In Re Juan Oltivero v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00022-CV

IN RE JUAN OLTIVERO

On Appeal from the 242nd District Court
Castro County, Texas
Trial Court No. B9545-1211-A, Honorable Kregg Hukill, Presiding

January 7, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J. and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

This appeal from a summary judgment concerns the question of who receives the

$75,000 deposited into the court’s registry, apparently by Prudential Assigned Settlement

Services Corporation (PASSCorp). 1 The deposit represented one annuity payment

originally due Clayton Curtis as part of his settlement of a personal injury lawsuit (Curtis

payment). Curtis assigned the payment to Stratcap Investments. Inc., which assignment

a trial court in the State of New York approved. Allegedly, Stratcap assigned the payment

to Genex Capital Corporation, who assigned it to Edwin C. Leonard, Jr., IRA, who

1 The sum was interpleaded into the court’s registry. Yet, the record before us does not contain
those pleadings.
assigned it to New England Annuity Associates (NEAA), who assigned it to the Mary

Tremble Family Trust, and who ultimately reassigned it to NEAA. So, the latter thought

itself entitled to the deposit. Genex disagreed and claimed it had the right to it. The two

then filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied that of NEAA and

granted that of Genex. It entered a final judgment ordering, among other things, that

Genex “shall recover judgment against NEAA in the amount of $75,000.00 . . .” and

awarding attorney’s fees to Genex.

NEAA appealed. We reverse and remand.

Standard of Review

The applicable standard of review is discussed in Odyssey 2020 Acad., Inc. v.

Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 624 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. 2021) and Rekerdres & Sons

Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Hegar, 611 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied).

We apply it here, and begin with Genex’s motion for summary judgment.

Genex Summary Judgment

To reiterate, Genex sought to recover the deposit in question through its motion

for summary judgment. It proffered two grounds purportedly entitling it to relief. The first

concerned the availability of a declaratory action as a means to collaterally attack a final,

non-appealable consent order executed in 2021. The second involved application of the

terms underlying that consent order as a means of adjudicating the dispute at bar.

Regarding the collateral attack, NEAA filed an amended petition to void the

consent order. The 242nd Judicial District Court of Castro County executed that consent

order in February 2021 as part of this cause. Through it, the court ordered “Prudential . . .

[to] forward the remaining Assigned Payments within 7 days of the date due in the manner

set forth in the parties' Stipulation (“Stipulation”), by check made payable to Genex Capital
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Corporation[] c/o GoldStar Trust Company Account #601250, at P.O. Box 719, Canyon,

TX 79015 (the “Designated Address”).” 2 Though the “Assigned Payments” alluded to a

structured settlement payment assigned by Juan Oltivero, the decree purported to

encompass foreign assignments of structured settlements executed in causes unrelated

to Oltivero and approved by judges outside Texas. Attempt was made to describe those

foreign assignments in paragraph 11 of the consent order.

Paragraph 11 alluded to them as “other qualified structured settlement

assignments more particularly identified, but not limited to, those in Exhibit “A” attached

to the Stipulation (collectively the “Other Assignments”).” And, the trial court expressly

“approve[d] the parties’ resolution of their dispute concerning the Other Assignments as

memorialized in the Stipulation.” So, apparently, the Other Assignments were diverted

from Stratcap c/o Security Title to “Genex Capital Corporation[] c/o GoldStar Trust

Company Account #601250, at P.O. Box 719, Canyon, TX 79015 . . . .” And, according

to Genex, the $75,000 Curtis payment was one of the “Other Assignments.”

NEAA amended its original petition in intervention. Through that amended

pleading, it not only asserted its claim to the sum (as an assignee) but also sought

judgment declaring void the 2021 consent order upon which Genex based its claim to the

$75,000. That resulted in Genex’s urging, as its first summary judgment ground, that

“‘[d]eclaratory relief is not available for the interpretation of a prior judgment entered by

that or any other court.’” That quote came from Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. SSC

Settlements, LLC, 251 S.W.3d 129, 140 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2008, no pet.). In uttering the

2 NEAA was not a party to the consent decree or stipulation.

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statement, the Rapid panel cited Martin v. Dosohs I Ltd., 2 S.W.3d 350, 353 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).

Indeed, the panel in Martin voiced the rule mentioned in Rapid Settlement. Martin,

2 S.W.3d at 354. It further described the rule as the majority position in Texas. Id. at

353-54. And, it chose to “follow the majority in Texas and hold that declaratory relief is

an inappropriate vehicle for interpreting previous judgments”. Id. at 354; but see Mungia

v. VIA Metro. Transit, 441 S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied)

(involving a bill of review and action for declaratory relief stating that a void default

judgment may be collaterally attacked through an action to declare the judgment void);

Wagner v. D’Lorm, 315 S.W.3d 188, 194-95 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (to same

effect).

Yet, whether a declaratory action is an appropriate means to collaterally attack a

purported void judgment is non-determinative here. Irrespective of the answer to that

question, Genex was obligated to prove, as a matter of law, its entitlement to the deposit.

And, it based its claim to the monies on the 2021 consent order. Allegedly, “there is no

justiciable controversy as to whether Genex is entitled to receive payment from Prudential

under the court orders that NEAA challenges.” This was so, according to Genex, since:

1) “the issue of legal title to the payment is not actually before this Court”; 2) “the present

issue of who is entitled to receive the Disputed Payment (notwithstanding any title

dispute) has already been resolved by prior judicial decision”; and 3) “[t]he New York

Order and this Court’s [2021] Consent Order each establish that Genex, by way of its

assignment from its agent Stratcap, is already entitled to receive the Disputed Funds.” In

other words, Genex claims the deposited funds, and the right to receive them, as opposed

to who actually owns them, was adjudicated via the 2021 Consent Order. And, it
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continued, that question was so adjudicated through the passages in the Consent Order

specifying that the “Other Assignments” were to be “made payable to Genex Capital

Corporation c/o GoldStar Trust Company Account #601250, at P.O. Box 719, Canyon,

TX 79015.”

Yet, a material question of fact exists as to whether the Curtis payment fell within

the ambit of “Other Assignments.” First, verbiage in the consent order described the

“Other Assignments” as “other qualified structured settlement assignments more

particularly identified, but not limited to, those in Exhibit ‘A’ attached to the

Stipulation . . . .” The summary judgment record contains no “Exhibit ‘A.’” Nor was it

attached to the consent order, as that document appears in the appellate record. Similarly

missing is other competent evidence of record illustrating that the Curtis payment was

either 1) part of “Exhibit ‘A’” or 2) one of the “other qualified structured settlement

assignments” outside the scope of “Exhibit ‘A’”.

Second, though the Consent Order also provided criteria purporting to describe

the “Other Assignments” which may not be “limited to, those in Exhibit ‘A,’” those criteria

do not encompass the Curtis payment. For instance, paragraph 12 states that “Genex is

identified as the payee and Prudential is identified as the issuer for each of the cases

that collectively comprise the Other Assignments.” (Emphasis added). We read this

as indicating that within the “Other Assignments,” Genex is the named payee. So, for the

Curtis payment to be an “Other Assignment” within the scope of the consent order, the

court order approving the assignment of the Curtis payment must name Genex as payee.

It did not.

Furthermore, paragraph 14 of the consent order also purports to define the

category of “Other Assignments.” It states: “[t]he court orders approving the Other
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Assignments, and the stipulations accompanying same, direct Prudential to issue

payments in the cases that comprise the Other Assignments to Genex care of

servicing agents purportedly for the benefit of Genex.” (Emphasis added). But, again,

the New York court order approving the Curtis payment did not do that. Rather, it

specified that “Prudential shall forward the Assigned Payments, within 7 days of the date

due, payable to Stratcap Investments, Inc., c/o Security Title Agency, [] at P.O: Box

33279, Phoenix, AZ . . . .”

Simply put, the Curtis assignment may well be one of the “Other Assignments,” but

the record before us fails to establish that fact. Because the burden lay with Genex to

prove its entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law and part of that burden

included proving the Curtis payment fell within the scope of “Other Assignments,” the trial

court erred in granting the party summary judgment.

One other matter precludes us from affirming the trial court’s judgment. It concerns

the trial court’s jurisdiction to modify the New York decree. Our United States Constitution

requires each state to give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial

proceedings of every other state. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Dalton v. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d

126, 135 (Tex. 2018). This means a valid judgment from one state must be enforced in

other states regardless of the laws or public policy of the other states. Bard v. Charles R.

Myers Ins. Agency, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1992); Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield

Motor & Control, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet.

denied) (op. on reh’g) (stating that “Texas is required to enforce a valid judgment from

another state”). Consequently, a Texas trial court lacks jurisdiction to simply set aside

another state’s judgment. Moreno v. Halperin, No. 05-20-00858-CV, 2021 Tex. App.

LEXIS 9879, at *6-7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec.14, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). This
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prohibition would seemingly include modifications of that judgment, as well, for if modified

the original is not being afforded full faith and credit.

Of course, there are statutory procedures which vest Texas courts with jurisdiction

over foreign judgments. They are found in § 35.001 et seq. of the Texas Civil Practice

and Remedies Code. Once complied with, that foreign judgment becomes tantamount to

a Texas judgment. Bahr v. Kohr, 928 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996,

writ denied) (stating that the “filing of a valid foreign judgment not only initiates the

enforcement proceedings, but also automatically creates an enforceable Texas

judgment”). As a Texas judgment, it is also subject to modification in the same ways a

Texas judgment is so subject. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003(c) (stating

that a “filed foreign judgment has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures,

defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, staying, enforcing, or satisfying a

judgment as a judgment of the court in which it is filed”).

Here, the Castro County district court attempted to modify the New York order by

renaming the entity entitled to receive the Curtis payment. When asked if the former

district court had jurisdiction to alter an order of the latter, Genex admitted it did not.

Genex then asserted that merely the servicing agent was changed through the consent

order; consequently, no actual modification occurred. This was purportedly so because

the New York decree “mandated Prudential ‘will’ make [] payment to a new address if the

‘Designated Address’ is no longer valid without further order of the court.” The

“designated address” allegedly became invalid because “Security Title was no longer in

business and the address was no longer valid.” We find this representation problematic,

though, for reasons we now explain.

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In approving the reassignment of the Curtis payment from Stratcap to a third-party,

the New York court mandated that “the Assigned Payments will continue to be serviced

by Stratcap (or an agent on its behalf).” (Emphasis added). That is, “the Assigned

Payments will continue to be made by Prudential to Stratcap at the Designated

Address only, regardless of any Reassignment.” (Emphasis added). Yet, it further wrote

that “if for reasons beyond the control of Stratcap, or due to Stratcap being merged with

or acquired by another individual or entity, or for traditional address change purposes the

Designated Address is no longer valid (i.e., if Stratcap moves or for other reasons the

Designated Address is no longer a viable address for Stratcap to receive payments),

Prudential will make the Assigned Payments to a new address.” (Emphasis added).

Then came the directive that “[n]otwithstanding the foregoing, the parties’ Stipulation will

remain binding and fully enforceable against Stratcap.” (Emphasis added). Affording

these passages their ordinary meaning, we read them as permitting for only a change in

the “designated address” to which payments were to be sent. They do not provide for an

actual change in servicing agent. Stratcap remained bound to service the payments,

regardless of whether it owned the payment. Yet, the Castro County district court

removed Stratcap as servicing agent and substituted Genex c/o Goldstar Trust Co. in its

stead. More than a mere change in “designated address” happened; the court modified

the servicing agent itself. 3 So, accepting Genex’s concession about the Castro County

court lacking jurisdiction to “modify” the New York order, then the change wrought in

servicing agent was beyond the court’s power.

3 Within the consent order, Genex seemingly acknowledged both that and the need to obtain
approval from the court which permitted an “Other Assignment.” Paragraph 15 of the Consent Order
evinces as much. There, Genex represented: “Insurers have been advised by Genex that it may in the
future have to seek a redirection of some or all of the payments that comprise the Other Assignments to
new servicing agents.” (Emphasis added).
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We do not ignore Genex’s other contention that Stratcap “disclaimed any interest

in” the Curtis payment. That purported disclaimer appeared in a letter from Stratcap’s

president. The latter wrote: “I hereby confirm that Stratcap disclaims any interest in and

to the $75,000.00 that Prudential Assigned Settlement Services Corporation has been

ordered by Judge Kregg Hukill to tender and deposit into the Registry of the Court in

Cause No. B9545-1211 pursuant to the court order entered on April 21, 2022.” By making

that disclaimer, it somehow freed the Castro County district court to replace Stratcap as

servicing agent, according to Genex. Interestingly, though, the letter said nothing about

Stratcap’s relinquishing its obligations as servicing agent for the Curtis payment. Nor did

the New York order contain anything authorizing Stratcap to unilaterally eschew its

servicing agent duties. Again, the New York court ordered that “[n]otwithstanding the

foregoing [matter about changing the designated address], the parties’ Stipulation will

remain binding and fully enforceable against Stratcap.” As said earlier, Texas courts

generally accord foreign judgments full faith and credit. They cannot simply be ignored.

This precludes us from affording weight to Genex’s interpretation about the effect of

Stratcap’s disclaimer.

In sum, Genex failed to prove, as a matter of law, its entitlement to summary

judgment and the $75,000 Curtis payment. Thus, we reverse it. But another matter

remains. It concerns attorney’s fees. Genex moved for same under § 37.009 of the

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and the trial court awarded the entity fees

exceeding $119,000.

Per § 37.009, a trial court may award either party reasonable and necessary

attorney’s fees “as are equitable and just.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009;

Timbercreek Canyon Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Fowler, No. 07-14-00043-CV, 2015 Tex.
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App. LEXIS 8460, at *18 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 12, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Genex

benefitted from that statute. Our having reversed the final judgment favoring it, though,

leads us to also reverse the fee award, however. See Kachina Pipeline Co. v. Lillis, 471

S.W.3d 445, 455 (Tex. 2015) (holding that an appellate court may reverse an award of

fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act when it reverses the underlying declaratory

judgment for the award may no longer be just and equitable).

NEAA Summary Judgment

As previously mentioned, NEAA also moved for summary judgment. Allegedly, it

proved its entitlement to “receive the Disputed Payment.” We overrule the issue.

Returning to the New York order, we reiterate its directive. The Curtis payments

were originally assigned to Stratcap. So too were they to be sent to “Stratcap

Investments, Inc., c/o Security Title Agency.” This remained true even if Stratcap

reassigned the payment to a third party. So, affording the New York order full faith and

credit precludes entry of summary judgment declaring NEAA entitled to “receive” the

$75,000 payment.

Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment of the trial court and remand the cause.

Brian Quinn
Chief Justice

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