State v. Hutchinson

2020 UT App 10
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee,
v.
JORDAN K EITH H UTCHINSON ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20180413-CA, No. 20180414-CA
No. 20180415-CA, and No. 20180416-CA
Filed January 9, 2020
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Thomas Low
No. 121403421, No. 141401527
No. 151400548, and No. 171400633
Jennifer Foresta, Margaret P. Lindsay, and Douglas J.
Thompson, Attorneys for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Thomas Brunker, Attorneys
for Appellee
JUDGE R YAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. O RME and K ATE A PPLEBY concurred.
HARRIS, Judge:
¶1 	At least since 2012, Jordan Keith Hutchinson has had a
drug problem. He pled guilty to his first drug-related offense
in 	2013, 	and 	then 	spent 	the 	next 	five 	years 	on 	probation,
during which time Hutchinson was given the opportunity to
participate in drug court and several other addiction treatment
programs. 	None 	seemed 	to 	work, 	though, 	and 	Hutchinson
racked 	up 	twenty-four 	probation 	violations, 	including
the 	commission 	of 	several 	new 	drug 	offenses, 	even 	two
for distribution. By 2018, the district court had seen enough,
and revoked Hutchinson’s probation and imposed his original

State v. Hutchinson
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prison 	sentences. 	Hutchinson 	appeals 	that 	decision,
asserting 	that our legislature’s adoption 	of the 2015 Justice
Reinvestment Initiative (JRI) changed the probation landscape
such that the district court’s decision was an abuse of discretion.
While we do not disagree that JRI, in some ways, did change the
probation landscape, we conclude that the district court, in this
particular 	case, 	did 	not 	abuse 	its 	discretion 	by 	revoking
Hutchinson’s probation and sending him to prison, and we
therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND1
2012 Charges
¶2 	In December 2012, police and paramedics were called to a
residence where they found twenty-four-year-old Hutchinson
on the floor, unconscious and barely breathing. Hutchinson
had 	a 	still-bleeding 	injection 	site 	on 	his 	arm; 	his 	family
reported 	that 	he 	had 	probably 	injected 	heroin. 	Paramedics
transported Hutchinson to a local hospital. Shortly thereafter,
Hutchinson snuck out of the hospital, taking approximately
$500 worth of hospital property with him. Related to these
events, the State charged Hutchinson with possession or use of a
controlled 	substance, 	a 	second-degree 	felony, 	as 	well 	as
misdemeanor 	counts 	of 	theft 	and 	possession 	of 	drug
paraphernalia.
¶3 	In February 2013, Hutchinson pled guilty to all three
charges, and the district court agreed to hold those pleas in
abeyance and refer Hutchinson to drug court. But the court
1. “In reviewing a revocation of probation, we recite the facts in
the light most favorable to the [district] court’s findings.” State v.
Legg, 2014 UT App 80, ¶ 2, 324 P.3d 656 (quotation simplified).

State v. Hutchinson
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ordered Hutchinson “to remain in custody until treatment space
becomes available” and to “comply with all the terms and
conditions of the Plea in Abeyance Agreement.”
¶4 	Just five weeks later, Hutchinson voluntarily opted out of
drug court. As a result, the district court revoked his plea in
abeyance and entered his guilty pleas. The court imposed a
prison sentence of one-to-fifteen years on the second-degree
felony count, and jail sentences on the misdemeanor counts, but
suspended those terms of incarceration and placed Hutchinson
on probation, to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole
(AP&P). Per the probation conditions, Hutchinson was ordered
to, among other things, “have no further violations during the
probation 	period,” 	“pay 	fines, 	fees, 	restitution, 	and/or
supervision fees,” and “successfully complete a substance abuse
assessment and all recommended treatment.”
¶5 	Shortly 	thereafter, 	Hutchinson 	was 	screened 	for 	and
accepted into the Drug Offender Reform Act (DORA) program
for substance abuse treatment. AP&P described Hutchinson as
exhibiting 	“exemplary 	performance 	and 	attitude 	toward
treatment,” and he was deemed to have successfully completed
the DORA program in January 2014.
¶6 	Just a few months later, however, in May 2014, an AP&P
agent was conducting a routine visit at Hutchinson’s house, and
noticed that “Hutchinson’s pupils were very constricted and had
the appearance of pin holes.” The agent asked Hutchinson “if he
had been doing drugs,” and Hutchinson admitted “that he had
been using every few days for the past week and a half up until
[that] morning.” Based on this admission, the agent performed a
search of Hutchinson’s room. The search uncovered twenty-one
baggies of black tar heroin, fourteen baggies of crack cocaine,
four baggies of cocaine, and four syringes. Hutchinson told the
agent that he had obtained the drugs “so he could try and sell
them because he was broke.”

State v. Hutchinson
20180413-CA 	4 	2020 UT App 10
¶7 	Following 	this 	incident, 	the 	agent 	filed 	a 	probation
violation report with the district court. The report alleged that
Hutchinson had committed seven separate violations of the
terms and conditions of his probation: (1) possession of heroin,
(2) possession of cocaine, (3) possession of crack cocaine, (4)
possession 	of 	drug 	paraphernalia, 	(5) 	use 	of 	a 	controlled
substance (heroin), (6) failure to pay supervision fees, and (7)
failures 	to 	pay 	fines 	and 	fees. 	The 	district 	court 	held 	an
evidentiary hearing on the matter, during which Hutchinson
admitted to five probation violations (1, 2, 5, 6, 7), and the
remaining two allegations (3, 4) were dismissed. The court
revoked and reinstated Hutchinson’s probation, but ordered
Hutchinson to serve sixty days in jail as a penalty for his
probation violations.
2014 Charges
¶8 	Based 	on 	the 	“extensive” 	amount 	of 	drugs 	and
Hutchinson 	“openly 	admitt[ing] 	he 	had 	them 	for 	the 	sole
purpose of distribution,” an AP&P supervisor “decided that new
charges needed to be filed” against Hutchinson “in addition to
the 	probation 	violation.” 	Soon 	thereafter, 	the 	State 	charged
Hutchinson with four new offenses, including three first-degree
felony counts of possession with intent to distribute heroin,
cocaine, and crack cocaine. In July 2014, Hutchinson pled guilty
to two counts of possession with intent to distribute (for heroin
and cocaine), both reduced to second-degree felonies; the third
charge was dismissed. On these new counts, the district court
sentenced Hutchinson to terms of one-to-fifteen years in prison,
but again suspended those sentences and placed Hutchinson on
probation, governed by the same conditions as before.
¶9 	About six months later, in 2015, AP&P filed a probation
violation report alleging that Hutchinson had again violated his
probation, this time in fourteen different ways. Hutchinson
eventually admitted to eleven new violations, including the

State v. Hutchinson
20180413-CA 	5 	2020 UT App 10
following: failing to submit to mandatory drug tests, possessing
heroin and methamphetamine, theft, driving on a suspended
license, and operating a vehicle without insurance. The district
court again revoked and reinstated Hutchinson’s probation, but
this time ordered him to serve 300 days in jail, with credit for
time served, as a penalty for his probation violations. The court
also ordered that a portion of the jail term could be served at
home on an ankle monitor.
2015 Charges
¶10 	The State filed new charges against Hutchinson related to
his 2015 probation violations, including three second-degree
felonies for possession or use of controlled substances (heroin,
methamphetamine, cocaine), as well as various misdemeanor
charges. 	Hutchinson 	eventually 	pled 	guilty 	to 	some 	of 	the
charges, 	including 	two 	counts 	of 	possession 	or 	use 	of 	a
controlled 	substance, 	reduced 	from 	second-degree 	to 	third-
degree 	felonies. 	The 	district 	court 	dismissed 	the 	remaining
charges, and sentenced Hutchinson to the statutorily-required
prison term but suspended it, and revoked and reinstated his
probation with substantially the same terms as before.
¶11 	A little over a year later, in 2016, AP&P filed a third
probation 	violation 	report, 	alleging 	that 	Hutchinson
had committed five new violations of his probation, including
using 	both 	heroin 	and 	methamphetamine, 	and 	failing 	to
submit to mandatory drug testing or pay his court ordered fines
and 	supervision 	fees. 	At 	a subsequent 	hearing, 	Hutchinson
admitted to all five probation violations, and the district court
again revoked and reinstated Hutchinson’s probation, but this
time 	it 	also 	ordered 	Hutchinson 	to 	participate 	in 	further
substance 	abuse 	treatment. 	Specifically, 	Hutchinson 	was
directed 	to 	“re-enter 	treatment 	at 	[AP&P’s] 	Treatment 	and
Resource 	Center 	(TRC) 	and 	complete 	any 	recommended
treatment as directed after release.” As a penalty, the court

State v. Hutchinson
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ordered Hutchinson to serve 180 days in jail, but offered to cut
that jail sentence in half if Hutchinson completed a 90-day
substance dependency treatment program, known as the OUT
program, at the jail.
2017 Charges
¶12 	Although apparently no new charges were filed against
Hutchinson related to the 2016 probation violations, he was
charged with additional crimes for actions that occurred in
February 2017 when police observed him throw a baggie on the
ground that was later determined to contain methamphetamine.
When officers asked him about the baggie, Hutchinson was
uncooperative and argumentative, and eventually fled on foot.
Police were later able to locate Hutchinson after discovering his
ID card in a backpack that he had abandoned in his attempt to
escape. Hutchinson later voluntarily admitted that he was the
one who fled on foot.
¶13 	As a result of this event, Hutchinson was charged with
possession or use of a controlled substance, a second-degree
felony, and failure to stop at the command of law enforcement, a
misdemeanor. 	He 	eventually 	pled 	guilty 	to 	the 	possession
charge, and the State agreed to dismiss the second count. The
court sentenced Hutchinson to the statutorily-required prison
term, but again suspended it and revoked and reinstated his
probation with effectively the same terms as before.
Latest Probation Violations
¶14 	In April 2018, Hutchinson arrived at an AP&P field office
for 	his 	monthly 	scheduled 	visit. 	Hutchinson’s 	parole 	agent
observed that Hutchinson “was under the influence of drugs
due to his accelerated and involuntary body movement.” After
questioning, Hutchinson admitted to recently using both heroin
and methamphetamine, and he was unable to produce a sample

State v. Hutchinson
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for a drug test. Hutchinson was arrested for probation violations
and booked into jail.
¶15 	Shortly thereafter, AP&P filed probation violation reports
in all four cases, alleging a total of eight violations. At a hearing
convened to address the matter, Hutchinson admitted to three of
the allegations: committing retail theft and having used heroin
and 	methamphetamine. 	The 	three 	allegations 	relating 	to
Hutchinson’s failure to pay his fines and fees were stricken, and
Hutchinson denied the remaining two allegations (concerning
his 	alleged 	failure 	to 	maintain 	full-time 	employment 	or
education, and concerning his alleged failure to be cooperative,
compliant, and truthful with AP&P); the district court never
made findings on them.
¶16 	At the close of the hearing, the court announced its ruling,
first noting that it had considered “the background and the
facts” of Hutchinson’s “previous supervision,” the “severity of
some 	of 	[Hutchinson’s] 	crimes,” 	and 	that 	the 	precipitating
incident at the AP&P office involved Hutchinson using “a large
amount” 	of 	“two 	separate 	substances” 	“immediately 	before
seeing AP&P.” The court also noted that Hutchinson had “been
on probation for five years,” and told Hutchinson that “we have
spent five years’ worth of services on you, and you’ve done
nothing but try to get out of responsibility.” For these reasons,
the court concluded that “probation is no longer a suitable
option,” revoked Hutchinson’s probation in all four cases, and
imposed the original prison sentences, all to run concurrently.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶17 	Hutchinson now appeals, and raises two issues for our
review. First, he takes issue with the court’s decision to revoke
his probation and send him to prison. A district court’s “decision
to grant, modify, or revoke probation” is one that we review for

State v. Hutchinson
20180413-CA 	8 	2020 UT App 10
“abuse of discretion.” State v. Nichols, 2016 UT App 52, ¶ 2, 370
P.3d 575 (per curiam) (quotation simplified). Accordingly, “we
view the evidence of a probation violation in a light most
favorable to the [district] court’s findings and substitute our own
judgment only if the evidence is so deficient as to render the
court’s action an abuse of discretion.” State v. Maestas, 2000 UT
App 22, ¶ 12, 997 P.2d 314. However, whether a district court
correctly followed the statutory framework governing probation
decisions 	presents 	a 	question 	of 	law 	that 	we 	review 	for
correctness. See Schleger v. State, 2018 UT App 84, ¶ 6, 427 P.3d
300 (“Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law that
we review for correctness . . . .” (quotation simplified)).
¶18 	Second, Hutchinson contends that the district court failed
to 	make 	adequate 	findings 	regarding 	each 	of 	his 	specific
probation 	violations. 	Hutchinson 	admits 	this 	issue 	was 	not
preserved, 	but 	asks 	us 	to 	review 	it 	for 	plain 	error. 	“To
demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) an
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the
[district] court; and (iii) the error is harmful.” State v. Dean, 2004
UT 63, ¶ 15, 95 P.3d 276 (quotation simplified).2
2. Hutchinson attempts to raise a third issue, asserting that the
district court abused its discretion by not ordering AP&P to
correct errors in his probation violation report. But Hutchinson
has not preserved this issue for our review (he asked the district
court to strike the probation violation report, but never asked the
court to correct anything in it if the court declined to strike it),
and does not argue for the application of any exception to our
preservation requirement. See Wilson v. Sanders, 2019 UT App
126, ¶ 30, 447 P.3d 1240 (stating that “[a] party that wishes an
appellate court to address an unpreserved issue must argue that
an exception to preservation applies,” and declining to “discuss
the matter further” where appellants did “not argue for the
(continued…)

State v. Hutchinson
20180413-CA 	9 	2020 UT App 10
ANALYSIS
I
¶19 	Hutchinson’s chief argument on appeal is that the district
court erred by revoking his probation and imposing his original
prison sentences. Hutchinson’s argument has a general theme—
that 	prison 	is 	too 	harsh 	a 	sanction 	for 	addiction-related
offenses—but has two particular parts. First, Hutchinson makes
a legal argument, asserting that the district court erroneously
applied the statutory scheme, amended in 2015 by JRI, that
governs 	probation 	situations. 	Second, 	Hutchinson 	makes 	a
factual argument, asserting that the district court abused its
discretion in this case by revoking his probation and imposing
his original prison sentences. We address each argument in turn.
A
¶20 	In 	2014, 	concerned 	about 	Utah’s 	growing 	prison
population and falling success rates for offenders placed on
probation, members of the Utah legislative branch called for a
review of the state’s criminal justice system. Justice Reinvestment
Report, 	Utah 	Comm’n 	on 	Criminal 	and 	Juvenile 	Justice 	3
(2014), http://dsamh.utah.gov/pdf/Justice_Reinvestment_Report_
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/BXD2-XFJK]. In response, the Utah
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice (CCJJ) began an
intensive 	seven-month 	review 	process, 	including 	a
comprehensive examination of sentencing and corrections data
across 	the 	state, 	with 	the 	aim 	of 	developing 	policy
(…continued)
applicability of any particular exception to our preservation
rules” (quotation simplified)). Accordingly, we do not consider
this argument further.

State v. Hutchinson
20180413-CA 	10 	2020 UT App 10
recommendations targeted at reducing both recidivism and costs
associated with incarceration. Id. CCJJ’s recommendations were
compiled in a report, and included, among other things, findings
that 	Utah 	had 	experienced 	a 	large 	increase 	in 	offenders
sentenced 	to 	prison 	for 	nonviolent 	crimes, 	including 	drug
offenses, as well as an increase in the number of probation
revocations. Id. Based on these findings, CCJJ recommended
certain changes to sentencing and correction practices in Utah.
Of relevance in this case, CCJJ recommended a number of
changes to the manner in which defendants are sentenced for
drug 	offenses, 	such 	as 	updating 	the 	sentencing 	guidelines,
particularly for low risk offenders, and establishing graduated
sanctions 	for 	probation 	violations. 	Id. 	at 	14–18. 	The
recommendations 	also 	envisioned 	a 	proposed 	expansion 	of
treatment services for substance abuse and improved support
programs for recovery and reentry. Id. at 19. Partly in response
to 	CCJJ’s 	report, 	in 	2015 	the 	Utah 	Legislature 	passed 	a
comprehensive 	criminal 	justice 	reform 	bill, 	JRI, 	which
incorporated many of CCJJ’s recommendations, including the
addition 	of 	requirements 	that, 	in 	at 	least 	some 	instances,
mandated application of graduated sanctions for probationers
who violated the conditions of their probation. See, e.g., Utah
Code Ann. § 64-13-21(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2019) (stating that the
department 	of 	corrections, 	including 	AP&P, 	“shall 	apply
graduated 	sanctions 	established 	by 	the 	Utah 	Sentencing
Commission to facilitate a prompt and appropriate response to
an individual’s violation of the terms of probation or parole”).
¶21 	An aspect of JRI that is relevant here is its treatment of
one of the subsections of Utah’s probation statute. See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (LexisNexis 2014). Prior to the amendment,
subsection (12) of that statute stated that “[p]robation may not be
modified or extended except . . . upon a hearing and a finding in
court 	that 	the 	probationer 	has 	violated 	the 	conditions 	of
probation,” id. § 77-18-1(12)(a)(i) (2014), and specifically allowed

State v. Hutchinson
20180413-CA 	11 	2020 UT App 10
a 	judge, 	“[a]fter 	the 	hearing” 	and 	after 	“finding 	that 	the
defendant violated the conditions of probation,” to entirely
revoke a violator’s probation, id. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii) (stating that
the 	court 	may 	“order 	the 	probation 	revoked, 	modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew”);
see also id. § 77-18-1(12)(a)(ii) (“Probation may not be revoked
except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the conditions
of probation have been violated.”).
¶22 	Significantly, the JRI amendments to the probation statute
preserved 	a 	district 	court’s 	authority 	to 	completely 	revoke
probation in appropriate cases, even without applying the new
graduated sanctions. In the post-JRI version of the statute, the
language of subsection (12)(a)(ii) remains unchanged, stating as
before that “[p]robation may not be revoked except upon a
hearing in court and a finding that the conditions of probation
have been violated.” Id. § 77-18-1(12)(a)(ii) (2017).3 And although
the 	legislature 	added 	several 	new 	provisions 	to 	subsection
(12)(e), including one discussing the new graduated sanctions,
the 	statute 	still 	authorizes 	courts 	to 	“order 	the 	probation
revoked,” see id. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii) (Supp. 2019), and commands
courts to apply the new graduated probation sanctions only if “a
period of incarceration is imposed for a violation” of probation,
but specifically not in cases where “the judge determines that . . .
the sentence previously imposed shall be executed,” see id. § 77-
18-1(12)(e)(iv).
¶23 	Moreover, the new sentencing guidelines adopted by
the Utah Sentencing Commission reflect that, even post-JRI,
district 	judges 	retain 	the 	flexibility 	to 	revoke 	probation 	in
3. 	In 	2018, 	this 	statutory 	subsection 	was 	redesignated 	as
subsection 	(12)(a)(iii), 	but 	the 	relevant 	language 	remains
unchanged in the current statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(12)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2019).

State v. Hutchinson
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appropriate 	cases 	even 	without 	first 	applying 	the 	new
graduated sanctions. Those guidelines specifically state that a
goal of the JRI modifications was to decrease the disparity
involved in the sentencing process, while still “retain[ing] the
flexibility 	to 	deal 	with 	individual 	cases.” 	Adult 	Sentencing
& Release 	Guidelines, 	Utah 	Sentencing 	Comm’n 	4–5
(2017) https://justice.utah.gov/Sentencing/Guidelines/Adult/2017
%20Adult%20Sentencing%20and%20Release%20Guidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ALZ5-ULV6]. 	To 	this 	end, 	the 	guidelines
include 	six 	“Tools” 	designed 	to 	be 	used 	“to 	determine 	an
appropriate response to both accomplishments and violations
while on supervision.” Id. at 33. One of those tools (Tool 6,
entitled “Exceptions to Incarceration Caps”) notes that the post-
JRI 	statute 	does 	not 	require 	application 	of 	the 	graduated
sanctions in cases where the court makes a “[f]inding that
execution of [the] sentence previously imposed is warranted.” Id.
at 42 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(iii)(B)).
¶24 	Hutchinson asserts that the court erred by revoking his
probation before implementing the graduated sanctions referred
to in the JRI amendments. See Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-21(2)
(LexisNexis 	Supp. 	2019). 	But 	under 	the 	post-JRI 	statutory
scheme, a court—as opposed to, say, AP&P, see id.—is required
to implement the graduated sanctions only if two conditions are
met: (a) the court elects to impose “a period of incarceration . . .
for a [probation] violation,” and (b) the court determines not to
revoke probation (and thereby impose the original sentence), see
id. § 77-18-1(e)(iv). Neither condition is met here.
¶25 	First, in this instance, the court did not impose a “period
of incarceration” “for a probation violation.” See id. § 77-18-
1(12)(e)(iv). On previous occasions, in 2014, 2015, and 2016, the
court—while revoking and reinstating Hutchinson’s probation—
did 	impose 	a 	jail 	term 	upon 	Hutchinson 	as 	a 	penalty 	for
Hutchinson’s various probation violations. But this time, the
court 	did 	not 	impose 	any 	“period 	of 	incarceration” 	upon

State v. Hutchinson
20180413-CA 	13 	2020 UT App 10
Hutchinson specifically as a penalty for his probation violations.
Instead, the court revoked Hutchinson’s probation entirely, and
imposed 	the 	original 	jail/prison 	sentences 	that 	had 	been
suspended pending the outcome of his probation—something
that the post-JRI statute continues to allow district court judges
to 	do, 	in 	appropriate 	cases, 	even 	without 	implementing
graduated sanctions. And the court’s decision in this case to
revoke probation directly negated the second condition. Because
neither of the foundational conditions were met here, the court
was not obligated to implement graduated sanctions.
¶26 	Accordingly, we discern no error in the district court’s
interpretation and application of the post-JRI probation statute.
Even after JRI, district courts continue to 	possess statutory
authority, 	in 	appropriate 	cases, 	to 	revoke 	a 	probationer’s
probation and impose the original sentences.
B
¶27 	Hutchinson next argues that, even if the district court
correctly 	interpreted 	the 	statute, 	it 	abused 	the 	discretion
afforded 	to 	it 	under 	that 	statute 	by revoking 	Hutchinson’s
probation under the circumstances presented here. On this point,
Hutchinson asserts that “no reasonable person” would impose a
sanction as harsh as prison for “minor” probation violations that
have their roots in drug addiction problems, and concludes that
the district court abused its discretion by doing so in this case.
¶28 	“The decision to grant, modify, or revoke probation is in
the discretion of the [district] court.” State v. Robinson, 2014 UT
App 114, ¶ 7, 327 P.3d 589 (quotation simplified). However,
although 	“the 	district 	court 	is 	afforded 	wide 	latitude 	in
sentencing,” this discretion is not limitless, and an appellate
court may reverse a sentencing decision upon a finding that the
district court abused its discretion. State v. Moreau, 2011 UT App
109, ¶ 6, 255 P.3d 689 (quotation simplified). An abuse of

State v. Hutchinson
20180413-CA 	14 	2020 UT App 10
discretion occurs if “no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the [district] court” or “if the sentence is clearly
excessive, 	inherently 	unfair, 	or 	exceeds 	statutory 	or
constitutional limits.” Id. (quotation simplified). In this context,
Utah courts have recognized “that a single violation of probation
is legally sufficient to support a probation revocation.” State v.
Legg, 2014 UT App 80, ¶ 11, 324 P.3d 656.
¶29 	Here, the court did not revoke Hutchinson’s probation
for 	a 	single 	probation 	violation, 	or 	for 	“minor” 	probation
violations. Over the years, Hutchinson had committed a total of
twenty-four 	probation 	violations, 	including 	three 	fresh
ones, 	some 	of 	which 	were 	anything 	but 	minor; 	while 	on
probation, 	Hutchinson 	had 	committed 	at 	least 	nine 	new
offenses, including felony offenses for drug distribution. As the
court 	pointed 	out 	in 	making 	its 	ruling, 	it 	had 	reinstated
Hutchinson’s probation for all of his previous violations, even
though some of the earlier violations were quite serious, and had
directed Hutchinson to at least three different drug treatment
programs over the years. The court noted that it had given
Hutchinson 	every 	chance 	to 	address 	his 	drug 	addiction
problems, noting that “we have spent five years’ worth of
services” on Hutchinson and lamenting the fact that Hutchinson
had not taken advantage of the opportunities. The court noted
that, in making its final decision, it had considered (among other
things) 	“the 	background 	and 	the 	facts” 	of 	Hutchinson’s
“previous 	supervision” 	and 	the 	“severity 	of 	some 	of
[Hutchinson’s] crimes.” See State v. Rogers, 2017 UT App 156, ¶ 7,
405 P.3d 801 (per curiam) (recognizing that the district court can
review the defendant’s entire probation history when deciding
to revoke probation).
¶30 	Under 	these 	circumstances, 	we 	cannot 	conclude 	that
the 	court 	exceeded 	its 	discretion 	by 	revoking 	Hutchinson’s
probation. See Moreau, 2011 UT App 109, ¶ 10 (finding that
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked a

State v. Hutchinson
20180413-CA 	15 	2020 UT App 10
defendant’s 	probation 	after 	concluding 	“that 	the 	current
rehabilitative 	measures 	were 	not 	working” 	because 	the
defendant had “tallied seventeen violations over his two years in
drug court” and “accumulated several new felonies”).
II
¶31 	Finally, 	Hutchinson 	argues 	that 	the 	district 	court
plainly erred “by not making specific findings as to which
allegations and evidence served as the basis for the court’s
decision 	to 	revoke 	Hutchinson’s 	probation.” 	Although 	he
acknowledges that a single violation is sufficient to support a
revocation, see State v. Legg, 2014 UT App 80, ¶ 11, 324 P.3d 656,
Hutchinson contends that the record needs to be clear as to
the specific violation(s) upon which the court was relying to
support its decision, especially here, where the court’s decision
was based on his performance on probation in 	its totality.
Because this argument was not preserved below, Hutchinson
asks us to review it for plain error. To demonstrate plain error,
Hutchinson must establish not only that the district court erred,
but must also demonstrate that the error was so obvious and
fundamental that the court should have stepped in on its own,
without being asked to do so. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶ 15,
95 P.3d 276. In addition, he must demonstrate that the error was
harmful to him. Id. If Hutchinson fails to show all of these
elements, 	“plain 	error 	is 	not 	established.” 	Id. 	(quotation
simplified).
¶32 	Hutchinson’s argument in this regard has two parts.
First, Hutchinson assigns error to the district court for failing to
make findings with regard to two of the eight allegations of
probation violation—regarding Hutchinson’s alleged failure to
maintain full-time employment and his alleged failure to be
cooperative, compliant, and truthful with AP&P—that AP&P
leveled against Hutchinson in 2018. But even assuming, without

State v. Hutchinson
20180413-CA 	16 	2020 UT App 10
deciding, that the district court committed error by failing to
make findings on these two allegations, any such error was
harmless 	here, 	where 	Hutchinson 	admitted 	to 	three 	other
(arguably more significant) violations that same day, and had
already committed twenty-one other probation violations in the
past. Where a defendant admits to some (but not all) of the
probation violation allegations against him, a district court may
choose 	to 	act 	solely 	on 	the 	admitted 	violations. 	These
violations—unlike the only established violation in Legg, 2014
UT App 80, ¶ 25—were serious enough to support revocation of
probation on their own, even without consideration of the two
unadjudicated allegations. And in this case, there were twenty-
one other previous adjudicated violations to consider. Under the
circumstances, Hutchinson has not demonstrated that the court’s
failure 	to 	make 	findings 	on 	an 	additional 	two 	allegations
harmed him.
¶33 	Second, 	Hutchinson 	faults 	the 	district 	court 	for 	not
being more specific as to which of the twenty-four (three current,
twenty-one 	historic) 	probation 	violations 	caused 	it 	to 	reach
its decision to revoke probation. On this point, there is simply no
error. When a district court has before it this many probation
violations upon which to ground a decision, we do not believe a
court need be more specific. Indeed, it is entirely appropriate
for 	a 	district 	court 	to 	rest 	its 	decision 	on 	the 	totality 	of
the 	probationer’s 	supervision 	history, 	including 	the 	three
current as well as the twenty-one historic violations of the terms
and conditions of probation. Moreover, in this case, the district
court did make special mention of the two previous violations
that involved new felony offenses for drug distribution, noting
that these two violations were particularly significant in its
analysis.
¶34 	In 	sum, 	Hutchinson 	has 	not 	carried 	his 	burden 	of
demonstrating that the district court committed plain error in
the manner in which it articulated its ruling.

State v. Hutchinson
20180413-CA 	17 	2020 UT App 10
CONCLUSION
¶35 	Hutchinson has not demonstrated that the district court
erred in its interpretation and application of the post-JRI statutes
regarding 	revocation 	of 	probation. 	Hutchinson 	has 	not
persuaded us that the district court abused its discretion in
revoking Hutchinson’s probation, given the circumstances of
this case. And Hutchinson has not demonstrated that the court
plainly erred by not making more specific findings regarding the
violations for which it revoked his probation. Accordingly, we
affirm 	the 	district 	court’s 	decision 	to 	revoke 	Hutchinson’s
probation and impose the original sentences.