Godfrey v. Godfrey

2024 UT App 156
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
A MANDA GODFREY ,
Appellee,
v.
R ANDY GODFREY ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20210871-CA
Filed October 31, 2024
Third District Court, Silver Summit Department
The Honorable Teresa L. Welch
No. 184500190
Lauren Forsyth, Attorney for Appellant
Emily Adams and Rachel Phillips Ainscough,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES DAVID N. M ORTENSEN and R YAN D. TENNEY
concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	In late 2018, Amanda Godfrey filed for divorce from Randy
Godfrey. A three-day trial on issues related to the division of the
marital estate, alimony, and child support began in June 2021.
Thereafter, 	the 	trial 	court 	issued 	its 	findings 	of 	fact 	and
conclusions of law and entered a final decree of divorce. Randy1
now appeals the trial court’s ruling and challenges the court’s
findings in various respects, arguing that the court abused its
1. Throughout this opinion, we refer to the parties by their first
names as they share a last name. We intend no disrespect by this
apparent informality.

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discretion. Because we discern no abuse of the court’s discretion
on any of the points raised by Randy on appeal, we affirm.
BACKGROUND2
Pretrial Proceedings
¶2 	Amanda and Randy married in October 2006, and together
they have three children, all of whom are still minors. During their
marriage, the couple primarily resided in Summit County, and
they purchased three properties that they refer to as (1) the
Snowview Property, (2) the Oakridge Property, and (3) the St.
George Property.
¶3 	In September 2018, the parties separated, and the following
month Amanda filed a petition for divorce, citing “irreconcilable
differences.” Randy then filed an answer and counter-petition for
divorce.
¶4 	The matter came before a domestic relations commissioner
to discuss competing motions for temporary orders that had been
filed by the parties. Following that hearing, the commissioner
ordered that one of the couple’s savings accounts, which had “an
approximate balance of $170,071.14,” be divided “equally,” and
the parties were to “use their respective share” of those funds “for
their respective attorney fees and expert fees.” Thereafter, Randy
filed an objection to the commissioner’s recommendation. Due to
various scheduling conflicts, a hearing on Randy’s objection had
to 	be 	rescheduled, 	and 	the 	issue 	eventually 	was set 	to 	be
“addressed in the parties’ trial.”
2. “On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the trial court’s findings, and therefore recite the
facts consistent with that standard.” Chesley v. Chesley, 2017 UT
App 127, ¶ 2 n.2, 402 P.3d 65 (quotation simplified).

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¶5 	The parties were able to reach a settlement concerning their
three properties prior to trial: Amanda would retain the St.
George Property, and Randy would keep the other two—the
Snowview Property and the Oakridge Property. But even though
Amanda and Randy had decided who would retain “possession
of the properties,” they had not yet determined “what the equity
would be,” and they agreed that the “equitable distribution
would be determined at the time of trial.” Before trial, Randy sold
the Snowview Property for $1,050,000.
¶6 	In early 2020, Randy asserted the matter was moving more
slowly than he would like and requested that the trial court
“bifurcate the divorce from the remaining issues in the divorce
proceeding.” The court granted Randy’s motion and thereafter
entered a bifurcated decree of divorce. The issues that remained
“unresolved” and were certified for trial included child support,
alimony, property valuation, debts and liabilities, insurance,
taxes, and attorney fees.3
¶7 	In March 2021, the trial court held a scheduling conference
in anticipation of trial, which was supposed to begin the next
month. At the beginning of the conference, the court informed the
parties that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial “would not
be able to occur in person.” Each side requested that the trial be
postponed in hopes that an in-person trial could eventually be
scheduled. The court granted the parties’ request and, after
settling on new trial dates, the court turned to “a few of the
logistics” that needed to be discussed.
¶8 	One of the issues that would be addressed at trial was the
equitable distribution of the parties’ three properties. Amanda
indicated that because “so much time” had passed since the
inception of the litigation, she would “like to get some updated
3. Prior to trial, the parties were able to resolve issues concerning
child custody and parent time.

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20210871-CA 	4 	2024 UT App 156
appraisals” for the Oakridge Property and the St. George Property
and she wanted to use her own appraiser for such appraisals.4
Randy “slightly” objected to this request. He explained that while
he had no objection to getting an updated appraisal on the
Oakridge Property using the same appraiser that had conducted
the earlier appraisal, he was “hesitant to . . . start introducing other
appraisers” because doing so could potentially lead to “further
disputes regarding appraisal prices.” He also indicated that he
had “no objection” to getting an appraisal on the St. George
Property using a new appraiser because that property had never
actually been appraised and because of the location of the
property. And if they were getting any updated appraisals, Randy
asked that the appraisers also “give their opinion of what the
value” of the properties would have been on two additional dates:
December 2019, when the parties “made a final agreement on who
would be receiving what property,” and April 2020, when the
bifurcated decree was entered.
¶9 	Given the arguments of the parties, the trial court stated it
would “permit the expert witness to be substituted,” meaning
that Amanda could use a different appraiser than the one she had
previously disclosed and that it would allow “both sides to
submit 	updated 	expert 	reports.” 	The 	court 	stated 	that 	this
decision was based on Utah case law that indicates that, when
considering an equitable distribution of property, courts should
look to “values based upon the date of the decree,” but that due
to the delays in this case, and the postponement of the trial, it
would be unable to do so without updated appraisals. The court
also acknowledged that the parties could, of course, “argue at trial
whether or not [the court] should deviate from” valuing the
properties based on the date of the decree. Based on this, the court
also found that Randy had made a “fair request” regarding the
additional appraisal dates and instructed the parties to provide
4. At the time of the scheduling conference, Randy had already
sold the Snowview Property.

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appraisals related to the properties’ values as of both December
2019 and April 2020.
¶10 	During the scheduling conference, the trial court also
instructed the parties that the “direct examination of witnesses”
would be “done by affidavit” and submitted to the court prior to
trial.
The Trial
¶11 	The trial court commenced a three-day bench trial in June
2021. As they had been instructed, the parties submitted the direct
examinations of their witnesses through affidavits before the trial
began. We briefly describe the evidence presented at trial that is
relevant to this appeal.
¶12 	In his affidavit, Randy testified that his primary source of
income, both before and during the marriage, had been derived
from his landscaping and snow removal business, High Country
Lawn Care & Snow Removal (High Country), which he started
prior to the marriage in 1998. Evidence was then submitted to the
court indicating that prior to the parties’ marriage, High Country
had a value of $238,850.38. In 2019, Randy sold High Country for
$1,300,000, giving Amanda $20,000 of the proceeds and keeping
the remainder for himself.
¶13 	Through her affidavit, Amanda testified that she primarily
worked in the home during the marriage and that she contributed
to Randy’s business even though she “received no income for
[her] work at High Country.” During trial, Amanda provided
various details and evidence that demonstrated her work and
contributions toward the success of High Country, stating that she
would 	handle 	tasks 	related 	to 	“payroll,” 	“invoicing,” 	and
“pick[ing] 	up” 	and 	“drop[ping] 	off” 	supplies. 	Amanda
considered it to be “a family business,” and she testified that she
was willing to do “anything that really needed to be done.”

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¶14 	To further demonstrate her contributions to High Country,
Amanda submitted copies of various text messages between her
and Randy discussing aspects of the business. In several of these
messages, Randy instructed Amanda to “update” client accounts,
to “[s]top services” for certain clients, what services to “[a]dd to
[the] contract” for other clients, and how much to charge each
client for the work that was done. And during trial, when
presented with these messages, Randy acknowledged they were
“work-related,” although he tried to argue that Amanda only
began doing this work for High Country “after [they] were
separated.”
¶15 	Because Amanda did not earn a steady income during the
marriage, the trial court also received evidence related to her
earning capacity. To that end, Randy submitted a “vocational
assessment” from December 2019, which concluded that Amanda
“would be able to earn an annual income of $33,080 in the Park
City/Salt Lake City, Utah labor market.” There was also evidence
that, from time to time, Amanda would receive funds from a trust
titled “Robert H. Davis Properties, LLC” (the Family Trust),
which were essentially “[t]rust assets that constitute a loan on
[Amanda’s] inheritance.” Furthermore, Amanda testified that, in
October 2020, she started “Recharge Retreats,” a business that
offered clients relaxing weekend getaways. It was not until
February 2021, however, that Amanda was able to host her “first
paid retreat.” But due to the overhead costs, Amanda indicated
that she “actually lost money” in the endeavor.
¶16 	According to the parties, they were also able to obtain
additional income during their marriage by renting out their
properties. While the parties’ divorce was pending, they did, at
various times, continue to rent out these properties.
¶17 	The trial court also received evidence concerning the value
of the parties’ three properties, the possession of which had
already been decided through settlement, with only the matter of

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the “equitable distribution” left to be decided. As the parties
requested, various appraisals of the properties based on different
relevant dates were submitted to the court for consideration. As
for the most recent appraisals, they demonstrated that as of June
2021, the properties were worth (1) $1,300,000 for the Snowview
Property, 	(2) 	$3,140,000 	for 	the 	Oakridge 	Property, 	and
(3) $1,250,000 for the St. George Property.
¶18 	As 	previously 	noted, 	see 	supra 	¶ 	5, 	Randy 	sold 	the
Snowview Property for $1,050,000 before the matter went to trial.
Concerning that property, the evidence showed that only Randy’s
name was on the title, but the parties agreed that Amanda had
contributed funds toward the purchase of that property. They
disagreed, however, as to the amount of Amanda’s contribution.
Amanda testified that she contributed a $75,000 down payment
toward the purchase of the Snowview Property while Randy
claimed Amanda contributed only $50,000. Randy’s father also
submitted an affidavit stating that he sold the Snowview Property
to Randy as an “early inheritance gift,” and he stated that it was
Randy who made the $75,000 down payment on the property.
¶19 	The trial court heard closing arguments from the parties
two 	months 	after 	the 	trial. 	Before 	the 	parties 	began 	their
arguments, the court listed various issues that it would like
further clarification on. In particular, the court noted that the
parties were “asking for different calculations in terms” of the
three properties, explaining that the disagreement was over “the
valuation date of those properties,” and asked that the parties
“highlight the pertinent law” that they wanted the court to
consider when determining “the valuation date that should apply
to that certified issue.” The court also instructed counsel to
include in their proposed findings, which would be submitted
following the hearing, “anything that [they] want to based” on
their closing arguments.

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¶20 	Amanda began with income, reiterating that she did not
work outside the home and had “very, very limited work
experience,” and asked that her income be imputed at the
minimum wage. She argued the trial court should not rely on the
“outdated” and “[un]reliable” vocational assessment because it
was “performed in 2019 prior to the economic downturn that
transpired 	with 	COVID” 	and 	“was 	based 	on 	the 	living
circumstance[s]” for Amanda while she was living in Park City
“where the wages are higher,” but she had since moved to
Bountiful.
¶21 	Concerning High Country, Amanda believed that she was
entitled to half of the proceeds that Randy received when he sold
the business because she made significant efforts throughout the
marriage 	toward 	the 	maintenance 	and 	enhancement 	of 	the
business.
¶22 	As 	for 	the 	properties, 	Amanda 	claimed 	it 	had 	been
“difficult” for her “to do any type of rental agreements” related to
the St. George Property because, even though possession of the
property had been awarded to Amanda in the settlement, the title
remained in Randy’s name. She argued that any future rents she
might receive would be “speculative” because the house first
needed to be “refinanced,” which might result in an increased
mortgage and require her to assess whether “the rent” would
“meet this new mortgage payment.” Amanda further argued that
the three properties “should be valued as close to the date of the
final Decree of Divorce” as possible.
¶23 	Randy argued that “the valuation date for the marital
properties should be either (1) December 11, 2019, the date the
Parties entered into a final agreement to award each other a
certain property, or (2) April 22, 2020, the date when the Court
issued the bifurcated Decree of Divorce.” In both December 2019
and 	April 	2020, 	the 	Snowview 	Property 	was 	appraised 	at
$945,000. The Oakridge Property was appraised in December 2019

Godfrey v. Godfrey
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at $2,270,000 and in April 2020 at $2,420,000. As for the St. George
Property, it was appraised in December 2019 at $1,030,000 and in
April 2020 at $1,050,000. Randy did not indicate a preference
between the two dates, December 2019 or April 2020; he only
asked that the trial court choose one of the earlier dates for the
valuation of the properties and not the date of the trial.
¶24 	As for High Country, Randy argued this was “premarital
property” and that “any equity that accrued during the marriage”
should be considered as his separate property and not subject to
division. Randy pointed out that throughout the marriage, “the
business remained in Randy’s name alone, and he remained the
sole 	shareholder 	of 	High 	Country.” 	He 	also 	argued 	that
Amanda’s “interest[] in assisting him with the business” only
began after she filed for divorce, and that her testimony regarding
her contributions during the marriage was not credible.
¶25 	In Randy’s proposed findings, he also mentioned the
savings account, which had had a balance of $170,071.14, that the
commissioner had ordered to be divided equally between the
parties. Randy then acknowledged that he had filed an objection
to the commissioner’s recommendation, but nowhere in his
proposed findings and conclusions did Randy indicate that he
was requesting a ruling that would order Amanda to return those
funds or that he otherwise receive credit for that amount.
¶26 	Following arguments, the trial court took the matter under
advisement.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
¶27 	After receiving the parties’ submissions, the trial court
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law. We summarize
those findings and conclusions relevant to the issues on appeal.
¶28 	Before making any determinations regarding child support
and alimony, the trial court noted that it “must first make factual

Godfrey v. Godfrey
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findings regarding the Parties’ gross monthly incomes.” The court
began with Amanda, acknowledging her work history and the
vocational 	assessment 	from 	December 	2019. 	The 	court
determined that the vocational assessment was only helpful “to
the 	extent 	[that] 	it 	outline[d]” 	Amanda’s 	“work 	history,
occupation qualifications, education attainment, literacy, age,
health, and whether [Amanda] has a criminal record.” The court
found the “applicability” of the assessment to be limited because
it was “outdated,” particularly considering that it “was completed
prior to the impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Moreover, the
assessment was based on Amanda’s “job opportunities in the
Summit County area,” but she had since move to Bountiful, and
the assessment did not discuss her job opportunities “in the
Bountiful area.”
¶29 	As for any rental income from the St. George Property, the
trial court noted that while it was “marital” property, Randy was
“solely listed on the title” and Amanda “was not able to collect
rents during the pendency of this case.” And because there was
“no evidence” that Amanda intended to keep the St. George
Property, the court was unable to find that there was “a history of
recent rents related” to the property “or a prospect of future
rents.” The court therefore did not “attribute these rents as
income” to Amanda. As for the Family Trust and Recharge
Retreats, the court likewise did not consider money Amanda had
received from these sources as “income” because the evidence
showed that monies from the Family Trust were “a loan on her
inheritance,” and that payments from Recharge Retreats were
“minimal, sporadic, and offset by a number of significant and
pertinent costs.” Based on the evidence presented, the court
determined 	that 	Amanda’s 	“income 	should 	be 	imputed 	at
minimum wage at $1,257 per month.”
¶30 	Based on his historical earnings from High Country, and
the regular rental income he had been receiving, the trial court

Godfrey v. Godfrey
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found that Randy’s “gross monthly income for purposes of child
support” was $9,589.50.
¶31 	Turning to the issue of the parties’ three properties, the trial
court decided that they should “be valued as close to the date of
the final Decree of Divorce,” meaning the court would use the
appraisals that were conducted in June 2021. Thus, the Snowview
Property was valued at $1,300,000, the Oakridge Property was
valued at $3,140,000, and the St. George Property was valued at
$1,250,000.
¶32 	When it came to the division of the sale proceeds of High
Country, the trial court found that Amanda’s “testimony and
evidence 	was 	credible 	in 	proving 	that 	she 	substantially
contributed to the maintenance, enhancement, protection, and
increased value of High Country” during the parties’ marriage.
Based on the evidence at trial and the relevant law, the court
found it “equitable” that Amanda should receive “half” of the
“proceeds from the sale of High Country, subject to pertinent
offsets.” As part of those offsets, Randy was credited $238,850.38
as his premarital portion of High Country. After subtracting the
remaining offsets, the court concluded that this left “$756,239.62
to be split equally” between the parties.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶33 	Randy now challenges the trial court’s rulings, arguing
that the court abused its discretion in five respects: (1) by allowing
Amanda to submit updated appraisals and using experts not
previously disclosed, (2) by valuing the parties’ properties at the
time of trial, (3) by calculating Amanda’s income for purposes of
child support and spousal support at the minimum wage, (4) by
awarding Amanda half of the proceeds from the sale of High
Country, and (5) by not addressing Randy’s objection to the
commissioner’s recommendation regarding the division of the
savings account.

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20210871-CA 	12 	2024 UT App 156
¶34 	We review the first four issues raised by Randy on appeal
for an abuse of discretion. See Segota v. Young 180 Co., 2020 UT
App 105, ¶ 9, 470 P.3d 479 (“We review a [trial] court’s decisions
regarding the management of its docket, including whether to
grant continuances or extend deadlines, for abuse of discretion.”);
Petrzelka v. 	Goodwin, 2020 UT App 34, 	¶ 7, 461 P.3d 1134
(explaining that a trial court has broad discretion in choosing a
date for the valuation of property in a divorce dispute); Pankhurst
v. Pankhurst, 2022 UT App 36, ¶ 13, 508 P.3d 612 (“Courts have
broad discretion to select an appropriate method of assessing a
spouse’s 	income, 	including 	determinations 	of 	income
imputation.” (quotation simplified)); Thorup v. Thorup, 2024 UT
App 93, ¶ 14, 554 P.3d 329 (“[Trial] courts are in the best position
to determine whether property is marital or separate, and we
defer to their findings of fact in this regard unless clearly
erroneous.” 	(quotation 	simplified)). 	“Under 	the 	abuse 	of
discretion standard, we will not reverse unless the decision
exceeds the limits of reasonability.” Dierl v. Birkin, 2023 UT App
6, ¶ 15, 525 P.3d 127 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 527 P.3d
1107 (Utah 2023).5
5. This court has inconsistently articulated the standard of review
to be applied when reviewing a trial court’s determination that
property is marital or separate. In some instances, we have treated
the 	lower 	court’s determination 	deferentially, 	reviewing 	the
decision only for abuse of discretion, see, e.g., Lindsey v. Lindsey,
2017 UT App 38, ¶ 26, 392 P.3d 968 (“We generally defer to a trial
court’s 	categorization 	and 	equitable 	distribution 	of 	separate
property and uphold its determinations in that regard unless a
clear 	and 	prejudicial 	abuse 	of 	discretion 	is 	demonstrated.”
(quotation simplified)), whereas in other cases we have reviewed
the court’s determination for correctness, see, e.g., Fischer v. Fischer,
2021 UT App 145, ¶ 13, 505 P.3d 56 (“Whether property is marital
or separate is a question of law, which we review for correctness.”
(continued…)

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¶35 	As to the final issue raised by Randy, we do not address it
because it was not preserved for appeal. See Horne v. Horne, 2022
UT App 54, ¶¶ 6, 10, 511 P.3d 1174.
ANALYSIS
I. Expert Discovery and Appraisals
¶36 	Randy contends the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing updated appraisals of the properties and by allowing
Amanda to substitute her expert after discovery deadlines had
passed. In general, trial courts are granted “a great deal of
(quotation simplified)); Brown v. Brown, 2020 UT App 146, ¶ 13,
476 P.3d 554 (same); Liston v. Liston, 2011 UT App 433, ¶ 5, 269
P.3d 169 (“Whether property is marital or separate is a question
of law, and thus we review the trial court’s legal conclusions
concerning the nature of property for correctness.” (quotation
simplified)).
Here, 	neither 	party 	has 	acknowledged 	the 	apparent
tension in Utah’s caselaw on the subject, and both parties have
instead advocated for us to review the trial court’s determination
for an abuse of discretion. But given the state of our jurisprudence
and the nature of the underlying decision, we question whether it
would be appropriate to utilize a different standard of review
going forward. See Sawyer v. Department of Workforce Services, 2015
UT 	33, 	¶¶ 	9, 	11, 	345 	P.3d 	1253 	(outlining 	the 	“analytical
framework 	for 	choosing 	the 	standard 	of 	review 	for 	mixed
questions of law and fact,” and stating that under this framework,
mixed 	questions 	that 	are 	more 	fact-like 	are 	reviewed
deferentially). Ultimately, because this issue was not briefed and
Randy’s argument would have been unsuccessful even applying
a less deferential standard of review, we do not decide this issue
today. However, we note the question does warrant additional
consideration in a case where it is fully briefed and presented to
the court.

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deference in matters of discovery and [appellate courts] review
discovery orders for abuse of discretion.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT
79, ¶ 63, 459 P.3d 276. Moreover, “trial courts have broad
discretion in managing the cases assigned to their courts,” Solis v.
Burningham Enters. Inc., 2015 UT App 11, ¶ 25, 342 P.3d 812
(quotation simplified), which includes determining whether or
not to extend discovery deadlines, Segota v. Young 180 Co., 2020
UT App 105, ¶ 9, 470 P.3d 479.
¶37 	The trial in this matter was originally scheduled to take
place in April 2021, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial
court informed the parties the trial “would not be able to occur in
person.” In response, Amanda and Randy each requested that the
trial 	be 	postponed 	in 	hopes 	that 	an 	in-person 	trial 	could
eventually be scheduled. It was as a result of this postponement—
which both parties requested—that the court began to entertain
Amanda’s 	request 	for 	“updated 	appraisals” 	concerning 	the
parties’ properties. While Randy did express “hesitan[cy]” at
reopening discovery, he also indicated he had “no objection” to
an updated appraisal for the St. George Property and had no
problem “with [Amanda] finding another appraiser” for that
property. Randy even added his own request, asking the court
that the appraisers be allowed to “give their opinion of what the
value” of the properties would have been on two additional dates:
December 2019, when the parties “made a final agreement on who
would be receiving what property,” and April 2020, when the
bifurcated decree was entered.
¶38 	In rendering its decision on the parties’ requests, the trial
court considered the fact that both parties agreed to postpone the
trial, along with Utah caselaw indicating that courts should
typically value marital property “based upon the date of the
decree.” See Petrzelka v. Goodwin, 2020 UT App 34, ¶ 7, 461 P.3d
1134 (“Generally, the marital estate is valued at the time of the
divorce decree or trial.” (quotation simplified)). In weighing those
factors, the court decided to “permit the expert witness to be

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substituted,” meaning the appraiser that Amanda had previously
disclosed, and that it would allow “both sides to submit updated
expert reports.” Randy was therefore given an opportunity to
respond to any expert report that Amanda submitted. Moreover,
the court found it only “fair” that Randy’s request also be granted
and instructed the parties to provide appraisals related to the
properties’ values as of December 2019 and April 2020.
¶39 	Given the situation, and the opportunities the trial court
was providing to each side, enabling them to fully present their
arguments at trial, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court
to allow updated appraisals of the properties or for Amanda to
substitute her appraiser. On these issues, reversal would only be
warranted “if there is no reasonable basis for the [trial] court’s
decision.” Berger v. Ogden Reg’l Med. Center, 2020 UT App 85, ¶ 15,
469 P.3d 1127 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 474 P.3d 944
(Utah 2020). Here, the court was forced to reschedule the trial due
to a global pandemic—a rescheduling that both parties agreed to.
But for the court to also follow Utah law as closely as possible, by
valuing the properties at the time of trial, updated appraisals were
necessary. This was a reasonable basis for the court to grant
Amanda’s request.
¶40 	Moreover, when it came to the issue of “new experts,”
Randy indicated he would be fine “with [Amanda] finding
another appraiser” for the St. George Property, but he was less
than clear as to why he did not want a new appraiser assessing
the other two properties. Instead, Randy raised his own request,
asking that he be allowed to get appraisals for two other dates that
he intended to argue the trial court should use in its valuation.
With each of these requests, the court apparently found it would
be only “fair” that each party be given the opportunity to provide
this additional information to the court. When the court granted
Randy’s request, it seemingly assuaged any concerns he had
about reopening discovery. This is supported by our review of the
record, which shows that—after the scheduling conference—

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Randy never argued the court should not consider the June 2021
appraisals of the properties, which is further evidenced by the fact
he cited these values in his proposed findings.
¶41 	Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s decision to allow Amanda to substitute her expert witness
while 	simultaneously 	allowing 	Randy 	the 	opportunity 	to
supplement his own disclosures regarding the valuations of the
properties.
II. Valuation Date of the Properties
¶42 	The general rule concerning the valuation of a marital
estate is that it is “valued at the time of the divorce.” Fischer v.
Fischer, 2021 UT App 145, ¶ 16, 505 P.3d 56 (quotation simplified).
In its discretion, however, the trial court may “value the parties’
marital assets at a different time, such as that of separation, if it
determines 	that 	the 	circumstances 	so 	warrant,” 	but 	“any
deviation from the general rule must be supported by sufficiently
detailed findings of fact that explain the [trial] court’s basis for
such deviation.” Knowles v. Knowles, 2022 UT App 47, ¶ 62, 509
P.3d 265 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1258 (Utah
2022).
¶43 	Randy argues that the equitable valuation dates of the
three properties “should have been the date the parties stipulated
to who was awarded the real property (December 2019), or the
date of dissolution of the marriage (the bifurcated decree date of
April 2020).” Before the trial court and again on appeal, Randy
argues that it would be “more reasonable and equitable” for the
court to have chosen either of these dates than to have used the
date of the final decree.
¶44 	After considering Randy’s argument, the trial court noted
that it was appropriate to value the properties close to the date of
the final decree, particularly where the parties “have maintained
ownership rights to the properties despite” their settlement

Godfrey v. Godfrey
20210871-CA 	17 	2024 UT App 156
agreement, or “the entry of the bifurcated divorce decree.” The
court noted that Amanda was “still listed on the title and
mortgage of the Oakridge Property, but she has not benefitted
from the bifurcation, and she has not been able to remove her
name from the title.” Furthermore, the court stated that Randy
had been “solely listed on the title” of the St. George Property and
that, thus, Amanda had been unable “to collect rents during the
pendency of this case.” This was in accordance with Amanda’s
argument at trial that she would need to “refinance” the St.
George Property in her name, which she had been unable to
previously do, meaning the mortgage payments would likely
change and any future rent she could receive from this property
would be merely “speculative.”
¶45 	Randy 	resists 	this 	conclusion, 	arguing 	that 	Amanda
“exercised control” over the St. George Property and that he
likewise “treated the Oakridge [P]roperty and the Snowview
Property as his individual properties after the December 11, 2019
agreement” and after the bifurcated decree was entered in April
2020. We are not persuaded that the evidence highlighted by
Randy warrants reversal. While Randy places much emphasis on
the evidence from trial that favors his position and argues that his
testimony was “more credible and accurate” than Amanda’s, this
does not demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in
valuing the properties as of June 2021. It is beyond “this court’s
purview to engage in a reweighing of the evidence”; moreover,
“when a foundation for the court’s decision exists in the evidence,
we may not engage in a reweighing of the evidence.” Lobendahn v.
Lobendahn, 2023 UT App 137, ¶ 31, 540 P.3d 727 (emphasis added)
(quotation simplified). Indeed, this court will review the rulings
of the lower court to determine whether they are supported by the
evidence, but “in cases where the appellant has merely pointed to
evidence that might have supported findings more favorable to
them rather than identifying flaws in the evidence relied on by the
[trial] court that rendered the court’s findings clearly erroneous,
we will not reverse.” Id. (quotation simplified). This is precisely

Godfrey v. Godfrey
20210871-CA 	18 	2024 UT App 156
what Randy has done in this matter, and his arguments therefore
do not warrant reversal.
¶46 	Furthermore, Randy raises two additional challenges to the
trial court’s division of the Snowview Property. First, he contends
it was an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude that
Amanda “made a $75,000 down payment” on the Snowview
Property when her contribution was, in reality, only $50,000. To
accept Randy’s position, however, would require us to conclude
that 	his 	evidence 	was 	“more 	credible 	and 	accurate” 	than
Amanda’s evidence was at trial. This also is something we cannot
do 	on 	appeal, 	because 	this 	court 	“may 	not 	substitute 	[its]
judgment for that of the trial court” in such matters “as trial courts
are in a better position to weigh conflicting evidence and evaluate
the credibility of witness testimony.” Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App
192, ¶ 19, 186 P.3d 978. And unless the record demonstrates that
the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous, “we accord
deference to the trial court’s ability and opportunity to evaluate
credibility and demeanor.” Salt Lake City v. Northern, 2013 UT App
299, ¶ 6, 318 P.3d 775 (per curiam) (quotation simplified). Here,
Randy has not demonstrated that the court’s credibility findings
and weighing of the evidence were clearly erroneous.
¶47 	Second, 	Randy 	contends 	the 	trial 	court 	abused 	its
discretion in adopting the June 2021 appraisal for the Snowview
Property based on its conclusion that Randy “wrongfully sold and
dissipated the property prior to trial.” This argument fails because
Randy ignores that this statement represents only half of the
court’s finding. That is, the court first concluded that it would use
the June 2021 valuation to divide the parties’ equity in the
Snowview Property since “the time of trial is generally the
appropriate valuation date for marital assets.” Because we have
already determined that the court did not abuse its discretion in
reaching this conclusion, the propriety of the court’s alternative
reason for picking this valuation date is irrelevant.

Godfrey v. Godfrey
20210871-CA 	19 	2024 UT App 156
¶48 	Accordingly, we determine that the trial court’s decision to
value the parties’ properties at the time of the divorce, as opposed
to 	another 	date 	proposed 	by 	Randy, 	was not 	an 	abuse 	of
discretion.
III. Amanda’s Imputed Income
¶49 	Randy takes issue with the trial court’s determination that
Amanda’s gross monthly income should be imputed at $1,257 for
purposes of calculating child support and alimony. Specifically,
Randy asserts that the court failed to consider (1) the vocational
assessment 	from 	2019, 	(2) 	that 	Amanda 	is 	voluntarily
underemployed, (3) the potential rental income from the St.
George Property, and (4) money Amanda receives from the
Family Trust and Recharge Retreats. For the following reasons,
we disagree with Randy that the court’s imputation of income
was an abuse of discretion.
¶50 	Income imputation “is primarily focused on a spouse’s
ability to produce income,” and for that reason, “it is not unusual
for courts to impute income to a spouse who has not worked
during the marriage (or who has not worked for a number of years
preceding 	the 	divorce) 	but 	who 	is 	nevertheless 	capable 	of
producing income.” Tilleman v. Tilleman, 2024 UT App 54, ¶ 65,
549 	P.3d 	65 	(quotation 	simplified). 	The 	rationale 	behind
imputation is that courts want to avoid situations where a spouse
intentionally becomes unemployed or underemployed in order to
manipulate their child support or alimony obligations. See id. But
“the imputation analysis” should be focused “on the detailed
findings of fact necessary to support a decision to impute income
rather than the ultimate fact or legal conclusion of voluntary
unemployment or underemployment.” Pankhurst v. Pankhurst,
2022 UT App 36, ¶ 14, 508 P.3d 612 (quotation simplified).
¶51 	Concerning the vocational assessment, Randy argues that
Amanda “never presented any evidence to rebut the report” or
demonstrate “that it wasn’t current” or was otherwise unreliable.

Godfrey v. Godfrey
20210871-CA 	20 	2024 UT App 156
Instead, Randy believes the trial court “improperly came up with
its own justification without evidence to rebut what [Randy]
presented” 	at 	trial. On 	this 	issue, 	trial 	courts 	“have 	broad
discretion to select an appropriate method of assessing a spouse’s
income, including determinations of income imputation.” Id. ¶ 13
(quotation simplified). Randy therefore “bear[s] a heavy burden”
on appeal and we will find that the trial court abused its discretion
only “if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the
trial court.” Id. (quotation simplified).
¶52 	In its findings, the trial court offered numerous reasons
why 	it 	chose 	not 	to 	rely 	on 	the 	vocational 	assessment’s
conclusions regarding Amanda’s earning capacity. For one, the
court noted that the assessment was outdated, which meant its
usefulness was limited. The court also noted that other events,
such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Amanda’s move from
Summit 	County 	to 	Bountiful, 	rendered 	the 	assessment 	less
reliable. Given the reasons provided by the court, we are not
persuaded that it was an abuse of discretion for the court not to
rely on the results of the vocational assessment.
¶53 	The final two issues that Randy has with the trial court’s
calculation of Amanda’s income are its exclusion of any rental
income from the St. George Property and its exclusion of any
money 	Amanda 	might 	receive 	from 	the 	Family 	Trust 	and
Recharge Retreats. As this court has previously held, Utah law
requires trial courts to “consider all sources of income when
determining alimony,” but that “does not dictate that all sources
of income be counted as income received by a spouse for that
purpose.” Clarke v. Clarke, 2023 UT App 160, ¶ 29, 542 P.3d 935
(quotation simplified). “Instead, our case law preserves a trial
court’s broad discretion to treat sources of income as the court
sees fit under the circumstances.” Id. (quotation simplified).
¶54 	Moreover, when it comes to these potential sources of
income, this court has noted that “courts typically do not expect a

Godfrey v. Godfrey
20210871-CA 	21 	2024 UT App 156
party to use their property in a way they would not otherwise be
inclined to.” Rothwell v. Rothwell, 2023 UT App 50, ¶ 89, 531 P.3d
225, cert. denied, 537 P.3d 1011 (Utah 2023). It therefore would not
be an abuse of discretion for a court to decline to “impute
investment income to a wife for alimony purposes where the
evidence showed the parties had a history of reinvesting their
investment returns rather than living off them.” Id. Nor would it
be an abuse of discretion for a court to decline to include in its
calculation funds that a party “could potentially draw from [their]
retirement accounts” or that they “could receive by electing to
collect Social Security benefits early.” Id. (quotation simplified).
Simply put, it is within the court’s discretion to decline to force a
party “to do something with [their] portion of the marital estate
that the parties did not do during the marriage.” Id. ¶ 90.
¶55 	In its ruling, the trial court considered the rental income
from the St. George Property as well as funds available to
Amanda from the Family Trust and potential earnings from
Recharge Retreats. Concerning the St. George Property, the court
found that Amanda “was not able to collect rents during the
pendency of this case,” as the title was listed in only Randy’s
name, and that because there was no evidence that Amanda
intended to keep the property, the court was unable to find “a
prospect of future rents.” As for the Family Trust and Recharge
Retreats, the court found that the evidence indicated the “[t]rust
assets . . . constitute a loan on [Amanda’s] inheritance” and any
payments 	she 	had 	received 	from 	Recharge 	Retreats 	“were
minimal, sporadic, and offset by a number of significant and
pertinent costs.” These findings support the court’s decision not
to consider these potential sources of income when calculating
Amanda’s imputed income. Consequently, we find no abuse of
discretion in the court’s exclusion of income related to the St.
George Property, the Family Trust, or Recharge Retreats from its
calculations.

Godfrey v. Godfrey
20210871-CA 	22 	2024 UT App 156
¶56 	Accordingly, Randy has not demonstrated that the trial
court abused its discretion by imputing Amanda’s income at
$1,257 per month.
IV. The Business as Separate Property
¶57 	Randy also challenges the trial court’s decision to award
Amanda “half” of the “sale proceeds from the sale of High
Country.” According to Randy, the court should have found that
High Country was his separate property and not subject to
division. On this point, given the way the parties have advocated
we review this issue, we again defer to the trial court’s findings;
after all, trial courts “are in the best position to determine whether
property is marital or separate,” and we will not disturb the
court’s ruling unless it is clearly erroneous. Thorup v. Thorup, 2024
UT App 93, ¶ 14, 554 P.3d 329 (quotation simplified). Because
Randy has not established that the court’s ruling was clearly
erroneous, his challenge fails.
¶58 	The general presumption under Utah law “is that marital
property will be divided equally while separate property will not
be divided at all.” Lindsey v. Lindsey, 2017 UT App 38, ¶ 32, 392
P.3d 968. Therefore, it is typical in divorce matters that “each
party retain the separate property he or she brought into the
marriage, including any appreciation thereof.” Id. (quotation
simplified). There are, however, three circumstances where Utah
courts have allowed a spouse’s separate property to be divided
between the parties at the time of the divorce: (1) “when separate
property has been commingled;” (2) “when the other spouse has
augmented, maintained, or protected the separate property;” and
(3) “in extraordinary situations when equity so demands.” Id.
¶ 33. In this matter, the trial court applied the second exception to
its division of High Country, stating that “a spouse’s separate
property may be subjected to equitable distribution when the
other spouse has by her efforts and/or expenses contributed to the
enhancement, 	maintenance 	or 	protection 	of 	that 	property.”

Godfrey v. Godfrey
20210871-CA 	23 	2024 UT App 156
(Citing Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988);
Lindsey, 2017 UT App 38, ¶ 35.)
¶59 	On 	appeal, 	Randy’s 	argument 	is 	essentially 	that 	the
evidence 	at 	trial 	was 	insufficient 	to 	establish 	that 	Amanda
contributed to the success of High Country or that she assisted in
“increas[ing] the value of the business.” In Randy’s view, the trial
court should have discounted various exhibits submitted by
Amanda and, instead, “given more weight” to the testimony of
his trial witnesses. Randy again mistakes the role of this court,
which is “not to reweigh the evidence presented at trial”; instead,
our 	task 	is 	“to 	determine 	whether 	the 	court’s 	decision 	is
supported by the evidence.” Merrill v. Merrill, 2024 UT App 125,
¶ 80 (quotation simplified).
¶60 	In this matter, the trial court provided great detail in
explaining the reasoning behind its decision to award Amanda
half of the proceeds from the sale of High Country. In particular,
the court noted that Amanda “credibly testified to doing various
tasks and to contributing various monies for High Country”
during 	the 	marriage, 	and 	that 	Amanda’s 	testimony 	was
“supported by evidence of texts between the Parties regarding
various business tasks that [Amanda] did for High Country,”
along with Amanda’s “journal entries that she wrote regarding
her work for High Country.” The court further noted that
Amanda was even “an authorized user for an American Express
card for High Country” and that she could “use that card for
business purchases.” And while some of Randy’s employees may
not have seen Amanda working for the business, the court found
that “the trial evidence as a whole indicate[d] that [Amanda] did
in fact substantially work for the business,” which was supported
by 	Randy’s 	“own 	statements 	(through 	his 	texts 	and 	trial
testimony) . . . that [Amanda] substantially contributed to the
maintenance, enhancement, protection, and increased value” of
the business during their marriage.

Godfrey v. Godfrey
20210871-CA 	24 	2024 UT App 156
¶61 	While Randy might be able to point to conflicting evidence
in the record, that is an insufficient basis for this court to set aside
the trial court’s findings. As we have stated before, “the pill that
is hard for many appellants to swallow is that if there is evidence
supporting a finding, absent a legal problem—a fatal flaw—with
that evidence, the finding will stand, even though there is ample
record evidence that would have supported contrary findings.”
Lobendahn v. Lobendahn, 2023 UT App 137, ¶ 27, 540 P.3d 727
(quotation simplified).
¶62 	The trial court provided sufficient reasoning to support its
decision, and we will not reweigh the evidence. We therefore
decline to disturb the court’s ruling where it was not an abuse of
discretion for it to distribute the proceeds from the sale of High
Country equally between the parties.
V. The Financial Account
¶63 	Randy 	argues 	the 	trial 	court 	“failed 	to 	address 	that
[Amanda] had received $85,035” from one of the savings accounts
earlier in the litigation. The commissioner had ordered that the
savings account with a balance of $170,071.14 be divided equally
between 	the 	parties, 	and 	Randy 	filed 	an 	objection 	to 	that
recommendation, which was never ruled on. Because Randy
either waived or failed to preserve this issue for appeal, we need
not address the merits of this argument.
¶64 	“An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been
presented to the [trial] court in such a way that the court has an
opportunity to rule on it.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15, 416
P.3d 443 (quotation simplified). “To provide the court with this
opportunity, the issue must be specifically raised by the party
asserting error, in a timely manner, and must be supported by
evidence and relevant legal authority.” Id. (quotation simplified).
¶65 	Moreover, as this court has previously stated, “the mere
mention of an issue in the pleadings, when no supporting

Godfrey v. Godfrey
20210871-CA 	25 	2024 UT App 156
evidence or relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in
support of the claim, is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and
thus insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.” Janson v. Janson,
2019 UT App 106, ¶ 24, 448 P.3d 1 (quotation simplified).
Accordingly, “a party may waive an issue by relinquishing or
abandoning 	it 	before 	the 	[trial] 	court, 	either 	expressly 	or
impliedly.” Id.
¶66 	In an attempt to demonstrate that he preserved this issue
for appeal, Randy points to his affidavit from trial, which stated
that “[a]t the temporary orders hearing on February 13, 2019,” the
commissioner 	ordered 	that 	his 	account 	“with 	a 	balance 	of
$170,071.14 be divided in half and that half be given to Amanda
for her use.” But Randy merely stated this as a fact and made no
argument that this money should be returned to him. While
Randy did mention this savings account in his proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law, there is no indication that he was
seeking a return of or a credit for those funds. In fact, if the trial
court 	had 	chosen 	to adopt 	Randy’s proposed 	findings and
conclusions in its final ruling, he would not have been credited
with the funds he now seeks.
¶67 	Because Randy did not present the matter of the division
of this particular account to the trial court “in such a way that the
court ha[d] an opportunity to rule on it,” the issue is unpreserved
for appeal. See Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15 (quotation simplified).
Furthermore, 	the 	record 	demonstrates 	that 	Randy 	at 	least
impliedly waived the issue before the trial court “by relinquishing
or abandoning it,” see Janson, 2019 UT App 106, ¶ 24, as was made
clear by his proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. For

Godfrey v. Godfrey
20210871-CA 	26 	2024 UT App 156
those reasons, we decline to address the merits of Randy’s
argument on this point.6
CONCLUSION
¶68 	Randy has failed to establish that the trial court abused its
discretion in its management of discovery issues, valuation of the
marital property, imputation of income, or application of the
contribution exception to the distribution of High Country’s sale
proceeds. He failed to preserve for our review the issue of the
savings account that the commissioner had ordered to be divided
equally between the parties. We therefore affirm the trial court’s
rulings in all respects.
6. Randy also raised the issue of attorney fees. The trial court
determined that “an award of attorney’s fees to either Party is
neither necessary nor appropriate,” and the parties were therefore
ordered to “pay for their own attorney fees and costs.” On appeal,
Randy requests that if he prevails, and this court vacates the trial
court’s rulings, we “direct the trial court on remand to evaluate
his request for fees.” Because Randy has not prevailed and we are
not remanding the matter to the trial court, there is no need to
make such an instruction.