In the Matter of T.L.J. v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-24-00090-CV
________________

IN THE MATTER OF T.L.J.

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Liberty County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 23CC-JUV-00033
________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On appeal, Appellant T.L.J., (“Tom”) a juvenile, complains the juvenile court

erred by waiving jurisdiction and transferring his case to district court arguing the

evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s transfer to

district court.1 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 54.02, 56.01(a), (c)(1)(A). For the

reasons explained below, we affirm the juvenile court’s Order Waiving Jurisdiction

and Order of Transfer to District Court.

1
To protect the identity of the child, we use pseudonyms to refer to the child
and his parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
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Background

Tom is charged with murder. The State filed a Petition for Waiver of

Jurisdiction and Transfer to District Court, requesting that the juvenile court waive

jurisdiction and transfer the case to the appropriate district court under section 54.02

of the Texas Family Code because Tom was sixteen years old at the time of the

alleged offense and was sophisticated and mature enough to be treated as an adult.

The State alleged that: (1) the prospects of the public’s adequate protection and the

likelihood of Tom’s reasonable rehabilitation by the use of available procedures,

services, and facilities in the juvenile court “is in serious doubt” to warrant his

treatment as an adult; (2) there was probable cause he committed the offense alleged;

and (3) Tom is sophisticated and mature enough to be treated as an adult.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s Petition during which it

considered witness testimony and the following records in making its decision:

Psychological Evaluation conducted by Dr. Kimberly Vandermark Grimsley, a

Confidential Social History Report conducted by Juvenile Probation Officer

Graciela Trevizo, Confidential Neurocognitive Plan, and Hardin County Incident

Reports. Dr. Grimsley’s Psychological Evaluation states that Tom understood what

he was charged with and the nature of the pending proceedings, and that Tom

demonstrates his capacity to assist his counsel. In her report, Dr. Grimsley states the

following:

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[Tom] was polite and cooperative. He answered all of the
psychologist’s questions freely, and he showed no signs of difficulty
with comprehension or understanding. He was able to state the charges
that have been made against him in his own words, as well as to recount
the events that took place in his own words. He was able to state how
he felt in the moments after the event took place. He expressed that he
felt fear and concern, but he never expressed remorse or regret. It is the
psychologist’s opinion that he is not serious about reforming his
behaviors. He is sufficiently aware of his actions, and he is able to be
certified as an adult.

Trevizo’s Social History Report outlined Tom’s family, medical, educational,

and substance abuse history and concluded that Tom should be certified as an adult.

[Tom], who was sixteen years of age when the state filed its original
petition on July 12th, 2023 was born on October 10th, 2006, and was
sixteen when he committed one alleged felony count. No adjudication
hearing has been conducted concerning this offense. The sophistication
and maturity of the child have been addressed in the diagnostic
evaluation by Dr. Kimberly Vandermark Grimsley.

Suppose the court finds probable cause for the first-degree offense of
Murder. In that case, it is recommended that [Tom] be transferred to the
Liberty County District Court for criminal proceedings.

Evidence at the Hearing

John Christopher Duos

Detective John Christopher Duos testified that he is employed by the Dayton

Police Department. He detailed his educational and professional background and

stated that on the night of June 27, 2023, he arrived at a home in Liberty County and

observed a victim in the driveway, with a single gunshot wound to the chest, being

treated by EMS. Duos interviewed witnesses at the scene but was unable to collect

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much information that night. The next day, he interviewed the homeowner’s

granddaughter, who told him that she was with two males the night before, including

appellant, and stated the following happened after the granddaughter, her boyfriend

Harley Blalock, and Tom, all arrived at her grandmother’s home:

And they said whenever they went up – whenever they showed up, there
was – [the victim] was there. Of course, they didn’t know his name, but
[the victim] and another guy was there and then Blalock and [the
victim], for whatever reason, had words and actually ended up getting
into a fist fight and then [the granddaughter] was still in the vehicle
while the two were fighting and then their buddy, [Tom], exited the
back seat with Blalock’s handgun and shot at [the victim].

Based on the information received, Tom was arrested. Tom admitted to shooting the

victim and told Duos that “Blalock and [the victim] were in a fight, and he was

concerned for his friend’s well-being, safety, I guess, and out of -- to protect his

friend, he shot [the victim].”

Graciela Trevizo

Graciela Trevizo testified she works as a probation officer with the Liberty

County Juvenile Probation Department. Trevizo testified regarding her educational

and professional background and described her job duties as a juvenile probation

officer. Trevizo stated that she is familiar with Tom as she had previously been his

probation officer in 2020, when Tom was placed on probation for criminal trespass.

Tom successfully completed that probation, though she recalled that he missed

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appointments, had poor communication, and “it didn’t really phase him much. He

wasn’t very concerned about it.”

Trevizo prepared Tom’s social history report and a copy of her report was

admitted at the hearing. In preparation for her report, Trevizo spoke to Tom’s parents

and visited each parent’s respective residence. She testified that his parents were

divorced and that each parent had very different parenting styles, describing Tom’s

father as the disciplinarian, although Mother appeared closer to her children. She

stated that Mother’s house had several broken windows, holes in the walls and doors

ripped off the frames. Mother told Trevizo that the destruction was due to the boys’

(including Tom’s twin brother and older brother) outbursts in the home. In contrast,

Father’s home was “well-kept[,]” with Trevizo describing the atmosphere as “more

maintained.” Tom lived primarily with Mother. She noted that Tom had been

diagnosed with ADHD, major depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder,

and that Tom had previously taken medication but stopped in 2022. According to

Trevizo, Tom had to repeat ninth grade because of truancy but, at the time of the

murder, was doing a home-school program with no monitoring or reporting. When

Tom attended public school, his grades were a combination of passing and failing.

Tom currently resides at the Hardin County Juvenile Detention Center, where he has

been written up “numerous” times for rule violations, including profanity,

disrespectful behavior, and making a weapon. Trevizo described his current attitude

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as “why are you guys doing this to me[,]” and not receptive to help, including

therapy. Trevizo explained that, in her opinion Tom should be certified as an adult.

Her belief is that Tom could not be rehabilitated if he were placed back on juvenile

probation.

Trey McConnell

Trey McConnell testified that he is the director of juvenile probation in

Liberty County. He described his educational and professional background and

stated that his department has worked with Tom in the past. McConnell detailed

several incidents that occurred regarding Tom during his supervision. Several of

Tom’s “detention write-ups” were admitted as evidence. The reports included

incidents of profanity directed at officers, disrespectful behavior, assaultive-type

conduct, and making a weapon.

Dr. Kimberly Grimsley

Dr. Kimberly Grimsley testified that she is the CEO and founder of Exodus

Consulting and Psychological Services, she is a clinical psychologist with the State

of Texas, and she conducts evaluations. She described her education and

professional background and stated that she was there to determine whether Tom

should be certified as an adult for trial.

Grimsley testified that she met with Tom and prepared a psychological

evaluation. A copy of her psychological evaluation was admitted into evidence. In

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her evaluation, Grimsley stated that she spoke with Tom about the alleged incident,

conducted an IQ test, and a personality evaluation. She testified that there was

nothing remarkable about his appearance, that he was cooperative, pleasant and

respectful, and that he told her “that at the time he was having no oppressive

thoughts, no suicidal thoughts and that he was not currently experiencing any

auditory or visual hallucinations.” According to Grimsley, Tom’s memory was

within normal range, he was able to concentrate and sustain attention, and he had no

trouble performing the tests. Tom reported that his father was physically abusive,

but he denied any sexual assault. Tom reported that he had a history of drug use and

began to smoke marijuana at age 12. Tom also reported that he was diagnosed with

bipolar disorder and depression, and he was given medication, but he stopped taking

it because “he didn’t like the way it made him feel.” Tom first told Grimsley that he

did not have any auditory or visual abnormalities, and he later reported a “history of

seeing black figures in the corner of his room and that he heard voices that told him

to kill himself because no one liked him and he wasn’t good enough, but he said that

had not happened in over two years.”

In testifying about Tom’s behavior assessment, Grimsley first detailed the

testing procedure, objectives and scoring, and testified that Tom has “low average”

verbal comprehension skills, perceptual reasoning, and “average” working memory.

She stated that Tom’s “processing speed is in a borderline range, it just means that

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he has to process things a little slower, but he is functional.” Overall he is in the 14th

percentile of the global population, explaining that he would score higher on the

assessment than 14 percent of people who took the test. According to Grimsley, Tom

does not suffer from an intellectual disability. She also testified per her assessment,

that Tom is on par with his education-based grade equivalent in school.

Next, Grimsley administered a personality assessment, explaining that based

on the results, Tom showed “no signs of difficulty with his attitude towards school.”

Tom had “atypical thoughts” noting his previous history of “perceptual abnormality

or paranoia and he was endorsing that he does occasionally have unusual thoughts

or perceptions[,]” some anxiety, physical ailments such as headaches and sore

muscles, but “[n]othing that was a red flag of, you know, extreme danger or anything

like that.” Grimsley stated that Tom “understood the events for which he’s being

accused[,] and I think he is competent to understand everything that’s going on in

this process.”

According to Grimsley, Tom did not express “any regret over the alleged

situation, but he was concerned about what was going to happen to him.” Grimsley

testified there was “no barrier” to Tom’s being certified as an adult.

Anna Emmons

Anna Emmons is a first assistant prosecutor with the Liberty County District

Attorney’s Office. Emmons stated that she is familiar with juvenile prosecution and

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the certification process and if the trial court was to waive jurisdiction and transfer

the case to criminal court, the Liberty County District Attorney’s Office would

accept the case for prosecution.

Mother

Tom’s Mother testified Tom has previously attended Dayton Independent

School District but that she “checked him out because he wasn’t going to class.”

Tom primarily lives with her but has visitation with Father. She testified that Tom

would fall asleep or skip class, and any medication he was taking for his ADHD and

Gilbert Syndrome was discontinued as it made him ill. Tom also attended counseling

at school and was prescribed medications including antidepressants which he did not

take. She agreed that Tom began to experience behavioral issues starting in sixth

grade. She did not believe that Tom is a danger to society, but stated “To himself,

yes. And I -- for six years what we’ve been trying to get him help with.” According

to Mother, Tom is not the same person as he was before he was arrested and placed

into detention, and that his mental acuity “has declined.” Mother testified if Tom

were to remain in juvenile court and be placed on probation, she would do everything

in her power to make sure Tom complies with probation.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile trial court waived its exclusive

jurisdiction and transferred jurisdiction to the appropriate designated district court

in Liberty County, Texas for criminal proceedings:

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The Court, after considering all of the testimony, the evaluation of the
juvenile-respondent under Texas Family Code §51.20, the
circumstances of the juvenile-respondent and the circumstances of the
alleged offense, does hereby certify and make the following findings:

1. The juvenile-respondent is alleged to have violated a penal law of the
grade of first degree felony, to wit: Murder, that on or about the 27th
day of June, 2023 in Liberty County and the State of Texas, [Tom], did
then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the death of an
individual, namely [the victim], by shooting, and the defendant did use
or exhibit a deadly weapon, namely a 9mm pistol, during the
commission of the offense.

2. The juvenile-respondent was 16 years of age at the time he was
alleged to have committed the first degree felony offense of Murder.

3. No adjudication concerning the alleged offense has been made and
no adjudication hearing concerning the offense has been conducted.

4. There is probable cause to believe the juvenile-respondent committed
the offense alleged.

5. Based on the seriousness of the offense alleged and the background
of the juvenile-respondent, the welfare of the community requires
criminal proceedings.

6. The alleged offense was against a person.

7. The juvenile-respondent was previously placed on an unrelated,
misdemeanor deferred by prosecutor agreement and was deemed to
have been unsuccessfully terminated.

8. Liberty County Juvenile Court and Liberty County Juvenile Services
do not currently possess adequate resources for the rehabilitation of the
child by use of procedures, services, and facilities.

9. The juvenile-respondent is sufficiently sophisticated and mature to
be tried as an adult and is sufficiently mature to aid his attorney in his
defense.

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10. Based on the seriousness of the offense, the public cannot be
protected if the juvenile-respondent remains in the juvenile system.

11. Based on the background of the juvenile-respondent, the public
cannot be protected if the juvenile-respondent remains in the juvenile
system.

12. The likelihood that the juvenile system could rehabilitate the
juvenile-respondent is remote.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this Court waives its exclusive
jurisdiction and transfers jurisdiction to the appropriate, designated
District Court in Liberty County, Texas for criminal proceedings[.]

Tom timely filed this appeal, asserting the juvenile court erred by waiving

jurisdiction and transferring his case to district court when there is no legal or factual

evidence to support the transfer. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 54.02, 56.01(a), (c)(1)(A).

Analysis

A juvenile court may waive its jurisdiction and transfer a child to the district

court for criminal proceedings if:

(1) the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of
felony;

(2) the child was:

...

(B) 15 years of age or older at the time the child is alleged to
have committed the offense, if the offense is a felony of the
second or third degree or a state jail felony, an no adjudication
hearing has been conducted concerning that offense; and

(3) after a full investigation and a hearing, the juvenile court determines
that there is probable cause to believe that the child before the court
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committed the offense alleged and that because of the seriousness of
the offense alleged or the background of the child the welfare of the
community requires criminal proceedings.

Id. § 54.02(a). Among the factors the juvenile court is required to consider are the

following:

(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with
greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person;

(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;

(3) the record and previous history of the child; and

(4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood
of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and
facilities currently available to the juvenile court.

Id. § 54.02(f). “Any combination of these criteria may suffice to support a waiver of

jurisdiction; not every criterion need weigh in favor of transfer.” Matter of C.M.M.,

503 S.W.3d 692, 701 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (citation

omitted).

We review a juvenile court’s decision to waive its exclusive original

jurisdiction and transfer a case to district court using a two-step process. Bell v. State,

649 S.W.3d 867, 887 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d); In re J.J.B.,

No. 09-23-00162-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 3583, at *12 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

May 23, 2024). First, we review the juvenile court’s finding for sufficiency of the

evidence. Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887. (citations omitted). “In reviewing the legal

sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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juvenile court’s findings and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable

factfinder could not reject it.” Id. (citations omitted); Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d

849, 857 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.); In re J.J.B., 2024 Tex.

App. LEXIS 3583, at *12. If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the

juvenile court’s findings, the evidence is legally sufficient. Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887.

In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence to

determine whether the juvenile court’s findings conflict with the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence to be clearly wrong or unjust. Id.; Matter of C.R., 571

S.W.3d at 857 (citation omitted).

If the juvenile court’s findings are supported by legally and factually sufficient

proof, we then review the ultimate waiver decision under an abuse-of-discretion

standard. Collins v. State, 516 S.W.3d 504, 520 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, pet.

ref’d) (citations omitted); see also Matter of A.M., 577 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (citations omitted). In applying that

standard, we conduct our own analysis of the evidence and determine whether the

juvenile court acted without reference to guiding rules or principles such that its

decision to transfer the case was arbitrary and unreasonable. See Collins, 516 S.W.3d

at 520 (citation omitted); see also Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887; In re J.J.B., 2024 Tex.

App. LEXIS 3583, at *13.

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The first statutory factor requires considering whether the alleged offense is

one against person or property. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(f)(1). Murder, the

offense alleged in this case, is an offense against a person, and the trial court was

required to give such an alleged offense “greater weight in favor of transfer[.]” Id.

With respect to the second statutory factor, Tom complains that he is not a

sophisticated and mature child. See id. § 54.02(f)(2). Tom argues that the record

demonstrates that he has a low-average or below-average IQ and several disorders,

including ADHD, major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and schizoaffective

disorder, that he processes situations slowly and suffers from intellectual

impairment. “In assessing the sophistication and maturity of the child, the juvenile

court places emphasis on whether the evidence shows that the child knew right from

wrong and could assist his attorney in his defense.” Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 892.

“Evidence that the child understands the seriousness of the charge against him as

well as the proceedings support a juvenile court’s finding that the child’s

sophistication and maturity weigh in favor of transfer.” Id. at 893; see also In re

D.T., Nos. 01-24-00568-CV & 01-24-00569-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 141, at

*23-24 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 16, 2025, no pet.). Both Grimsley and

Trevizo testified that Tom had an understanding of his crime, that he was clear and

appropriate in his communications and that he could be certified as an adult. We

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conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support a finding the

second factor weighed in favor of transfer.

Next, Tom argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to “support

certification based on Appellant’s record and previous history.” See Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 54.02(f)(3). The record shows Tom was previously on probation for criminal

trespass, and while he completed probation, the record contains evidence he was a

less-than-ideal probationer. Trevizo noted that he missed appointments, had poor

communication, and exhibited a bad attitude while on probation. Witnesses also

testified that Tom displayed no remorse for the shooting. Additionally, there was

evidence Tom was skipping classes, smoking marijuana, and instigating fights at

school. He continued this behavior while in detention, including profanity directed

at officers, disrespectful behavior, assaultive-type conduct, and making a weapon.

Trevizo and Grimsley testified that based on Tom’s past record and the totality of

Tom’s actions while in detention, it was in the community’s best interest to transfer

him to the adult system. We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient

to support a finding the third factor weighed in favor of transfer.

Addressing the fourth factor, Tom acknowledges Trevizo, McConnel and

Grimsley testified that Tom “was likely to re-offend, not likely to be rehabilitated

and that juvenile probation’s resources were not likely to assist in rehabilitating

[him,]” but he asserts the trial court should have assigned this factor less weight than

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the second factor which focuses on the juvenile’s sophistication and maturity.

However, the trial court found Tom “is sufficiently sophisticated and mature to be

tried as an adult and is sufficiently mature to aid his attorney in his defense.” Because

we have already concluded that finding is supported by sufficient evidence and

because it weighs in favor of, rather than against, transfer to the district court, it

matters not which factor was assigned more weight by the trial court; they both

weigh in favor of the trial court’s decision.

After considering the totality of the circumstances and viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s finding, we conclude there is more

than a scintilla of evidence to support the trial court’s findings. See Bell, 649 S.W.3d

at 887; Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 857. We also conclude the juvenile court’s

finding does not conflict with the great weight and preponderance of the evidence to

be clearly wrong or unjust. Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887.

We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion when it waived

its jurisdiction and transferred Tom’s case to district court for criminal proceedings.

As detailed above, the evidence shows Tom had a criminal history where he was

previously placed on probation, which he completed, but during which he missed

appointments and had poor communication and attitude. Testimony also showed

Tom continued to have behavioral problems while in detention for this crime,

including aggressive threats, profanity, and making a weapon. While the juvenile

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court heard Tom’s mother testify that she would try everything in her power to make

sure he complied with probation, the juvenile court could have determined, based on

the other witness’s testimony, that a mentoring program would not provide the

services necessary to sufficiently rehabilitate Tom to offer adequate protection to the

public if he were allowed to remain in the juvenile system. In re J.J.B., 2024 Tex.

App. LEXIS 3583, at *20-21. In making its determination, the juvenile court was

required to consider the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child using the

procedures, services, and facilities that were currently available to the juvenile court.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(f)(4). The juvenile’s age at the time of the transfer

“hearing is relevant to the ‘likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of

procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court’” because

the juvenile court’s resources are designed to assist and rehabilitate children, not

adults. See Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 896-97 (citations omitted).

Any combination of the factors listed in 54.02(f) “may suffice to support a

waiver of the juvenile court’s exclusive original jurisdiction and not every factor

need weigh in favor of transfer to the criminal district court.” Id. at 886. Here, all

four factors weigh in favor of waiver and transfer, and all four findings are supported

by legally and factually sufficient evidence. We conclude the juvenile court did not

abuse its discretion in waiving jurisdiction and transferring Tom’s case to district

court as its decision was not arbitrary based on the evidence and there is no indication

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it acted without reference to guiding rules or principles. See Collins, 516 S.W.3d at

520; see also Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887; In re J.J.B., 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 3583, at

*22. Accordingly, we overrule Tom’s issues on appeal and affirm the juvenile

court’s Order Waiving Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to District Court.

AFFIRMED.

KENT CHAMBERS
Justice

Submitted on June 26, 2025
Opinion Delivered November 13, 2025

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.

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