Daryl Washington v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00188-CR

DARYL WASHINGTON, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 364th District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. DC-2022-CR-2110, Honorable William R. Eichman II, Presiding

December 31, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Daryl Washington, appeals from his convictions for possessing a

controlled substance and, as a convicted felon, possessing a firearm. Through one issue,

he contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant his motion to suppress

because evidence was obtained as the result of an unlawfully extenuated detention and

search exceeding consent. We affirm.
Background

Appellant was stopped by police and arrested in August 2022. This came about

when an officer observed him 1) speeding and 2) operating a vehicle with a

nonfunctioning license plate light. Upon making initial contact with appellant, the officer

saw an open container of alcohol in plain view, a fact no one disputed. That resulted in

the officer deciding to search the vehicle. To that end, the officer requested backup. So

too was appellant asked to exit the vehicle and consent to a search of his person for

weapons. Appellant granted same. While patting him down, the officer also questioned

appellant whether there was “anything illegal in [his] pockets” and asked for consent to

search them. The answers received were “no” and “yes,” respectively.

Searching appellant’s pockets uncovered a metal container, which the officer

opened. Within it was a controlled substance, which tested positive for cocaine.

Upon the arrival of police backup, a search of the vehicle ensued. That search led

to the discovery of other controlled substances and a firearm. Appellant’s arrest followed.

Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress the fruits of the search. The trial court

ultimately denied said motion.

Analysis

Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial. Reading

his argument leads us to view it as based, in large part, upon the belief that the officer

extended the stop beyond its permissible duration. That is, once the officer saw the

opened can of alcohol and informed appellant of the defective license plate light, the need

for detaining appellant evaporated. Thus, searching the car violated his constitutional

rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Regarding the discovery of

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contraband on his person, appellant seems to suggest his consent was involuntary due

to the extended nature of the stop and the search of the container exceeding the scope

of consent. We overrule the issue.

The standards and law applicable to review of a search and seizure are well-

established and discussed in Villamares v. State, 07-23-00007-CR, 2023 Tex. App.

LEXIS 8217, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 30, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). We apply them here.

Next, a traffic stop made to investigate a traffic violation must be reasonably related

to that purpose and may not be prolonged beyond the time to complete the tasks

associated with the traffic stop. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App.

2018); Villamares, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 8217, at *7-8. Although an officer may ask

drivers and passengers about matters unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop, any

questioning cannot measurably extend the duration of the stop. Id.

Here, it is undisputed that the initial traffic stop was lawful. And, there is little

quibble that an officer is permitted to ask a driver if he possesses any illegal contraband

and to solicit voluntary consent to search. Strauss v. State, 121 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. ref’d). The inquiry, then, is whether the extension of the stop

was justified. See Harper v. State, 349 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011 pet.

ref’d).

We have held that an officer seeing an open container of alcohol in a vehicle gives

the individual probable cause to both believe an open container violation occurred and to

conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle for open containers. Id. Since evidence

illustrates the officer observed the open container in plain sight, he had both probable

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cause to search the vehicle and reasonable basis to extend the stop to effectuate that

search. Appellant mistakenly argues otherwise. And, it was during that permissible

search that other contraband and the weapon were encountered.

As for the discovery of contraband in the metal container, evidence reveals that

appellant consented to the officer’s search of his (appellant’s) pockets. And though

consent was given as the officer conducted a pat-down, other evidence indicates that the

officer sought consent to search not simply to discover the presence of weapons on

appellant’s person. Indeed, the officer asked if appellant had “anything illegal” in his

pockets before requesting permission to search them. In so asking, one witnessing the

exchange could reasonably construe it as the officer’s request to search the pockets for

contraband, not simply weapons. Moreover, appellant did not limit or otherwise condition

the scope of his consent to the search of his pockets. That scenario was akin to the

circumstances which led the court in Glass v. State, No. 14-12-01039-CR, 2014 Tex. App.

LEXIS 2684 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 11, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) to uphold the search of a wallet.

Glass also involved the search of a detainee’s pockets. The detainee granted the

officer permission to do so, which led to the officer removing and opening the individual’s

wallet. As noted in Glass, “[s]ince Deputy Cruz already had done a pat down for weapons,

a reasonable person would have understood that he was now searching for something

else.” Id. at 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *4. And, the suspect failed to condition or otherwise

limit the search’s scope. Thus, “it was objectively reasonable for the trial court to conclude

that the general consent to search appellant's pockets included consent to search

‘containers’ within those pockets.” Id. at 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *5. The same is no

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less true here. The officer asking about the presence of anything illegal within the

pockets, soliciting consent to search them, and hearing consent without limitation made

it objectively reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the general consent appellant

afforded to search the pockets included consent to search containers found therein.

As for the voluntariness of the consent, that too seemed to hinge on improperly

delaying the traffic stop. Yet, as discussed earlier, the officer had legitimate basis to do

so; again, he had probable cause to search the vehicle upon seeing the open alcoholic

beverage container.

Having overruled appellant’s issue, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Brian Quinn
Chief Justice

Do not publish.

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