In the Interest of A.N.R. v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-23-00204-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF A.N.R.

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On Appeal from the 279th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. F-240,569-A
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her one-year-

old son, A.N.R. 1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that

statutory grounds exist for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that

termination of her parental rights would be in the best interest of the child. See Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P), (2).

1
To protect the child’s identity, we use pseudonyms to refer to the child and
the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). The trial court’s Order of Termination
also terminated the child’s father’s parental rights, but the father is not a party to this
appeal.
1
Mother’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which he contends that there

are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730-31 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (Anders procedures apply in parental-right termination

cases). The brief presents the attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and

explains why no arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The

attorney represented to the Court that he gave Mother a copy of the Anders brief he

filed, notified Mother of her right to file a pro se brief, and notified Mother of how

to access the appellate record. The Court notified Mother of her right to file a pro se

response and of the deadline for doing so. Mother did not file a response with the

Court.

We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by

Mother’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988)

(citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009,

no pet.). Based on our review, we have found nothing that would arguably support

an appeal, and we agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit. See Bledsoe,

178 S.W.3d at 827-28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the

opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for

reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas

2
Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we

find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf.

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental

rights.2

AFFIRMED.

LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice

Submitted on October 31, 2023
Opinion Delivered November 9, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

2
We note that if Appellant decides to pursue review in the Supreme Court of
Texas, counsel may satisfy his obligations to Appellant “by filing a petition for
review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24,
27-28 (Tex. 2016).
3