Guanuna v. Sawatzki

2026 UT App 130
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
JUAN M IGUEL G UANUNA,
Appellant,
v.
LINDSEY R. S AWATZKI AND JONATHAN C. S AWATZKI ,
Appellees.
Opinion
No. 20240191-CA
Filed August 20, 2026
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Barry G. Lawrence
No. 194904191
Taylor P. Webb and Erin B. Hull,
Attorneys for Appellant Juan Miguel Guanuna
Mark Wiser and Scott Wiser, Attorneys for Appellee
Lindsey R. Sawatzki
Julie J. Nelson, Attorney for Appellee
Jonathan C. Sawatzki
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES GREGORY K. O RME and R YAN D. TENNEY
concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	This appeal arises from a paternity action within a divorce
action in the district court. Jonathan C. Sawatzki and Lindsey R.
Sawatzki (Mother) were married for seven years. During this
marriage, Mother 	gave 	birth 	to 	two 	sons. 	Unbeknownst 	to
Jonathan,1 Mother had been carrying on an affair with another
1. For clarity and consistency, and with no disrespect intended by
the apparent informality, we refer to Jonathan and Miguel by their
common names, as the district court did below.

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man, Juan Miguel Guanuna, and Jonathan is not the biological
father of either child. Miguel, too, was continually deceived by
Mother about her relationship with Johnathan.
¶2 	After petitioning for divorce from Mother, Jonathan was
awarded sole custody of the children. Miguel later learned about
the divorce and moved to intervene in the proceedings. Miguel
subsequently filed a petition to terminate Jonathan’s parental
rights, along with a motion to conduct genetic testing. Results of
that testing confirmed that Miguel is the biological father of both
children.
¶3 	Thereafter, the district court held a hearing on Miguel’s
petition. Ultimately, the court concluded that it was in the
children’s best interest to remain in Jonathan’s care. The court
therefore issued an order disregarding the genetic testing results
and adjudicating Jonathan as the children’s legal father. After the
ruling, Miguel filed a posttrial motion for relief, which the court
denied without holding a hearing.
¶4 	Miguel now appeals. Though we are sympathetic to the
situation 	Miguel, 	Jonathan, 	and 	the 	children 	have 	found
themselves in as a result of Mother’s years-long deception, we
discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s rulings. We
therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶5 	Though lengthy and complicated, the factual background
of this case is not in dispute. We recount the facts relevant to the
issues on appeal.
The Relationships Begin
¶6 	Jonathan and Mother began dating in late 2010 or early
2011. Jonathan and Mother became engaged in October 2011, and
they scheduled their wedding for April 2012. During this time,

Guanuna v. Sawatzki
20240191-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 130
Mother represented that she was not dating anyone other than
Jonathan.
¶7 	Mother 	and 	Miguel 	had 	met 	in 	junior 	high 	school,
although the two had little contact during their younger years. But
this changed in late 2010 or early 2011, when they started to date.
At the time, Mother told Miguel that she was not involved in any
other romantic relationships. And when Mother became engaged
to Jonathan, she concealed that fact from Miguel.
Mother Becomes Pregnant
¶8 	In 	January 	2012, 	Mother 	realized 	she 	was 	pregnant.
Because she had not had sex with Jonathan but had been intimate
with Miguel, she knew that Miguel was the father. Nevertheless,
Mother convinced Jonathan that “her pregnancy was the result of
his sperm finding its way to her vagina while they were engaged
in heavy petting resulting in him ejaculating.” To help conceal the
fact that the pregnancy had occurred before the two were married,
Jonathan and Mother moved up their wedding date and were
married in February 2012.
¶9 	Mother 	also 	informed 	Miguel 	about 	the 	pregnancy.
Although Miguel suggested that he and Mother should marry,
Mother did not act on this suggestion. The two continued to date
and spend time together, and Miguel was actively involved in the
pregnancy. Miguel was not informed about Mother’s marriage to
Jonathan.
Mother Gives Birth
¶10 	Drew2 was born in September 2012. Jonathan was present
for the birth, but Mother did not tell Miguel when she was giving
birth, so he was not at the hospital, and Jonathan was named as
Drew’s father on the birth certificate.
2. We use pseudonyms for both children.

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¶11 	Shortly after returning home from the hospital, Mother
took Drew to meet Miguel. Because Miguel had another son from
a previous relationship, he knew that because he and Mother were
not 	married, 	he 	needed 	to 	sign 	a 	voluntary 	declaration 	of
paternity (VDP) for Drew. Miguel asked Mother to go with him
to sign the VDP, which led to Mother disclosing to him that she
was married to Jonathan and that Jonathan’s name was on Drew’s
birth certificate. Mother promised that she would complete the
necessary steps to correct the birth certificate. After Mother failed
to take action for several weeks, Miguel hired an attorney and
filed a paternity action.
¶12 	In December 2012, facing pressure from Miguel’s paternity
action, Mother came clean to Jonathan about being unfaithful
during their engagement, and she informed him that Miguel is
Drew’s biological father. Jonathan submitted to a paternity test,
the results of which confirmed that he is not Drew’s biological
father. Thereafter, Mother and Miguel stipulated to joint physical
and 	legal 	custody 	of 	Drew. 	Mother 	later 	withdrew 	that
stipulation, and the case was ultimately dismissed with prejudice
in December 2013 after Miguel, apparently relying on Mother’s
representations that “she would be taking care of things,” failed
to appear at a hearing.
Mother Continues Her Deception
¶13 	Mother continued to maintain her relationships with both
Jonathan and Miguel, with neither man being fully aware of the
extent of 	Mother’s ongoing 	relationship 	with 	the 	other. By
January 2013, Mother began insisting that Jonathan allow Miguel
and his family contact with Drew. Though Jonathan initially
opposed such contact, he eventually gave in to Mother’s requests.
¶14 	In March 2013, when Drew was six months old, Mother
and Jonathan separated. Although the couple did not divorce
until 2019, from January 2013 to June 2019 they lived separately
more than half of the time. Also, for some portion of this period,
Mother spent significant time with Miguel and was able to
convince him that they (meaning she and Miguel) lived together.

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Drew saw both Jonathan and Miguel during the times in which
Mother was “living” with them, and both men’s extended families
provided surrogate care during this period.
Mother Gives Birth Again
¶15 	In February 2014, Mother informed Jonathan that she was
pregnant again. The two resumed living together in September
2014. Shortly thereafter, Mother gave birth to a second son,
Austin. Mother did not designate the child’s father on the birth
certificate but listed the child’s last name as Sawatzki.
Mother Marries Miguel
¶16 	In 	April 	2016, 	during 	one 	of 	Mother’s 	temporary
separations from Jonathan, Mother and Miguel married in Las
Vegas, Nevada. Prior to the ceremony, Mother had provided
Miguel a fake divorce decree that purported to show that her
marriage with Jonathan had been dissolved.
¶17 	After the wedding, Mother and the children lived at least
part-time with Miguel. In January 2017, Austin’s birth certificate
was amended to reflect that Miguel is his biological father.
Mother Enters a Third Relationship
¶18 	Mother and Jonathan separated for the final time around
March 2017, though they did not divorce for financial reasons. A
few months later, in October 2017, Mother entered a new romantic
relationship—this time with her current husband. Mother moved
out of Miguel’s house in September 2018 to pursue this new
relationship.
Jonathan Files for Divorce from Mother, and Miguel Intervenes
¶19 	In July 2019, Jonathan filed for divorce from Mother. The
following month, the district court entered a decree of divorce
based on their stipulation. The decree provided, “The parties have
two children born to them as issue of the marriage . . . : [Drew],

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20240191-CA 	6 	2026 UT App 130
born in September of 2012, and [Austin], born in September of
2014.” Jonathan was awarded sole legal and physical custody of
the children, and Mother was awarded parent-time. Per the terms
of the stipulation, Mother was prohibited from allowing the
children to contact or see Miguel or his family.
¶20 	Miguel soon learned about the divorce. And in November
2019, 	Miguel 	filed 	a 	motion 	to 	intervene 	in 	the 	divorce
proceedings, set aside the divorce decree, and alter the custody
order. The parties stipulated to Miguel’s intervention, and the
district court set aside the provisions of the divorce decree relating
to the children. The court then found it was in the children’s best
interest to remain in Jonathan’s custody as the case proceeded.
Miguel Petitions to Terminate Jonathan’s Parental Rights
¶21 	In November 2020, Miguel filed a petition to terminate
Jonathan’s parental rights and “re-establish” his own parental
rights and paternity, which he claimed had “been wrongfully
terminated.” Miguel asserted that he, not Jonathan, was “the
actual biological father” of the children, and he requested that the
district 	court 	order 	genetic 	testing 	to 	establish 	biological
parentage. Later, Miguel moved to have the court recognize the
results of DNA testing showing that he is the children’s biological
father.
¶22 	In response to the request for genetic testing, Jonathan
noted that Drew’s paternity had been resolved by the paternity
action that was dismissed with prejudice in December 2013 after
Miguel failed to appear at a hearing. Jonathan argued that, as a
result, res judicata barred Miguel from asserting any rights as to
Drew. As to Austin, Jonathan asserted that Miguel’s action was
governed by Utah Code section 81-5-608 (Section 608),3 which
3. The statutory provisions that govern this case have been
renumbered since the proceedings at issue. But because the
provisions have not been substantively amended, we cite the
current version of the code for convenience.

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allows a court to deny a motion seeking an order for genetic
testing if denying the motion for genetic testing is in the best
interest of the child.
¶23 	Following 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing, 	the 	district 	court
rejected Jonathan’s res judicata argument. After then addressing
the best-interest factors in Section 608, the court concluded that
the 	evidence 	supported 	ordering 	genetic 	testing, 	and 	it
accordingly granted Miguel’s motion for genetic testing. But the
court made clear that this decision concerned only whether to
order genetic testing; it was not intended “to be the dispositive
ruling regarding custody,” and the results would “have no force
and effect going forward regarding the best interests or custody
determinations.”
¶24 	Thereafter, Jonathan stipulated that Drew is Miguel’s
biological child and waived testing as to him. Genetic testing for
Austin was performed, which confirmed that Miguel is his
biological father too.
The Court Orders a Custody Evaluation
¶25 	The district court ordered a custody evaluation. From
January 2022 through April 2023, a custody evaluator (Evaluator)
conducted extensive interviews and prepared a detailed report.
¶26 	Evaluator explained that in the summer of 2019, as the
divorce between Jonathan and Mother was being finalized, the
children “had their world change dramatically” when they were
removed 	from 	Mother’s 	primary 	care, 	placed 	in 	Jonathan’s
primary care, and cut off from Miguel and his family. Evaluator
observed that in the nearly four years since these events, the
children had adjusted to the changes and were “doing quite well”
in the existing arrangement. Evaluator credited this success to
Jonathan’s “efforts to give them stability and predictability.”
¶27 	Evaluator noted that there had been no reported concerns
with Jonathan’s ability to meet the children’s needs since they
were placed in his primary care in July 2019. By contrast, Miguel

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had “chosen to refrain from attempting to directly engage [with]
either [Jonathan] or the [children] over th[e] course of that time.”
And Evaluator found that Miguel had “no history with any of his
3 sons in a primary care role”; though Miguel is “responsive” to
his oldest son’s needs, the son’s mother assumes the primary
parental role. Given this fact, Evaluator opined that “having the
primary parental role is not Miguel’s aspirational intention for his
sons” but that, if permitted, Miguel could “be a supportive and
responsive coparent partner in meeting the needs of his children.”
¶28 	Evaluator found that from the time of their births until the
divorce in 2019, the children “had frequent and continuous
participation with both their Guanuna family and their Sawatzki
family.” Evaluator recognized that since July 2019, when Jonathan
became the children’s “only parental figure,” their bonds with
Jonathan had continued to develop but there was no opportunity
to maintain their bonds with Miguel or his family. Evaluator
found that it was in the children’s “long term best interest . . . to
have opportunities to persist in the exercise and development of
all 	of 	their 	previously 	established 	bonds 	and 	significant
relationships.”
¶29 	Based on the foregoing findings, Evaluator recommended
that the parties adopt a triangulated parenting plan with Jonathan
and Mother moving toward equal parent-time, Miguel receiving
minimum 	parent-time, 	and 	all 	parties 	being 	involved 	with
substantive 	decisions. 	To 	implement 	this 	plan, 	Evaluator
recommended that Jonathan and Mother build on the existing
parenting structure by continuing to participate in the children’s
lives while simultaneously working to reunify the children with
Miguel and his family. Evaluator recommended that for the time
being, Jonathan should “remain the primary residential parent”
and 	“maintain 	presumptive 	legal 	authority 	for 	day-to-day
decision making.” But Evaluator suggested that going forward,
Jonathan’s “authority and practices as a primary residential
parent [would] need to be both limited in scope and inclusive of
the [children’s] other parents for substantive decisions affecting”
the children.

Guanuna v. Sawatzki
20240191-CA 	9 	2026 UT App 130
¶30 	Evaluator clarified that the recommendation to maintain
Jonathan as the children’s primary physical and legal custodian
was not “an endorsement of [Jonathan] as [his] preferred choice”
but instead reflected his belief that, “at present,” maintaining the
current situation was “the least detrimental alternative” for the
children. (Emphasis omitted.) However, Evaluator cautioned that
maintaining 	the 	children 	in 	Jonathan’s 	care 	“[m]ust 	be
conditioned 	upon 	[Jonathan] 	supporting 	[the 	triangulated
parenting plan]” and that if he refused to do so, “then maintaining
his primary residential and legal authority is the wrong long-term
choice.”
The Case Proceeds to Trial
¶31 	In advance of trial, the parties submitted briefs to the court.
Miguel stated that the primary “[i]ssues to be addressed at trial”
included the following: (1) “[c]onsidering that Miguel is the
biological father of both the children, the Court needs to address
the factors of Utah Code [section 81-5-608(3)]”; (2) “[w]hether
[Jonathan] or Miguel is the legal father of the minor children”; and
(3) “[w]hether the Court can issue an equitable order allowing all
three parents to be a part of the minor children’s lives.” Regarding
the second issue, Miguel argued that he was “the legal father
according to the factors of Utah Code [section 81-5-608(3)].” And
regarding the third issue, Miguel argued that should Jonathan be
adjudicated 	as the 	legal 	father, the 	court should 	“issue 	an
equitable ‘third-party’ visitation plan under Utah Code [section
81-9-402].”
¶32 	On September 18, 2023, the district court held a bench trial
on Miguel’s outstanding petition to terminate Jonathan’s parental
rights and motion to recognize genetic testing results. Miguel and
Jonathan testified as to the facts recounted above. Evaluator also
testified as to the findings in his report as described above. In
addition, immediately before his testimony at trial, the court had
the following exchange with Evaluator:

Guanuna v. Sawatzki
20240191-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 130
[The court]: 	I appreciate your report. . . . So I sort
of look at your report as sort of a square hole in a
round peg in this case because this analysis is the
sort of analysis I would have between two parents
who have parental rights and we’re trying to figure
out, well, one is the primary and the other isn’t, and
we’re going to have reunification.
This is different. The job that I have is to . . .
pick one. . . . [I]t’s not a binary determination. I have
to make a best-interest determination.
As I read your report, what I hear you saying
is—and correct me if I’m wrong—the [children] are
stable. They’re in a predictable place right now, and
they are doing well. You would have hoped that we
could have some sort of reunification with Miguel
going forward.
That sort of indicates to me that, if we’re
looking 	at 	things 	right 	now, 	that[] 	it’s 	in 	the
children’s best interest to stay with [Jonathan]. Do
you disagree with that? Or not?
[Evaluator]: I agree with that.
The Court Rules Against Miguel
¶33 	Following trial, the district court adjudicated Jonathan as
the children’s legal father. The court found both Jonathan and
Miguel to be credible witnesses. The court recognized that both
men “share a deep love for the children and the goal of preserving
their relationship with” the children. The court found that Mother
had “maintained a double life, deceiving Jonathan and Miguel,
living in two households, and bearing two boys.” But the court
explained 	that 	“[w]hile 	Jonathan 	and 	Miguel 	may 	have
experienced similar circumstances in regards to [Mother], they

Guanuna v. Sawatzki
20240191-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 130
[were] not similarly situated . . . before the Court.” Specifically,
the court found that while Miguel is the children’s biological
father, Jonathan is the presumed father under Utah Code section
81-5-204(1)(a) because he was married to Mother at the time of the
children’s births. The court determined that, as the presumed
father, Jonathan “had no obligation to do anything to perfect that
relationship.” The court determined that Miguel, however, “as an
unmarried father, would have had to take certain steps to assert
his paternity,” which he did not do (or at least did not complete)
until he intervened in the divorce in 2019.
¶34 	Relying in part on Evaluator’s report and testimony, the
district court then made findings regarding each of the relevant
Section 608 factors. As to factor (a)—the length of time between
the adjudication proceeding and when the presumed father was
put on notice he might not be the genetic father—and factor (c)—
the facts surrounding the presumed father’s discovery of his
possible nonpaternity—the court found that Jonathan and Miguel
both knew that Miguel was Drew’s biological father “for over a
decade.” The court found that despite this knowledge, Miguel
failed to act to “perfect” his rights until 2019.
¶35 	The district court next addressed factor (e)—the age of the
children. The court found that the children were nine and eleven
years old, they had “resided exclusively with Jonathan for over
four years,” and they were “doing well in [his] care.” Given their
ages, their “current thriving relationship[s]” with Jonathan, and
the importance of maintaining “stability and predictability” in the
children’s lives, the court found that factor (e) favored Jonathan.
¶36 	The district court grouped together factor (b)—the length
of time the presumed father has assumed the role of father—and
factor (d)—the nature of relationship between the children and
the presumed father. The court recognized that from 2013 to 2018,
Miguel had “a substantial relationship with the children” and was
involved in their lives. However, the court found that in 2019,
things changed when Jonathan assumed the role of the children’s
primary caregiver. The court found that since 2019, the children
had developed “a strong relationship with Jonathan and they

Guanuna v. Sawatzki
20240191-CA 	12 	2026 UT App 130
[were] thriving under his care.” Conversely, the court found that
the children “had no contact with Miguel during this four year
time period.”
¶37 	Though the district court recognized that the matter had
been delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, an event for which
Miguel 	was 	not 	at 	fault, 	it 	nevertheless 	rejected 	Miguel’s
argument that it would be “unfair” to weigh the four years during
which the children were in Jonathan’s care in favor of Jonathan.
The court explained that its ruling would necessarily result in
unfairness to one of the parties but concluded that its “role [was]
not to apply its sense of fairness to the parties, but to determine
what [was] in the children’s best interest, specifically whether it
would 	be 	inequitable 	to 	disrupt 	the 	existing 	father-child
relationship[s].”
¶38 	Based on all of this, the district court found that factors (b)
and (d) weighed “strongly” in Jonathan’s favor. In addition, the
court concluded that Jonathan not only had demonstrated the
ability to care for the children during the pendency of the case,
but also that he was “better situated to retain his role as the
children’s primary physical custodian.” The court noted that this
latter conclusion was bolstered by the fact that Miguel was
seeking only “visitation with the children, not that he be named
their primary caregiver.”
¶39 	Finally, the district court assessed factor (f)—the harm that
may result to the children if presumed paternity is disestablished.
The court noted that Evaluator had described maintaining the
current situation as the “least detrimental alternative” and that
“harm . . . would result if Jonathan were uprooted from the
[children’s] lives.” The court agreed with Evaluator, finding that
allowing Miguel to displace Jonathan in the children’s lives would
cause the children “serious harm” and “would be horribly
destructive, would require reunification efforts by all involved,
and would clearly not be in the children’s best interest.”
¶40 	After weighing the Section 608 factors, the district court
concluded that it was “in the children’s best interest to disregard

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20240191-CA 	13 	2026 UT App 130
the genetic testing and declare Jonathan to be the children’s legal
father.” 	The 	court 	noted 	that 	while 	it 	was 	“sensitive 	to
[Evaluator’s] 	recommendation 	that 	it 	adopt 	a 	triangulated
parenting plan,” that was “beyond the scope of the Court’s
review.” Because “a child can have only one legal father,” the
court emphasized that its role was simply “to consider the
children’s best interests and to choose one father over the other,
but not both, based on a best interests analysis.”
¶41 	Thereafter, the district court issued an order disregarding
the genetic testing results and adjudicating Jonathan as the
children’s legal father. The court also reinstated the portions of the
divorce decree that had been previously set aside and denied
Miguel’s 	motion 	to 	intervene, 	dismissing 	his 	claims 	with
prejudice.
Miguel Files a Posttrial Motion
¶42 	With new counsel, Miguel filed a posttrial motion asking
the district court to alter or “amend the judgment to reflect that
[he] is the legal father of [Austin] and [Drew],” citing newly
discovered evidence as well as asserted legal errors. Miguel
claimed 	that 	“[i]n 	preparation 	for 	filing 	this 	motion,” 	he
“discovered” 	a 	VDP, 	purportedly 	signed 	by 	him, 	and 	an
accompanying denial of paternity (DOP), purportedly signed by
Jonathan on the same day in 2017, on file for Austin with the Utah
Office of Vital Records and Statistics. Miguel averred that he “was
unaware that either the VDP or the [DOP] were on file,” and he
asserted that “[n]either [Mother] nor Jonathan ever disclosed the
existence of the VDP or the [DOP] to [him] or to th[e] Court . . .
even though the documents [were] material to the issues before
the Court.”
¶43 	Miguel raised four new theories for why he, and not
Jonathan, should be deemed the children’s legal father. First, he
argued that the court should give effect to the VDP and DOP, both
of which “necessitate[d]” him being adjudicated as Austin’s legal
father. Second, he argued that “[S]ection 608 d[id] not govern the
outcome in this case,” because he had already rebutted Jonathan’s

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20240191-CA 	14 	2026 UT App 130
presumed paternity under the statute. Third, he argued that even
if Section 608 applied, the court “erred in its analysis of the factors,
giving improper weight to certain factors.” Fourth, Miguel argued
that applying Section 608 to deny him paternity would violate his
constitutional rights and, thus, the court should apply the canon
of constitutional avoidance to accept one of his aforementioned
arguments.
¶44 	Jonathan opposed Miguel’s motion and filed a cross-
motion to have the VDP and DOP declared void because they did
not meet the statutory requirements for validity and Jonathan’s
signature was forged. Jonathan also argued that Miguel had
waived most of the theories raised in his motion. Mother also
opposed Miguel’s motion; she filed a declaration asserting that
she forged the DOP, and she stipulated to Jonathan’s cross-motion
to have both documents declared void.
The Court Denies Miguel’s Posttrial Motion
¶45 	After considering the parties’ briefing, the district court
denied Miguel’s motion in its entirety. The court did so without
conducting a hearing, explaining that the issues had “all been
‘authoritatively decided.’” (Quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 7(h).)
¶46 	The 	district 	court 	first 	addressed 	Miguel’s 	argument
regarding the VDP and DOP. The court construed this claim to be
based on rule 60(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
allows relief from judgment based on fraud, misrepresentation, or
other misconduct of an opposing party. But the court concluded
that Miguel was not entitled to relief under rule 60(b)(3) because
he had failed to “cogently explain how Jonathan’s and [Mother’s]
conduct was fraudulent.” The court continued:
Although 	there 	was 	plenty 	of 	evidence
presented at trial showing that [Mother] had been
deceptive with both men, Miguel fails to persuade
the Court that [Mother’s] conduct in relation to the
VDP defrauded him. Indeed, under Miguel’s view

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20240191-CA 	15 	2026 UT App 130
of the facts, all three parties were equally culpable
as all allegedly knew of the VDP and DOP. Miguel
essentially argues that, at trial, even though all three
parties had awareness of, and failed to reveal the
existence of, the VDP/DOP, only two of the three
should be deemed to have fraudulent intent based
on their nonaction.
¶47 	As 	to 	Miguel’s 	remaining 	arguments, 	which 	were
“independent of his fraud claim,” the district court determined
that Miguel was “essentially asking th[e] Court to reconsider its
ruling.” The court declined to do so, concluding that these
arguments either had been “considered and rejected at trial or
could have and should have been raised at trial, but were not,”
thus rendering them “waived.”
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶48 	Miguel now appeals, raising three primary issues for our
review. First, he argues the district court erred in interpreting the
Utah Uniform Parentage Act (the Act). See Utah Code §§ 81-5-101
to -902. Specifically, he claims the court improperly refused to
recognize that Miguel was the children’s presumed father, which
would have foreclosed the need to conduct a Section 608 analysis.
Miguel frames this issue as a question of statutory interpretation,
but as discussed below, Miguel did not advance this particular
interpretation until his posttrial motion, at which point the court
deemed the argument to be waived. Our review, therefore,
concerns the court’s ruling on the posttrial motion. We review
such decisions for an abuse of discretion, while “any underlying
legal questions” are reviewed for correctness. Robinson v. Baggett,
2011 UT App 250, ¶ 13, 263 P.3d 411.
¶49 	Second, 	Miguel 	argues the 	district 	court 	erred 	in 	its
analysis of the Section 608 factors. A court’s decision to disregard
genetic 	testing 	results 	under 	Section 	608 	“involves 	a
determination of the best interest of the child and is discretionary

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20240191-CA 	16 	2026 UT App 130
by statute.” In re I.C., 2025 UT App 20, ¶ 32, 565 P.3d 876, cert.
denied, 570 P.3d 663 (Utah 2025). Thus, such a decision is entitled
to deference and will not be overturned “unless it goes against the
clear weight of the evidence or leaves the appellate court with a
firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.
(quotation simplified).
¶50 	Third, Miguel challenges the district court’s denial of his
posttrial motion for relief based on fraudulent concealment of the
VDP and DOP. We review a district court’s ruling on a posttrial
motion 	“for 	an 	abuse 	of 	discretion,” 	but 	we 	review 	“any
underlying legal questions for correctness.” Robinson, 2011 UT
App 250, ¶ 13 (quotation simplified). Whether a party is entitled
to a hearing on a posttrial motion under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.
See Pang v. International Document Services, 2015 UT 63, ¶ 8, 356
P.3d 1190.
ANALYSIS
I. Interpretation of the Act
¶51 	Miguel first argues the district court erred in failing to
recognize him as the children’s presumed father under the Act.
He contends that recognizing him as such would have obviated
the need for a Section 608 analysis because that section authorizes
a court to disregard genetic testing results only where the results
exclude the presumed father. In response, Jonathan contends that
we should not consider this argument because the court below
deemed it to be waived and none of the exceptions to our
preservation rule apply. We agree with Jonathan.
¶52 	Under the Act, a “father-child relationship is established
between a man and 	a child 	by,” among other things, “an
unrebutted presumption of the man’s paternity.” Utah Code § 81-
5-201(2). A presumption of paternity arises in several situations.
As relevant here, those situations include where (1) “the man and
the birth mother of the child are married to each other and the

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child is born during the marriage” or (2) “after the birth of the
child, the man and the birth mother of the child married each
other in apparent compliance with law, . . . the man voluntarily
asserted the man’s parentage of the child, and there is no other
presumptive father of the child.” Id. § 81-5-204(1)(a), (d). Once a
man is presumed to be the father of a child, that presumption may
be rebutted only in certain ways, including by “genetic test results
that exclude the presumed father.” Id. § 81-5-607(3)(a).
¶53 	But rebutting a presumption of paternity is necessary but
not sufficient to displace a presumed father. “The Act . . .
contemplates that, in some situations, a court can ignore genetic
test results when determining paternity.” Scott v. Benson, 2023 UT
4, ¶ 31, 529 P.3d 319. Pursuant to Section 608, a court may choose
to disregard genetic test results that exclude the presumed father
where it determines that doing so is in the best interest of the
children. See Utah Code § 81-5-608(2), (3).
¶54 	Here, Miguel filed a posttrial motion pursuant to rules
52(b), 	59(c), 	59(e), 	and 	60(b)(3) 	of 	the 	Utah 	Rules 	of 	Civil
Procedure, 	asking 	the 	district 	court 	to 	alter 	or 	amend 	the
judgment to reflect that he is the children’s legal father. Among
other arguments, Miguel asserted that the court should interpret
the 	Act 	in 	a 	manner 	different 	from 	which 	it 	already 	had.
Specifically, he argued for the first time that the court did not need
to conduct a Section 608 analysis as that section did “not govern
the outcome in this case, because Miguel had rebutted Jonathan’s
presumption of parentage under the [Act].”
¶55 	In ruling on this motion, the district court declined to
address the merits of Miguel’s new Section 608 argument. The
court explained, “[Miguel’s] motion . . . makes several general
arguments, independent of his fraud claim”—including that
Section 608 does not apply—“essentially asking this Court to
reconsider its ruling.” But because these arguments had “either
been considered and rejected at trial or could have and should
have been raised at trial, but were not,” the court “deemed [them]
to be waived.”

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20240191-CA 	18 	2026 UT App 130
¶56 	“Although 	a 	new 	argument 	may 	be 	advanced 	when
moving for a new trial, the trial court may refuse to consider the
merits of the argument because it may find the issue waived.”
State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶ 46, 114 P.3d 551 (quotation
simplified). Because the district court here took that route and did
not address the merits of Miguel’s new Section 608 argument, “the
issue remains unpreserved for appellate review and may be
addressed only if the challenging party can show plain error or
exceptional circumstances.” Id. Miguel suggests that review is
appropriate under either the plain error or ineffective assistance
of counsel exceptions to our preservation rule.4 We disagree on
both counts.
¶57 	First, plain error review does not apply in most civil cases.
See Kelly v. Timber Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, ¶ 41,
507 P.3d 357. While this court has left open the possibility that
plain error review might be available in civil cases that “involve
significant interests on par with those at issue in criminal cases,
such as” cases involving the “termination of parental rights,” id.
¶ 42 n.10, the issue remains unsettled, see Cove at Little Valley
Homeowners Ass’n v. Traverse Ridge Special Service Dist., 2022 UT
23, ¶¶ 40 & n.5, 44, 513 P.3d 658. Miguel did not acknowledge this
fact in his opening brief, much less argue why we should extend
plain error review to this civil paternity action. Consequently,
Miguel did not “devote adequate attention” to this claim and has
therefore “fail[ed] to carry [his] burden of persuasion on appeal.”
Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶¶ 12–13, 391 P.3d 196
(quotation simplified); see also Cove, 2022 UT 23, ¶ 44 (“The parties
in this case do not address the viability of the plain error exception
in civil cases. This places us in a disadvantageous position to
make broad pronouncements about the doctrine. . . . [W]e leave
the broader question for a case in which it is briefed and before
us.”).
4. 	Miguel 	does 	not 	challenge 	the 	district 	court’s 	waiver
determination.

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¶58 	Second, the ineffective assistance of counsel exception
likewise 	does 	not 	apply. 	“[C]riminal 	defendants 	are
constitutionally entitled to effective representation under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Thomas v.
Hillyard, 2019 UT 29, ¶ 13 n.11, 445 P.3d 521. But the same is not
true for civil litigants. Id. Because there is “no parallel [to the Sixth
Amendment] in the civil context,” the constitutional “protection
against ineffective assistance of counsel” does not ordinarily
extend to civil cases. Davis v. Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d
888, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Gillett
v. Price, 2006 UT 24, 135 P.3d 861.
¶59 	This general rule is subject to one key exception: “Parents
are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in child welfare
proceedings.” In re R.D., 2024 UT App 91, ¶ 33, 554 P.3d 318; see
also In re adoption of K.A.S., 2016 UT 55, ¶¶ 22, 38, 390 P.3d 278
(holding that in some circumstances, a parent facing termination
of parental rights may enjoy a constitutional due process right to
counsel); In re E.H., 880 P.2d 11, 13 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that parents are statutorily entitled to the effective assistance of
counsel in juvenile proceedings). But because this proceeding
concerns a paternity determination rather than a termination of
parental rights, there is no indication that this exception applies.
See Marchand v. Marchand, 2006 UT App 429, ¶ 12, 147 P.3d 538
(declining to “recognize ineffective assistance of counsel as a
proper ground for a new trial in a custody dispute”).
¶60 	In sum, we conclude that Miguel waived his argument that
Section 608 does not apply in this case. We further conclude that
it would be inappropriate to reach the merits of this argument
under either the plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel
exceptions to our preservation rule. These exceptions are not
ordinarily available in civil cases, and Miguel has not persuaded
us that this case warrants expanding either exception.
II. Section 608 Factors
¶61 	Miguel next argues that the district court’s Section 608
analysis 	was 	“flawed.” 	Specifically, 	he 	contends 	the 	court

Guanuna v. Sawatzki
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(A) “failed 	to 	comply 	with 	[Evaluator’s] 	recommendation,”
(B) “misunderstood 	the 	scope 	of 	its 	task 	in 	adjudicating
parentage,” and (C) “erred in applying [S]ection 608.” We address
each point in turn.
A. 	Evaluator’s Recommendation
¶62 	Miguel 	argues 	the 	district 	court 	erred 	in 	rejecting
Evaluator’s recommendation that “it was in the [c]hildren’s best
interest to be reunited with Miguel.” He contends the court relied
on a “single exchange” with Evaluator at the outset of his trial
testimony and “completely disregarded” Evaluator’s testimony
and report without articulating a basis for doing so. We disagree.
¶63 	Although a “district court is not bound to accept a custody
evaluator’s recommendation,” if a court chooses to reject the
recommendation, it “is expected to articulate some reason for
doing so.” Lobendahn v. Lobendahn, 2023 UT App 137, ¶ 37, 540
P.3d 727 (quotation simplified). Here, the court did exactly that.
¶64 	In 	its 	findings 	of 	fact, 	the 	district 	court 	addressed
Evaluator’s report and recommendation. The court explained that
Evaluator’s recommendation was for a “triangulated parenting
plan” that would allow the children to maintain relationships
with both Jonathan and Miguel. But given the legal posture of the
case, 	the 	court 	rejected 	that 	recommendation. 	The 	court
articulated 	its 	reasoning 	as 	follows: 	“Although 	[Evaluator]
testified that he believed [a triangulated parenting plan] may have
been 	in 	the 	best 	interests 	of 	the 	children, 	that 	is 	not 	the
determination this Court is required to make in this matter. Here,
the Court is obligated to determine whether it is in the [children’s]
best interests to declare Jonathan or Miguel as the [children’s]
legal father.”
¶65 	Because the district court clearly articulated why it chose
to reject Evaluator’s recommendation, Miguel’s argument falls
short. The court carefully considered Evaluator’s report but
ultimately concluded that it was “sort of a square hole in a round

Guanuna v. Sawatzki
20240191-CA 	21 	2026 UT App 130
peg” and, therefore, the resulting recommendation was of limited
value. This was not an abuse of the court’s discretion.
¶66 	In 	any 	event, 	Miguel’s 	claim 	that 	the 	district 	court
improperly relied on an exchange with Evaluator at trial as a basis
to disregard the written report is not supported by the record.
After explaining to Evaluator that, while thoughtfully prepared,
the report was not directly relevant given that the court was not
ordering reunification but was instead picking one man as the
legal father, the court asked Evaluator what would be in the
children’s best interest “if we’re looking at things right now.”
(Emphasis added.) And to that question, Evaluator affirmed that
it would be best for the children to remain with Jonathan. Thus,
although Evaluator “would have hoped” for reunification with
Miguel at some point in the future, when presented with the
options available at the time of trial, Evaluator recommended that
the children remain with Jonathan.
B. 	Scope of Task in Adjudicating Parentage
¶67 	In 	a 	related 	vein, 	Miguel 	argues 	the 	district 	court
misunderstood the scope of its task in adjudicating parentage as
a binary choice between Jonathan and Miguel. He contends that
because the court’s task was to adjudicate parentage based on
what was in the children’s best interest, it should have followed
Evaluator’s 	recommendation 	to 	implement 	a 	“triangulated
parenting plan” that would have given both Miguel and Jonathan
legal rights to the children. That is, Miguel contends the court
should have adjudicated him as the father, allowed for Jonathan
to file for guardianship, and “allow[ed] the parties to work out
some visitation and reunification through that guardianship.”
This argument lacks legal support.
¶68 	First, this matter came before the district court as a
paternity action within a divorce proceeding. Thus, adjudicating
parentage 	was 	exactly 	what 	the 	court 	was 	asked—and
authorized—to do. Miguel cites no statutory authority that allows
a court in a paternity case to adjudicate one person as the father
and simultaneously grant guardianship to a third party. And

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20240191-CA 	22 	2026 UT App 130
indeed, we are not aware of any provision that would allow the
court to do so.
¶69 	Second, even if the district court had acted in the way
Miguel suggests by adjudicating him as the father and then
“allow[ing]” 	Jonathan 	to 	file 	for 	guardianship, 	there 	is 	no
guarantee that the guardianship would survive long-term. This is
so because the only guardianship available to Jonathan in this
circumstance would be a consent-based guardianship under the
probate code. See Utah Code § 75-5-204(1)(a). Thus, the practical
reality is that even if Miguel initially agreed to a guardianship, he
could terminate it at any time with functionally no court review.
See In re V.K.S., 2003 UT App 13, ¶ 23, 63 P.3d 1284 (“If [a parent
who 	consents 	to 	a 	guardianship] 	thereafter 	petitions 	for
termination of the guardianship and custody of the child, the
probate court must grant the petition unless there has been a final
factual 	determination 	depriving 	the 	parent 	of 	custody 	or
terminating the parent’s parental rights, by a court with proper
jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)). This outcome would be contrary
to the children’s best interest and Evaluator’s recommendation.
The court therefore did not err by confining its decision to
adjudicating parentage.
C. 	Application of Section 608
¶70 	Lastly, Miguel argues the district court “erred in applying
[S]ection 608.” He contends that the court failed to consider
whether Jonathan’s and Mother’s conduct estopped them from
denying Miguel parentage and that the court improperly weighed
certain factors. Once again, we are not persuaded.
¶71 	Section 608 provides that “[i]n a proceeding to adjudicate
the parentage of a child,” a district court may “disregard the
genetic test 	results that 	exclude 	the 	presumed 	father” 	if 	it
determines that “(i) the conduct of the birth mother or the
presumed father . . . estops that party from denying parentage;
and (ii) it would be inequitable to disrupt the parent-child
relationship between the child and the presumed father.” Utah
Code § 81-5-608(2). In making this determination, the court “shall

Guanuna v. Sawatzki
20240191-CA 	23 	2026 UT App 130
consider the best interest of the child,” including enumerated
statutory factors. Id. § 81-5-608(3).
¶72 	The district court in this case carefully adhered to this
statutory framework when determining whether it was in the
children’s best interest to disregard the genetic testing results. The
court specifically addressed Section 608 factors and detailed its
reasoning for why those factors weighed in favor of Jonathan
rather than Miguel. Then, applying these factors, the court
concluded that the factors “strongly favor[ed]” disregarding the
genetic test results and adjudicating Jonathan as the children’s
legal father.
¶73 	Nevertheless, 	Miguel 	faults 	the 	district 	court 	for 	not
“consider[ing] whether Jonathan or [Mother’s] conduct estopped
them from denying Miguel’s parentage.” See id. § 81-5-608(2)(b).
However, the court was not required to do so. Miguel’s argument
is based on a fundamentally flawed reading of the estoppel
provision of the statute. This is so for two main reasons.
¶74 	First, Section 608 grants a district court the ability to
“disregard the genetic test results” based on “the conduct of the
birth mother or the presumed father.” Id. (emphasis added). But
that is not what Miguel is proposing the district court should have
done. Rather, it is his position that the court should have done
exactly the opposite—that is, it should have not disregarded the test
results.
¶75 	Second, estoppel does not apply here in the way advocated
by Miguel. Estoppel is “[a] bar that prevents one from asserting a
claim or right that contradicts what one has said or done before or
what has been legally established as true.” Estoppel, Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). In the context of Section 608, estoppel
prevents a mother or a presumed father (namely, Jonathan) from
denying the parentage of the presumed father (namely, Jonathan)
based on genetic testing. See Utah Code § 81-5-608(2)(b). Because
Jonathan was the presumed father and he was not denying
paternity, by virtue of the statute’s plain language, the estoppel

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20240191-CA 	24 	2026 UT App 130
provision does not apply in the way Miguel suggests. The district
court therefore did not err in failing to address it further.
¶76 	The next part of Miguel’s Section 608 challenge concerns
the manner in which the district court weighed the statutory
factors. 	In 	particular, 	he 	claims 	that 	the 	court 	“improperly
weighed” five factors “only against [him] and not Jonathan.”5 To
support this argument, Miguel points to the court’s findings
related to each factor and asserts that the court ignored certain
conflicting record evidence. This effort falls short of that required
to successfully challenge a court’s factual findings on appeal.
¶77 	“The existence of conflicting evidence in the record is not
sufficient to set aside a district court’s findings.” Lobendahn v.
Lobendahn, 2023 UT App 137, ¶ 27, 540 P.3d 727. “Rather, to
successfully challenge a district court’s factual findings on appeal,
the appellant must overcome the healthy dose of deference owed
to factual findings by identifying and dealing with the supportive
evidence and demonstrating the legal problem in that evidence,
generally through marshaling the evidence.” Id. ¶ 23 (quotation
simplified). “The pill that is hard for many appellants to swallow
is that if there is evidence supporting a finding, absent a legal
5. These include factors (a) through (e), which read as follows:
(a) the length of time between the proceeding to
adjudicate 	parentage 	and 	the 	time 	that 	the
presumed father . . . was placed on notice that
the presumed father . . . might not be the genetic
father of the child;
(b) the length of time during which the presumed
father . . . has assumed the role of parent of the
child;
(c) the facts surrounding the presumed father’s . . .
discovery of . . . [his] possible nonparentage;
(d) the nature of the relationship between the child
and the presumed father . . . ; [and]
(e) the age of the child.
Utah Code § 81-5-608(3).

Guanuna v. Sawatzki
20240191-CA 	25 	2026 UT App 130
problem—a fatal flaw—with that evidence, the finding will stand,
even though there is ample record evidence that would have
supported contrary findings.” Id. ¶ 27 (quotation simplified).
¶78 	Here, Miguel makes no attempt to address the evidence the
district court found weighed in favor of Jonathan. Critically, much
of the court’s analysis hinged on the “undisputed fact” that
Jonathan had been the children’s primary caregiver during the
four years leading up to trial and the children had a strong
relationship with him and were thriving in his care. In light of this
fact, the court was particularly concerned about the harm that the
children would suffer should they be removed from Jonathan and
placed with Miguel. Simply pointing to Mother’s deception as an
excuse or explanation for why Miguel did not have custody of the
children during this time and asserting that the court should have
assigned more weight to the fact that he was not at fault does not
change the reality that the court already heard and weighed this
evidence. And ultimately, though the court was sympathetic to
Jonathan’s and Miguel’s situation and recognized that its decision
“would by definition be unfair to one or the other of them,” the
court made clear that their interests were not the driving factor in
its decision. Indeed, the court explained that its “role [was] not to
apply its sense of fairness to the parties, but to determine what
[was] in the children’s best interest, specifically whether it would
be inequitable to disrupt the existing father-child relationship.”
¶79 	As a final note, Miguel does not grapple with the fact that
aside from the parties’ history, in undertaking its best interest
analysis, the district court placed weight on the proposed future
living situation. That is, the court found relevant that Miguel was
seeking only “visitation with the children, not that he be named
their primary caregiver.” The court emphasized that this fact
supported its conclusion that Jonathan would “continue to be the
best option for the [children] as a parent going forward.”
¶80 	In sum, Miguel “clearly views the evidence as compelling
a different outcome, but it is not within our purview to engage in
a reweighing of the evidence, and [Miguel] has not demonstrated
that the evidence underlying the district court’s findings is

Guanuna v. Sawatzki
20240191-CA 	26 	2026 UT App 130
insufficient.” Id. ¶ 24 (quotation simplified). As a result, we will
not disturb the court’s factual findings regarding the Section 608
factors.6
III. Miguel’s Posttrial Motion
¶81 	Miguel argues the district court erred in denying his
posttrial motion for relief. He claims the court erred because (A) it
did not hold a hearing on the motion, (B) it did not find that
Mother’s actions in concealing the VDP and DOP amounted to
fraud, (C) it did not grant relief under rule 59, and (D) it failed to
apply the statutory procedure for challenging the VDP and DOP.
We address each argument in turn.
A. 	Hearing on the Posttrial Motion
¶82 	As a threshold matter, Miguel argues the district court
erred by failing to hold a hearing on his posttrial motion, despite
all parties requesting a hearing. Not so.
¶83 	Rule 7(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires the
district court to hold a hearing where the motion “would dispose
of the action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court
finds that the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or
the issue has been authoritatively decided.” Utah R. Civ. P. 7(h)
(emphasis added). Here, the district court acknowledged that
6. 	As 	an 	additional 	basis 	for 	relief, 	Miguel 	invokes 	the
constitutional avoidance canon and urges us to adopt a reading of
Section 608 that would avoid denying him paternity and violating
his constitutional rights. See Scott v. Benson, 2023 UT 4, ¶¶ 52–53,
529 P.3d 319 (explaining the constitutional avoidance canon). But
Miguel did not raise this argument until his posttrial motion, at
which point the district court deemed it waived and declined to
consider it on the merits. Thus, the argument is unpreserved for
appellate review, and we will not address it further as Miguel has
argued no exception to preservation. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT
15, ¶ 46, 114 P.3d 551.

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Miguel had requested a hearing on his motion, but it declined that
request, concluding that “because the issues bearing on this
Motion have all been ‘authoritatively decided,’ a hearing is not
necessary.” (Quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 7(h).) The court was not
required to enter specific findings explaining its conclusion. See
Pang v. International Document Services, 2015 UT 63, ¶ 12, 356 P.3d
1190 (concluding that rule 7(h)’s language “does not require
district courts to enter specific findings before denying a request
for a hearing”).
B. 	Mother’s Fraudulent Conduct
¶84 	Miguel next argues the district court erred in declining to
grant him posttrial relief on the ground that Mother’s actions in
failing to reveal the existence of the VDP and DOP did not amount
to fraud under rule 60(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
He claims the court’s decision was based on its erroneous belief
that 	rule 	60(b)(3) 	requires 	parties 	to 	plead 	fraud 	“with
particularity.” See Utah R. Civ. P. 9(c) (“In alleging fraud or
mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake.”).
¶85 	Miguel’s appellate position fails to account for the whole
picture. The district court did not decline to grant relief merely
because Miguel had failed to prove fraud under a heightened
standard. Rather, it concluded that Miguel could not prove that
Mother’s conduct constituted fraud at all since he purportedly
agreed that he signed the very document that he argued was
fraudulently concealed from him. The court explained: “[U]nder
Miguel’s view of the facts, all three parties were equally culpable
as all allegedly knew of the VDP and DOP. Miguel essentially
argues that, at trial, even though all three parties had awareness of,
and failed to reveal the existence of, the VDP/DOP, only two of the
three should be deemed to have fraudulent intent based on their
nonaction.” Because Miguel has not sufficiently engaged with this
reasoning and explained how he was unaware of the existence of
a document he purportedly signed, he has not persuaded us that
the court abused its discretion in concluding that he was not
entitled to relief under rule 60(b).

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C. 	Rule 59 Relief
¶86 	Miguel argues the district court erred in failing to grant
him relief under rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
But Miguel once again fails to grapple with the basis of the court’s
ruling.
¶87 	Though the bulk of Miguel’s posttrial motion focused on
the newly discovered VDP and DOP, Miguel also raised several
new legal arguments that were “[i]ndependent” of his fraud
claim. The district court declined to grant him relief under rule
59(a)(7) 	for 	any 	of 	these 	new 	arguments, 	finding 	that 	the
arguments either had been waived because they could have been
raised at trial but were not, or were raised at trial and the court
was “exercis[ing] its discretion to not reconsider them.” Miguel
has not directly challenged these determinations on appeal.
D. 	Statutory Procedure for Challenging the VDP and DOP
¶88 	Miguel’s final argument is that the district court erred by
suggesting that the DOP was invalid without undertaking the
proper statutory analysis. He claims that had the court correctly
applied the statutory framework, it would have concluded that
the DOP and VDP were valid, effective, and legally binding
documents, which would have changed the outcome of this case.
¶89 	This argument fails at the outset, however, because neither
the DOP nor VDP at issue here are valid on their face. Among
other things, a VDP must “state that the child whose paternity is
being declared . . . does not have a presumed father, or has a
presumed father whose full name is stated.” Utah Code § 81-5-
302(1)(d). Here, the VDP does not meet this requirement because
it does not indicate that Jonathan was the presumed father at the
time the document was allegedly executed.7 And this deficiency
7. The VDP form asks the mother to make the following assertion:
“I am not/have not been married to any man at the time of this
(continued…)

Guanuna v. Sawatzki
20240191-CA 	29 	2026 UT App 130
also 	proves 	fatal 	to 	the 	DOP, 	because 	in 	cases 	where 	a
“declaration of paternity and [a] denial of paternity are both
necessary, neither is valid until both are signed and filed.” Id. § 81-
5-304(1)(b).
CONCLUSION
¶90 	The district court did not err or abuse its discretion in
concluding that it was in the children’s best interest to disregard
the 	genetic 	testing 	results 	and 	adjudicate 	Jonathan 	as 	the
children’s legal father. And the court likewise did not err or abuse
its discretion in denying Miguel’s posttrial motion for relief. We
therefore affirm the court’s ruling in all respects.
child’s birth or in the 300 days preceding the birth.” Mother did
not check the box indicating that this assertion was true, because
she was married to Jonathan. Miguel contends that as a result, the
VDP as submitted “was factually accurate and not fraudulent.”
But this obscures the relevant issue: the VDP was incomplete
because it did not “state that the child whose paternity [was]
being declared . . . d[id] not have a presumed father, or ha[d] a
presumed father whose full name [was] stated.” Utah Code § 81-
5-302(1)(d).