In re A.R.

2017 UT App 154
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH , IN THE INTEREST OF A.R. AND M.R.,
PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
J.S.R.,
Appellant,
v.
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20160330-CA
Filed August 17, 2017
Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Mark W. May
No. 1108329
Colleen K. Coebergh, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson, Attorneys
for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
JUDGE K ATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which J UDGES
M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN and JILL M. POHLMAN concurred.
TOOMEY, Judge:
¶1 	J.S.R. 	(Father) 	appeals 	the 	juvenile 	court’s 	order
terminating his parental rights. We reverse.

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	2 	2017 UT App 154
BACKGROUND
¶2 	A.R. 	and 	M.R., 	born 	in 	March 	2008 	and 	June 	2009,
respectively, are the children of C.S. (Mother) and Father.1 In
December 	2014, 	the 	Division 	of 	Child 	and 	Family 	Services
(DCFS) filed a verified petition alleging that the children were
“abused, 	neglected 	and/or 	dependent.” 	The 	petition 	alleged
there was a domestic disturbance between Father and Mother
and that Father was arrested for violating a protective order
between him and Mother. It also alleged Mother was using
methamphetamine, sometimes in the children’s presence. At a
shelter hearing during which both parents were present and
represented by counsel, the juvenile court gave DCFS temporary
legal and physical custody of the children.
¶3 	An 	adjudication 	hearing 	took 	place 	in 	January 	2015.
Father was incarcerated at that time but was transported to the
hearing. The juvenile court determined that Father had been
arrested for violating a protective order between himself and
Mother. It also determined that the children were dependent2 as
to Father and neglected3 as to Mother and gave custody of the
children to DCFS. It also ordered DCFS to create a plan to
address the children’s needs.
1. Mother was also a party to the termination proceedings. Her
parental rights were terminated and she filed a separate appeal.
See In re A.R., 2017 UT App 153.
2. A “dependent child” is one “who is homeless or without
proper care through no fault of the child’s parent.” See Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-6-105(11) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016).
3. A “neglected child” includes one who lacks “proper parental
care . . . by reason of the fault or habits of the parent.” See Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-6-105(27)(a)(ii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016).

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	3 	2017 UT App 154
¶4 	In February 2015, the court conducted a dispositional
hearing. The State explained that the Utah Code “requires DCFS
to [provide] reasonable services to a father who’s incarcerated,
unless 	[the 	court] 	determines 	that 	those 	services 	would 	be
detrimental 	to 	the 	minor.” 	The 	court 	concluded 	that
reunification services would not be detrimental to the children
but 	acknowledged 	the 	difficulty 	of 	providing 	them 	to 	an
incarcerated parent, especially since Father still had ten months
until his release. The court stated:
But at this point I’m not ordering the Division to go
out and set up services at the prison, because I’m
not going to find that that’s reasonable. So the
Division will provide reasonable services, meaning
that 	to the 	extent 	that 	[Father] 	can 	take those
services . . . at 	the 	prison, 	[Father] 	should 	avail
[himself] of those opportunities.
When 	[Father] 	get[s] 	out 	[he] 	need[s] 	to
immediately contact the Division, and then the
Division will have to expedite placement in some
sort of domestic violence/anger management.
The court stated that any contact the children had with Father
should be approved by their therapist and concluded, “So that
will be the treatment plan for [Father]. That’s what you’ll have to
put in writing and make sure he has a copy of it.”
¶5 	The court’s conclusion regarding reunification services is
further memorialized in a disposition order (the Disposition
Order). The court found that services would not be detrimental
to the children, that there were no reasonable services DCFS
could provide to Father while he was in prison, that it was
“reasonable 	to 	expedite 	services 	for 	[Father] 	if 	he 	contacts
[DCFS]” upon his release from prison, that Father should avail
himself of services offered at the prison, and that the child and
family plan for Father should be amended to include classes

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	4 	2017 UT App 154
available to him in prison. Additionally, the minutes of the
disposition hearing stated, “The Court orders DCFS to provide
reasonable reunification services for the father and children.”
¶6 	The 	State 	filed 	a 	verified 	petition 	for 	termination 	of
parental rights as to both parents in September 2015. With
respect 	to 	Father, 	the 	petition 	stated 	he 	was 	currently
incarcerated and listed his criminal convictions. It acknowledged
that 	the 	court 	had 	“ordered 	DCFS 	to 	provide 	reasonable
reunification services” for him, but urged the court to conclude
that DCFS had provided reasonable reunification services for
Father and to terminate his parental rights on several grounds.
The matter proceeded to trial beginning in December 2015 and
intermittently continued over eleven days through April 2016.
¶7 	Father was released from prison on January 5, 2016,
between the first and second days of trial. He contacted a DCFS
caseworker the next day.
¶8 	During trial, the caseworker testified she was aware that
reunification services had been ordered for Father. She explained
she had provided supervised visitation with the children but
stated she had not contacted Father’s parole officer, had not
investigated his living situation, had not inquired about which
classes Father had taken, and did not know whether he had
participated in domestic violence assessments. She testified she
had not provided a service plan to Father, and indeed, that a
plan had not yet been drafted. The State then asked the court to
determine 	that 	both 	parents 	had 	received 	reasonable
reunification services. Both the guardian ad litem and the court
expressed “grave concerns about whether the State . . . met the
first requirement of reasonable efforts concerning [Father].” The
court 	decided 	to 	postpone 	that 	determination 	and 	stated,
“[U]ntil [the court] determine[s] otherwise, [the court will] have
the Division continue to provide services” to both parents.

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	5 	2017 UT App 154
¶9 	Later in February 2016, on the fifth day of trial, the State
again raised the issue of reunification services, asking the court
to rule on whether “services were either extended or whether the
Court finds them appropriate.” The court replied that it had
“already ruled on the issue and [it had] already ruled that
reunification services continued.” But after reconsidering the
Disposition Order, the court noted “in the disposition order,
there’s 	something 	different 	. 	. 	. 	[it] 	really 	did 	not 	order
reunification services for [Father] but indicated that, once he was
released from prison . . . they could be expedited.” The court
ordered briefing on whether, “given the findings of fact and time
frames that we’re dealing with,” DCFS should “even be working
on 	a 	service 	plan 	for 	[Father]” 	and 	whether 	“reunification
services should even be offered to [Father].”
¶10 	After considering the briefing from Father’s counsel, the
State, and the guardian ad litem, the juvenile court issued a
written order (the March Order) stating that the court “did not
order reunification services for [Father].” The trial concluded in
April 2016. The court determined Father was an unfit parent,
that 	he 	had 	neglected 	his 	children 	“by 	exposing 	them 	to
domestic violence,” and had made only token efforts to support
them. The court terminated Father’s parental rights, concluding
termination was in the children’s best interests. Father appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 	Father raises several issues on appeal. First, during the
course of trial, the children’s foster mother testified to several
hearsay 	statements 	the 	children 	made 	to 	her, 	and 	Father
challenges the constitutionality of the statute under which those
hearsay statements were admitted.4 Second, Father contends the
4. The juvenile court admitted the statements under Utah Code
section 78A-6-115, which states that hearsay statements from
(continued…)

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	6 	2017 UT App 154
juvenile court abused its discretion in allowing the State to
amend its verified petition during trial. Third, Father contends
the court erred by “retroactively deciding it had not ordered
reunification services” in its March Order. Finally, Father raises a
due process challenge. Because we ultimately determine the
juvenile 	court 	erred 	in 	its 	decision 	regarding 	reunification
services and reverse its decision on this basis, we need not
analyze Father’s other claims.
(…continued)
children under eight are admissible if they are made “to a person
in a trust relationship” for “the purpose of establishing the fact
of abuse, neglect, or dependency.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-
115(6) 	(LexisNexis 	2012). 	Father 	argues 	this 	statute 	is
unconstitutional, in part because the legislature did not have
authority under the Utah Constitution to promulgate such a rule.
In support of his argument, Father cites In re L.M., 2013 UT App
191, 308 P.3d 553. In that case, this court acknowledged that the
Utah Constitution permits the legislature to amend the Utah
Rules of Evidence, but it also noted that “this provision explicitly
granting 	the 	legislature 	the 	power 	to 	amend 	the 	rules 	of
evidence was adopted one year after the hearsay exception was
promulgated.” Id. ¶ 3 n.3. Because the parties in that case did not
address what effect that fact may have had on the “propriety of
the 	hearsay 	exception,” 	this 	court 	declined 	to 	consider 	the
matter. Id. We also do not address the constitutionality of the
statute here because we reverse the juvenile court’s decision on
alternative grounds. See Clegg v. Wasatch County, 2010 UT 5, ¶ 26,
227 P.3d 1243 (“[W]here any direction we may provide . . . may
ultimately prove to be irrelevant, or where there are possible
circumstances under which we would not need to address the
constitutionality 	of 	[a 	statute], 	to 	do 	so 	would 	be 	to
impermissibly 	render 	an 	advisory 	opinion.” 	(omission 	and
second alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)).

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	7 	2017 UT App 154
¶12 	In concluding that reunification services had not been
ordered for Father, the juvenile court was interpreting its own
prior 	order. 	“A 	court’s 	interpretation 	of 	its 	own 	order 	is
reviewed for clear abuse of discretion and we afford the district
court great deference.” Uintah Basin Med. Center v. Hardy, 2008
UT 15, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d 786. Additionally, because the juvenile court
has an “advantageous position with regard to the parties and
witnesses,” 	we 	afford 	it 	“‘a 	high 	degree 	of 	deference,’
overturning its decision only if it is ‘against the clear weight of
the evidence or leave[s] the appellate court with a firm and
definite conviction that a mistake has been made.’” In re A.K.,
2015 UT App 39, ¶ 15, 344 P.3d 1153 (stating that a juvenile
court’s decision whether to offer reunification services is within
its sound discretion) (alteration in original) (quoting In re B.R.,
2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435).
ANALYSIS
¶13 	Father contends the juvenile court erred in interpreting its
prior order. He asserts the court’s Disposition Order stated that
reunification services were ordered for Father, and he argues
every 	participant 	understood 	“that 	the 	Court 	had 	ordered
reunification services.” He further argues the March Order,
which stated that reunification services had never been ordered,
prejudiced his case. We begin by examining the March Order in
greater depth.
I. Additional Background
¶14 	The court’s March Order stated that during trial, “[t]here
ha[d] 	been 	discussions 	and 	confusion 	about 	whether
reunification services were ordered for [Father].” This order then
summarized the court’s reasoning behind the prior Disposition
Order. At the time of the disposition hearing, In re A.T., 2013 UT
App 184, 307 P.3d 672, rev’d, 2015 UT 41, 353 P.3d 131, was
controlling authority. That case stated a juvenile court was

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	8 	2017 UT App 154
required 	to 	order 	reunification 	services 	for 	an 	incarcerated
parent 	unless the 	court 	determined 	that 	services 	would 	be
detrimental to the children. Id. ¶ 13; see Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-
312(25)(a) (LexisNexis 2012). In the March Order, the court
explained 	that 	at 	the 	disposition 	hearing, 	its 	analysis 	had
focused on (1) whether services would be detrimental to the
children and (2) what services would be reasonable. The court
acknowledged that at the disposition hearing it had determined
that services would not be detrimental to the children and that it
had determined DCFS could not provide reasonable services
while Father was incarcerated. In the March Order, the court
admitted it had made a “confusing statement” at the disposition
hearing:
So the Division will provide reasonable services,
meaning to the extent that you can take those
services . . . out at the prison, you should avail
yourself of those opportunities. . . . When you get
out you need to immediately contact the Division
and 	then 	the 	Division 	will 	have 	to 	expedite
placement in some sort of domestic violence/anger
management.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)
¶15 	The 	March 	Order 	provided 	this 	interpretation 	of 	the
“confusing statement”:
The court’s intended meaning was that it was not
ordering 	the 	Division 	to 	provide 	reunification
services to the father while he was in prison; the
father should avail himself of any services he could
while 	incarcerated; 	and 	when 	the 	father 	was
released from prison, the Division should help him
get into domestic violence and anger management
classes.

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	9 	2017 UT App 154
¶16 	The court additionally stated that “any such confusion
was cleared up by the formal written order prepared by the
Assistant 	Attorney 	General,” 	and 	quoted 	the 	following
statements from the Disposition Order:
2. Based 	on 	the 	Father’s 	expected 	10 	month
incarceration, 	there 	are 	not 	services 	that 	are
reasonable that The Division of Child and Family
Services can provide the father at this time. The 10
months remaining on the father’s sentence pose a
problem 	and 	an 	impediment 	to 	reasonable
services.
3. The Division of Child and Family Services does
not offer any services in the prison.
4. When he gets out of prison, it is reasonable to
expedite 	services 	for 	him 	if 	he 	contacts 	The
Division of Child and Family Services.
5. There may be services or classes that are offered
by the prison that the father could avail himself of.
If there are, the father should avail himself of those
services.
6. The child and family plan for the father should
be amended to include the father attending any
classes in domestic violence, anger management or
parenting that are available to him in prison.
¶17 	The March Order concluded by stating, “At no time
during 	the 	[Disposition 	Hearing] 	did 	the 	court 	state 	that
reunification services were ordered for the father. The court did
not order reunification services for the father.” Alternatively, the
court 	concluded 	that 	reunification 	services 	“are 	a 	gratuity
provided to parents by the Legislature” and “because there is no
fundamental right to receive services, the decision to provide or

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	10 	2017 UT App 154
deny services is in the judge’s discretion.” (Citations and internal
quotation marks omitted.)
II. Abuse of Discretion
¶18 	The juvenile court abused its discretion in interpreting its
prior 	Disposition 	Order. 	The 	plain 	language 	of 	both 	the
Disposition Order and the March Order contradict the court’s
ultimate conclusion that services were not ordered for Father.
¶19 	In the Disposition Order, the court stated that based on
Father’s 	incarceration, 	there 	were 	“no 	services 	that 	are
reasonable that [DCFS] can provide the father at this time.”
(Emphasis added.) It then stated, “When he gets out of prison, it
is reasonable to expedite services for him if he contacts [DCFS].”
(Emphasis 	added.) 	The 	plain 	language 	of 	these 	statements
reveals that the court did not expect DCFS to provide services
for Father while he was in prison, because such services would
not 	be 	reasonable. 	But 	the 	court 	further 	explained 	it 	was
reasonable for DCFS to expedite services for Father once he was
released. This indicates the court ordered expedited services for
Father once he made contact with DCFS after his release.
¶20 	The court attempted to clarify its determination in the
March Order, but its clarification also reveals that at least some
services were ordered for Father. At the disposition hearing, the
court stated that DCFS “will provide reasonable services,” that
Father should avail himself of classes offered at the prison, and
that DCFS would help expedite placement in domestic violence
or anger management classes upon his release. In the March
Order, the court interpreted this statement to mean the court
“was not ordering [DCFS] to provide reunification services to
the father while he was in prison; . . . and when the father was
released from prison, [DCFS] should help him get into domestic
violence and anger management classes.” (Emphases added.)
Similar 	to 	the 	statements 	in 	the 	Disposition 	Order, 	these
statements demonstrate that some services were in fact ordered

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	11 	2017 UT App 154
for Father: DCFS was ordered to help Father enroll in classes
once he was released from prison.
¶21 	The March Order attempts to clarify any confusion over
whether reunification services were ordered. But both the court’s
interpretation of its oral statements at the disposition hearing
and 	the 	written 	Disposition 	Order 	conflict 	with 	the 	March
Order’s 	ultimate 	conclusion 	that 	the 	court 	“did 	not 	order
reunification services for the father.”
¶22 	Next, the authority on which the court relied during the
disposition hearing suggests the court ordered some services for
Father. The March Order indicated that the juvenile court relied
on In re A.T., 2013 UT App 184, 307 P.3d 672, rev’d, 2015 UT 41,
353 P.3d 131, in determining whether reunification services were
appropriate. That case, which the court notes was the controlling
authority at the time, “requires the juvenile court to order
reasonable services to [an incarcerated parent] unless it makes an
actual determination that those services would be detrimental to
the [c]hildren.”5 See id. ¶ 12 (noting that Utah Code section 78A-
6-312(25)(a) (LexisNexis 2012) “expressly states that ‘the court
shall order reasonable services unless it determines that those
services would be detrimental to the minor’”).
¶23 	Under section 312, the juvenile court focused on a two-
part analysis: whether services would be detrimental to the
5. In re A.T. (A.T. I), 2013 UT App 184, 307 P.3d 672, was
overruled by the Utah Supreme Court in 2015. See In re A.T. (A.T.
II), 2015 UT 41, 353 P.3d 131. A.T. II issued on March 27, 2015,
after the juvenile court had relied on A.T. I in the disposition
hearing. 	A.T. 	II 	held 	that 	reunification 	services 	for 	an
incarcerated parent need only be ordered when reunification
services for that parent are consistent with the juvenile court’s
permanency goal for the child. Id. ¶¶ 14–21.

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	12 	2017 UT App 154
children, and if not, what services would be reasonable. Because
the court determined services would not be detrimental to the
children, 	the 	remaining 	question 	was 	what 	services 	were
reasonable, 	not 	whether 	services 	would 	be 	offered 	at 	all.
Additionally, at the disposition hearing, the court indicated that
it believed services were required by the statute: “Looking at the
statute . . . services are a gratuity offered by the State unless
you’re incarcerated. Then you do get them.” Thus, the authority
the court was operating under at the time of the disposition
hearing required it to order services to an incarcerated parent if
those services were not detrimental to the children. Both the
hearing transcript and the Disposition Order indicate the court’s
understanding of this authority, which cuts against the court’s
later interpretation stating it did not order services for Father.
¶24 	We also note that until February 2016, five days into the
termination trial and a full year after the disposition hearing, all
parties understood the Disposition Order to mean that the court
had ordered reunification services for Father. The court stated at
the 	disposition 	hearing 	that 	“the 	Division 	will 	provide
reasonable services, meaning that to the extent that [Father] can
take those services . . . at the prison, [he] should avail [himself] of
those opportunities” and that once he was released from prison,
“the Division will have to expedite placement in some sort of
domestic 	violence/anger 	management.” 	In 	the 	Disposition
Order, the court concluded that when Father “gets out of prison,
it is reasonable to expedite services for him if he contacts
[DCFS].” The disposition hearing minutes reflect that the court
“order[ed] DCFS to provide reasonable reunification services for
the father and children.”
¶25 	In 	its 	petition 	to 	terminate 	parental 	rights, 	the 	State
acknowledged that the court had ordered reunification services,
and in his reply, Father confirmed that DCFS was ordered to
provide reasonable reunification services. In fact, one of Father’s
defenses at trial rested on the fact that the court had ordered

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	13 	2017 UT App 154
reunification services but the State had not made reasonable
efforts to provide them. During trial, the State asked the court to
terminate services, and the court reiterated that it had “ordered
reunification 	services” 	and 	that 	they 	would 	continue. 	The
guardian ad litem also raised “grave concerns about whether the
State 	. 	. 	. 	met 	the 	first 	requirement 	of 	reasonable 	efforts”
concerning Father. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507(3)(a) (stating
that, except in specified circumstances, “in any case in which the
court has directed the division to provide reunification services
to 	a 	parent, 	the 	court 	must 	find 	that 	the 	division 	made
reasonable efforts to provide those services before the court may
terminate the parent’s rights”). Finally, the DCFS caseworker
assigned to Father’s case acknowledged that Father had the
benefit of reunification services. Each party involved in the
termination trial separately expressed the belief that services had
been ordered for Father, and the trial proceeded under that
assumption for two months.
¶26 	Furthermore, in the March Order, the court indicated that
there 	“have 	been 	discussions 	and 	confusion 	about 	whether
reunification services were ordered” for Father. But in reviewing
the transcripts, it seems the discussions and confusion were not
in regard to whether services had been ordered, but instead,
involved 	what 	services 	would 	be 	reasonable 	given 	Father’s
situation.
¶27 	The discussion surrounding services first arose when the
State requested a court ruling on whether “services were either
extended or whether the Court finds them appropriate.” The
State’s main contention was that Father should not be able to
request a service plan from DCFS where the twelve-month
statutory period for reunification services had already expired.6
6. An additional complication to this issue was the fact that the
permanency hearing had been combined with the termination
(continued…)

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	14 	2017 UT App 154
The guardian ad litem then directed the court’s attention to the
Disposition Order, noting the determination that services were
not reasonable while 	Father was incarcerated but could 	be
expedited once Father was released and stating, “So as we
address those questions of reasonable services, I think they
needed to be guided by . . . what the Court found and what the
Division [was] ordered to do . . . .” The court then noted the
Disposition Order stated that reunification services could be
expedited once Father was released from prison and reiterated
the State’s argument that it should not have to provide those
services because the statutory deadline for services had already
run. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-314(6). Finally, the court
ordered briefing on whether “reunification services should even
be offered to [Father]” and whether DCFS should “be working
on a service plan for [Father] at this point, given the findings of
fact and given the time frames that we’re dealing with[.]”
¶28 	The court noted that “at this point, no service plan has
ever been drafted, no services have ever been ordered; [the
Disposition Order] was an order that [was prospective]: When
[Father] gets out, expedite this.” But the main issue with which
the court seemed concerned was whether the State should have
to provide services considering the timing of Father’s release
from 	prison 	and 	the 	passing 	of 	the 	statutory 	deadline 	for
services.
(…continued)
trial. Thus, the court did not begin hearing evidence on whether
the State had made reasonable efforts to provide the parties with
services and whether services should be extended or terminated
until after the twelve-month deadline for services had already
expired. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-314(6) (LexisNexis Supp.
2016) (noting a court “may not extend reunification services
beyond 12 months after the day on which the minor was initially
removed from the minor’s home”).

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	15 	2017 UT App 154
¶29 	The State’s motion in response to the court’s request for
briefing was the first time any party had argued that services
had never been ordered for Father. Citing authority that was
issued after the disposition hearing, the State argued the court
“was not 	required 	to 	order reunification 	services to 	Father
because 	he 	was 	incarcerated” 	and 	claimed 	that 	the 	court
“correctly ordered no DCFS reunification services for him.” See
A.T. II, 2015 UT 41, 353 P.3d 131. The State concluded that
ordering services “at this point is inappropriate because the
twelve-month deadline for reunification services has passed.” In
contrast, the guardian ad litem’s motion argued that the court
“should clarify that [DCFS] is no longer required to provide
services 	to 	[Father].” 	(Emphasis 	added.) 	The 	March 	Order
followed 	the 	lead 	in 	the 	State’s 	briefing, 	and 	instead 	of
discussing 	what 	services 	were 	reasonable 	given 	the 	timing
concerns, it discussed only whether services had been originally
ordered by the court.
¶30 	The discussion that preceded the briefing and the briefing
itself demonstrate the court was trying to discern what services
should be offered to Father given the timing issues. There is an
important difference between (1) whether services were actually
ordered and (2) what services would be reasonable to offer
under the circumstances. The discussion revolved around the
latter 	issue, 	and 	the 	former 	issue—whether 	services 	were
originally ordered—was not raised until the State’s briefing was
submitted.
¶31 	Finally, it is troubling that the confusion surrounding
reunification services manifested itself only after it became clear
the State’s case was in jeopardy. During cross-examination of the
DCFS caseworker, Father’s counsel revealed that the State had
undertaken minimal effort to provide services to Father. Both the
court and the guardian ad litem expressed “grave concerns
about 	whether 	the 	State 	. 	. 	. 	met 	the 	first 	requirement 	of
reasonable efforts concerning [Father].” The court asked the

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	16 	2017 UT App 154
State directly, “So if I find the Division so far, based on the
information 	I 	have, 	has 	failed 	to 	make 	reasonable 	efforts
concerning [Father], what’s your position?,” which demonstrates
the court’s skepticism that the State had met its burden.
¶32 	Under Utah law, if a court orders the State to provide
reunification services, it must determine that the State made
reasonable 	efforts 	to 	provide 	those 	services 	before 	it 	can
terminate parental rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507(3)(a)
(LexisNexis 2012). Father’s defense was based on demonstrating
that even though services were ordered, the State did not make
reasonable efforts to provide them. Father’s counsel revealed the
minimal efforts the State had made in providing services and
exposed a potentially fatal weakness in the State’s case. It was
only after this weakness was revealed that the court interpreted
its order to mean that services had never been ordered for
Father.7
7. In the March Order, the juvenile court cited In re D.W., 2006
UT App 42U (per curiam), which states, “Because there is no
fundamental right to receive services, the decision to provide or
deny services is ‘in the judge’s discretion’ and ‘a judge may deny
services 	if 	for 	any 	reason 	he 	or 	she 	finds 	they 	are
inappropriate.’” Id. at para. 2 (quoting In re N.R., 967 P.2d 951,
955–56 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). The court relied on this language
for an alternative basis for denying reunification services. But,
although a judge has discretion to award reunification services,
once it orders such services, it must “determine whether the
services offered or provided by the division under the child and
family plan constitute ‘reasonable efforts’ on the part of the
division.” Utah Code 	Ann. § 78A-6-312(12)(a)(i) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2016); see also id. § 78A-6-507(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2012) (“[I]n
any case in which the court has directed the division to provide
reunification services to a parent, the court must find that the
division made reasonable efforts to provide those services before
(continued…)

In re A.R.
20160330-CA 	17 	2017 UT App 154
¶33 	Given the plain language of the Disposition Order and the
March Order, the authority the court relied on in the disposition
hearing, the discussion surrounding the March Order, and the
context of the matter in the entire trial, the juvenile court clearly
abused its discretion in interpreting the Disposition Order to
mean that reunification services had never been ordered for
Father. There is significant evidence that the court ordered at
least some services for Father after he was released from prison.
The juvenile court is granted great deference in interpreting its
own orders, but we are firmly convinced a mistake has been
made in this case. See Uintah Basin Med. Center v. Hardy, 2008 UT
15, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d 786; In re A.K., 2015 UT App 39, ¶ 15, 344 P.3d
1153. Though we conclude the court abused its discretion in
stating that no services were ordered, we do not comment on the
reasonableness of the services provided to Father.
CONCLUSION
¶34 	Because 	the 	juvenile 	court 	abused 	its 	discretion 	in
interpreting its prior order, we reverse and remand this case for
a new trial.
(…continued)
the court may terminate the parent’s rights.”). The court did not
make 	this 	necessary 	determination 	and 	could 	not 	have
terminated reunification services without it.