Kidd v. Kidd

2014 UT App 26
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ELAINE J. KIDD,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
CLARK BRUCE KIDD,
Respondent and Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20120460-CA
Filed January 30, 2014
First District Court, Logan Department
The Honorable Kevin K. Allen
No. 104100559
Raymond N. Malouf, Attorney for Appellant
Lyle W. Hillyard, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
GREGORY K. ORME and CAROLYN B. MCHUGH concurred.
ROTH, Judge:
¶1 Clark Bruce Kidd (Husband) appeals from several orders
of the trial court related to the dissolution of his marriage to
Elaine J. Kidd (Wife). We affirm.

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20120460-CA 2 2014 UT App 26
BACKGROUND1
¶2 Husband and Wife married on March 13, 1980, and
divorced on March 9, 2012, after thirty-two years of marriage.
Although the parties were able to agree on most of the terms of
their divorce, they could not resolve four issues that are now the
subject of this appeal: alimony; Husband’s demand that as a
condition of receiving certain personal assets, Wife pay him the
$4,505 she had withdrawn from a joint account; distribution of a
thrift savings plan (TSP) account;2 and removal of Wife’s name
from the mortgage on the marital home. After a bench trial on
November 18, 2011, the trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law in a memorandum decision.
I. Alimony
¶3 At the time of the trial, Husband, who was fifty-six,
earned a gross monthly income of $5,925. He also collected
another $2,324 per month from pensions and rental income and
had approximately $87,000 in savings. Wife, age fifty-five, was
then unemployed, but she had worked at a Wal-Mart pharmacy
1. ‚On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the trial court’s findings, and therefore recite
the facts consistent with that standard.‛ ProMax Dev. Corp. v.
Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 250 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). ‚However, we present
conflicting evidence to the extent necessary to clarify the issues
raised on appeal.‛ Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
2. A thrift savings plan is ‚a defined contribution
plan,‛ similar to a 401(k) plan, ‚for Federal employees and
members of the uniformed services.‛ Purpose and History, Thrift
Savings Plan, http://www.tsp.gov/planparticipation/about/
purposeAndHistory.shtml (last visited January 23, 2014).

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between 2006 and 2010 for approximately thirty-five hours per
week at $9.80 per hour. The trial court heard evidence that Wife
had, at some time in the past, partially completed the
coursework for a college degree but that she had experienced
difficulty in maintaining employment due to depression. For
purposes of its alimony determination, the court imputed to
Wife a salary of $9 per hour or $1,560 per month. The court
accepted both parties’ estimates of their respective monthly
expenses, which amounted to $7,270 for Husband, including
income taxes and other deductions, and $6,078 for Wife.3 The
parties’ combined expenses were approximately $3,500 more
than their combined income. Because Husband was receiving
from employment, retirement, and rental income $979 more
than his monthly expenses and Wife considerably less than hers,
the court found it ‚appropriate to equalize the parties’
standards of living‛ by having Husband ‚help provide for
*Wife’s+ needs.‛ It therefore awarded Wife monthly alimony in
the amount of $2,182.50. The court explained that it arrived at
this figure by adding the parties’ monthly income only from
employment ($5,925 + $1,560 = $7,485), dividing that income in
half ($7,485 / 2 = $3,742.50), and subtracting the income imputed
to Wife ($1,560). This division left both parties with a monthly
shortfall but was intended to ensure that the shortfall in their
ability to maintain the marital standard of living was equitably
shared. The court made the alimony award retroactive to the
time of the separation in October 2010 and awarded Wife $9,555
in back alimony, the difference between the permanent monthly
3. Husband asserts that Wife’s projected monthly expenses
contain a mathematical error and actually total $5,728, rather
than $6,078. The trial court failed to either seek clarification from
Wife or correct its finding, presumably because the $350
discrepancy had no effect on its analysis or its ruling. For that
reason, we use the $6,078 figure accepted by the court, while
acknowledging that there appears to be a mathematical error in
Wife’s budget. The discrepancy does not affect our decision.

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20120460-CA 4 2014 UT App 26
alimony award ($2,182.50) and the temporary monthly alimony
amount ($1,500), calculated from October 1, 2010, when
temporary alimony began, to December 19, 2011, when
permanent alimony was awarded.
II. Property Division
¶4 The parties reached agreement about the division of most
of their assets. However, $4,505 that Wife had withdrawn from
a marital account remained in dispute, as did interpretation of
the provision of their settlement agreement that related to
division of Husband’s TSP account.
A. The $4,505 Withdrawal
¶5 Shortly after the parties’ separation, Wife withdrew $4,505
from a joint bank account primarily used by Husband.
Eventually, Wife paid the $4,505 to Husband, although the
parties dispute the circumstances that led her to do so.
¶6 At trial, Wife testified that when she attempted to pick up
personal property from the former marital home, as the parties
had earlier agreed she could, Husband prevented her entry,
stating, ‚*Y+ou’re not taking anything until we’ve settled the
[$]4,505 that you owe me from my account that you took.‛ Wife
testified that she wrote a check on the spot for $4,505 so that she
could collect her personal property.
¶7 Husband testified, however, that the parties had reached
a tentative agreement on how to divide their personal property
but renegotiated because Wife wanted some additional
property, primarily a piano, that they had yet to divide.
According to Husband, the parties reached a new agreement in
which Wife agreed to pay the $4,505 in exchange for the piano
and some other items. Husband explained that they had settled
this payment when they had divided their final joint banking
account, which contained $10,788 of equity withdrawn from the
marital home. Wife was entitled to half that amount ($5,394),

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but Husband claims that because she had agreed to pay the
$4,505 she had withdrawn from another account, he paid her
the difference between her share and the withdrawal, or $899,
by check. The trial court resolved this dispute in Wife’s favor
and ‚awarded *her+ a credit of $4,505.00 as a refund for funds
*Husband+ obtained from *her+ by way of unlawful coercion.‛
B. The TSP Account
¶8 During the marriage, Husband contributed to a TSP
account. Prior to trial, Husband and Wife had executed a
settlement agreement, in which they agreed to ‚evenly divide
the TSP savings plan as of March 31, 2011.‛ It appears that the
parties intended that these assets be divided in advance of the
entry of a final divorce decree, but by the time of trial, no
Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) had been
presented to the account administrator to distribute the assets.
A dispute had also arisen regarding whether the TSP account
was to be divided by assigning shares to Wife or by paying her
their cash value. The trial court received evidence on the
number of shares in the account and the value of the account as
of four separate dates: October 1, 2010, the date that temporary
alimony was ordered; March 31, 2011, the date agreed upon in
the settlement agreement; April 1, 2011, the date after the one
agreed upon in the settlement agreement; and October 28, 2011,
just before trial. The number of shares had steadily increased
between October 1, 2010, and October 28, 2011, due to
Husband’s continued contributions to the account after the
parties’ separation. The value of each share had also increased
between October 1, 2010, and April 1, 2011, but by October 28,
2011, the value of each share had decreased. Wife argued that
the TSP account could not be properly allocated by simply
dividing the number of shares; rather, she contended, ‚*y+ou
have to figure out the value and then make an award of money
that . . . offsets that value.‛

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¶9 The trial court concluded that the settlement agreement
contemplated that the parties would evenly divide the value of
the TSP account rather than the shares. It calculated the
account’s value by multiplying the number of shares on April 1,
2011 (2992.4822 shares) by the value of each share as of October
28, 2011 ($21.1507 per share). The court explained that it used
October 28 as the valuation date so as not to penalize Husband
for any decrease in share value due to the delay in dividing the
account.4 According to that calculation, the account had a value
of $63,293.09, and the court awarded Wife $31,646.55 in
accordance with the parties’ agreement to ‚evenly divide the
TSP savings plan.‛
III. The Mortgage on the Marital Home
¶10 Sometime after executing the written settlement
agreement, Husband and Wife orally agreed that Husband
would buy Wife’s interest in the marital home and take action
to remove her name from the mortgage loan.5 In spring 2010,
the parties had refinanced the marital home, at which time they
4. It is not apparent why the court used the number of shares in
the TSP account on April 1, 2011, when the parties had
stipulated to using the number of shares in the account on March
31, 2011. However, neither party disputes the fact that the
number of shares was the same on April 1 as it was on March 31.
5. ‚Remove Wife’s name from the mortgage‛ appears to have
been a shorthand description used by the parties and later
adopted by the trial court to refer to an arrangement whereby
Wife would be excused from any further responsibility on the
loan secured by a mortgage on the marital home after Husband
bought out her interest in June 2011. At trial, Husband stated
that he intended to fulfill this obligation by refinancing the home
as the sole obligor. For consistency and convenience, we use the
same language.

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withdrew and divided evenly much of the equity from the
marital home. In June 2011, Husband paid Wife $1,000 for her
share of the small remaining equity and Wife executed a
warranty deed transferring her ownership interest in the home
to Husband. By the time of trial however, Husband had not yet
taken steps to remove Wife’s name from the mortgage. The trial
court therefore ordered Husband to ‚take the necessary steps to
remove [Wife’s] name from the mortgage‛ by March 18, 2012,
ninety days from the entry of the memorandum decision.
IV. Decree of Divorce
¶11 On March 9, 2012, the trial court entered a final decree of
divorce, to which it attached copies of the parties’ settlement
agreement and the court’s memorandum decision, both of
which were incorporated by reference in the decree. In addition
to the issues specifically addressed in the memorandum
decision and the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
decree included provisions outlining the QDROs needed to
divide Husband’s retirement accounts and established the
length of the marriage—thirty-two years—as the term for
Husband’s payment of alimony, with the usual provisions for
termination in the event of remarriage, cohabitation, or death.
¶12 Husband now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶13 Husband challenges the trial court’s $2,182.50-per-month
alimony award. Specifically, Husband asserts that the court
abused its discretion by awarding alimony without an adequate
basis for its finding on Wife’s needs and by awarding alimony
in excess of Wife’s needs and Husband’s ability to pay.
‚Alimony determinations will be upheld on appeal unless a
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.‛ Mark
v. Mark, 2009 UT App 374, ¶ 6, 223 P.3d 476 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). In making an award of
alimony, the court must ‚support*+ its decision with adequate

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findings and conclusions.‛ Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Those findings must be ‚sufficiently detailed
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached.‛ Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ‚Unstated
findings can be implied if it is reasonable to assume that the trial
court actually considered the controverted evidence and
necessarily made a finding to resolve the controversy, but
simply failed to record the factual determination it made.‛ Id. at
1025. ‚We review challenges to findings of fact for clear error‛
and will reverse only if the findings ‚are in conflict with the
clear weight of the evidence, or if this court has a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.‛ Henshaw v.
Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ¶ 10, 271 P.3d 837 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). ‚Consequently, as an
appellate court, we give great deference to the trial court and
do[] not lightly disturb . . . [its] factual findings.‛ Id. (alterations
and omission in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
¶14 Husband also appeals from two property distribution
rulings dealing with the repayment of $4,505 and the
distribution of the TSP account. ‚Trial courts have considerable
discretion in determining . . . property distribution in divorce
cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.‛ Stonehocker v.
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 8, 176 P.3d 476 (omission in
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To the
extent, however, that the trial court’s ruling depended on
interpretation of the settlement agreement, we defer to it on
issues of fact but review its decision on legal questions for
correctness. See Flores v. Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90, ¶ 7, 209 P.3d
428 (explaining the standard for reviewing a trial court’s
determination that a contract was ambiguous); see also Jacobsen
v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, ¶ 13, 257 P.3d 478 (‚The governing
principle in our law is that contracts between spouses are

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 9 2014 UT App 26
enforceable and generally subject to ordinary contract principles
. . . .‛ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶15 Husband next takes issue with the trial court’s order that
he take steps to remove Wife’s name from the mortgage on the
marital home by March 18, 2012. A trial court’s equitable orders
should be ‚accord*ed+ substantial deference,‛ with the trial
court being given ‚considerable latitude.‛ Cf. Connell v. Connell,
2010 UT App 139, ¶ 34, 233 P.3d 836 (applying this standard to
equitable orders on child support).
¶16 Husband also challenges the trial court’s decision to
incorporate the parties’ settlement agreement and the
memorandum decision by reference in the final decree of
divorce. Husband argues that pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(a), the court should have included findings and
conclusions derived from these documents in the decree itself,
rather than merely attaching them for reference. We review a
court’s compliance with the rules of procedure for correctness.
See Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, LLC, 2010 UT 40,
¶¶ 10, 18, 238 P.3d 1035; Martinez v. Media-Paymaster
Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT 42, ¶ 46,
164 P.3d 384. To the extent that the rule permits an exercise of
discretion, we review the trial court’s acts for abuse of that
discretion. Cf. Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, ¶ 4 & n.2, 16 P.3d 549
(considering whether the trial court ‚exceeded the range of
discretion‛ afforded to trial courts in awarding costs (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶17 Finally, Husband contends that the trial court included
decisions in the decree that were not addressed in the court’s
memorandum decision. We interpret this as a contention that
the court made rulings in the decree on matters that were not
addressed at trial. Whether an issue has been presented to the
court so as to permit it to grant relief is an issue of law
ordinarily reviewed for correctness. Combe v. Warren’s Family
Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 735–36 (Utah 1984); Cowley v.
Porter, 2005 UT App 518, ¶ 31, 127 P.3d 1224. However, we

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 10 2014 UT App 26
resolve Husband’s contention on grounds of preservation and
inadequate briefing, and as a result, we do not reach its merits.
ANALYSIS
I. Alimony
¶18 In his challenge to the trial court’s award of alimony,
Husband raises three claims of error: (1) the trial court failed to
state an adequate basis to support a finding that Wife had a
need for alimony and thus erred in its attempt to equalize the
parties’ standards of living; (2) the alimony award ‚ignore*s
Husband’s] obligation to pay taxes, and [the] costs and
inconvenience to earn *his+ salary‛ and also exceeds both Wife’s
needs and Husband’s ability to pay; and (3) the court should not
have ordered Husband to pay alimony retroactively because
‚*d+uring those months, the expenses she lists were not
incurred.‛ We first address Husband’s two contentions that
challenge the prospective alimony award.
A. Husband Has Not Demonstrated Error in the Alimony
Award.
¶19 Husband argues that ‚*t+he trial court did not find facts
that *Wife+ has the present need for alimony awarded,‛
essentially because the court did not limit its assessment of
Wife’s need to the expenses she was actually incurring at the
time of trial. Husband also contends that the court failed to
accurately assess Husband’s own ability to pay in making the
award. A request for alimony requires that the trial court
consider ‚the financial condition and needs of the recipient
spouse,‛ ‚the recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce
income,‛ ‚the ability of the payor spouse to provide support,‛

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 11 2014 UT App 26
and ‚the length of the marriage.‛6 Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2013).7 ‚Findings of fact, whether based on
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.‛ Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). A finding is clearly erroneous
only if it is ‚in conflict with the clear weight of the evidence.‛
Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 14, 217 P.3d 733. Because
the trial court’s findings regarding alimony appear to be
supported by the evidence, we decline to disturb the alimony
award.
1. The Trial Court Appropriately Based Its Alimony Award
on Wife’s Projected Needs.
¶20 Husband complains that the trial court based its alimony
determination on Wife’s projected monthly expenses of $6,078
rather than on the much lower expenses she was actually
incurring at the time of trial. Husband asserts that the court
erred in using those projected expenses to equalize the parties’
standards of living without taking into consideration the
parties’ actual needs and Husband’s ability to pay.
¶21 At trial, Wife testified that she was then living with a
family member but that she intended to purchase her own home
as soon as the divorce was finalized. Wife explained that she
had become accustomed to living in her own home during the
marriage and was only living with family until she qualified for
a mortgage loan, which depended on the final division of the
6. The other statutory alimony factors are not applicable here. See
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
7. This subsection of the Utah Code has not been amended since
the entry of the divorce decree. We therefore cite the current
codification as a convenience to the reader.

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20120460-CA 12 2014 UT App 26
parties’ assets and determination of any alimony award.
Accordingly, she presented a financial declaration that included
both her then-current monthly expenses ($3,698) and the higher
monthly expenses she anticipated once she moved into her own
home ($6,078). Wife’s expense projection included a mortgage
payment of $1,100 (including principal, interest, taxes, and
insurance, based on a listing for a four-bedroom home at
$170,500) and $550 in additional household expenses that she
would incur once she was on her own again. Based on this
testimony, the trial court found that Wife ‚currently lives with a
relative and is searching for a home. Once she finds a home she
will have $6,078.00 in monthly expenses.‛ Having imputed
$1,560 in income to Wife, the court concluded that she was left
with a $4,518 deficit between her needs and her ability to earn.
¶22 Husband contends that the court’s findings do not explain
why the court accepted Wife’s projected monthly expenses of
$6,078 when both Wife’s then-current actual monthly expenses
and the monthly expenses that Husband himself projected for
Wife totaled less than $4,000.8 He also contends that the court
abused its discretion in using those projected expenses to
equalize the parties’ standards of living because Wife’s actual
expenses demonstrated that she did not need alimony. See
Sellers v. Sellers, 2010 UT App 393, ¶ 3, 246 P.3d 173 (explaining
that unless the party seeking alimony has insufficient income to
meet her needs, a court abuses its discretion in further
analyzing the alimony factors and in making any attempt to
equalize the income).
8. Husband did not present a projected budget for Wife at trial.
After trial, however, Husband objected to the court’s findings
regarding alimony based on his claim that Wife’s proposed
budget had ‚obvious math and logic errors.‛ Husband attached
a recalculated budget to his objection, which calculated Wife’s
monthly expenses at $3,205, nearly $500 less than Wife’s then-
current actual monthly expenses.

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20120460-CA 13 2014 UT App 26
¶23 The trial court, however, explained in its memorandum
decision why it accepted Wife’s projected expenses as her
reasonable needs: ‚[She] is searching for a home. Once she finds
a home, she will have $6,078 in monthly expenses.‛ The court
also recognized that it had imputed only $1,560 per month in
income to her. On the other hand, the court found that Husband
received $8,249 per month in salary, retirement, and rental
income, and it also accepted Husband’s declared monthly
expenses of $7,270 without making any deductions, just as it
had for Wife. The court therefore concluded that because
Husband brought in more than he spent and Wife had more
expenses than income, Husband ‚has the capacity to earn
sufficient for his needs and to help provide for *Wife+’s needs.‛
However, because the parties’ joint expenses exceeded their
joint incomes, the trial court found it ‚appropriate to equalize
the parties’ standards of living.‛ See id. (‚*T+he courts will
equalize the incomes of the parties . . . in those situations in
which one party does not earn enough to cover his or her
demonstrated needs and the other party does not have the
ability to pay enough to cover those needs.‛). And the court did
so by adding ‚*Wife+’s imputed income ($1560) . . . to
[Husband’s] salary ($5925) divided in half‛ and then
subtracting Wife’s imputed income. This calculation, which
excluded Husband’s additional pension and rental income of
$2,324, left Wife with a $2,335.50 monthly shortfall, while
Husband’s was $1,203.50.9
9. Husband asserts that the court failed to consider Wife’s $1,514
share of two retirement accounts, which should have been
considered in calculating need. Husband does not say whether
Wife is currently eligible to receive this money nor does he direct
us to any point in the record where this information was
provided to the trial court. As a consequence, we do not further
consider this argument. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A)
(requiring an appellant to provide citation to the place in the
record where the issue was preserved in the trial court).

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20120460-CA 14 2014 UT App 26
¶24 Husband nevertheless insists that Wife’s projected $6,078
monthly need was ‚speculative and wishful‛ because both her
actual needs and the more modest budget he prepared for her
demonstrated that her monthly expenses were under $4,000. As
the trial court found, however, Wife’s lower expenses at the
time of trial were largely due to the separation, which caused
her to temporarily move in with a relative and live in
circumstances significantly more straitened than during the
marriage.10 Indeed, we have previously instructed trial courts to
avoid focusing on ‚actual expenses alone‛ when assessing need
because the expense level during separation ‚may be
necessarily lower than needed to maintain an appropriate
standard of living for various reasons, including, possibly, lack
of income.‛ Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct. App.
1991). Rather, the trial court generally should ‚consider*+ the
standard of living ‘during the marriage.’‛ Id.; see also Bingham v.
Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (considering
the wife’s estimated future expenses in determining whether the
alimony award was appropriate). And although Wife’s monthly
budget includes a payment of $800 in attorney fees toward a
balance of just under $15,000, we also reject Husband’s claim
that the alimony award results in his subsidizing Wife’s savings
by paying money for fees that will cease to exist after
approximately eighteen months. Even when alimony is
combined with her imputed salary, Wife is left with a deficit of
expenses over income that far exceeds her monthly attorney fees
obligation.
10. It is perhaps worth noting that the trial court imputed $1,560
in income to Wife when she was not then employed and was not
employed during the vast majority of the marriage. So the
court’s approach to both income and expenses involved
projections that took into account Wife’s circumstances in the
longer term.

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20120460-CA 15 2014 UT App 26
2. The Alimony Award Was Not Disproportionate.
¶25 Husband next argues that the court abused its discretion
by awarding Wife $2,182.50 per month in alimony because the
award disproportionately burdens him and because the
findings of fact regarding Wife’s needs and Husband’s ability to
pay are insufficient to support it. Husband claims that in using
his gross income to calculate his ability to pay, the court
‚ignored *his+ obligation to pay taxes, and *the+ costs and
inconvenience to earn the salary‛ because his employment
required him to travel to an out-of-town job site. For purposes
of determining alimony, however, the court accepted
Husband’s entire monthly budget of $7,270, which included
$1,466 in taxes (social security, federal and state income, and
Medicare) as well as $910 in rent and transportation expenses
associated with the commute to his remote work location.
Husband fails to even acknowledge this aspect of the trial
court’s analysis. Thus, his argument amounts to little more than
a disagreement with the court’s decision without any
meaningful consideration of the factual underpinnings of the
court’s pertinent findings or resulting order. This is insufficient
to challenge the finding on appeal. Bell v. Bell, 2013 UT App 248,
¶ 30, 312 P.3d 951 (‚*A+ party challenging a trial court’s factual
finding must do more than merely reargue the evidence
supporting his or her position . . . .‛ (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
¶26 Nor does the court’s effort to equalize the parties’
standard of living disproportionately burden Husband. The
purpose of equalization is to ensure that when the parties are
unable to maintain the standard of living to which they were
accustomed during marriage, the shortfall is equitably shared.
Sellers, 2010 UT App 393, ¶ 3. Indeed,
[i]ncome equalization, as imposed by the courts
in divorce proceedings, is perhaps better
described as ‚equalization of poverty.‛ In other
words, the courts will equalize the incomes of

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20120460-CA 16 2014 UT App 26
the parties only in those situations in which one
party does not earn enough to cover his or her
demonstrated needs and the other party does
not have the ability to pay enough to cover
those needs.
Id. And as we discussed above, this is the exact circumstance the
court found in this case: the court’s calculation of alimony
resulted in Wife having a $2,335.50 monthly shortfall ($6,078 in
expenses minus $1,560 in imputed income and $2,182.50 in
alimony), while Husband’s shortfall is less, only $1,203.50 per
month ($7,270 in expenses and $2,182.50 for the alimony
payment minus $5,925 in earned income and $2,324 in rental
income). The court’s imposition of a lesser burden on Husband
in shouldering the parties’ income deficit appropriately
recognizes both the extra effort that Husband must exert to
obtain his monthly income and Wife’s need for assistance in
maintaining her own household.
¶27 Because the court articulated both the basis for the
alimony award and its calculation of that award in its findings
and because the award appropriately considers Wife’s needs
and Husband’s ability to pay, we find no error in the court’s
decision to award Wife $2,182.50 per month in alimony.
B. Husband Has Not Carried His Burden of Establishing
that the Court Erred in Awarding Retroactive Alimony.
¶28 Finally, Husband contests the court’s order that alimony
be retroactive to October 1, 2010, arguing that ‚*d+uring those
months, the expenses *Wife+ lists were not incurred.‛ The
validity of this position is not self-evident, especially in light of
our rejection of his argument that the court erred in basing the
alimony award on Wife’s marital standard of living rather than
on her actual expenses during the separation. Yet Husband does
not offer any legal authority or analysis to support his assertion.
Accordingly, we decline to consider it further. See Springville
Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 21

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 17 2014 UT App 26
n.2, 979 P.2d 332 (explaining that appellate courts need not
consider issues that the appellant fails to adequately brief).
II. Property Distribution
¶29 Husband also challenges the trial court’s orders regarding
the distribution of certain property. Specifically, Husband
contends that the evidence does not support the court’s findings
and its conclusion that he coerced Wife to repay him the $4,505
she had withdrawn from a marital account after the parties’
separation. Husband also contests the court’s order that the TSP
account be divided in dollars based on the value of the shares
on October 28, 2011.
A. The Trial Court’s Findings and Conclusion that Husband
Coerced Wife To Repay Him $4,505 Are Supported by the
Evidence.
¶30 Just after the parties separated, Wife withdrew $4,505
from a joint banking account primarily used by Husband, one
half of the total amount in the account. Wife later paid $4,505 to
Husband in response to his demand that she repay the amount
of the withdrawal in order to gain access to personal property
she had arranged to pick up at his house. The trial court
determined that Husband coerced Wife into repaying the
money and ordered it credited back to her. Specifically, the
court found,
On June 17, 2011, after the Parties had resolved
[most of the personal property distribution]
. . . , [Wife] arrived at the marital home with a
moving van to move her personal property.
Despite *Wife+’s emotional problems,
[Husband] told [Wife] that [she] could have the
piano if she agreed to pay back the $4,505 that
[she] withdrew from the marital accounts after
the separation. [Wife] agreed and [Husband]
deducted the $4,505 from the remaining $10,788

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 18 2014 UT App 26
to be dispersed as the remaining funds from the
refinance.
The court concluded that Wife had agreed to Husband’s demand
because ‚she was very upset and just wanted to leave the
situation.‛
¶31 Husband argues that the trial court could not have
reached such a conclusion because there were ‚*n+o actual facts
[to] support a finding of . . . unlawful coercion.‛ A party
challenging a finding of fact in a bench trial must ‚demonstrate
that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding . . .
when viewing [the evidence] in a light most favorable to the
court below.‛ Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ¶ 76, 100 P.3d 1177.
This is a heavy burden, as appellate courts must ‚not . . . set
aside *a finding of fact+ unless clearly erroneous,‛ having given
‚due regard . . . to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.‛ Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
¶32 Husband fails to effectively meet his burden of
persuasion on this issue because he overlooks substantial
evidence in the record that supports the court’s findings and
conclusion. Both Husband and Wife testified that Wife had long
suffered from depression, which had, at times, caused her to
become ‚distraught‛ and unable to appropriately handle
stressful situations. They also testified that Husband had agreed
that she could remove her personal property on June 17, 2011,
and that he was aware that to accomplish this, Wife would have
to make arrangements to travel from Sigurd, Utah, where she
was staying with a relative, to the marital home in River
Heights, Utah. On June 17, she left Sigurd with a moving van
she had hired, accompanied by people she had brought along to
help with the work. Wife testified that despite their agreement,
she arrived in River Heights to find the driveway and garage
blocked by Husband’s vehicles and the house ‚dead-bolted,
locked.‛ When Husband answered the door, he told her,
‚*Y+ou’re not taking anything until we’ve settled the *$+4,505
that you owe me from my account that you took.‛ Husband

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 19 2014 UT App 26
acknowledged that Wife acceded to his payment demand prior
to Wife removing any items from the home, though he
described the circumstances differently.
¶33 Husband’s alternative explanation for Wife’s agreement
to pay him the $4,505—i.e., that she received additional
personal property in exchange for $4,505—certainly finds
evidentiary support in the record, but the trial court resolved
the conflicts in the evidence against Husband’s position. The
court determined that Husband took advantage of Wife’s
‚emotional problems‛ to coerce her to ‚pay back $4,505 that
*she+ withdrew after the separation‛ in exchange for the piano.
Husband has not demonstrated that the trial court erred.
¶34 The resolution of this issue ultimately required the court
to determine the relative weight and credibility of each
witness’s testimony in order to resolve conflicting evidence.
Credibility determinations are within the province of the trial
judge, who is uniquely equipped to ‚mak*e+ factual findings
based exclusively on oral testimony‛ due to his or her
opportunity to ‚view*+ the witnesses firsthand, to assess their
demeanor and to consider their testimonies in the context of the
proceedings as a whole.‛ Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56,
¶¶ 11–12, 271 P.3d 837. Accordingly, ‚due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses,‛ Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), and ‚absent a proper
showing that the trial court erred, we will not revisit the facts on
appeal,‛ Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ¶ 12 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). In his attempt to undermine the
court’s credibility determination, Husband points to the court’s
rejection of Wife’s testimony that she paid Husband by check on
the date of the renegotiation, testimony that Husband
characterizes as perjury. The trial court, however, determined
that Wife was ‚confused about the check,‛ as opposed to lying.
Husband dedicates the rest of his analysis on this issue to
rearguing the facts that support his characterization of the
events that led to Wife’s payment of $4,505. But ‚a party
challenging a trial court’s factual finding must do more than

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 20 2014 UT App 26
merely reargue the evidence supporting his or her position
. . . .‛ Bell v. Bell, 2013 UT App 248, ¶ 30, 312 P.3d 951 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, a party
challenging the findings of fact must ‚demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding . . . when
viewing [the evidence] in a light most favorable to the court
below,‛ Chen, 2004 UT 82, ¶ 76, because the finding is ‚in
conflict with the clear weight of the evidence,‛ Kimball v.
Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 14, 217 P.3d 733. Accordingly, we
decline to disturb the trial court’s findings that led to its order
that Husband return the $4,505 to Wife.11
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Dividing
the TSP Account.
¶35 Husband next contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in distributing his TSP account by dividing its cash
value on October 28, 2011, rather than by simply allocating Wife
half the shares as of March 31, 2011. Husband’s argument has
two components: first, he asserts that the settlement agreement
required the account to be divided according to shares, not
dollars, on March 31, 2011; second, he claims that in the absence
of strict compliance with the settlement agreement, ‚the more
equitable division date‛ is October 1, 2010, when his obligation
to pay temporary alimony began.
¶36 ‚Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining
. . . property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on
11. Husband also asserts that ‚*t+he trial court’s decision to find
*him+ guilty of ‘unlawful coercion’ violates his civil rights, if it is
a crime.‛ Husband does not provide any analysis to support this
novel argument. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to the
question of whether the evidence supports the facts underlying
the conclusion to award Wife the $4,505 she repaid to Husband.

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 21 2014 UT App 26
appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is
demonstrated.‛ Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 8,
176 P.3d 476 (omission in original) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The burden is on the appellant to
show that the trial court acted outside of that discretion by
showing that the property division resulted in clear prejudice.
Id. Husband has failed to satisfy his burden. First, he has not
properly challenged the trial court’s determination that the
settlement agreement contemplated division of the TSP account
by cash value. Second, he has not demonstrated any prejudice
from the court’s choice of date from which to calculate
distribution.
¶37 Through mediation, Husband and Wife had agreed to
‚evenly divide the TSP savings plan as of March 31, 2011.‛ The
settlement agreement does not specify whether that division
was to be made by shares or dollars, and either interpretation
seems plausible. The trial court considered evidence from both
Wife and Husband bearing on the issue, with Wife presenting
evidence that dividing a thrift savings plan by shares was not
feasible and Husband testifying about the parties’ intent to
‚divide the existing shares.‛ See Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51,
¶ 25, 190 P.3d 1269 (explaining that when a contract is facially
ambiguous, the court may consider parol evidence of the
parties’ intentions). In the end, the court determined that the
account should be divided by dollar value. The court’s
approach is consistent with the long-recognized ‚preference for
valuation of the non-employee spouse’s share and its immediate
cash-out from other assets.‛ Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841,
845 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d
431, 433 (Utah 1982)); see also Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015,
1020 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (reiterating the preference to cash-out
the non-employee spouse because ‚*a+warding retirement
benefits solely to the employee spouse comports with the goal
of allowing the parties to make as much of a clean break from
each other as is reasonably possible‛ (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999). On
appeal, Husband simply reasserts that the shares themselves

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 22 2014 UT App 26
could be divided and does not engage in any meaningful
discussion of ambiguity in the settlement agreement or provide
any citation to or analysis of the case law on contract
interpretation. Husband has therefore failed to properly
challenge the trial court’s resolution of the ambiguity on
conflicting evidence, and the court’s interpretation of the
settlement agreement is therefore ‚placed beyond the reach of
further appellate review.‛ See Benns v. Career Serv. Review Office,
2011 UT App 362, ¶ 2, 264 P.3d 563 (per curiam).
¶38 Husband’s criticism of the court’s decision to value the
TSP account as of October 28, 2011, is likewise unavailing.
Husband’s primary argument is that because ‚the trial court
selectively disregarded parts of their negotiated agreement‛—
for example, when it ordered Husband to repay Wife the $4,505
she withdrew from the marital account despite his position that
she had received additional personal property in return—it
could ‚also disregard *the settlement agreement’s terms about+
when to divide the TSP.‛
¶39 The settlement agreement provides that Husband and
Wife ‚will evenly divide the TSP savings plan as of March 31,
2011.‛ By the time of trial, however, no distribution of that
account had been sought or obtained. At trial, the court received
evidence of the number and value of the shares in the TSP
account on October 1, 2010, the date that temporary alimony
was ordered; March 31 and April 1, 2011, the date upon which
the TSP was to be divided and the day after; and October 28,
2011, just before trial. On October 1, 2010, the account held
2,420.5212 shares with a per share value of $18.4578. On March
31 and April 1, 2011, the account had 2,992.4822 shares; the
share value on March 31 was $22.9421, while the share value on
April 1 was $23.0797. By October 28, 2011, the number of shares
had increased to 3,484.8029, but each share’s value had dropped
to $21.1507. The court elected to award Wife the cash value of
half of 2,992.4822 shares (the number on March 31, 2011, as the
settlement agreement contemplated) but valued them as of
October 28, 2011, so as ‚not *to+ penalize* Husband+ for any

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 23 2014 UT App 26
decrease in value‛ between the mediation and trial when the
parties had not acted to timely distribute the account.
¶40 Husband asserts that rather than dividing the account as
of October 28, 2011, the ‚more equitable division‛ would have
been to value the shares as of the date that Wife began receiving
temporary alimony, October 1, 2010. According to Husband,
‚equity suggests he should not be ordered to pay temporary
spouse support . . . and also keep dividing TSP shares
accumulated after temporary spouse support begins.‛
Husband’s argument on appeal echoes the argument he made
below, which the trial court rejected. Husband, however, does
not offer any reason, much less supporting legal authority, on
why it was more equitable in the broader circumstances
affecting both parties, as opposed to simply more favorable to
him, to divide the shares as of October 1, 2010. Trial courts have
broad equitable powers in the division of marital property that
will not be disturbed on appeal without a showing of ‚a clear
and prejudicial abuse of discretion.‛ Stonehocker, 2008 UT App
11, ¶ 8. The court’s finding demonstrates that it intended to
enforce the parties’ settlement agreement—to ‚evenly divide
the TSP savings plan‛—but to do so taking into account the
changed circumstances at the time of trial—the passing of
nearly eight months during which Wife failed to present a
QDRO for distribution of the account and the value of the
shares had decreased. Such a decision seems to be well within
the equitable discretion accorded to the trial court, and no
prejudice to Husband is apparent; the fact that the court might
have chosen a valuation date more advantageous to Husband is
not in itself the kind of prejudice that the test contemplates. See
id. We therefore decline to disturb the court’s distribution of the
TSP account.
III. The Mortgage on the Marital Home
¶41 The trial court ordered that Husband take steps to
‚remove *Wife+’s name from the mortgage of the marital home
within ninety days of the issuance of [the] Memorandum

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 24 2014 UT App 26
Decision‛ on December 19, 2011. Husband challenges the
court’s order on two alternative grounds. First, he contends that
the court could not order him to take action to remove Wife’s
name from the mortgage because that was not a term of the
parties’ settlement agreement. In his reply brief, Husband
clarifies that the parties had discussed a six-to-twelve-month
time period for him to take steps to remove Wife’s name from
the mortgage but claims they never reached a formal agreement
that he would do so or as to the timing in which it would be
completed. Husband further asserts that any court-imposed
requirement that he take steps to remove Wife’s name from the
mortgage must allow him time after the issuance of the decree
to comply. Alternatively, he asserts that the court’s order was
impossible to comply with because, as a practical matter, he was
incapable of obtaining new financing until after the final divorce
decree issued on March 9, 2012, a mere nine days before the
court-imposed deadline of March 18, 2012. Husband also
contends that he now may be unable to qualify for a refinancing
loan due to the skewing of his income-to-debt ratio created by
the divorce decree.
¶42 Husband’s first argument amounts to a challenge to the
court’s factual findings that ‚in return‛ for Husband’s payment
in June 2011 of ‚$1,000 to *Wife+ for *Wife+ to deed the property
to *Husband+,‛ Husband ‚was required to remove *Wife+’s
name from the mortgage within six to twelve months of the
agreement,‛ yet, ‚*a+s of *November 18, 2011+, *Wife+’s name
was still on the mortgage.‛ ‚Findings of fact, whether based on
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous . . . .‛ Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). A finding is clearly
erroneous if it is ‚in conflict with the clear weight of the
evidence.‛ Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 14, 217 P.3d
733.
¶43 Husband contends that the parties never reached any
agreement for him to take action to remove Wife’s name from
the mortgage because although this issue was discussed during
mediation, it was not included in the settlement agreement

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 25 2014 UT App 26
itself. At trial, however, Husband took a different position,
acknowledging his understanding that Wife had executed a
deed conveying her interest in the marital home to him in June
2011 and that he ‚had six months to a year‛ from that date to
refinance the marital home to remove Wife’s name from the
mortgage. Husband now asserts that if this testimony can be
interpreted to be an affirmative representation that the parties
had reached an agreement on the matter, his testimony should
be read ‚in the context of doing that after the Decree was
entered‛ because ‚it was very apparent that the name could not
be removed without a finalized Divorce Decree.‛ At the
November 2011 trial, however, Husband stated that the six
months was coming up in ‚the middle of December‛ and that
based on his discussions with two banks, he expected to
complete the refinancing process within one to two months.
This evidence supports the trial court’s findings that in
exchange for Husband’s payment to Wife in June 2011 of her
remaining share of the equity in the home, Husband had agreed
to take steps that would result in the removal of Wife’s name
from the mortgage within six to twelve months.12
¶44 Alternatively, Husband asserts that compliance with the
order to take steps to remove Wife’s name by March 18, 2012,
was impossible. We are not persuaded. Husband did not offer
12. Husband also contends that the trial court’s finding that
Wife’s name was still on the mortgage was incomplete because it
‚omits to also find that as of the final order, the Deed to
*Husband+ had not yet been recorded.‛ The trial court itself
rejected Husband’s similar objection to the memorandum
decision on the basis that it simply asked the court to ‚provide
‘more appropriate background’‛ without affecting the substance
of the court’s ruling. We agree with the trial court. Its findings,
as written, lend support to its order that Husband remove Wife’s
name within ninety days of the memorandum decision.

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 26 2014 UT App 26
the trial court any evidence that his ability to refinance was
dependent upon the entry of a final divorce decree. To the
contrary, as discussed above, Husband testified at trial that he
recognized that he needed to act upon his obligation to
restructure the mortgage so as to remove Wife’s name within six
to twelve months and that because six months was coming up
in mid-December, he had begun working with a lender to
obtain a new mortgage. Husband expressed no concern about
the feasibility of complying within the six-to-twelve-month
period or before the issuance of a final divorce decree; in fact, he
indicated that based on his discussions with the lender, he
expected to complete the refinancing within ‚a month or two.‛
The court apparently accepted that testimony and even gave
Husband an additional two months (a total of nine months) to
complete the refinancing.13
¶45 Finally, it does not appear that Husband presented his
claim that he may not be able to qualify for a refinancing loan
due to the skewing of his income-to-debt ratio created by the
divorce decree to the trial court, and it is therefore unpreserved
for our review. See 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,
¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (explaining that an issue is unpreserved when
it has not been ‚presented to the trial court in such a way that
the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue‛ and
appellate courts need not consider unpreserved issues). To the
extent that Husband’s concerns involve events occurring after
the entry of the divorce decree, Husband’s remedy is to seek
relief in the trial court; it is not a matter for resolution on appeal.
¶46 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.
13. Although Husband asserts that the court should have
allowed him six to twelve months from the date of the final
decree to refinance and remove Wife’s name from the mortgage,
there is no indication in the record or in briefing that Husband
has yet removed Wife’s name from the mortgage.

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 27 2014 UT App 26
IV. The Divorce Decree
A. Incorporation by Reference of the Settlement Agreement
and Memorandum Decision in the Divorce Decree
¶47 Husband next argues that the decree ‚should not
incorporate by reference documents subject to interpretation,‛
specifically, the parties’ settlement agreement and the court’s
memorandum decision. To support his position, Husband
quotes the language in rule 54(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure that provides, ‚*A+ judgment shall not include any
matter by reference,‛ Utah R. Civ. P. 54(a). Husband, however,
fails to acknowledge the introductory clause of the sentence he
quotes, which states, ‚[U]nless otherwise directed by the court, a
judgment shall not include any matter by reference.‛ Id.
(emphasis added).
¶48 In interpreting rules of procedure, appellate courts apply
‚our general rules of statutory construction,‛ which require that
we attribute to a rule’s language its ordinary meaning and read
the provision as a whole. Arbogast Family Trust v. River
Crossings, LLC, 2010 UT 40, ¶ 18, 238 P.3d 1035; Martinez v.
Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
2007 UT 42, ¶ 46, 164 P.3d 384. Under these canons of statutory
construction, the qualifying clause ‚unless otherwise directed
by the court‛ can be read to imply that the trial court has
discretion to include a matter by reference in a judgment if the
court judges it useful or appropriate to do so.
¶49 Husband has not cited any authority in support of a
contrary reading of the rule. Rather, he simply argues that
referencing other documents in the divorce decree ‚adds
confusion by layering actual findings with documents that do,
and don’t refer to each other.‛ But Husband fails to show how
the court’s doing so in this case created confusion or otherwise
prejudiced him, and there does not appear to be anything on the
face of the decree that creates confusion about which documents

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 28 2014 UT App 26
the decision depends upon or what the court is ordering the
parties to do.
¶50 A final divorce decree is intended to implement the
court’s decision, which may have been otherwise explained,
analyzed, and supported in separate court documents, such as a
memorandum decision or findings of fact and conclusions of
law. That was the case here, and there seems to be little practical
benefit in repeating the basis for the trial court’s decision in the
final decree when the court thoroughly stated its reasoning in
the memorandum decision. Under the circumstances, the trial
court’s decision to include the memorandum decision and
settlement agreement by reference only was an appropriate
exercise of the broad discretion it is granted.
B. Inclusion of Matters in the Divorce Decree that Were Not
Part of the Memorandum Decision
¶51 Finally, Husband challenges the trial court’s inclusion in
the final divorce decree of ‚matters not included within the
December 1*9+, 2011 Memorandum Decision‛ or resolved at
trial. In particular, Husband contests the court’s order that
alimony continue until ‚*Wife+’s remarriage or cohabitation
with another person, as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
(1953 as amended), the death of either party, or the length of the
marriage, which is 32 years,‛ and its specification of the
language to be included in the QDROs needed for Wife to
receive her distributions from multiple retirement accounts.
¶52 Husband argues that not only was the duration of
alimony not addressed at trial but the court’s sua sponte
decision to allow alimony to continue for up to thirty-two years
effectively precludes him from retiring before age eighty-eight.
Husband did not preserve the issue of alimony duration in the
trial court, and we therefore will not consider it on appeal. See
438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801
(explaining that when an issue has not been ‚presented to the
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 29 2014 UT App 26
to rule on that issue,‛ then it is not preserved for appeal and
appellate courts need not consider it).
¶53 Alimony was a significant issue at trial, and if the trial
court ultimately were to decide to award alimony to Wife, it
would naturally be required to establish a time period during
which alimony was to be paid. Utah law provides that except in
extenuating circumstances, ‚*a+limony may not be ordered for a
duration longer than the number of the years that the marriage
existed.‛ Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(j) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
Thus, an award of alimony up to the length of the marriage falls
within the trial court’s ‚broad discretion.‛ See Childs v. Childs,
967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (‚Trial courts have broad
discretion in making alimony awards. Therefore, we will not
disturb [such an] award so long as the trial court exercised its
discretion within the appropriate legal standards . . . .‛ (citation
omitted)). Given that Husband and Wife’s marriage was one of
long duration, in which Wife had primarily been a homemaker
and had not acquired substantial work skills or experience, it is
unsurprising that the court awarded her alimony for the same
period of time (with the usual termination provisions). This is
especially true considering that neither party offered any
alternative time period as a reasonable length for the alimony
award. Thus, even though the parties did not address the length
of alimony directly, given the significant attention dedicated to
the question of whether alimony ought to be awarded, Husband
should have anticipated a ruling on the duration of any alimony
awarded.
¶54 If Husband desired to offer the court evidence or
argument on the alimony term, he had a responsibility to raise
the issue at trial or, alternatively, in the motion for relief from
judgment that he filed after the court decision—in which he
objected to inclusion of the QDRO language but made no
mention of the alimony term. See Dickman Family Props., Inc. v.
White, 2013 UT App 116, ¶¶ 12–13, 302 P.3d 833 (declining to
consider the appellants’ contempt argument on appeal where
the appellants not only failed to alert the district court to their

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 30 2014 UT App 26
position at the contempt hearing but also failed to bring this
issue to the court’s attention in their objection to its order).
Husband’s objection to the alimony term ruling is something
that could have been readily resolved had Husband brought it
to the trial court’s attention at the appropriate time. See Patterson
v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 15, 266 P.3d 828 (noting that one
purpose of the preservation rule is to allow the trial court an
opportunity to correct the error in the first instance).
Accordingly, we will not address the merits of the decision here;
Husband must seek whatever relief may be available in the trial
court under applicable rules of procedure. Cf. Nelson v. Nelson,
2004 UT App 254, ¶¶ 2–3, 5, 97 P.3d 722 (explaining in the
context of resolving whether there had been a material change
in circumstances to justify modification of an alimony award
that a ‚claim to entitlement to retire‛ is ‚not ripe for judicial
determination‛ if the party ‚had not *yet+ retired‛).
¶55 Next, Husband takes issue with the court’s inclusion in
the decree of QDRO language to divide the retirement accounts
that was apparently intended to direct the account
administrators to distribute the funds in accordance with the
provisions of the decree. Husband argues that ‚*t+he language
about Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, Decree Paragraphs
4, 5, 6 and 7, goes beyond the Memorandum Decision.‛
However, Husband does not provide any explanation or
authority for his position that the court was prohibited from
including such language in a decree where the parties
specifically indicated that QDROs were needed to distribute the
parties’ retirement accounts, including those on which they had
reached an agreement regarding division. Nor does he identify
any error in the QDRO language that the court specified. He
simply asserts that because the court did not include the same
language in its memorandum decision, it could not do so in the
decree. This is insufficient to satisfy his appellate briefing
requirements, and we therefore will not consider the issue. See
Springville Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. City of Springville, 1999
UT 25, ¶ 21 n.2, 979 P.2d 332.

Kidd v. Kidd
20120460-CA 31 2014 UT App 26
CONCLUSION
¶56 We affirm on all issues. There was no abuse of discretion
in the trial court’s alimony award because it is supported by
adequate facts and those facts are supported by the evidence.
Husband has failed to properly challenge the retroactive
alimony order.
¶57 Regarding the $4,505 payment, the trial court elected to
believe Wife’s version of the events, and Husband has not
demonstrated any error with that decision. Husband also has
not shown that the court erred in determining that the
settlement agreement contemplated a division of the TSP
account by its cash value, and we conclude that it was
appropriate for the court to adapt the terms of the settlement
agreement to take into account the present circumstances, which
involved a decrease in the account value and Wife’s failure to
timely present a QDRO. The trial court also did not abuse its
discretion in ordering Husband to remove Wife’s name from the
mortgage on the marital home within ninety days of the
issuance of the memorandum decision.
¶58 Finally, the trial court acted within its discretion in
determining that the parties’ settlement agreement and the
memorandum decision could be incorporated by reference into
the final divorce decree. Husband’s complaint about the
inclusion of a term for the payment of alimony is not preserved,
and we do not consider Husband’s challenge to the decree’s
inclusion of QDRO language because Husband has not
adequately briefed the issue.
¶59 Affirmed.
____________