In re C.D.M. (T.M. v. I.A.)

1. The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by
special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code
Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6).
2014 UT App 130
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE INTEREST OF C.D.M., A PERSON UNDER
EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
T.M.,
Appellant,
v.
I.A.,
Appellee.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20140267-CA
Filed June 12, 2014
Seventh District Juvenile Court, Castledale Department
The Honorable Scott N. Johansen
No. 1074213
Josie E. Brumfield and Zachary J. Weyher,
Attorneys for Appellant
Don M. Torgerson and Mandie J. Torgerson,
Attorneys for Appellee
Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, and
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD.1
PER CURIAM:
¶1 T.M. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order denying her
second motion to set aside a custody order pursuant to rule 60 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm.

In re C.D.M.
2. Mother did not file anything in the juvenile court until August
2013, when she filed her first motion to set aside the custody order.
3. Mother also argued that she was entitled to a hearing and that a
Guardian ad Litem should have been appointed.
20140267-CA 2 2014 UT App 130
¶2 In this case, I.A. (Grandmother) petitioned for permanent
custody of C.D.M., Mother’s infant child. The petition was served
on Mother with a summons indicating that she had twenty days to
respond to the petition. Mother failed to answer the petition. As a
result, the juvenile court entered Mother’s default and granted
Grandmother custody in an order entered in October 2012.2
¶3 In Mother’s second motion to set aside the custody order,
she argued that the summons was improper because under rule 19
of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Mother should have had
twenty-five days to respond to the petition, not just twenty as
recited in the summons. Accordingly, she contended, the juvenile3
court should set aside the custody order under rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. She also asserted that the juvenile
court’s “premature” entry of judgment based on the incorrect
number of days in the summons was a clerical error that could be
corrected by setting aside the order under rule 60(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The juvenile court denied the motion as
untimely under rule 60(b) and as not within the scope of rule 60(a).
¶4 On appeal, Mother first contends that the custody order was
void because of alleged due process violations and that, therefore,
the time limits under rule 60(b) do not apply to her second motion.
This issue is not preserved for appeal. “As a general rule, claims
not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.” State
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346. The preservation rule
“applies to every claim, including constitutional questions.” Id. To
preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be specifically raised
in such a way as to permit the trial court to rule on the issue. 438
Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801.

In re C.D.M.
20140267-CA 3 2014 UT App 130
¶5 In her motion before the court at the January 2014 hearing,
Mother asserted that the summons was insufficient because it
contained errors, and that the court could set aside the custody
order on that basis. She did not argue that the custody order was
void because of any errors, or that the time limits should not apply.
The issue now raised on appeal was not specifically raised in the
juvenile court in such a manner as to permit the court to rule on
whether the custody order was void. As a result, the issue is not
properly before this court on appeal and we do not consider it. See
id.
¶6 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court erred in determin-
ing that the entry of the custody order was not a clerical error
within the scope of rule 60(a). Under rule 60(a), clerical mistakes in
orders arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the
court at any time. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a). “The correction contem-
plated by rule 60(a) must be undertaken for the purpose of
reflecting the actual intention of the court and parties. [It] is not
intended to correct errors of a substantial nature, particularly
where the claim of error is unilateral.” Peterson v. Jackson, 2011 UT
App 113, ¶ 46, 253 P.3d 1096 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). The distinction depends on whether the error “was made
in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as
rendered.” Id. (citation omitted).
¶7 Here, Mother does not seek the mere correction of a clerical
error, but rather seeks to vacate an order entirely. Rule 60(a)
permits only the correction of an error in an order. Rule 60(b)
provides the relief of setting aside an order or judgment, but only
if relief is warranted under that section. By its plain language, rule
60(a) does not permit the relief Mother seeks. Furthermore, the
asserted error was not in the order but in the summons. There is no
error identified in the order itself. Rather, Mother asserts that the
juvenile court erred in entering the order. Mother challenges the
“rendering [of] the judgment,” not merely the recording of it.
Accordingly, any error alleged in the entry of the custody order is
not within the scope of rule 60(a).

In re C.D.M.
20140267-CA 4 2014 UT App 130
¶8 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court erred in conclud-
ing that res judicata applied to her second motion to set aside the
custody order. The juvenile court found that the second motion
was untimely. Other than the unpreserved argument that the
custody order was void, Mother does not challenge the juvenile
court’s finding. Accordingly, we do not reach the res judicata issue.
¶9 Affirmed.