Ray Douglas Griffith v. Lindsay D. Steele and Steele Law Firm PLLC

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-26-00045-CV
___________________________

RAY DOUGLAS GRIFFITH, Appellant

V.

LINDSAY D. STEELE AND STEELE LAW FIRM PLLC, Appellees

On Appeal from the 348th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 348-370088-25

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr, J.; and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Ray Douglas Griffith sued his former bankruptcy attorney and her

firm, Appellees Lindsay D. Steele and Steele Law Firm PLLC (collectively Steele), for

legal malpractice and negligence when an involuntary dismissal of Griffith’s Chapter

13 bankruptcy case led to his losing his family ranch at a foreclosure sale in the gap

before his bankruptcy case was reinstated. Steele moved to dismiss Griffith’s claims

under Rule 91a—a motion the trial court granted. At issue in this appeal is whether

the trial court properly determined that limitations barred Griffith’s claims against

Steele. Because the trial court correctly ordered dismissal on that basis, we will affirm.

I. Background

A. The Alleged Legal Malpractice1

Over 20 years ago, Griffith bought around 200 acres in Cisco, Texas, that he

described as his “beloved family ranch” and that became his father’s “final resting

place.” Griffith financed the ranch’s purchase with a loan from Lone Star Bank.

In late 2018, Griffith began experiencing financial difficulties, and he engaged

Steele to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case on November 4, 2019. Griffith filed for

bankruptcy primarily to protect his interest in his ranch. To that end, upon his filing,

1
The underlying facts are disputed, but because this appeal involves a Rule 91a
motion, we take as true Griffith’s allegations about Steele’s malpractice. See Tex. R.
Civ. P. 91a; City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016).

2
the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic-stay provision successfully stopped a foreclosure

sale that Lone Star had scheduled for the next day. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.

But on December 4, 2019, the bankruptcy court dismissed Griffith’s Chapter

13 case after he missed a December 2 deadline to file certain documents with the

bankruptcy court. Griffith alleged that he had attempted to speak or meet with Steele

“to get her the information needed to continue with the bankruptcy,” and he further

alleged—“[u]pon information and belief”—that he had given her the needed

documents by the filing deadline. According to Griffith, despite his efforts, Steele

failed to meet the filing deadline or to seek a filing extension, resulting in the case’s

dismissal.

Regardless of who is to blame, the automatic stay ended upon the case’s

dismissal, and Lone Star resumed its foreclosure efforts. Steele moved on December

9 to reinstate the bankruptcy case, but she did not also request an expedited

reinstatement, so no bankruptcy stay existed to prevent Lone Star’s proceeding with a

foreclosure sale. Griffith’s ranch was sold at a January 7, 2020 foreclosure sale.2 Seven

days later, the bankruptcy court reinstated Griffith’s bankruptcy case, at which time

the automatic stay went back into effect.

Seeking to “undo the results of [Steele’s] negligence” and to recover what he

had lost during the “gap” in which the automatic stay was not in place, Griffith hired

The ranch sold for $102,000. It was valued at around $510,000, and Griffith
2

owed Lone Star around $94,000.

3
another attorney to initiate an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court against

Lone Star for breach of contract and wrongful foreclosure. The bankruptcy court

ruled in Lone Star’s favor. Griffith appealed first to the district court, which affirmed,

and he appealed next to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which also affirmed in a

January 30, 2023 decision. 3

Griffith’s pleadings do not indicate that Steele was involved in the adversary

proceeding, but he alleged that she represented him in his Chapter 13 case “in his

initial filing, through his bankruptcy’s reinstatement in mid-January 2020, and during

his bankruptcy plan, conveying information and maintaining [her] representation of

him.” When Griffith received the notice of his plan’s completion on November 13,

2024, Steele filed the motion for entry of a discharge order, which the bankruptcy

court signed on December 30, 2024.

B. The Legal-Malpractice Lawsuit

On September 11, 2025, Griffith sued Steele for legal malpractice and

negligence. In response, Steele filed a Rule 91a dismissal motion, arguing that the

two-year statute of limitations had expired before Griffith had filed suit. Specifically,

Steele argued that Griffith’s claims accrued on December 4, 2019, when the

bankruptcy court dismissed Griffith’s Chapter 13 case and the stay ended—the event

3
See Griffith v. Lone Star FLCA (In re Griffith), No. 19-44562-MXM-13,
2021 WL 2389671 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 10, 2021), aff’d sub nom. Griffith v. Lone Star
FLCA, No. 4:21-cv-0825-P, 2022 WL 1289559 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2022), aff’d,
No. 22-10527, 2023 WL 1095133 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 2023) (per curiam).

4
that enabled Lone Star to sell the ranch at foreclosure during the gap created by

Steele’s not requesting the case’s expedited reinstatement. She alternatively argued that

Griffith’s claims accrued “at the latest” on January 7, 2020—the date of the

foreclosure sale.

Steele’s Rule 91a motion also preemptively addressed the potential applicability

of the tolling doctrine recognized in Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d

154 (Tex. 1991). Steele quoted from Hughes: “[W]hen an attorney commits malpractice

in the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of

limitations on the malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals on

the underlying claim are exhausted.” Id. at 157. She argued that the adversary

proceeding in the bankruptcy case was the litigation resulting from the alleged

malpractice and that the Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling on

January 30, 2023. Steele thus argued that even if the Hughes tolling doctrine applied,

Griffith’s September 11, 2025 filing came too late.

Griffith amended his petition to plead the Hughes tolling doctrine and

responded to Steele’s Rule 91a motion. Among other things, he argued that the

reinstated bankruptcy case was the resulting litigation under Hughes, that Steele had

represented Griffith through the bankruptcy court’s December 30, 2024 discharge

order, and that he had filed the underlying malpractice suit within two years of that

date. Griffith replied and among other things (1) distinguished the adversary

proceeding from the overall bankruptcy case and (2) argued that Steele’s continued

5
representation of Griffith in the bankruptcy case after he had exhausted his appeals in

the adversary proceeding did not impact the limitations analysis.

After considering the parties’ filings, the trial court determined that Griffith’s

claims were “barred by the statute of limitations,” granted Steele’s Rule 91a motion,

and dismissed Griffith’s claims against Steele with prejudice. Griffith appealed.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Griffith raises a single issue: whether “Steele’s continuing

representation of Griffith, throughout the bankruptcy in which he contends

malpractice occurred, toll[ed] the statute of limitations on his legal[-]malpractice

claim.” He maintains that “[s]o long as [Steele was] representing [him] in the same

bankruptcy case from which his malpractice claim arose, the statute of limitations was

tolled as to such claim.” Thus, he argues that the trial court erred by granting Steele’s

Rule 91a motion. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review Governing Rule 91a Motions

A party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it has no

basis in law or fact. Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1. A court may also grant a Rule 91a motion

on limitations grounds. See Quinn v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 02-22-00191-CV,

2023 WL 3749932, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 1, 2023, no pet.). Such

motions are permissible when the limitations affirmative defense is “conclusively

established by the facts in a plaintiff’s petition.” Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds,

Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651, 656 (Tex. 2020).

6
Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 91a “if the allegations, taken as true,

together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to

the relief sought . . . [or if] no reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded.”

Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d at 724 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a). We review a Rule 91a motion’s

merits de novo because the availability of a remedy under the facts alleged is a

question of law and because the rule’s factual-plausibility standard is akin to a

legal-sufficiency review. Id.

Rule 91a.6 does not allow a trial court to consider evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P.

91a.6; Galindo v. Peterson, No. 02-23-00268-CV, 2024 WL 1792377, at *2, *5, *6 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Apr. 25, 2024, pet. denied). The trial court’s factual inquiry is

limited to “the pleading of the cause of action” and any pleading exhibits permitted by

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Tex. R. Civ. P. 59, 91a.6; see Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at

656; Fiamma Statler, LP v. Challis, No. 02-18-00374-CV, 2020 WL 6334470, at *8 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Oct. 29, 2020, pet. denied). If a claimant’s factual allegations in his

pleadings, taken as true, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those

allegations do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought, then the claim has no basis

in law. Fiamma Statler, 2020 WL 6334470, at *8. But the trial court’s legal inquiry is not

as limited. See Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656. In its legal inquiry, a trial court may

additionally consider the substance of the dismissal motion and any arguments

presented at the hearing. See id. at 655.

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B. Legal Malpractice and the Statute of Limitations

Negligence and legal-malpractice claims are governed by a two-year statute of

limitations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a); Zive v. Sandberg, 644 S.W.3d

169, 174 (Tex. 2022). Limitations begin to run when the claim accrues, see Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a), and other than in cases governed by the discovery

rule, a claim accrues when the claimant sustains a legal injury, see Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at

156; see also Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 120 (Tex. 2001). A claim’s accrual

date is a legal question. Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 623 (Tex. 2011).

In addition to determining accrual, we also consider whether the limitations

period has been tolled. In Hughes and Apex, the supreme court announced an

equitable-tolling rule governing an attorney’s malpractice “in the prosecution or

defense of a claim that results in litigation”: “[T]he statute of limitations on the

malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals on the underlying claim

are exhausted,” Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 157, “or the litigation is otherwise finally

concluded,” Apex, 41 S.W.3d at 119.4 Adding to this general rule, in Zive, the court

enunciated that “Hughes tolling applies only to all appeals in which the malpractice

plaintiff participates.” Zive, 644 S.W.3d at 179. Accordingly, Hughes tolling ends on the

4
The court later extended the Hughes rule to toll limitations during the pendency
of a third-party suit. See Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Brown, 821 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex. 1991)
(involving a client’s suit against its lawyers based on the lawyer’s actions in a
foreclosure sale that had precipitated a wrongful-foreclosure suit against the client).

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date on which the court where the underlying claim is pending rules on the

malpractice plaintiff’s last action regarding that claim. See id.

C. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Overview

Griffith’s legal-malpractice case concerns his bankruptcy attorney’s conduct

leading up to and during the gap between the dismissal and reinstatement of his

Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. “Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code affords individuals

receiving regular income an opportunity to obtain some relief from their debts while

retaining their property,” Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 498, 135 S. Ct. 1686,

1690 (2015), and a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is “an exchanged for bargain between

the debtor and the debtor’s creditors,” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Oparaji (In re Oparaji),

698 F.3d 231, 238 (5th Cir. 2012). A debtor “must propose a plan to use future

income to repay a portion (or in the rare case all) of his debts over the next three to

five years.” Bullard, 575 U.S. at 498, 135 S. Ct. at 1690. In exchange, the debtor can

retain his property, and, “[i]f the bankruptcy court confirms the plan and the debtor

successfully carries it out, he receives a discharge of his debts[,]” id., giving the debtor

a “fresh start,” Harris v. Viegelahn, 575 U.S. 510, 513, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1835 (2015).

We mention three other pertinent aspects of the process:

First, once a debtor files for bankruptcy, an automatic stay arises in the

debtor’s favor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); Campbell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 545 F.3d

348, 353 (5th Cir. 2008). The stay prohibits “all entities” from making collection

efforts against the debtor or his bankruptcy estate’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). In

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essence, the automatic stay guarantees “‘breathing room’ for a debtor and the

bankruptcy court to institute an organized repayment plan,” Brown v. Chesnut (In re

Chesnut), 422 F.3d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chase Manhattan Bank USA NA v.

Stembridge (In re Stembridge), 394 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2004)), and “[i]t allows for the

equitable disbursement of estate property among creditors,” id. (citing Reliant Energy

Servs., Inc. v. Enron Can. Corp., 349 F.3d 816, 825 (5th Cir. 2003)).

But if a Chapter 13 case is closed or dismissed, “the automatic stay terminates.”

In re Carlsson, No. 24-51952, 2024 WL 4806638, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Nov. 1,

2024) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)); Richard D. Davis, L.L.P. v. Knott,

No. 14-17-00257-CV, 2019 WL 438788, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

Feb. 5, 2019, pet. denied). A “pre-discharge dismissal . . . returns the parties to the

positions they were in before the case was initiated.” Oparaji, 698 F.3d at 238 (citation

modified). Thus, the “return to pre-bankruptcy rights enables creditors to resume

debt collection and other acts to protect their interests.” In re Orosco, No. 19-60038,

2020 WL 6054695, at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2020).

Although the Bankruptcy Code and Rules do not expressly provide for the

reinstatement of a dismissed case, debtors can seek reinstatement as “a judicially

created fiction . . . to spare [them] the burden of filing a new case.” Id. at *5 (quoting

In re Murphy, 493 B.R. 576, 579 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013)). One consequence of a

Chapter 13 case’s being dismissed and later reinstated is that if a secured creditor took

action against a debtor’s property in the gap before reinstatement, the automatic stay

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will not be retroactively applied to undo the creditor’s actions. Id.; Frank v. Gulf States

Fin. Co. (In re Frank), 254 B.R. 368, 374 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2000). This “balance[s] the

rights of both the debtor and the creditors.” Orosco, 2020 WL 6054695, at *8 (quoting

Murphy, 493 B.R. at 580).

Second, bankruptcy disputes take two distinct forms: (1) contested matters

initiated by filing a motion in the main bankruptcy case; and (2) adversary proceedings

initiated by filing a complaint creating “a separate lawsuit treated similarly to a civil

suit outside of bankruptcy.” In re CTLI, LLC, 534 B.R. 895, 905 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.

2015) (citing Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 762–63 (5th Cir. 1995)).

Bankruptcy Rule 7001 lists the types of disputes that can be resolved in an adversary

proceeding, including a proceeding to recover money or property. Fed. R. Bankr. P.

7001(a).

Treated as “free[]standing lawsuit[s]” that are “totally separate from the

bankruptcy case,” In re Roberts, 570 B.R. 532, 537 n.12 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2017),

[a]dversary proceedings are not filed in bankruptcy cases. Adversary
proceedings are filed separately from a bankruptcy case. An adversary
proceeding can be filed long after a bankruptcy case has been filed and
even after a bankruptcy case has been closed. An adversary proceeding is
given its own adversary proceeding number[,]

Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Rodriguez), 396 B.R. 436, 454–55 (Bankr.

S.D. Tex. 2008). “Consistent with adversary proceedings being distinct from the

underlying bankruptcy [case], an order disposing of an adversary proceeding is

appealable as a final order, even though the bankruptcy case has not ended.” Cox v.

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Richards, No. 3:16-CV-00668, 2017 WL 7693446, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2017)

(citing Smith v. Seaside Lanes (In re Moody), 825 F.2d 81, 85 (5th Cir. 1987)), aff’d, 761 F.

App’x 244 (5th Cir. 2019); Tiburon Land & Cattle, LP. v. Stephens, 675 B.R. 14, 16 (N.D.

Tex. 2025).

Because “adversary proceedings are discreet judicial units,” a litigant must

appeal the adversary proceeding’s final ruling and cannot wait to appeal it in the main

bankruptcy case. Kreit v. Quinn (In re Cleveland Imaging & Surgical Hosp., L.L.C.),

26 F.4th 285, 293 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Dorsey v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Dorsey),

870 F.3d 359, 362 (5th Cir. 2017)). Once final, bankruptcy-court orders generally

operate to preclude relitigating the decided issues. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323,

334, 86 S. Ct. 467, 475 (1966) (“The normal rules of res judicata and collateral

estoppel apply to the decisions of bankruptcy courts.”); Blum v. Restland of Dall., Inc.,

971 S.W.2d 546, 550–51 & nn.12–17 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. denied)

(discussing the finality of bankruptcy-court orders and their potential preclusive

effect).

Third, and finally, Chapter 13 “[d]ebtors have an affirmative, ongoing duty to

disclose all assets, including contingent and unliquidated claims and potential causes

of action.” U.S. ex rel. Long v. GSD&M Idea City LLC, No. 3:11-CV-1154-O,

2014 WL 11320447, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 10, 2014), aff’d sub nom. U.S. ex rel. Long v.

GSDMIdea City, L.L.C., 798 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2015). When a Chapter 13 bankruptcy

case is filed, “the bankruptcy estate includes, among other property, ‘all legal or

12
equitable interests of the debtor in property.’” In re Hazlewood, 570 B.R. 557, 560–

61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2017) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)). Chapter 13 estates also

include “all property . . . that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case

but before the case is closed, dismissed[,] or converted . . . whichever occurs first.” Id.

at 561 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)).

Thus, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate includes any causes of action belonging

to the debtor before and after filing the bankruptcy case but before it is closed,

dismissed, or converted. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), 1306(a); La. World Exposition v. Fed.

Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233, 245 (5th Cir. 1988) (concerning pre-petition claims); Hazlewood,

570 B.R. at 561 (discussing post-petition claims); see also In re Wilson, 555 B.R. 547,

550 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2016). And this would include the debtor’s legal-malpractice

claims—potentially even those involving the debtor’s bankruptcy counsel. See, e.g.,

Jackson v. Marlette (In re Jackson), 317 B.R. 573, 575 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004) (concluding

that debtor’s malpractice claim against his former bankruptcy counsel—whether it

arose pre-petition or post-petition—was property of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy

estate); cf. Johnson, Blakely, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, P.A. v. Alvarez (In re Alvarez),

224 F.3d 1273, 1277, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a legal-malpractice claim

arising from Chapter 7 bankruptcy counsel’s alleged pre-petition negligence accrued at

the moment of filing and was the estate’s property); Macon v. Meredith (In re Macon),

669 B.R. 626, 650–59 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2025) (analyzing post-petition

13
legal-malpractice claim and determining that it was not Chapter 13 estate property

because of the case’s closure).

D. Analysis

Both parties agree that Griffith’s legal-malpractice claim is governed by a

two-year statute of limitations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a); Zive,

644 S.W.3d at 174. In addition, they do not dispute when Griffith’s legal-malpractice

claim accrued. Steele argued in his Rule 91a motion that the claim arose either on

December 4, 2019—the date the bankruptcy case was first dismissed—or at the latest

on January 7, 2020—the date of the foreclosure sale, and Griffith offered no

counter-position. Because the accrual date is not disputed, we assume without

deciding that the trial court correctly applied the later January 7, 2020 accrual date. See

Shield v. Bio-Synthesis, Inc., No. 02-21-00160-CV, 2022 WL 2840111, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth July 21, 2022, no pet.).

Turning to the Hughes tolling doctrine’s application, we consider Griffith’s

contention that “Steele’s continuing representation of [him] throughout the

bankruptcy [case] in which he contends malpractice occurred[] toll[ed] the statute of

limitations on his legal-malpractice claim.” The flaw in Griffith’s position is that the

adversary proceeding he initiated to “undo the results of [Steele’s] negligence” was a

freestanding lawsuit, totally separate from the overall bankruptcy case. See Zale Corp.,

62 F.3d at 762–63; Roberts, 570 B.R. at 538; CTLI, 534 B.R. at 905; Rodriguez, 396 B.R.

at 454–55.

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The bankruptcy court’s order in the adversary proceeding was a final,

appealable order that operated to preclude relitigating the issues decided concerning

the ranch foreclosure sale. See Cleveland Imaging & Surgical Hosp., 26 F.4th at 293;

Moody, 825 F.2d at 85; Tiburon Land & Cattle, 675 B.R. at 16. Applying the Hughes rule

“categorically” in a “clear and strict manner”—as we must—when the Fifth Circuit

issued its January 30, 2023 decision, Griffith had exhausted his appeals on the

underlying claim resulting from Steele’s alleged malpractice, and that litigation—the

adversary proceeding—was finally concluded. See Zive, 644 S.W.3d at 179; Apex,

41 S.W.3d at 119; Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 157.

Griffith insists that the trial court should have looked beyond the adversary

proceeding and to the overall bankruptcy case, in which Steele continued to represent

him through his December 30, 2024 discharge. He argues that “[t]here is no precedent

for determining that a Chapter 13 debtor must sue his own attorney to keep the

statute of limitations from running on his malpractice claim.” But this is not entirely

accurate.

Neither party has found a case similar to this one in which a Texas court has

addressed a legal-malpractice claim after the conclusion of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy

case in which a party initiated an adversary proceeding to undo his bankruptcy

counsel’s alleged negligence occurring in the Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. 5 Nor have

5
Griffith cites Guillot v. Smith for the proposition that we should look to the
conclusion of his Chapter 13 bankruptcy case as the operative date under Hughes, but

15
we. But because Chapter 13 debtors have an affirmative, ongoing duty to disclose

estate assets—including both pre-petition and post-petition legal-malpractice claims—

Griffith was required to disclose any alleged legal-malpractice claim against Steele

arising out of the foreclosure sale during the pre-reinstatement gap period. 6 See

11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), 1306(a); Alvarez, 224 F.3d at 1277, 1279–80; La. World

Exposition, 858 F.2d at 245; Hazlewood, 570 B.R. at 561; Wilson, 555 B.R. at 550; Jackson,

317 B.R. at 575.

Griffith also predicates his argument on whether Hughes’s policy aims would be

served by applying its tolling rule to the bankruptcy case’s final conclusion instead of

the adversary proceeding’s final conclusion.7 But the supreme court has rejected such

the debtor in Guillot—a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case—did not initiate an adversary
proceeding to litigate the issue that the debtor’s lawyer had allegedly caused through
post-petition conduct. 998 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no
pet.). In addition to this critical procedural difference, we also note that Chapter
13 estates are broader than Chapter 7 estates and include post-petition property. In re
Easley-Brooks, 487 B.R. 400, 408 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). So the theoretical conflicts
concerns that the court outlined in Guillot are dissimilar to what confronted Griffith,
who was required in his Chapter 13 case to disclose his potential claim against his
bankruptcy counsel in that case. 998 S.W.2d at 633.
6
We do not know whether Griffith disclosed such a claim.
7
He argues that

[i]f Griffith had initiated a lawsuit against his bankruptcy counsel while
the Chapter 13 was still pending, with Steele representing him, she would
almost certainly have withdrawn, because the continuing representation
presented her with a conflict between (1) acting in Griffith’s interest and
ensuring he completed his plan, and (2) acting in her own interests,
where her exposure for malpractice could be mitigated by Griffith’s

16
an approach, advising that “without re-examining whether the policy reasons behind

the tolling rule apply in each legal-malpractice case matching the Hughes paradigm,

courts should simply apply the Hughes tolling rule to the category of legal-malpractice

cases encompassed within its definition.” Apex, 41 S.W.3d at 122. So too, we similarly

reject Griffith’s suggestion that we decide whether use of the Hughes rule is justified

for policy reasons. See J.M.K. 6, Inc. v. Gregg & Gregg, P.C., 192 S.W.3d 189, 198 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

Here, once the adversary proceeding reached its final conclusion, resulting in

the loss of the ranch, Griffith had exhausted his appeals and had no further legal

options against Lone Star in the adversary proceeding or in the overall bankruptcy

case. See Zive, 644 S.W.3d at 175. As Steele points out, Griffith “offers no explanation

of how any ruling in the Chapter 13 bankruptcy [case] could have altered the outcome

of the adversary proceeding or the resulting damages.” Thus, if Griffith believed that

Steele’s negligence caused him to lose the ranch—in addition to his affirmative,

ongoing obligation to disclose that potential claim against Steele in his bankruptcy

case—when the adversary proceeding concluded, he was on the clock to file a

legal-malpractice case against Steele.

Because Griffith delayed filing suit until more than two years from the

adversary proceeding’s final conclusion, he sued too late. We thus conclude that the

default on his plan, and dismissal of his case without discharge of his
debts.

17
trial court correctly determined that his claims were barred by limitations and properly

granted Steele’s Rule 91a motion. We overrule Griffith’s sole issue.

III. Conclusion

Having overruled Griffith’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s order granting

Steele’s Rule 91a motion and dismissing Griffith’s claims against Steele with prejudice.

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice

Delivered: June 18, 2026

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