Jerome Yancey v. the State of Texas

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-23-00251-CR

Jerome Yancey, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 460TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-DC-19-300876, THE HONORABLE SELENA ALVARENGA, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Jerome Yancey guilty of murder, and the trial court assessed the

sentence at forty years in prison. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(c). Appellant contends that the

evidence is insufficient to have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he promoted or assisted

the commission of an aggravated robbery or murder. We will affirm.

BACKGROUND

Appellant went with two other men to the hotel room of Jannerra Antwaun

Williams. Appellant testified that he was planning to buy marijuana from Williams and that one

of the men wanted to pick up his girlfriend. Instead, there was an “explosion” and Appellant’s

group fled the hotel. The State’s theory of the case was that Appellant was part of a group that

set out to rob Williams, and that in the process one of the group killed Williams.
Austin Police Department officer Nathan Taylor responded to a report of an

explosion at the hotel and three males and a female fleeing. He found Williams dead from a

gunshot wound to the head in the doorway of Room 318. Taylor found a shell casing just

outside the room. The medical examiner testified that Williams died from a gunshot to his head

fired from less than three feet. Williams’s mother identified him as the victim in the photos of

the scene.

The bulk of the testimony and evidence relevant to the issue on appeal came from

APD Detective Joshua Griggers, Appellant, hotel surveillance video, Appellant’s recorded

statement, and text messages between Williams and a conspirator. Appellant testified in his

own defense.

APPLICABLE LAW

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, we view all

the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2020). We “consider all of the admitted evidence, regardless of whether it was

properly admitted.” Stahmann, 602 S.W.3d at 577. The jury as factfinder is the sole judge of the

credibility of the witnesses and may choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony

presented. Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The factfinder

“can draw reasonable inferences from the evidence so long as each inference is supported by the

evidence produced at trial,” Stahmann, 602 S.W.3d at 577, and is “free to apply common sense,

knowledge, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life in drawing reasonable inferences

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from the evidence,” Eustis v. State, 191 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2006, pet. ref’d). “When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury

resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination.” Merritt v. State,

368 S.W.3d 516, 525-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

When considering a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, we do not sit as the

thirteenth juror and may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the

weight and credibility of the evidence. Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Tex. Crim. App.

2023). Appellate courts must “determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based

upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most

favorable to the verdict.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

“Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor”

and “can be sufficient” on its own “to establish guilt.” Kiffe v. State, 361 S.W.3d 104, 108 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). “The court conducting a sufficiency review must

not engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the

evidence.” Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Murray

v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)). The evidence is legally insufficient

if “the record contains no evidence, or merely a ‘modicum’ of evidence, probative of an element

of the offense” or if “the evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt.” Kiffe,

361 S.W.3d at 107 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320).

The court instructed the jury that it could find Appellant guilty of felony murder

as a party. A person commits felony murder by performing “an act clearly dangerous to human

life that causes the death of an individual” in the course of and in furtherance of the commission

of a felony other than manslaughter. Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b)(3). A person is criminally

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responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the

conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both. Id. § 7.01(a). The State

sought to prove Appellant’s guilt under Texas Penal Code subsections 7.02(a) or 7.02(b). See id.

§ 7.02. Section 7.02(a)(2) permits finding a defendant criminally responsible for an offense

committed by another if the defendant acted with intent to promote or assist the commission of

the offense by soliciting, encouraging, directing, aiding, or attempting to aid the other person to

commit the offense. Id. § 7.02(a)(2). Section 7.02(b) provides:

If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is
committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually
committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in
furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a
result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.

Id. § 7.02(b). 1

The law of parties may be applied to a case even though no such allegation is

contained in the indictment and “[t]his rule applies not only to the law of parties found in Section

7.02(a)(2) [of the Penal Code] but also the law of parties found in Section 7.02(b),” Montoya

v. State, 810 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).

“Evidence that a defendant knew his co-conspirators might use guns in the course

of the robbery can be sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant should have anticipated the

possibility of murder occurring during the course of the robbery.” Ervin v. State, 333 S.W.3d 187,

201 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (quoting Love v. State, 199 S.W.3d 447,

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After the date alleged in the indictment, the Legislature amended Penal Code § 7.02(b)
to add the following language at the end: “In this subsection, ‘conspiracy’ means an agreement
between two or more persons to commit a felony.” Act of May 24, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch.
735 § 1, 2023 Tex. Gen. Laws 1780, 1780. That amendment, applicable only to offenses
committed on or after September 1, 2023, did not apply to this case. See id. §§ 2, 3.
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453 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d)). In determining whether the accused

participated as a party, the court may look to events occurring before, during, and after the

commission of the offense. Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

Since an agreement between parties to act together in common design can seldom

be proven by words, the State often must rely on the actions of the parties, shown by direct or

circumstantial evidence, to establish an understanding or a common design to commit the

offense. Miller v. State, 83 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet ref’d); see Wygal

v. State, 555 S.W.2d 465, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (holding that circumstantial evidence was

sufficient to show defendant’s guilt as party). Presence at the scene may be considered in

determining whether a defendant was a party to the offense, but mere presence at the scene

without more is insufficient to prove guilt as a party. Valdez v. State, 623 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1979) (op. on reh’g); Miller, 83 S.W.3d at 314.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support beyond a

reasonable doubt a finding that he promoted or assisted the commission of an aggravated robbery

or murder. Though he quotes Penal Code Section 7.02(a)(2) and (b) when setting out the

applicable law, he focuses his discussion on the sufficiency of the evidence under the theory of

criminal responsibility of parties defined by Penal Code Section 7.02(a)(2). He does not

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support party responsibility under Penal Code

Section 7.02(b).

Alternate pleading of the differing methods of committing an offense may be

charged in one indictment. Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

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“When the charge authorizes the jury to convict the defendant on more than one theory . . . the

verdict of guilt will be upheld if the evidence is sufficient on any theory authorized by the jury

charge.” Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When multiple

methods of commission are charged and the jury returns a general verdict, the appellant must

challenge each of the theories in order to gain reversal of the judgment. Kitchens, 823 S.W.2d at

259. In Kitchens, the trial court charged the jury that it could find appellant guilty of capital

murder by proving murder in the course of either aggravated sexual assault or robbery; the

appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence only as to the assault theory, and the Court

of Criminal Appeals held that, “[b]ecause appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the

evidence to prove a murder in the course of robbery his last point of error is overruled” without

conducting a sufficiency review of the robbery theory. Id. at 259.

Here, Appellant challenged the murder conviction by arguing that the evidence

was insufficient to prove that he was responsible as a party who acted with intent to promote or

assist the commission of the murder, by soliciting, encouraging, directing, aiding, or attempting

to aid the other person committing the offense. See Tex. Penal Code § 7.02(a)(2). He does not

raise an issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction under Section

7.02(b), which permitted conviction upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder

occurred in the course of and in furtherance of the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit

aggravated robbery and that the murder should have been anticipated as a result of carrying out

the conspiracy. See Tex. Penal Code § 7.02(b). We can affirm the judgment on this basis.

Even if Appellant’s arguments are broad enough to encompass the Section 7.02(b)

theory of parties, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. See Brickley v. State,

623 S.W.3d 68, 75-76 (Tex. App.—Austin 2021, pet. ref’d) (noting that appellate courts

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normally “‘refrain from conducting a sufficiency of the evidence review when the defendant fails

to attack all theories of conviction submitted alternatively to the jury’” but addressing sufficiency

“in the interests of justice”). Appellant points to his testimony that he intended to buy marijuana

from Williams and did not know that his companions planned to commit a crime of theft, assault,

robbery, or murder. He asserts that there was no direct evidence of conspiracy or his knowledge

of a criminal scheme and that the evidence did not provide a sufficient basis for the jury to infer

such conspiracy or knowledge.

Griggers testified that Williams contacted Doris Walker through a dating website

in the afternoon of May 5, 2019. After a series of messages she agreed to meet Williams in his

hotel room to “hang out and smoke together.” She asked Williams if he was alone; he was.

Williams got someone to pick up Walker. Griggers testified that Walker was a girlfriend of

Timothy Bowie, Appellant’s friend since middle school. Bowie was also friends with Roosevelt

Haynes, whom Appellant did not know. Walker entered Williams’s room at about 7:35 p.m.

according to the hotel’s video. The video was a compilation from various hotel cameras; the one

showing the door to Williams’s room was from the opposite end of the half of the atrium

surrounding the pool.

At 7:46 p.m., Haynes drove a vehicle into the hotel’s parking lot with passengers

Bowie and Appellant. The car drove around the parking lot for around two minutes passing

many open spots before backing into one. Griggers testified that this was “consistent with

suspicious behavior” because those about to commit a crime will look for cameras, easy access

to the vehicle, and avenues of escape. The vehicle had no rear license plate, indicating to

Griggers that the occupants were concealing their identities in preparation for committing a

crime. Griggers testified that Bowie grabbed something at his waistline while getting out of the

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car, which Griggers deduced based on later video was a handgun; he said some people tuck their

guns into their waistband and will need to check for its presence and adjust it.

Appellant followed his companions into the hotel lobby at 7:51 p.m. and walked

to the elevators without looking at the front desk; Griggers testified that this behavior indicated

that the group had been contacted by someone who told them where to go in the hotel. As the

elevator doors closed, Bowie lifted his shirt revealing what Griggers said was a pistol in his

waistband. Griggers testified that, in his experience, a person bringing a pistol to a hotel where

he is not staying is likely coming to commit a robbery. They went to Williams’s room at

7:52 p.m. and waited outside the door. Before the door opened, Bowie pulled his shirt over his

face and Haynes pulled his hood over his head; Griggers testified that these actions indicated

they were hiding their identities in preparation for a robbery.

At 7:56 p.m., Walker left the room. The three men were so close to the door they

had to move out of her way. The men then entered the room as Walker continued to walk away.

The men were in the room for four seconds, with Appellant stepping past the threshold for only a

second. There was no sound on the video, but something startled Walker and she began to move

faster and Appellant and the other men ran down the stairs. Griggers testified that Appellant was

covering his face with his shirt to conceal his identity and that both Bowie and Haynes were

carrying handguns and covering their faces. Appellant found a side door and disappeared from

the video. Bowie and Haynes left through the front lobby. Haynes was wearing a latex glove on

his hands that he did not have on previously that he dropped by the car door before he and Bowie

drove away.

Police pulled a still photo of Appellant from the hotel camera and publicized him

as a person of interest. They found and arrested Appellant; he did not turn himself in. Griggers

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interrogated Appellant, a recording of which was played for the jury. Griggers testified that

Appellant said the trio were going to pick up Bowie’s girlfriend. Appellant testified that Bowie

and Walker were communicating by text. In the hotel, they heard an explosion and ran.

Griggers pointed out several conflicts between Appellant’s report and Griggers’s observations of

the video. In the interview, Appellant said he never saw the woman they were there to pick up,

though the video showed her walk past him when he was standing outside the door. In the

interview, Appellant said that they did not go into the room, but the video showed he did.

Appellant said he heard an explosion as they walked toward the room, but the video showed that

he entered the room briefly and ran away. Appellant told Griggers that being named a person of

interest “spooked” him; Griggers said that people wrongly accused normally soon call police and

explain. When Griggers confronted Appellant about discrepancies between the hotel video and

Appellant’s responses at the interview, Appellant terminated the interview.

Griggers acknowledged that it was reasonable to be unsure whether Appellant

saw Bowie’s gun. Griggers said the handle of the gun was revealed when Bowie lifted his shirt

after getting on the elevator; he said that Appellant would have seen it while standing at Bowie’s

side, but that it was possible he did not. Griggers testified that covering their faces indicated this

was no visit to pick up a girlfriend or typical drug deal, but preparation for a robbery. Griggers

testified on cross-examination that Bowie confessed that he was communicating with Walker

while she was in the room with Williams and that they went to the hotel planning to rob

Williams. Griggers testified that it was possible that Appellant saw Haynes carrying a handgun

and putting on a latex glove as they waited for Walker to leave Williams’s room. Griggers

testified that Haynes must have put on the glove while in the elevator or while waiting outside

the room; Griggers reasoned that it was not likely that Appellant did not see the glove because

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the trio were standing together and did not turn their backs to each other for more than a few

seconds during that time. Griggers did not think that Bowie knocked on the door. He rejected

Appellant’s claim that he merely heard an explosion and did not know what it was.

Griggers testified that, when he was undercover, persons selling him drugs did not

invite him to their room where they kept “their stuff,” especially not when they could be

outnumbered. “That’s a good way to get robbed,” he testified. He said that Walker’s sharing of

information with Bowie, the trio of men, the two guns, and Bowie and Haynes hiding their faces

before they entered the room made it “clear that a robbery is taking place.” He did not know

whether anybody entered the room intending to kill Williams. Griggers opined further “[Y]ou

don’t just learn about that at the door. You learn about that in the car ride over . . . . [T]o

indicate that [Appellant] had no idea what’s going on is absurd. He is absolutely a party to the

robbery and to the murder.”

Appellant testified that he did not shoot Williams and that he did not engage in a

conspiracy with either Bowie or Haynes to rob anybody. He said he and Bowie had lost touch

while Appellant was in prison for five years. On the day of the murder, he was walking along

the street while high on marijuana and ecstasy (about 8.5 out of 10 in intoxication level, he said),

when Haynes and Bowie drove by and honked at him. Appellant said they decided to play some

basketball and smoke some weed. He said Haynes drove to the hotel in about two or three

minutes, but nobody explained why. He said there was not time to form a plan to rob anyone

and that he was unaware that Bowie had a gun. Appellant said he had $100 in his pocket

because he had cashed his paycheck and had been told that Williams had marijuana. He said he

did not know what room they were going to and that Bowie was coming to pick up a girlfriend.

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Appellant said Bowie and he knocked on the door separately. Appellant said he did not know

Williams and got impatient when nobody came to the door.

Appellant testified that a girl came out of the room. He was standing at the door

and did not remember stepping over the threshold. There was an explosion, and he ran because

he did not know what happened. He thought maybe there was bomb packaging happening in the

room. He thought the building might collapse. He said he ran because he wanted to get to safety

for his family. He denied trying to hide his face. Instead of running to the car after getting

outside, he ran through a hole in the fence and went to his sister’s house. He testified that after

learning that he was a person of interest he was advised by a lawyer not to go to the police; he

said his choice not to turn himself in was not because he was guilty of any crime. He said he

wanted to wait to go to police until after celebrating his birthday with family for the first time

since going to prison.

Appellant admitted that after he was released on bond for the charges in this case,

he cut off his ankle monitor and failed to report to the trial court; he said he regretted that. He

said he cut off the monitor after he argued with his sister with whom he was living while on

bond. He maintained that he was going to play basketball while high because he was

accustomed to doing so with his friend in a non-competitive setting. He agreed that he was

walking pretty normally on the video, but had experience being under the influence of drugs.

Appellant said he did not see Haynes put on the latex glove. He agreed that it would be strange

for Bowie to knock on the hotel room door of a person he was about to rob, but said “I’m not

inside Mr. Bowie[’s] head.” He said that all he saw in the hotel room was the back of the shirt

and head of the man in front of him.

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Evaluating this testimony and evidence is a credibility choice left to the jury. See

Heiselbetz, 906 S.W.2d. at 504. Applying the law to these facts involves drawing reasonable

inferences using their common sense, knowledge, and experience—actions that are within the

province of the jury. Stahmann, 602 S.W.3d at 577; Eustis, 191 S.W.3d at 884. Though the

video and testimony might support conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the

conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525-26.

We cannot reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the jury’s decisions but must

determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and

cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.

Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16-17.

Though Griggers had no direct knowledge of whether there was an agreement to

rob Williams, what Appellant knew of that agreement, and whether he saw Bowie’s gun,

Griggers’ testimony was largely based on the videos shown to the jury. The jurors could assess

the video and testimony for themselves and use their own experience to assess the accuracy of

Griggers’s observations and the reasonableness of his conclusions. They could balance that

assessment against Appellant’s testimony and its internal inconsistencies and conflicts with

Griggers’s testimony—e.g., did Appellant knock on the door? step into the room briefly? know

why they were going to the hotel or that they were picking up Walker? think that they were

going to buy marijuana from Williams? know of Bowie’s confessed plan to rob Williams?

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence

was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Appellant was part of a conspiracy to commit

aggravated robbery; that in furtherance of the attempt to carry out the aggravated robbery, one of

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the men committed murder; and that murder should have been anticipated as a result of the

carrying out of the aggravated robbery. See Ervin, 333 S.W.3d at 201.

We overrule the sole issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of conviction.

__________________________________________
Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Ellis

Affirmed

Filed: August 15, 2025

Do Not Publish

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