Stephens v. Stephens

2018 UT App 196
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DONOVAN T ODD S TEPHENS,
Appellee and Cross-appellant,
v.
BRIDGET NICOLE S TEPHENS,
Appellant and Cross-appellee.
Opinion
No. 20170440-CA
Filed October 12, 2018
Third District Court, West Jordan Department
The Honorable James D. Gardner
No. 104400395
Jennifer R. Jackson, Attorney for Appellant
and Cross-appellee
Angilee K. Dakic and Amy F. Hugie, Attorneys for
Appellee and Cross-appellant
JUDGE K ATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. O RME and M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN
F ORSTER concurred.
TOOMEY, Judge:
Bridget 	Nicole 	Stephens (Mother) 	appeals the 	district	¶1
court’s judgment on a petition to modify a decree of divorce, and
Donovan 	Todd 	Stephens 	(Father) 	cross-appeals 	the 	same
judgment. Mother argues that the district court erred when it
awarded Father sole physical custody of the parties’ minor child
(Child), 	asserting 	the 	modified 	decree 	met 	the 	statutory
requirements for joint physical custody. Mother further argues
the 	court 	erred 	when 	it 	calculated 	Mother’s 	child 	support
obligation on the award of sole physical custody to Father,
asserting it should have used a joint physical custody worksheet.
Father cross-appeals, asserting the district court erred when it

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denied his requested relief for parent-time modification. We
affirm with respect to the sole physical custody designation and
the child support award. But we reverse and remand for the
district court to make additional findings with respect to the
parent-time award and, after doing so, to adjust its order as
necessary.
BACKGROUND
Father and Mother divorced in 2011. The parties were	¶2
awarded joint legal custody of Child, but Father was awarded
sole physical custody subject to Mother’s liberal parent-time.
Under the parent-time arrangement, Child stayed overnight
with Mother for more than thirty percent of the year. Because
Mother 	was unemployed, 	her 	child 	support obligation 	was
calculated based on an imputed minimum wage.
Four years later, Father filed a petition to modify the	¶3
divorce decree, asserting that a substantial and material change
of circumstances supported a reduction in Mother’s parent-time
and an increase of Mother’s child support obligation. As to
parent-time, 	Father 	claimed 	Mother 	had 	abused 	Child. 	The
abuse allegation was based primarily on a supported finding of
child abuse by the Utah Division of Child and Family Services
(the DCFS Finding). With regard to the child support issue,
Father claimed Mother had returned to work and asked for a
modification based on her new income.
Mother 	answered 	the 	petition, 	denying 	the 	abuse	¶4
allegation. Mother also filed a counter-petition to modify, asking
for an award of joint physical custody that designated her as
primary custodian. Mother’s counter-petition alleged Father did
not communicate with her about Child, Father “failed to work
with [Child]” regarding Child’s learning difficulties, and that she
was “concerned about [Child’s] nutrition and hygiene while in
[Father’s] custody.” Mother acknowledged her new employment

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and asked that child support be modified “based on the parties’
current income and the parent-time ordered, in compliance with
[Utah’s] child support guidelines.”
Based on the DCFS Finding, the district court entered a	¶5
temporary 	order, 	greatly 	reducing 	Mother’s 	parent-time,
terminating 	her 	overnight 	parent-time, 	and 	requiring
supervision during all visits. The district court also appointed a
private guardian ad litem (the GAL) to represent Child’s best
interest. The GAL was to make recommendations regarding the
alleged abuse and whether Mother’s parent-time should be
supervised.
The GAL interviewed Child, who reported “substantial	¶6
communication issues” with Mother, as well as physical and
emotional abuse. For example, Mother called Child “fat” and
“stupid,” 	causing 	Child 	“distress 	and 	problems 	with 	her
self-image.” Mother also “required” Child to call her every day,
and if Child missed a call, Mother became angry with her. In
addition, Child described witnessing episodes of violence by
Mother directed toward one of Mother’s other children and
Child’s step-father.
Child also detailed the incident that gave rise to the DCFS	¶7
Finding. According to Child, Mother was upset because Child
had not called her the previous night. Mother asked Child “what
goes on in her head,” while forcefully and repeatedly jabbing
and poking Child’s face, then hit Child’s leg with a fist. Child
ultimately told the GAL she was “terrified of [Mother]” and
would fear for her safety sleeping at Mother’s house if the
overnights resumed. Child feared Mother would “speak to her
inappropriately, hit her, or lash out at her in other ways.”
The 	GAL 	next 	interviewed 	Mother 	and was “openly	¶8
shocked” at the way Mother communicated about Child. The
GAL noted it was easy to understand why Child thought Mother

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called her “fat” or “dumb,” “despite different verbiage or use of
words.”
The GAL also interviewed Child’s personal therapist. The	¶9
personal therapist began treating Child for anxiety at school, but
the 	treatment 	evolved 	to 	include 	Child’s 	relationship 	with
Mother 	and 	a 	potential 	diagnosis 	of 	post-traumatic 	stress
disorder resulting from the incident that gave rise to the DCFS
Finding. 	The 	personal 	therapist 	concluded 	that 	Mother’s
damaging comments and the domestic violence toward Child
had created Child’s anxiety and caused her relationship with
Mother to become “toxic.” Child constantly worried about their
interactions because at “any moment [Mother] could go off.”
Based on the investigation, the GAL recommended the	¶10
court adopt a provisional “step-up” parenting plan. That plan
eventually eliminated supervision during Mother’s visits, and
allowed Mother a path to regain the parent-time awarded in the
original divorce decree. The plan gradually increased Mother’s
visits each week, with a return to parent-time as established in
the original decree after a successful six-week period. The GAL
recommended continued therapy for Mother and Child as well
as feedback from the therapists as the process moved forward.
Also, 	the 	plan 	made 	returning 	to 	the 	original 	parent-time
schedule contingent on Mother refraining from further abusive
behavior. If Mother engaged in additional incidents of violence
or 	abuse 	directed 	at 	Child, 	the 	step-up 	plan 	would 	cease
immediately and Mother’s parent-time would return to what it
was under the temporary order.
The district court also received evidence at trial. Father	¶11
detailed his understanding of the incident giving rise to the
DCFS Finding and testified to Mother’s other violent outbursts.
Father also testified that Child smoked marijuana during a
supervised visit at Mother’s house. Ultimately, Father asked the
court to adopt an extended step-up plan that would allow

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20170440-CA 	5 	2018 UT App 196
Mother overnight parent-time only after six months and cap
Mother’s potential parent-time at the statutory minimum under
Utah Code section 30-3-35.
Mother 	also 	testified, 	denying 	Child’s 	version 	of 	the	¶12
incident giving rise to the DCFS Finding. Mother admitted
“tapping” Child on the head, but she disputed the number of
taps, and denied hitting Child’s leg. In addition, Mother denied
that 	Child 	smoked 	marijuana 	at 	Mother’s 	house. 	Mother
ultimately asked the court to award joint physical custody,
identifying her as primary custodian.
The court also considered “affidavit-style answers” to the	¶13
parties’ questions submitted by the Child’s personal therapist
and Mother and Child’s reunification therapist. The personal
therapist reported Child’s symptoms of post-traumatic stress
disorder 	and 	recommended 	continued 	personal 	and
reunification therapy to increase Child’s “feelings of safety in the
presence of [M]other.” The personal therapist said she felt a
step-up 	plan 	was 	appropriate, 	but 	she 	believed 	Child 	and
Mother needed more than six weeks for reunification therapy
before the plan was set in place. The personal therapist also
recommended a “safety plan” to assist Child in the eventual
transition back to increased, overnight parent-time with Mother,
and to reduce the risk of physical violence that Child felt was
“high as changes in [parent-time] [were] being addressed.” That
safety plan included (1) allowing Child to have her phone with
her at all times when she is with Mother, (2) allowing Child to
state “I feel unsafe right now” and go to a secluded area for at
least half an hour of alone time, and (3) requiring a lock on
Child’s bedroom door at Mother’s house that Child could lock
before going to sleep.
The 	reunification 	therapist 	explained, 	“[Child] 	and	¶14
[Mother] have been able to do some repair in their relationship,
but it is both mine and [Child’s] opinion that the work isn’t

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completed 	and 	family 	therapy 	should 	continue.” 	The
reunification therapist said Child was still working to develop
“some power in the relationship between her and [Mother]” and
that 	“it 	is 	going 	to 	likely 	require 	a 	combination 	of 	more
counseling (both individual and family) and getting older and
more mature.” The reunification therapist said she believed the
six-week step-up plan was “appropriate because it gives [Child]
a chance to . . . get used [to] the changes gradually.”
After considering the evidence, the district court entered	¶15
an order supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law.
First, 	the 	district 	court 	found 	Mother’s 	abuse 	of 	Child
constituted a significant and material change in circumstances
warranting modification of parent-time. The findings stated that
the abuse was “well documented,” citing the DCFS Finding,
Child’s confirmation of that finding, and Father’s testimony
regarding the incident. The district court also found Mother had
made other “violent outbursts in the presence of or directed at”
Child, and that Child used marijuana at Mother’s house during a
supervised visit. The court concluded Child was suffering from
post-traumatic stress disorder, and her relationship with Mother
had become strained.
Despite the findings of abuse, the district court found the	¶16
relationship between Mother and Child had improved through
temporary parent-time restrictions and counseling. As such, the
district court concluded it remained in Child’s best interest that
the original custody order remain in place—that Father retain
sole physical custody and Mother have parent-time as set forth
in the original decree—subject to a “step-up” plan.
The district court granted, in part, Father’s petition to	¶17
modify. First, it ordered the immediate adoption of the six-week
step-up plan (without supervision), and the “safety plan,” as
recommended by Child’s personal therapist. To support that
modification, the court relied on the declarations of both the

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personal therapist and the reunification therapist “that a step-up
and reunification plan [were] in the best interest of [Child].”
Additionally, 	the 	district 	court 	ordered 	that 	Child 	continue
personal 	therapy, 	and 	that 	Mother 	and 	Child 	continue
reunification 	therapy 	until 	the 	reunification 	therapist
determined, 	“with 	input 	from 	[Child],” 	it 	was 	no 	longer
necessary. The court also conditioned the return to the original
parent-time 	arrangement, 	noting 	that 	if 	Mother 	engaged 	in
additional episodes or incidents of violence or physical abuse
against Child, the step-up plan would cease immediately and
supervised visits would be restored in accordance with the terms
of the temporary orders.
The 	court 	also 	modified 	the 	parties’ 	child 	support	¶18
obligations to an amount consistent with Mother’s new income,
noting 	that 	“[b]oth 	parties 	acknowledged 	that 	there 	was 	a
material 	change 	in 	circumstances 	related 	to 	[Mother’s]
employment status and this was not a contested issue in this
case.” It made the calculation based on the sole physical custody
calculation in Utah Code section 78B-12-205.
Mother appeals and Father cross-appeals.	¶19
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Mother contends the district court erred in two respects.	¶20
She argues it should not have granted sole physical custody to
Father, asserting the modified order satisfies Utah’s statutory
definition of joint physical custody. Next, Mother contends the
court erred by not using a joint physical custody child support
worksheet 	to 	calculate 	her 	obligation. 	“A 	[district] 	court’s
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review for
correctness.” Spall-Goldsmith v. Goldsmith IV, 2012 UT App 302,
¶ 6, 288 P.3d 1105 (quotation simplified). Otherwise, this court
reviews the district court’s decision whether to modify a custody

Stephens v. Stephens
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award and an award of child support for an abuse of discretion.
Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985).
Father cross-appeals, contending the district court erred	¶21
in failing to modify the parent-time order and award Mother
only 	the 	statutory 	minimum 	amount 	of 	parent-time, 	as
requested in his petition to modify. He argues “the [district]
court’s 	findings 	supporting 	denial 	of 	[Father’s 	requested]
parent-time modification are not clear and are contrary to the
evidence.” 	This 	court 	reviews 	a 	district 	court’s 	parent-time
determination 	for 	abuse 	of 	discretion. 	See 	Trubetzkoy 	v.
Trubetzkoy, 2009 UT App 77, ¶ 7, 205 P.3d 891.
ANALYSIS
I. Custody Designation
Mother argues the district court erred by awarding Father	¶22
sole physical custody. We disagree. Mother failed to show a
substantial and material change in circumstances justifying a
change to the custody designation. Thus, the original custody
order appropriately remained unchanged in that regard.
Under Utah law, there is “neither a preference nor a	¶23
presumption 	for 	or 	against 	joint 	physical 	custody 	or 	sole
physical custody.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(5) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2017). Instead, “the court and the family [have] the widest
discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of
the child.” Id. Joint physical custody “means the child stays with
each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year, and both
parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to
paying child support,” id. § 30-3-10.1(3)(a), in appropriate cases.
Once 	the 	district 	court 	makes 	an 	initial 	custody	¶24
determination, it “has continuing jurisdiction . . . and may later
make such changes in custody provisions as it determines are

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reasonable and necessary for the welfare and best interests of
the 	child.” 	Hogge 	v. 	Hogge, 	649 	P.2d 	51, 	53 	(Utah 	1982)
(quotation 	simplified). 	But 	before 	the 	district 	court 	may
modify custody, the moving party must first show changed
circumstances that warrant reconsideration of the issue. See
id. Once the district court finds such changed circumstances,
it considers the best interest of the child to decide “the manner
in 	which custody should be modified, 	if 	at all.” See id. A
district court “is given broad discretion” in deciding whether
to modify custody, and “its decision will not be disturbed
absent 	a 	showing 	of 	an 	abuse 	of 	discretion 	or 	manifest
injustice.” Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Here, the district court awarded Father sole physical	¶25
custody in the original divorce decree. In Mother’s counter-
petition, she asked the district court to change that designation
to joint physical custody and award her primary custody. But
the court denied Mother’s request, finding that Mother had not
met her burden. Although the court noted “that [Father] has not
shared all important information with [Mother] in a timely
manner,” and that “both parties testified that [Child] struggles
with schooling,” the court found there was insufficient “credible
evidence that changing parent-time or custody as requested by
[Mother] would resolve these struggles—particularly given the
abuse findings.”
The 	district 	court 	did 	not 	abuse 	its 	discretion	¶26
when 	it 	denied 	Mother’s 	request 	to 	modify 	the 	custody
designation. Father’s actions, and the lack of communication
between 	Mother 	and 	Father, 	do 	not 	“indicate 	that 	the
custodial 	circumstances 	of 	[Child] 	or 	the 	parenting
capabilities of [Father]” have been affected. See Becker v. Becker,
694 P.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1984). Thus, the court acted within
its 	discretion 	in 	denying 	Mother’s 	counter-petition 	to
modify custody.

Stephens v. Stephens
20170440-CA 	10 	2018 UT App 196
Further, the parent-time modifications the court made did	¶27
not require an alteration of the physical custody designation.
The district court granted, in part, Father’s petition to modify
parent-time. First, it implemented the temporary order, greatly
limiting Mother’s parent-time. Next, the court ordered the step-
up plan, allowing Mother to regain the parent-time she was
awarded in the original divorce decree so long as she satisfied
the plan’s conditions. Those modifications, however, did not
necessarily affect the award of custody as designated in the
original divorce decree. The court specifically found the custody
arrangement 	as entered 	in 	the 	original 	decree 	remained 	in
Child’s best interest and would remain in place. Because Mother
did 	not 	establish 	a 	change 	in 	circumstances 	warranting
reconsideration 	of 	the 	issue, 	the 	original 	order 	remained
unchanged regarding Father’s sole physical custody designation
and the court was not required to modify the physical custody
designation.1
II. Child Support
Mother next argues the district court failed to comply	¶28
with Utah’s statutory child support guidelines when it used a
sole physical custody worksheet to calculate her child support
obligation. We disagree. Because the step-up parenting plan
1. Much of Mother’s argument centers on her assertion that
Child currently stays overnight with Mother for more than thirty
percent of the year as required for joint physical custody under
Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1(3)(a) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2017). But, as we discuss infra ¶ 30, Mother’s parent-time
under the district court’s order was contingent on successful
completion of the step-up plan. Any remedy Mother may have
with respect to the physical custody designation following her
successful completion of the step-up plan lies with the district
court.

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20170440-CA 	11 	2018 UT App 196
allowed Mother the time required for joint physical custody only
after six weeks, contingent on Mother’s actions, the modified
parent-time order did not meet the requirements for a joint
physical custody child support calculation.
Under 	the 	Utah 	Child 	Support 	Act, 	child 	support	¶29
obligations are generally calculated using a worksheet in cases of
joint physical custody. See Spall-Goldsmith v. Goldsmith IV, 2012
UT App 302, ¶ 8, 288 P.3d 1105; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
12-208 (LexisNexis 2012). Moreover, for purposes of calculating
child support, the designation of “joint physical custody” or
“sole physical custody” is not as important as whether the
custody arrangement “exceed[s] the [statutory] threshold for
joint physical custody.” See Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097, 1100
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that the district court erred
when it used a sole custody child support worksheet when
“[a]lthough labeled ‘sole custody,’ the [district] court awarded
[the father] [parent-time] that exceeded the [statutory] threshold
for joint physical custody”). In Utah, a custody plan meets the
requirements for joint physical custody when “the child stays
with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year, and
both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition
to paying child support.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-102(15)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2018). When those requirements are met, a
court 	must 	“use 	a 	joint 	[physical] 	custody 	child 	support
worksheet . . . [or] make findings supporting its deviation.”
Spall-Goldsmith, 2012 UT App 302, ¶ 8 (quotation simplified).
Here, the district court modified child support and was	¶30
thus required to make the modification consistent with the Utah
Child Support Act. The parties agree that the modified divorce
decree awarded Mother a path to obtain overnight parent-time
with Child for more than thirty percent of the year. But under
the modified decree, Mother could not achieve such parent-time
until after successfully completing the six-week step-up plan.
Further, Mother’s increased parent-time was conditioned on her

Stephens v. Stephens
20170440-CA 	12 	2018 UT App 196
refraining from engaging in further abusive behavior toward
Child. Thus, at the time the court entered the order, Mother was
not entitled to overnight parent-time with Child for more than
thirty percent of the year. Accordingly, the modified decree did
not meet the requirements for joint physical custody under Utah
Code section 78B-12-102(15), and the district court was not
required to use a joint physical custody worksheet to calculate
Mother’s child support obligation.
III. Parent-Time
Father argues the district court erred in denying his	¶31
requested relief for parent-time modification. He contends “the
district court’s findings supporting denial of [his requested]
parent-time modification are not clear and are contrary to the
evidence.” We agree that the court’s findings in support of the
parent-time modification were not sufficiently detailed to inform
the parties of the court’s reasoning or facilitate meaningful
appellate 	review. 	See 	Lay 	v. 	Lay, 	2018 	UT 	App 	137, 	¶ 	28
(concluding that “the district court’s findings were inadequate to
disclose 	the 	steps 	by 	which 	the 	court 	reached 	its 	ultimate
conclusion” regarding modification of a parent-time agreement).
“[District] courts have continuing jurisdiction to consider	¶32
motions 	to 	modify 	dealing 	with 	child 	custody 	and
[parent-time],” Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 1980), and
to make such modifications “as [they] determine[] are reasonable
and necessary for the welfare or best interests of the child,”
Hogge 	v. 	Hogge, 	649 	P.2d 	51, 	53 	(Utah 	1982) 	(quotation
simplified); see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (LexisNexis
Supp. 	2017) 	(recognizing 	the 	district 	court’s 	continuing
jurisdiction 	over 	child 	custody 	and 	child 	maintenance
determinations).
The district court’s decision to modify a decree of parent-	¶33
time “must involve two separate steps.” Hogge, 649 P.2d at 54.
First, the court must find that the petitioner has made “some

Stephens v. Stephens
20170440-CA 	13 	2018 UT App 196
showing of change in circumstances” that would support a
modification of parent-time. Jones v. Jones, 2016 UT App 94, ¶ 10,
374 P.3d 45; see id. (explaining that the showing of a change in
circumstance 	when 	a 	district 	court 	alters 	parent-time
arrangements “does not rise to the same level as the substantial
and material showing required when a district court alters
custody”). Second, the court “must consider the changes in
circumstance 	along 	with 	all 	other 	evidence 	relevant 	to 	the
welfare or best interests of the child . . . [to] determine de novo
which 	custody 	arrangement 	will 	serve 	the 	welfare 	or 	best
interest of the child, and modify, or refuse to modify, the decree
accordingly.” Hogge, 649 P.2d at 54.
“[T]he [district] court’s proximity to the evidence places it	¶34
in a better position than an appellate court to choose the best
custody arrangement.” Trubetzkoy v. Trubetzkoy, 2009 UT App 77,
¶ 6, 205 P.3d 891. Thus, we generally “will not disturb the
[district] court’s [parent-time] determination absent a showing
that 	the 	[district] 	court 	has 	abused 	its 	discretion.” 	Id. 	¶ 	7
(quotation simplified).
Although the district court’s discretion is broad, that	¶35
discretion “must be exercised within the confines of the legal
standards set by the appellate courts.” Schindler v. Schindler, 776
P.2d 84, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In addition, the “facts and
reasons for the court’s decision must be set forth in appropriate
findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Id. “The district court’s
factual 	findings 	are 	adequate 	only 	if 	they 	are 	sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached.” Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 19 (quotation simplified).
Without sufficient detail and clarity, appellate courts cannot
“ensure that the district court’s discretionary determination was
rationally based,” Fish v. Fish, 2016 UT App 125, ¶ 22, 379 P.3d
882, and ensure that “the parties are informed of the district

Stephens v. Stephens
20170440-CA 	14 	2018 UT App 196
court’s reasoning,” Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 19 (quotation
simplified).
Here, 	the 	district 	court 	found 	Father 	had 	shown 	“a	¶36
significant 	change 	in 	circumstances 	that 	warrant[ed] 	a
modification of parent-time . . . based on the . . . finding of child
abuse 	of 	[Child] 	by 	[Mother].” 	The 	court’s 	finding 	was
supported with detailed, subsidiary findings of fact, including
that the DCFS Finding was credible, well-documented, and
confirmed by Child.2 In addition, the district court found Mother
made “multiple violent outbursts in the presence of or directed
at Child,” and Child used marijuana at Mother’s house during a
supervised visit. “[B]ased on [Mother’s] abusive behavior,” the
district 	court 	found 	“that 	[Child] 	is 	suffering 	from 	post-
traumatic stress disorder . . . and that [Child’s] relationship with
[Mother] is strained.”
The district court then began the second step to determine	¶37
which 	parent-time 	arrangement 	would 	serve 	Child’s 	best
interest. To that end, the court modified parent-time by ordering
2. We note that Mother appealed the DCFS Finding during this
appeal, and we were informed by Mother’s counsel that it was
changed from “supported” to “unsupported.” An unsupported
finding means “there is insufficient evidence to conclude that
abuse 	. 	. 	. 	occurred.” 	Utah 	Code 	Ann. 	§ 	62A-4a-101(45)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2018). But an unsupported finding does not
mean “that [DCFS] . . . conclude[d] that the allegation was
without merit.” Id. “Without merit” is a separate designation
that means DCFS determined “the alleged abuse . . . did not
occur.” Id. § 62A-4a-101(46). On remand, “the decision whether
to take additional evidence” regarding the parent-time order “is
within the sound discretion of the [district] court.” Interiors
Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d 929,
931 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quotation simplified).

Stephens v. Stephens
20170440-CA 	15 	2018 UT App 196
the immediate adoption of the six-week step-up plan. But the
court found that it remained in Child’s best interest that Mother
retain parent-time as set forth in the original decree, following
successful completion of the step-up plan.
We are unable to properly review the district court’s	¶38
parent-time 	modification 	because 	its 	findings 	regarding
parent-time did not contain sufficient detail to explain the “steps
by which the ultimate conclusion” was reached. See Lay, 2018 UT
App 137, ¶ 19 (quotation simplified). The only findings to
support 	a 	return 	to 	Mother’s 	original 	parent-time 	after
completion 	of 	the 	six-week 	step-up 	plan 	were 	that 	the
relationship between Mother and Child had “improved through
counseling and due to the restrictions that [had] been in place
since the temporary orders were entered,” and that the court
“found credible” the therapists’ opinions “that a step-up and
reunification plan are in the best interest of [Child].”
As to the therapists’ opinions, the district court’s finding	¶39
was that the therapists supported “a” step-up plan, not “the”
step-up 	plan. 	As 	Father 	notes, 	Child’s 	personal 	therapist
recommended 	a 	longer 	period 	for 	reunification 	and 	a
“step-down” schedule, basing that recommendation on the lack
of progress Child felt had taken place in therapy. The court did
not 	explain 	why 	it 	deemed 	the 	reunification 	therapist’s
recommendation 	of 	a 	six-week 	step-up 	plan 	was 	more
appropriate than the the personal therapist’s recommendation
regarding 	a 	longer 	period 	of 	time 	for 	further 	reunification
therapy before Mother regained her parent-time. The court may
have reached that conclusion because it found the reunification
therapist’s 	testimony 	more 	credible 	than 	Child’s 	personal
therapist’s testimony. But the court “did not provide any such
explanation.” See id. ¶ 28.
Further, compelling evidence in the record supports a	¶40
contrary conclusion regarding Mother and Child’s relationship.

Stephens v. Stephens
20170440-CA 	16 	2018 UT App 196
Child stated she was “‘afraid’ of [Mother], and [did] not feel
[Mother] [had] the capacity to change or learn anything from
therapy.” Through the GAL, Child told the district court she
would be “in fear for her safety” if she slept at Mother’s house.
Child’s personal therapist reported that the relationship	¶41
between Mother and Child had not improved. At the time of the
personal therapist’s recommendation, Mother and Child had
completed 	only 	two 	months 	of 	reunification 	therapy 	and
attended only eight sessions. Indeed, the record indicates that
both therapists and the GAL expressed concerns about the
uncertain results of the reunification therapy. Those concerns are
highlighted by several statements, including “there hasn’t been
progress,” “the work isn’t complete,” and “[I] am concerned by
the actions of [Mother] and the effect of her actions on [Child].”
“A [district] court’s failure to provide adequate findings is	¶42
reversible error when the facts are not clear from the record.”
Bartlett v. Bartlett, 2015 UT App 2, ¶ 2, 342 P.3d 296 (quotation
simplified). That is the case here. The district court’s findings of
fact do not “show that the court’s judgment . . . follows logically
from, 	and 	is 	supported 	by, 	the 	evidence.” 	Id. 	(quotation
simplified). Given the court’s finding of “significant change
warranting modification of parent-time,” it was required to state
adequate findings to ensure there was a rational basis to support
its decision to allow Mother to return to her extended, overnight
parent-time after just six weeks. See Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 19.
The district court’s findings are therefore insufficient.
We agree with Father’s argument that “jump[ing] from	¶43
establishing 	that 	there 	has 	been 	a 	significant 	change 	of
circumstances that warrants modification, to then stating that . . .
the relationship between [Mother] and [Child] [had] improved
through 	counseling” 	renders 	the 	conclusion 	regarding
parent-time “not entirely clear.” Considering the court’s findings
of abuse, and the conflicting evidence regarding the appropriate

Stephens v. Stephens
20170440-CA 	17 	2018 UT App 196
restrictions and conditions to Mother’s parent-time, it is not
“reasonable 	to 	assume 	that 	the 	[district] 	court 	actually
considered the controverted evidence and necessarily made a
finding to resolve the controversy, but simply failed to record
the factual determination it made.” Fish v. Fish, 2016 UT App
125, ¶ 22, 379 P.3d 882 (quotation simplified); see also Hall v. Hall,
858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (determining that
“missing findings can be viewed as harmless error” where “the
undisputed evidence clearly establishes the factor or factors on
which findings are missing,” or where “the absent findings can
reasonably be implied” (quotation simplified)).
In sum, the district court’s findings were “inadequate to	¶44
disclose 	the 	steps 	by 	which 	the 	court 	reached 	its 	ultimate
conclusion” 	that 	Mother’s 	relationship 	with 	Child 	had
improved, making the six-week step-up plan in Child’s best
interest. See Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 28. We thus remand to the
district 	court 	to 	make 	additional 	findings 	with 	respect 	to
whether the modified parent-time plan is in Child’s best interest
and to adjust its order as may be appropriate, given those
findings.
CONCLUSION
We conclude the district court did not err in awarding	¶45
sole physical custody to Father. We also conclude it did not err
in using a sole physical custody worksheet to calculate Mother’s
child support obligation. But we conclude the district court did
not 	provide 	adequate 	findings 	to 	support 	its 	ultimate
parent-time award and therefore remand to the district court to
make additional findings with respect to whether the modified
parent-time plan is in Child’s best interest. The court may, in its
discretion, allow additional evidence with regard to parent-time.
And with the additional findings made, the court shall adjust its
order as may be appropriate.