State v. Molina

2024 UT App 172
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellant,
v.
JESUS M OLINA,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20220853-CA
Filed November 21, 2024
Thid District Court, West Jordan Department
The Honorable Chelsea Koch
No. 171404311
Sean D. Reyes, Christopher A. Bates, and Andrew F.
Peterson, Attorneys for Appellant
Andrea J. Garland, E. Rich Hawkes, and Justin F.
Knell, Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES JOHN D. LUTHY and A MY J. O LIVER concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	The State of Utah offered Jesus Molina a plea deal: in
exchange for his plea of guilty to a reduced charge of felony
manslaughter, the State would affirmatively recommend that the
district court sentence him to serve an additional year in jail and
then place him on probation. But before Molina entered his guilty
plea, the State rescinded its offer. Molina sought to enforce the
plea 	agreement, 	and 	the 	district 	court 	ordered 	specific
performance of the plea deal after determining that Molina had
detrimentally relied on the State’s promise.
¶2 	The State petitioned for interlocutory review of the district
court’s order. We determine the court erred in finding that Molina

State v. Molina
20220853-CA 	2 	2024 UT App 172
detrimentally relied on the State’s offer. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand the case for further proceedings on the charges.
BACKGROUND1
¶3 	On Halloween night in 2017, Molina, Dominic,2 and several
other people were “driving around . . . to look for a party.” Later
that night, as they were dropping off Dominic, “an argument . . .
broke out” between Molina and Dominic. The argument escalated
into a fight, and Dominic “fell to the ground” and died from a
“[g]unshot wound to the chest.” After the fight, Molina fled to
Mexico but was later arrested.
¶4 	In December 2017, the State charged Molina with one count
of 	murder. 	The 	case 	suffered 	numerous 	delays 	due 	to
“continuances requested by one or both parties, as well as
additional delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.” In June
2021, 	Molina 	requested 	a 	pretrial 	justification 	hearing, 	as
authorized by Utah Code section 76-2-309.3 After the justification
1. Because this case comes to us on interlocutory appeal and there
has not yet been a trial, we recite the alleged facts from relevant
case documents. Molina retains the presumption of innocence
that attaches prior to conviction.
2. A pseudonym.
3. “The recently enacted pretrial justification statute . . . allows for
a district court to assess claims of self-defense at an earlier stage
in 	a 	criminal 	case. 	The 	statute 	provides 	that 	if 	a 	criminal
defendant files a motion requesting a pretrial justification hearing,
then the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant was
justified in the use or threatened use of force. At the evidentiary
hearing, the defendant must first make a prima facie claim of
(continued…)

State v. Molina
20220853-CA 	3 	2024 UT App 172
hearing had been rescheduled twice—once on the State’s motion
and once to accommodate the district court’s calendar—the State
agreed that if Molina pleaded guilty to second-degree felony
manslaughter, it would recommend that Molina serve only one
additional year in jail before being released on probation. Molina
agreed to the plea offer.
¶5 	At a telephone conference held on the Friday before the
Monday morning on which the justification hearing was to begin,
the State and Molina informed the district court they had reached
a tentative plea agreement and presented the agreement to the
court for advanced approval under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.4 After the agreement was presented, the
prosecutor expressed to the court that “the likelihood of the State
surviving the justification hearing [was] low enough” that the
proposed agreement was “the appropriate resolution.” The court
justification. If the court determines the defendant has made a
prima facie claim, then the State has the burden to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant’s use or threatened
use of force was not justified. If the State meets this burden, the
defendant’s 	motion 	is 	denied, 	the 	case 	proceeds, 	and 	the
defendant may raise the issue of justification to the jury at trial.
But if the State fails to meet its burden, the district court must
dismiss the relevant charges against the defendant.” State v. Clara,
2024 UT 10, ¶ 9, 546 P.3d 963 (quotation simplified).
4. Rule 11(i)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states,
When a tentative plea agreement has been reached,
the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit
the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the
reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of
the 	plea. 	The 	judge 	may 	then 	indicate 	to 	the
prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether
the proposed disposition will be approved.

State v. Molina
20220853-CA 	4 	2024 UT App 172
indicated that the proposed disposition was acceptable and set the
plea hearing for Monday morning.
¶6 	Later 	that 	evening, 	however, 	at 	the 	direction 	of 	his
supervisors, the prosecutor informed Molina that the State was
withdrawing its offer because the supervisors had told the
prosecutor that he did not have the authorization to make the
contemplated 	sentencing 	recommendation. 	The 	prosecutor
advised Molina that he could still plead guilty to manslaughter
but 	that 	the 	State 	would 	seek 	a 	presentence 	report 	and
affirmatively recommend that the court sentence Molina based on
that report.
¶7 	When the parties appeared before the district court on
Monday morning, Molina moved the court to order enforcement
of the plea deal because he had “substantially relied on [the]
agreement already.” He informed the court that after he “entered
the 	agreement 	on 	Friday” 	he 	“called 	off” 	his 	justification
witnesses. He argued that under State v. Francis, 2017 UT 49, 424
P.3d 	156—wherein 	the 	supreme 	court 	laid 	out 	the 	legal
framework 	for 	determining 	whether 	a 	defendant 	has
detrimentally relied on a withdrawn plea agreement—he had
detrimentally 	relied 	on 	the 	State’s 	promise 	by 	presenting
“otherwise privileged plea negotiations to the judge,” signaling
his willingness to plead guilty, and diluting his right to a speedy
trial by calling off his witnesses. Regarding the last point, he
explained that due to the age of the case and the number of times
the witnesses had already been subpoenaed, it would be “very
difficult to get [his] witnesses back on board” and that he would
not be able to move forward with the justification hearing that
week. The State opposed Molina’s motion.
¶8 	After 	considering 	the 	parties’ 	arguments, 	including
briefing the parties prepared at the court’s request, the district
court granted Molina’s motion. The court concluded that while no
one factor alone established that Molina had detrimentally relied
on the plea agreement, “the cumulative effect of all of the factors”

State v. Molina
20220853-CA 	5 	2024 UT App 172
did. These factors included that (1) Molina’s “decision to accept
the plea agreement caused him to admit to facts on the record,”
(2) Molina had “forfeit[ed] his justification hearing for another six
months,” 	and 	(3) 	Molina 	had 	“risked 	his 	ability 	to 	secure
witnesses” for a future hearing.
¶9 	In assessing these factors, the district court found that in an
attempt 	to 	persuade 	the 	court 	to 	accept 	and 	enforce 	the
agreement, Molina had admitted on the record that he was willing
“to plead guilty to manslaughter and serve an additional year in
jail,” which was “detrimental” to Molina and “would never have
been placed on the record prior to a justification hearing had he
not anticipated a plea.” The court found that this admission was
“even more significant” to its analysis given the State’s concession
made at the rule 11 conference “that it was unlikely to prevail at
the justification hearing.”
¶10 	The 	district 	court 	also 	found 	that 	by 	calling 	off 	his
witnesses, Molina “likely [knew] that he would have to wait
another lengthy period of time for another justification hearing”
and that the court’s busy calendar could not accommodate a new
hearing “for almost six additional months.” Further, both parties
had already “experienced difficulty in securing the appearance of
the 	witnesses 	given 	the 	number 	of 	times 	they 	had 	been
subpoenaed and the age of the case.”
¶11 	The State filed a petition for interlocutory review, which
we granted.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶12 	The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court
correctly determined that Molina detrimentally relied on the plea
agreement offered by the State. “The enforceability of a plea

State v. Molina
20220853-CA 	6 	2024 UT App 172
agreement presents a question of law we review for correctness.”
State v. Francis, 2017 UT 49, ¶ 8, 424 P.3d 156.5
5. Molina does not dispute that the district court’s ultimate
decision to enforce the plea agreement is a question of law that we
review 	for 	correctness. 	However, 	he 	contends 	the 	court’s
subsidiary determination that he detrimentally relied on the
agreement is entitled to deference. To that end, Molina devotes a
significant portion of his appellate brief explaining the framework
our supreme court has adopted for analyzing differing standards
of appellate review, see, e.g., Randolph v. State, 2022 UT 34, ¶¶ 17–
26, 515 P.3d 444, and he argues that under this framework, the
court’s findings regarding detrimental reliance are findings of fact
that should be reviewed for clear error. He further argues that to
the extent the court’s detrimental reliance determination involves
a mixed question, it is fact-like and must be accorded deference.
Molina’s argument is unavailing on both fronts.
First, a determination that a defendant detrimentally relied
on 	a 	plea 	agreement 	necessarily 	means 	the 	agreement 	is
enforceable. See State v. Francis, 2017 UT 49, ¶ 14, 424 P.3d 156.
Thus, applying a different, more deferential standard of review to
the detrimental reliance inquiry would effectively transform the
standard of review for the enforceability inquiry into a more
deferential standard as well. And this would directly conflict with
the correctness standard of review that Molina agrees applies
when evaluating the enforceability of a plea agreement.
Second, the question of whether a defendant detrimentally
relied on a withdrawn plea agreement is a law-like mixed
question. To determine whether a mixed question should be
deemed law-like or fact-like, we apply a “balancing test” that
involves the consideration of three factors: “(1) the degree of
variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be
applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court’s application of the
legal rule relies on facts observed by the trial judge, such as a
witness’s appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application
(continued…)

State v. Molina
20220853-CA 	7 	2024 UT App 172
ANALYSIS
¶13 	“[A] defendant does not have a constitutional right to a
plea agreement,” but once an agreement has been reached, the
parties must adhere to certain conduct. State v. Francis, 2017 UT
49, ¶ 11, 424 P.3d 156. As a general rule, “the State may withdraw
from a plea bargain agreement at any time prior to . . . the actual
of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record
available to appellate courts; and (3) other policy reasons that
weigh for or against granting discretion to trial courts.” Randolph,
2022 UT 34, ¶ 25 (quotation simplified); see also State v. Levin, 2006
UT 50, ¶ 25, 144 P.3d 1096.
Utilizing this test to evaluate the mixed question at issue
here, it is readily apparent that all three factors point in the same
direction: that whether a defendant detrimentally relied on a plea
agreement is a law-like question. Specifically, the first two factors
do not favor deferential review because the facts involved in
determining whether a defendant detrimentally relied on a plea
agreement 	(namely, 	the 	timing 	of 	the 	plea 	agreement 	and
withdrawal, the content of the agreement, and any actions the
defendant 	took 	in 	reliance 	on 	the 	agreement) 	are 	usually
relatively 	simple 	and 	can 	be 	easily 	identified; 	likewise, 	a
detrimental reliance determination does not typically rely heavily
on credibility determinations or other factual determinations that
cannot be adequately conveyed on the record. Lastly, even if these
first two factors provided a strong basis for adopting a deferential
standard 	of 	appellate 	review, 	they 	would 	nevertheless 	be
outweighed 	by 	the 	practical 	need 	for 	consistency 	in 	plea
enforcement decisions. Although there is no constitutional right
to a plea agreement, see Francis, 2017 UT 49, ¶ 11, the rights
implicated in a plea agreement are “generally fundamental and
constitutionally based,” United States v. Ringling, 988 F.2d 504, 506
(4th 	Cir. 	1993). 	And 	where 	the 	application 	of 	a 	legal 	rule
implicates “constitutional protections,” the supreme court has
held that “there is a strong interest in promoting clarity and
consistency in our state’s jurisprudence.” Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 41.

State v. Molina
20220853-CA 	8 	2024 UT App 172
entry of the guilty plea by the defendant.” Id. ¶ 14 (quotation
simplified). However, this general rule is subject to a detrimental
reliance exception. Id. That is, the State may not withdraw from a
plea 	agreement 	“[w]hen 	a 	defendant 	has 	reasonably 	and
detrimentally relied” on the agreement because a defendant’s
detrimental reliance on a prosecutorial promise in plea bargaining
makes a plea agreement binding. Id. ¶¶ 12–14.
¶14 	In this case, Molina agreed to plead guilty in exchange for
the reduction of the charge and sentencing recommendation but
did not enter the plea before the State rescinded its offer. Thus,
Molina’s motion to enforce the plea agreement—and the district
court’s order granting the motion—rested on his assertion that he
had 	detrimentally 	relied 	on 	the 	State’s 	promise 	before 	the
prosecutor withdrew the offer.
¶15 	Before the district court and again on appeal, both parties
argue that State v. Francis, 2017 UT 49, 424 P.3d 156, is controlling.
In Francis, the defendant argued the trial court should be required
to enforce a plea agreement the State had rescinded on the
morning of trial. Id. ¶¶ 4–6, 18. According to the defendant, his
reliance on the agreement had worked to his detriment in four
ways: (1) he had forgone his investigation and assertion of certain
discovery claims; (2) 	he had discontinued trial preparation;
(3) one of the witnesses who had been scheduled to appear at trial
was unlikely to appear at a future trial date; and (4) he would
incur additional expert witness fees. Id. ¶ 18.
¶16 	The supreme court rejected all the defendant’s arguments.
First, the court found the defendant had already raised, and the
trial court had rejected, the allegedly forgone discovery claims. Id.
¶ 19. Second, the court determined the defendant was not forced
to go to trial unprepared because the trial court had granted a
continuance after the State withdrew the plea agreement. Id. ¶ 20.
Third, the court found unpersuasive the defendant’s assertion
that the witness was unlikely to appear at a future trial. Id. ¶ 21.
The court explained that it is commonplace for “reluctant and

State v. Molina
20220853-CA 	9 	2024 UT App 172
unwilling 	witnesses” 	to 	be 	needed 	for 	trial, 	and 	that 	such
witnesses “can be subpoenaed and made to appear in court.” Id.
Further, to “meet his burden of persuasion” on this point, the
defendant would have needed “to explain who the witness [was],
what the testimony would have been, why the testimony [could
not] be obtained from another source, and how the lack of that
testimony [would] adversely affect[] his defense.” Id. Finally, as
to the additional expert witness cost, the court ruled that “a
potential and unquantified increase in the cost of defense” was
not “the sort of reliance that would compel the enforcement of a
plea agreement.” Id. ¶ 22.
¶17 	In rejecting the defendant’s arguments, the supreme court
did not set forth a specific test for establishing detrimental
reliance on a plea agreement. The court instead recognized a
number of actions that have “been held to constitute acts made in
detrimental reliance upon a prosecutor’s breached promises.” Id.
¶ 13 (quotation simplified). Those actions include “providing
information 	to 	government 	authorities, 	testifying 	for 	the
government, confessing guilt, returning stolen property, making
monetary restitution, failing to file a motion to have charges
presented to a grand jury, submitting to a lie detector test[,] and
waiving certain procedural guarantees.” Id. ¶ 12 (quotation
simplified).
¶18 	Here, 	the 	district 	court 	concluded 	that 	Molina 	had
detrimentally relied on the State’s offer because his decision to
accept the plea agreement caused him to (A) admit to a key fact
on the record and (B) call off his witnesses. The State argues the
court was incorrect on both fronts. We address each in turn.
A. 	Admitting a Key Fact on the Record
¶19 	The district court found that during the rule 11 conference
and also on the morning of the scheduled plea hearing, Molina
put a key fact “on the record in an effort to persuade the Court to
accept 	and 	enforce 	the 	agreement.” 	This fact 	was Molina’s

State v. Molina
20220853-CA 	10 	2024 UT App 172
“willingness 	to 	plead 	guilty 	to 	manslaughter 	and 	serve 	an
additional year in jail.” The court found that this fact was
“detrimental” to Molina and that it “would never have been
placed on the record prior to a justification hearing had [Molina]
not anticipated a plea.”6 But we fail to see how this admission
constitutes detrimental reliance.
¶20 	First, construing the mere indication to the district court of
a willingness to plead guilty to a lesser charge in return for a
recommendation of a lower sentence as detrimental reliance
would undermine our rules related to guilty pleas. Under our
rules of criminal procedure, before accepting and entering a plea
of guilty, a court must ensure that the plea is knowing, is
voluntary, and has an adequate factual basis. See Utah R. Crim. P.
11(e). Were we to allow a plea agreement to become enforceable
based solely upon a defendant’s communication to the court of a
willingness to tender a plea, the requirements for accepting a plea
outlined in our rules of criminal procedure would effectively be
nullified. This would also create the bizarre situation where a plea
agreement that a court has rejected would nonetheless still be
enforceable simply because the defendant had indicated to the
court a willingness to plead guilty.
¶21 	Second, 	Molina’s 	willingness 	to 	plead 	guilty 	to
manslaughter and serve an additional year in jail did not provide
the district court with any new material information about his
case. And the fact that Molina had requested a justification
hearing does not change the analysis. As an initial matter, Molina
6. Relatedly, the district court found that Molina “revealed trial
strategy . . . in his arguments to obtain the plea agreement and to
enforce the agreement.” But this finding lacks any record support.
The only thing Molina revealed during the rule 11 conference was
that the parties had reached a tentative plea agreement that he
was willing to accept. And Molina did not reveal any “strategy”
while attempting to enforce the agreement the following Monday
because the agreement had already been withdrawn.

State v. Molina
20220853-CA 	11 	2024 UT App 172
was charged with murder for fatally shooting Dominic. By
requesting a justification hearing, Molina had necessarily already
admitted that he had used force against Dominic—the point of the
justification hearing was to determine whether Molina’s use of
force 	had 	been 	justified. 	Moreover, 	judges 	understand 	that
defendants frequently choose to waive their right to maintain
their innocence, for a variety of reasons; indeed, plea bargaining
is essential to our system of justice, Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 260 (1971). Even in cases such as this, where a defendant
claims that his use of force was justified, he might nevertheless
prefer to accept a guilty plea to secure an agreed-upon sentence
in order to guard against potential deficiencies in the strength of
the evidence supporting a justification defense or in order to
avoid the expense and stress of trial.
¶22 	Third, even if Molina’s willingness to plead guilty and
serve 	an 	additional 	year 	in 	jail 	had 	somehow 	conveyed
information to the district court that was “detrimental” to Molina,
courts are routinely required to set aside information that is
unfavorable to one party that is revealed during the proceedings.
There are many situations in our justice system where this occurs,
including when in the case of a bench trial a court sustains a
motion to strike an answer, grants a motion in limine to exclude
evidence, or considers evidence at a preliminary hearing that is
ultimately inadmissible at trial. In all these situations, the court
has 	an 	obligation 	during 	later 	stages 	of 	the 	proceeding 	to
disregard the information learned previously. See State v. Graham,
2012 UT App 332, ¶ 31, 291 P.3d 243 (“Utah appellate courts
presume that when conducting a bench trial, the trial court
considers 	only 	admissible 	evidence 	and 	disregards 	any
inadmissible evidence.” (quotation simplified)). Molina has not
persuaded us that a different result should follow here. Thus,
we 	agree 	with 	the 	State 	that 	even 	had 	the 	court 	learned
information potentially unfavorable to Molina prior to making an
adjudicative 	decision, 	that 	does 	not 	by 	itself 	constitute
detrimental reliance.

State v. Molina
20220853-CA 	12 	2024 UT App 172
¶23 	Lastly, by indicating a willingness to plead guilty to
manslaughter, Molina did not forfeit any potential arguments at
a future justification hearing or trial or otherwise narrow his range
of possible defenses. The State would not be allowed to use any
statements Molina made during the plea negotiations, or during
the rule 11 conference, against him at trial. See Utah R. Evid. 410(a)
(barring evidence of “a statement made during plea discussions
with an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions
did not result in a guilty plea”). Nor would any such statements
be admissible at a justification hearing. See id.
B. 	Calling off Witnesses
¶24 	During the brief interval between the Friday rule 11
conference with the district court and the State’s withdrawal of
the plea offer, Molina called off his justification witnesses. When
the parties appeared before the court on Monday morning,
Molina asserted that this decision was attributable to the fact that
he had “substantially relied” on the plea agreement. He then
informed the court that because he had called off his witnesses, he
was unprepared to move forward with the scheduled justification
hearing that week. Consequently, he argued, the court should
enforce the agreement.
¶25 	The district court credited Molina’s argument on this point.
The court concluded that Molina had relied to his detriment on
the plea agreement when he “called off all witnesses.” The court
reasoned that this action constituted detrimental reliance because
by calling off his witnesses, Molina “forfeit[ed] his justification
hearing for another six months and risked his ability to secure
witness.” But the premise on which the court’s conclusion is based
is 	faulty, 	and 	therefore 	neither 	of 	the 	stated 	justifications
demonstrate that Molina detrimentally relied on the plea.
¶26 	To begin, nothing in the plea agreement required, or even
suggested, that Molina call off his witnesses. Likewise, at no point
did the State instruct Molina to call off his witnesses or suggest he

State v. Molina
20220853-CA 	13 	2024 UT App 172
should do so because of the agreement. His decision to do so was
entirely voluntary. That distinguishes this case from the range of
cases where courts have found detrimental reliance based on
actions the defendant took that were required under the plea
agreement. See State v. Francis, 2017 UT 49, ¶¶ 12–13, 424 P.3d 156
(collecting cases).
¶27 	Next, it was not the plea offer itself that induced Molina to
call off his witnesses; rather, it was Molina’s belief that the district
court would accept the plea, thereby rendering the justification
hearing unnecessary. This assumption on Molina’s part does not
mean that the State induced him to call off his witnesses. See
generally State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ¶ 14, 17 P.3d 1153
(“The decision whether to accept or reject a plea agreement lies
within the discretion of the trial court. Thus, even where the
government and the defendant reach a plea agreement, the court
is not required to accept it.” (quotation simplified)). Indeed, as just
noted, the State never so much as suggested to Molina that he do
so.
¶28 	Moreover, Molina’s belief that the district court would
accept and enter the plea also rested on a further assumption. That
is, Molina assumed the court would find that his plea of guilty
was knowing, voluntary, and had an adequate factual basis. See
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) (stating that the court “may refuse to accept
a plea of guilty” and explaining that the court “may not accept [a]
plea until the court has” made findings in accordance with the
rule). Although the court indicated at the rule 11 conference that
it would follow the parties’ proposed disposition, at that point it
had not yet heard from Molina, had not yet heard the factual basis
for the plea, and had not yet made any of the required findings.
See id. There are any number of things that could have happened
at the plea hearing that would have led—or even required—the
court to ultimately reject the agreed-upon plea despite the court’s
initial indication of a willingness to accept the parties’ agreement.
See, e.g., Kelty v. Warden Walden Corr. Inst., No. 15-cv-01130, 2015
WL 10372438, at *1 (D.S.C. Dec. 18, 2015) (rejecting plea where the

State v. Molina
20220853-CA 	14 	2024 UT App 172
defendant testified during the plea hearing that he “did not
remember committing the charged crime”); People v. Ottomanelli,
505 N.E.2d 1328, 1329, 1331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (rejecting a
negotiated plea after the defendant failed to offer sufficient facts
during the plea colloquy to establish a factual basis for the plea);
State v. Wallace, 480 S.E.2d 673, 675 (N.C. 1997) (rejecting a
proposed plea after the prosecutor revealed new facts during the
plea hearing); cf. State v. Lopez, 2005 UT App 496, ¶¶ 4, 26–27, 128
P.3d 1 (setting aside a guilty plea where the defendant had not
been offered a copy of the plea statement in his native language),
cert. denied, 138 P.3d 589 (Utah 2006).
¶29 	In light of the foregoing, neither of the reasons the district
court cited as factors in its detrimental reliance analysis are
availing. Aside from the fact that neither the plea agreement itself
nor the State required Molina to call off his witnesses, any delay
in rescheduling Molina’s justification hearing was completely
unrelated to the plea agreement—or anything the State had
done—and was instead due to scheduling conflicts on the part of
the court. This point was underscored by the court when it
explained that it would be unable to schedule “another five-day
setting for almost six additional months” due to its “insane”
calendar. Similarly, because Molina’s decision to call off his
witnesses 	was 	not 	the 	result 	of 	detrimental 	reliance 	on
representations by the State, any consequences flowing from that
decision are not attributable to the State. Therefore, even if
Molina’s decision to call off his witnesses does in fact result in
difficulties securing these witnesses in the future, any such
difficulties would not constitute grounds for enforcing the plea
agreement.7
7. The district court also incorrectly concluded that a likely
difficulty of securing witnesses in the future is grounds for a
determination of detrimental reliance. In State v. Francis, 2017 UT
49, 424 P.3d 156, our supreme court squarely rejected the notion
(continued…)

State v. Molina
20220853-CA 	15 	2024 UT App 172
CONCLUSION
¶30 	The State may not withdraw from a plea agreement if a
defendant has reasonably and detrimentally relied on the State’s
offer. Here, the district court incorrectly concluded that Molina
detrimentally relied on the State’s promise. We therefore reverse
the court’s order granting Molina’s motion to enforce his plea
agreement and remand the matter for further proceedings.
that a bald assertion that a witness may fail to appear at a
subsequent 	hearing 	or 	trial 	is 	sufficient 	to 	prove 	that 	the
defendant’s purported reliance was detrimental to the defense. Id.
¶ 21. Rather, to carry his burden of persuasion on such a claim,
Molina was required to “show that the witness was no longer
available,” as well as to explain “who the witness [was], what the
testimony would have been, why the testimony [could not] be
obtained from another source, and how the lack of that testimony
[would] adversely affect[] his defense.” Id. Although Molina
identified for the court who his witnesses were and provided a
general explanation as to what some of them might say, he did
not 	provide 	specifics 	about 	their 	potential 	testimony 	or
specifically explain why that testimony could not be obtained
from 	another 	source. 	And 	perhaps 	even 	more 	importantly,
Molina wholly failed to establish that any of the witnesses were
“no longer available.” Id. The crux of his argument was simply
that their cooperation would be difficult to obtain. This is not
enough to prove that the purported reliance was detrimental. See
id.