Ellis v. State

1. The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by
special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code
Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6).
2014 UT App 50
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CURTIS JASON ELLIS,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent and Appellee.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20120987-CA
Filed March 6, 2014
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable William W. Barrett
No. 090920576
Curtis Jason Ellis, Appellant Pro Se
Sean D. Reyes and Andrew F. Peterson, Attorneys
for Appellee
Before JUDGES CAROLYN B. MCHUGH, GREGORY K. ORME, and
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD.1
PER CURIAM:
¶1 Curtis Jason Ellis appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of
his petition for postconviction relief. We affirm.
¶2 Ellis asserts that the postconviction court erred in dismissing
his claims for relief which were based on his alleged incompetency
to enter a guilty plea and the advice of his trial counsel to plead
guilty when she knew he was incompetent. These claims are based

Ellis v. State
20120987-CA 2 2014 UT App 50
on the premise that Ellis was incompetent merely because he was
taking medication for a psychological disorder, rendering him
unable to plead guilty knowingly and voluntarily. This premise is
flawed and is not supported by Utah law or the facts in the record.
¶3 The use of medication “does not per se render a defendant
incompetent to . . . plead guilty.” Oliver v. State, 2006 UT 60, ¶ 7,
147 P.3d 410 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Rather, the actual effect of the drug is what is important. Id. “The
critical question is whether the drugs—if they have a capacity to
impair the defendant’s ability to plea—have in fact done so [at the
plea hearing].” Id. ¶ 11 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Typically,
when a mood-altering drug is given to a defendant
by a physician, it is to improve the defendant’s
cognitive abilities. In other words, the fact that a
defendant has undergone a medical evaluation and
is receiving medication to treat a psychological
infirmity is often evidence weighing in favor of a
finding that the defendant is capable of entering a
knowing and voluntary plea. Id. ¶ 14.
Ellis was taking medication to treat bipolar disorder. Accordingly,
contrary to Ellis’s implication that the mere taking of the
medication made his plea invalid, the medication’s intended effect
was to enable him to function without cognitive impairment and,
by itself, fails to establish that his plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made.
¶4 Ellis does not assert that he was in fact impaired by the
medication. Additionally, the record supports the trial court’s
finding that Ellis knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty. Ellis
affirmed that he was thinking clearly at the plea hearing and that
he had conferred with his attorney and understood the plea. He
responded to questions lucidly and appropriately. Trial counsel
affirmed her belief that Ellis was competent to enter the plea based

Ellis v. State
2. Ellis alleged that trial counsel “knew” that he was incompetent,
but this is not supported by the record and appears to be based on
the same premise of per se incompetence from taking the
medication. He also alleges that trial counsel advised him not to tell
the trial court that he was taking the medication. However, even if
that were accurate, he has shown no prejudice because there is no
evidence that the medication impaired him or rendered his plea
invalid.
20120987-CA 3 2014 UT App 50
on her observations. In addition, the court noted that Ellis2
appeared competent based on its own observations. Overall, the
record supports the conclusion that Ellis was competent to enter
the plea and that he did so knowingly and voluntarily.
¶5 Ellis also argues that trial counsel was ineffective because
she coerced his confessions and failed to properly test the evidence
against him before negotiating a plea. In making this argument,
Ellis fails to acknowledge the postconviction court’s factual
findings, made after an evidentiary hearing, regarding the evidence
against him, trial counsel’s conduct, and the spontaneous nature of
his confession to killing his girlfriend (Girlfriend). Overall, there is
no factual basis for Ellis’s allegations on appeal and he primarily
reargues what he argued in his petition in the court below without
addressing the postconviction court’s rationale or findings. This
does not meet his burden on appeal. Because an appellate court
reviews the decision of a trial court, an appellant must address the
rationale of the trial court’s rulings and identify why the ruling
should be overturned. Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 14, 194 P.3d 303.
Ellis instead reargues his version of the facts, which was rejected by
the postconviction court. Accordingly, his arguments cannot
establish error.
¶6 Ellis next asserts that the postconviction court erred in
excluding expert witness testimony as irrelevant to the issues
before the court at the evidentiary hearing. The expert testimony

Ellis v. State
3. Ellis included the toxicology screen and the expert’s report with
his brief. The State moved to strike those documents and two
others. The motion to strike the toxicology screen and report is
denied because the documents were in the record on appeal. The
motion to strike the two additional documents is granted because
they were not in the record and cannot be added on appeal.
4. Ellis raises additional issues, which we determine to be without
merit, and we decline to address them further. State v. Carter, 776
P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (“[T]his court need not analyze and
address in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised
and properly before us on appeal. Rather, it is a maxim of appellate
review that the nature and extent of an opinion rendered by an
appellate court is largely discretionary with that court.”).
20120987-CA 4 2014 UT App 50
regarded the review of a toxicology screen of Girlfriend. The3
toxicology screen and the autopsy report had been reviewed by a
medical expert prior to Ellis entering a plea. That initial expert
agreed with the State’s expert that the cause of death was
strangulation even though Girlfriend had drugs in her system.
Contrary to Ellis’s argument, trial counsel had investigated the
evidence against him through the use of an expert. The later review
of only the toxicology screen without the autopsy report was not
relevant to trial counsel’s actions before Ellis’s guilty plea, and the
court did not err in excluding the later expert testimony.4
¶7 Affirmed.