In re J.A.A. (M.A. v. State)

1. The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by
special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code
Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6).
2014 UT App 135
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF J.A.A., J.C.A., J.J.A., AND
J.E.A., PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
M.A.
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20140226-CA
Filed June 12, 2014
Second District Juvenile Court, Ogden Department
The Honorable Sherene T. Dillon
No. 1070651
Mary Anne Ellis, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson, Attorneys
for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, and
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD.1
PER CURIAM:
¶1 M.A. (Father) appeals the order terminating his parental
rights in J.C.A. Father is not the biological or legal father of J.C.A.’s
siblings and had no parental rights to those children. We affirm.

In re J.A.A.
20140226-CA 2 2014 UT App 135
¶2 “[I]n order to overturn the juvenile court’s decision, the
result must be against the clear weight of the evidence or leave the
appellate court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake
has been made.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). We “review the juvenile
court’s factual findings based upon the clearly erroneous
standard.” In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680. A finding
of fact is clearly erroneous when, in light of the evidence
supporting the finding, it is against the clear weight of the
evidence. Id. Therefore, “[w]hen a foundation for the court’s
decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court may not engage
in a reweighing of the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.
¶3 The juvenile court concluded that several grounds
supported termination of Father’s parental rights. Pursuant to Utah
Code section 78A-6-507, the finding of a single enumerated ground
will support the termination of parental rights. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-6-507 (LexisNexis 2012). Therefore, it is sufficient if the
evidence supports any of the grounds for termination found by the
juvenile court. The court concluded that J.C.A. had been abused
and neglected by Father, see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(b), and that Father
was an unfit or incompetent parent, see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(c). The
court found that J.C.A. had been in an out-of-home placement
under the supervision of the court and the Division of Child and
Family Services (DCFS), see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(d)(i); that Father had
“substantially neglected, willfully refused, or has been unable or
unwilling to remedy the circumstances that caused [J.C.A.] to be in
an out-of-home placement,” see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(d)(ii), and that
“there is a substantial likelihood that [Father] will not be capable of
exercising proper and effective parental care in the near future,” see
id. § 78A-6-507(1)(d)(iii). The court found that Father failed in his
parental adjustment because he had been unable or unwilling
within a reasonable time to substantially correct the circumstances,
conduct, or conditions that led to placement of the child outside the
home notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of
DCFS. See id. § 78A-6-507(1)(e). Finally, the court found that it was

In re J.A.A.
20140226-CA 3 2014 UT App 135
in the best interests of J.C.A. that Father’s parental rights to J.C.A.
be terminated. Father’s petition on appeal challenges only the
finding that he is an unfit parent. Because the evidence supports
one or more of the remaining unchallenged grounds, even a
successful challenge to the unfitness determination would not
support reversal.
¶4 Father claims that the juvenile court failed to recognize the
significant amount of services he completed and the insight he
presented at trial. The detailed findings of fact reflect the juvenile
court’s consideration of the services, and Father essentially
disputes the juvenile court’s assessment of the facts. Father
completed some services with a provider who was not approved
by DCFS. Father concedes that after the DCFS team examined the
provider’s credentials and licensing, it determined that the
provider was not qualified to provide the services and that the
services were inadequate. Even that provider had referred Father
to Valley Mental Health for additional services, which Father did
not access. Although Father then obtained an assessment from a
second provider, he did not complete the recommended domestic
violence treatment and counseling. That second provider testified
that Father continued to have anger issues and that Father and his
wife, J.C.A.’s mother, had significant problems with conflict
resolution and communication. Father’s claim that he participated
in marriage counseling is incorrect. He was an invited guest at
some sessions with his wife’s individual therapist. The juvenile
court found that Father had employment and income, but he did
not use his earnings to provide support to the family. Father and
J.C.A.’s mother frequently separated. When they were together,
Father was out of the home eighty percent of the time. Father and
J.C.A.’s mother leased a suitable home in June 2013, which was a
year after the removal. The juvenile court found that Father had
not internalized the skills he verbalized, continued to have
problems with anger and domestic violence, and did not recognize
the severity of his actions toward the children, including his
physical punishment. The juvenile court’s findings amply
supported the ground for termination under section 78A-6-

In re J.A.A.
20140226-CA 4 2014 UT App 135
507(1)(d) by demonstrating that Father had been unable to remedy
the circumstances that caused J.C.A. to be in an out-of-home
placement and there was a substantial likelihood that he would not
be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care in the
near future. Similarly, the findings support a determination that
Father failed in his parental adjustment.
¶5 Father’s challenge to the best interests finding asserts that
there were other alternatives available to the juvenile court,
including permanent custody and guardianship with the foster
parents. He asserts that terminating parental rights would make it
less likely that the children would have sibling contact because they
would not be visiting the biological parents. However, the juvenile
court found, and the evidence supported, that DCFS ensured that
the foster families would facilitate sibling contact. Father argues
that J.C.A. told his foster parents that he wanted to return home.
However, J.C.A. also told his therapist that he wanted to remain in
his foster home. J.C.A. flourished in the foster home despite having
come into custody with serious behavioral problems and untreated
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. J.C.A. had been in the
foster home for one year. The foster family had recently made a
significant effort to adjust their living arrangements to allow them
to adopt another of J.C.A.’s siblings. The best interests findings are
amply supported.
¶6 Because “a foundation for the court’s decision exists in the
evidence,” we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Father’s
parental rights. See In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435.