downplayed it.

• Mother then chose to begin a relationship with yet another abusive man: Fifth
Boyfriend. Within days of Fifth Boyfriend’s violently beating Mother, holding
a gun to her head, and threatening to kill her, she told a Department
caseworker that she had not been the victim of any domestic violence for
several months, showing no recognition of the threat that he posed.

• Even after the termination trial began—as Mother urged the trial court to find
that her conduct did not endanger her children—she continued telling Fifth
Boyfriend that she “wanted to make the relationship work.”
This evidence demonstrated that Mother repeatedly and voluntarily engaged in

violent relationships all the while ignoring the jeopardy that these relationships posed

to her children’s well-being. See E.A., 2025 WL 1085189, at *10 (affirming

endangerment findings based in part on evidence of continued relationship with

19
On appeal, Mother repeatedly refers to Third Boyfriend’s murder of Zack as
“unforeseeable,” asserting that there was no evidence that she knew Third Boyfriend
was violent. But Mother admitted that she had been warned that Third Boyfriend was
violent, and a Department caseworker testified that, at the time of Zack’s death, Amy,
John, and Kim exhibited visible bruises suggestive of physical abuse.

13
domestic abuser and explaining that “[a]lthough aware of [f]ather’s violence, [m]other

continued to expose herself to it and would expose the children to it”); E.A.G., 2002

WL 31525633, at *5 (noting that parents’ attempt “to conceal their history of [mutual]

domestic abuse” was “evidence of an unwillingness to take responsibility and ensure

the child’s future safety”). And evidence that a parent has consistently “exposed her

children to domestic violence may . . . support a finding of [conduct-based]

endangerment . . . [—]even [though] the parent is the victim of the domestic

violence[—]when that parent continues to expose the children to the violence and

does not take affirmative steps to eliminate the potential harm to the children.” C.H.,

2024 WL 2862135, at *1–2 (affirming conduct-based endangerment finding based in

part on mother’s pattern of exposing children to domestic violence); cf. In re M.G.P.,

No. 02-11-00038-CV, 2011 WL 6415168, at *11–12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 22,

2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding evidence of domestic violence insufficient to

support conduct-based endangerment finding when mother did not continue the

relationship with her abuser and “took precautions to protect herself”).

Here, such evidence—whether viewed in a light most favorable to the

endangerment finding or weighed in the context of the record as a whole—allowed

the trial court to reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Mother engaged in a

deliberate course of conduct that endangered her children’s well-being. See Tex. Fam.

Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E); P.P.-S., 2024 WL 123654, at *6–7 (affirming conduct-based

endangerment finding and explaining that “[m]other deliberately exposed the children

14
to domestic violence in the home and . . . failed to protect [them] from [f]ather’s

violence”); E.A.G., 2002 WL 31525633, at *5 (affirming conduct-based endangerment

finding based in part on mother’s “history of domestic violence[ and] her misleading

statements designed to mitigate that history”); E.K.H., 2022 WL 1037766, at *7–9

(affirming conduct-based endangerment finding based in part on evidence of “an

ongoing pattern of domestic violence, a pattern [m]other was contributing to by

ignoring and creating a danger to [the child’s] physical safety and emotional well-

being”). In other words, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support

the trial court’s predicate finding of conduct-based endangerment. See Tex. Fam.

Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

We overrule this issue.

C. Best Interest Finding

Mother next challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to

support the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest.

See id. § 161.001(b)(2).

1. Law on Best Interest

In assessing the children’s best interest, the “paramount” consideration is their

need for a safe, stable, permanent home. E.A., 2025 WL 1085189, at *12–13; see

A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631 (noting that the best interest inquiry “is child-centered and

focuses on the child’s well-being, safety, and development”); E.K.H., 2022 WL

1037766, at *9 (noting presumption that “the prompt and permanent placement of

15
the child in a safe environment is . . . in the child’s best interest”). Although we

presume that it is in the children’s best interest to keep them with their mother, see

E.A., 2025 WL 1085189, at *11, we consider other factors as well, including (1) the

emotional and physical danger to the children; (2) the mother’s parental abilities;

(3) the acts or omissions of the mother that indicate an improper parent–child

relationship and the excuses given for those acts or omissions; (4) the children’s

emotional and physical needs; and (5) the overall stability—or instability—of the

mother’s home.20 Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); E.A., 2025

WL 1085189, at *11.

2. Evidence of Best Interest

Mother argues that termination was not in the children’s best interest because

she had taken steps to protect her children and to improve her parental abilities. See

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (listing best interest factors including the parent’s

parental abilities and the programs available to assist the parent). She notes that, as

the termination trial progressed, she cut off communication with Fifth Boyfriend,

participated in domestic violence classes, took trauma-intervention training, and

implemented a safety plan. But such efforts were measured in weeks, compared to

Mother’s concerning pattern of conduct, which was measured in years. See In re R.H.,

No. 02-19-00273-CV, 2019 WL 6767804, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 12,

These factors are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. E.A., 2025 WL 1085189,
20

at *11.

16
2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting in best interest analysis that parent’s recent

participation in self-improvement programs was “commendable” but that it

“reflect[ed] only four weeks in a forty-three-year lifetime”).

As previously discussed, the evidence showed that Mother consistently invited

violent men into her children’s lives while failing to acknowledge the threat those men

posed—much less to protect her children from that threat. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at

371–72 (listing best interest factors including the danger to the children, the parent’s

acts or omissions that indicate an improper parent–child relationship, and the parent’s

excuses for the acts or omissions); In re O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d 896, 908 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2019, no pet.) (reviewing best interest finding and concluding that because the

mother “exposed the children to a harmful and unstable home environment by

repeatedly engaging in relationships with men who engaged in domestic violence

against her[,] . . . the trial court could have found that the existing parent–child

relationship between [her] and the children [wa]s not a proper one”); E.A.G., 2002

WL 31525633, at *6 (reiterating that “the child’s best interest [is] served by being free

of an environment of domestic violence”). “The children needed a safe and stable

home and a mother who did not allow a violent person into the home.” P.P.-S., 2024

WL 123654, at *8 (affirming best interest finding in case involving domestic violence

and noting that “[t]he domestic violence in [m]other’s home created both emotional

and physical risks for the children”). This near-decade-long pattern of conduct not

only jeopardized the children’s physical safety and emotional well-being but also

17
reflected poorly on Mother’s parental abilities by demonstrating her unwillingness to

take the steps necessary to protect them. Cf. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (listing

parental abilities as best interest factor); E.A., 2025 WL 1085189, at *15 (noting in

best interest analysis that mother’s “remaining with [f]ather despite the domestic

abuse . . . reflected poorly on her parental abilities”); P.P.-S., 2024 WL 123654, at *8

(noting in best interest analysis that mother lacked parental abilities because, though

she “appeared to be concerned about the domestic violence happening in front of the

children, she was ‘not concerned enough to make [the father] leave’”); O.E.R., 573

S.W.3d at 908 (concluding in best interest analysis that the evidence showed the

mother had “poor parenting skills” when “she failed to protect the children from

domestic violence or provide them with a safe home environment”). Despite

Mother’s eleventh-hour efforts to change, a reasonable factfinder could nonetheless

have inferred that Mother’s established pattern of unprotective conduct would

continue. See R.H., 2019 WL 6767804, at *5 (“A fact[]finder may measure a parent’s

future conduct by h[er] past conduct and determine that it is in a child’s best interest

to terminate h[er] parental rights.”); O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d at 907 (“A fact finder may

infer that past conduct endangering the well-being of a child may recur in the future if

the child is returned to the parent.”); E.A.G., 2002 WL 31525633, at *8 (affirming

best interest finding in case involving parents’ mutual domestic violence and noting

that “the trial court did not have to accept as true the mother’s testimony of her

future intentions or recent alterations in lifestyle”).

18
In addition, there was evidence of Mother’s inability to provide for her

children’s basic physical needs. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (listing best interest

factors including the children’s physical needs and the parent’s plans for the children).

She had lived in various locations since the children’s removal, and at the time of trial,

she was living with Grandmother. See C.H., 2024 WL 2862135, at *3 (noting in best

interest analysis that parents “had lived in multiple locations . . . throughout the

proceedings” and “were not in a position to have the children returned to them”);

O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d at 908 (noting in best interest analysis that the mother’s “plan for

the children to be returned to her [wa]s not realistic in part because she was . . . living

with her grandparents at the time of trial”). Mother herself admitted that she did not

have a safe, stable home to offer the children. See E.A.G., 2002 WL 31525633, at *7

(affirming best interest finding in case involving parents’ mutual domestic violence

and emphasizing “[t]he need for permanence” and “the goal of establishing a stable,

permanent home for a child” as “paramount”). And “[c]hildren need permanency

and stability.” In re G.M., No. 02-23-00061-CV, 2023 WL 4243349, at *8 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth June 29, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d at

907 (“[P]ermanence is of paramount importance in considering a child’s present and

future needs.”).

The evidence raised questions regarding Mother’s source of income as well.

She admitted having worked as a prostitute in the past—including while the

termination case was pending—and although she claimed that she had stopped such

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work, she acknowledged that the advertisements for her services remained online. Cf.

C.H., 2024 WL 2862135, at *3 (noting in best interest analysis that parents “had

various jobs throughout the proceedings”); P.P.-S., 2024 WL 123654, at *8 (noting in

best interest analysis that mother provided “no proof of employment” to show that

“she could provide the children with permanency and stability”); O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d

at 908 (considering mother’s employment as part of best interest analysis and

describing mother’s “plan for the children to be returned to her [wa]s not realistic in

part because she was unemployed”).

In addition, there was evidence that she had routinely exposed herself to the

risk of arrest by engaging in other illegal behavior as well. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at

371–72 (listing best interest factors including the stability of the parent’s home); E.A.,

2025 WL 1085189, at *18 (noting in best interest analysis that the father had

“compromised his availability to parent the children when his conduct resulted in a

new felony indictment”). Mother was arrested at least four times while the

termination case was pending, and she admitted that she had been driving without a

valid driver’s license for years—including when the children were in her care. Even at

the time of trial, Mother still did not have a valid license. And when she was asked

“what [would] happen[] to these kids if suddenly they’re with [her] and [she] g[o]t

arrested,” she acknowledged that the Department might “[p]ossibly” have to come

retrieve them, exposing them to further instability.

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Meanwhile, the trial court heard evidence of two potential stable placements

for the children.21 Both placements would allow all of the children to live together,

both agreed to care for the children long-term, and one was interested in adoption.

Taking all of this evidence together—the evidence of Mother’s pattern of

endangering the children, lack of protective parental abilities, unstable housing,

questionable employment, and consistent arrests—a reasonable factfinder could have

formed a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the children’s best interest.

Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(2). Whether we view the record in a light most

favorable to the judgment or consider it as a whole, the evidence was sufficient to

support the trial court’s best interest finding. See id.

We overrule Mother’s final issue.

21
One of the potential placements was a friend of Mother’s who had cared for
the children for extended periods of time both before and during the case’s pendency.
However, the children were removed from the friend’s care and she lost her foster
license due to allegations of misconduct. Although there was evidence that the
allegations of misconduct had been either remedied or ruled out by the time of trial,
both the Department and the children’s ad litem expressed concerns regarding other
alleged misconduct and potential financial strains. When the trial court announced its
ruling at the end of the termination trial, it indicated that the Department could
review the options and place the children “as [it] s[aw] fit.”

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III. Conclusion

Because the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s termination

findings, we affirm the termination judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth
Chief Justice

Delivered: June 4, 2026

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