State v. Anderson

2026 UT App 110
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee,
v.
HEATH WADE A NDERSON ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20240323-CA
Filed July 23, 2026
Eighth District Court, Duchesne Department
The Honorable Samuel P. Chiara
No. 211800371
Lyla Mahmoud, Debra M. Nelson, Benjamin Miller,
and Wendy M. Brown, Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Natalie M. Edmundson,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES R YAN M. HARRIS and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	In 	November 	2021, 	the 	State 	charged 	Heath 	Wade
Anderson with two counts of aggravated child sexual abuse. At
the time the charges were filed, Anderson was incarcerated on
another criminal matter and for allegedly violating his parole. But
Anderson did not appear before the district court on the child sex
abuse charges until September 2022—approximately ten months
after the information was filed. Once Anderson appeared in court,
the case proceeded through repeated hearings, continuances, plea
negotiations, 	and 	motion 	practice 	over 	the 	next 	seventeen
months.

State v. Anderson
20240323-CA 	2 	2026 UT App 110
¶2 	Nine months after he first appeared, Anderson moved to
dismiss the charges on the grounds that the State had violated his
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Anderson argued that
he had been prejudiced by the State’s delay in bringing him to trial
because 	the 	unresolved 	charges 	allegedly 	affected 	parole
proceedings before the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole (the
Board) and deprived him of the opportunity to negotiate a more
favorable global plea agreement. The district court disagreed.
Applying the four-factor framework articulated in Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the court concluded that Anderson’s
claimed prejudice was speculative and that, under the totality of
the circumstances, his constitutional speedy trial right was not
violated. After entering a conditional guilty plea, Anderson now
appeals that decision, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND1
¶3 	On November 1, 2021, the State filed an information in
Duchesne County charging Anderson with multiple offenses
based on allegations that he sexually abused two young family
members. At the time the charges were filed, Anderson was
already incarcerated on unrelated matters involving a pending
Uintah 	County 	case, 	as 	well 	as 	on 	parole 	violation 	issues
stemming from an earlier conviction in Uintah County.
¶4 	Although the information was filed in November 2021,
Anderson did not appear before the district court until September
6, 2022. Although the details are not entirely clear, the record
suggests that this initial ten-month delay resulted from lack of
administrative oversight, the misspelling of Anderson’s name,
1. We recite the facts relevant to Anderson’s speedy trial claim
based on the district court’s findings and the information in the
record that accords with those findings. See State v. Hintze, 2025
UT 3, n.1, 567 P.3d 506.

State v. Anderson
20240323-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 110
and general negligence rather than deliberate misconduct by the
State. During this ten-month period, Anderson was charged with
another offense in Uintah County, he resolved both of his pending
Uintah County cases with a plea deal, and he was sentenced in
those cases to two concurrently running jail terms of 364 days.
¶5 	After Anderson appeared in this case in September 2022,
the matter proceeded through a series of hearings, scheduling
conferences, and continuances. Specifically, on September 14,
Anderson’s 	defense 	attorney 	(Counsel) 	requested 	that 	a
scheduling conference be continued until October 3. At the
October 3 hearing, Anderson requested a preliminary hearing,
which the district court scheduled for October 12. But on October
11, the State moved to continue the preliminary hearing to
October 17, and Counsel stipulated to the request. At the October
17 	hearing, 	Counsel 	requested 	another 	continuance 	so 	that
investigators could review materials related to the allegations.
The court continued the preliminary hearing until November 14.
Before that hearing occurred, the State moved to continue the
matter to November 28 so that both parties would have additional
time to prepare, and Counsel again stipulated to the request.
¶6 	The preliminary hearing was later continued two more
times at Counsel’s request. On November 28, Counsel requested
additional time to prepare, and the district court continued the
hearing until December 12. On December 12, Counsel requested
another continuance, and the hearing was reset for December 20.
The court conducted the preliminary hearing on December 20 and
later entered a bindover order in January 2023. The case then
proceeded toward trial.
¶7 	In February 2023, the trial was continued while the parties
addressed 	discovery 	issues. 	Shortly 	thereafter, 	Anderson
requested a jury trial, and the district court scheduled trial for
April 2023. But in March 2023, Counsel moved to continue the

State v. Anderson
20240323-CA 	4 	2026 UT App 110
trial date because a defense expert was unavailable. The court
granted the motion and reset trial for June 2023.
¶8 	In May 2023, Anderson wrote a letter to the district court
requesting a court appearance and expressing frustration with the
delays. Around the same time, Counsel resigned as a public
defender and replacement counsel was appointed. But following
disagreements with replacement counsel, Anderson personally
asked the court to continue the matter. Per the parties’ request, the
court then vacated the June trial date. A third attorney was
subsequently appointed to represent Anderson.
¶9 	On June 27, 2023, Anderson moved to dismiss the charges
for a constitutional speedy trial violation. Anderson argued that
the delay had prejudiced him because the unresolved charges had
allegedly affected his parole violation proceedings before the
Board. He also argued that an earlier appearance in this matter
might have allowed him to include this case in the plea resolution
of the Uintah County matters.
¶10 	The State opposed the motion. The State argued that
because the delay between the filing of the information and
Anderson’s initial appearance was not a deliberate act taken by
the State, it should not be given great weight in the speedy trial
analysis. As to the remaining delay, the State argued that much of
it 	resulted 	from 	defense-requested 	continuances, 	stipulated
continuances, the appointment of new defense counsel, and
ordinary scheduling issues. The State also argued that Anderson’s
claimed prejudice was largely speculative because it was “not
possible to determine whether” Anderson would still have been
incarcerated on the Uintah County cases and the parole violation
even without the delays in the instant case.
¶11 	The parties thereafter litigated the motion to dismiss over
the next several months. During this period and based upon his
convictions in the two Uintah County cases, the Board revoked

State v. Anderson
20240323-CA 	5 	2026 UT App 110
Anderson’s parole and he remained incarcerated. In September
2023, the district court denied Anderson’s motion to dismiss. The
court concluded that the delay was sufficient to trigger the
analysis required under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), but
that an analysis of the factors set forth in Barker did not establish
a constitutional violation. The court observed that Anderson was
“responsible for the great majority of all delays during the ten
months after his initial appearance.” The court also concluded
that Anderson had failed to establish concrete prejudice resulting
from the delay. The court scheduled trial for December 2023.
¶12 	But 	in 	October 	2023, Anderson’s new attorney 	again
moved 	to 	continue 	the 	trial 	because 	a 	defense 	expert 	was
unavailable for the scheduled trial dates. The district court
granted the motion and reset trial for February 2024. Before trial
occurred, the parties resolved the case through a negotiated plea
agreement. On February 20, 2024, Anderson pleaded guilty to a
reduced charge, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his
motion to dismiss. At the sentencing hearing in March, the State
advised 	the 	court 	that 	its 	favorable 	offer 	and 	sentencing
recommendation were partly based on “the amount of time Mr.
Anderson ha[d] served incarcerated since this offense happened”
but that it did not anticipate that he would be released because of
his pending parole violations. The court imposed a suspended
prison term and placed Anderson on probation.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶13 	Anderson now appeals and challenges the district court’s
denial of his motion to dismiss, which was based on an alleged
violation 	of 	the 	Sixth 	Amendment 	right 	to 	a 	speedy 	trial.
“Whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated
is a question of law reviewed for correctness.” State v. Hintze, 2025
UT 3, ¶ 38, 567 P.3d 506 (quotation simplified).

State v. Anderson
20240323-CA 	6 	2026 UT App 110
ANALYSIS
¶14 	The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial. See
U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right is a “fundamental” one and “is
imposed 	by 	the 	Due 	Process 	Clause 	of 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment on the States.” State v. Younge, 2013 UT 71, ¶ 16, 321
P.3d 1127 (quotation simplified). But it is also an “amorphous,
slippery, and necessarily relative” right, Vermont v. Brillon, 556
U.S. 81, 89 (2009) (quotation simplified), and it is one that “must
take into account the defendant’s rights as well as the rights of
public justice,” State v. Samora, 2022 UT App 7, ¶ 18, 504 P.3d 195
(quotation simplified).
¶15 	Courts evaluate claimed violations of the speedy trial right
under the four-factor balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972). Those factors are (1) the length of the delay,
(2) the reason for the delay, (3) the circumstances under which the
defendant asserted the right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.
See id. at 530. No single factor controls the analysis. See id. at 533.
Courts instead consider the factors together, along with the
particular circumstances of the case. See id. And “the only possible
remedy” 	for 	a 	violation 	of 	the 	speedy 	trial 	right 	is 	“the
unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment.” Id.
at 522. We discuss each Barker factor individually below and then
balance them against one another.
I. Length of the Delay
¶16 	The first Barker factor, the length of the delay, “is actually a
double enquiry.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992).
It first examines whether the delay was sufficiently long to trigger
constitutional concern and, if so, “the extent to which the delay
stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial
examination of the claim.” Id. at 652.

State v. Anderson
20240323-CA 	7 	2026 UT App 110
¶17 	Here, 	approximately 	twenty-seven 	months 	elapsed
between the filing of the information on November 1, 2021, and
the entry of Anderson’s guilty plea on February 20, 2024. That
delay was sufficient to trigger a full Barker analysis. See id. at 652
n.1 (explaining that delays approaching one year generally trigger
further constitutional review); see also State v. Younge, 2013 UT 71,
¶ 18, 321 P.3d 1127 (recognizing “that a delay approaching one
year is presumptively prejudicial”). But the extent to which the
delay stretched beyond that needed to trigger constitutional
concern was not particularly egregious given the circumstances of
this case, which we discuss more fully below. See Doggett, 505 U.S.
at 	652 	(labeling 	a 	delay 	of 	over 	eight 	and 	a 	half 	years
“extraordinary”); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972) (stating
that a delay of “well over five years” between arrest and trial “was
extraordinary”). 	Accordingly, 	while 	the 	length 	of 	the 	delay
weighs in Anderson’s favor, it does so only slightly.
II. Reason for the Delay
¶18 	The second Barker factor examines the reason for the delay
and assigns different weight to different types of delay. See Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972). Deliberate attempts by the State
to delay prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage weigh
heavily 	against 	the 	government, 	while 	negligent 	or
administrative delays carry less weight. See id. Delays attributable
to the defense ordinarily weigh against the defendant. See Vermont
v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2009).
¶19 	A substantial portion of the delay in this case resulted from
the ten-month period between the filing of the information and
Anderson’s initial appearance on September 6, 2022. And the
State acknowledges responsibility for that delay. But the record
suggests that this delay resulted from either lack of administrative
oversight or other general negligence rather than deliberate
misconduct. 	And 	nothing 	in 	the 	record 	indicates 	that 	the
prosecution intentionally delayed the proceedings to gain a

State v. Anderson
20240323-CA 	8 	2026 UT App 110
tactical advantage or to hamper Anderson’s defense. Under
Barker, negligent delay still weighs against the State, though less
heavily than does purposeful delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
¶20 	And the remaining delays during the next seventeen
months were simply the standard scheduling delays associated
with most criminal cases. Once Anderson appeared before the
district court, the case became active and involved repeated
hearings 	and 	litigation 	on 	the 	motion 	to 	dismiss. 	Several
continuances 	were 	requested 	by 	Counsel. 	Those 	requests
included continuances to review discovery, allow new counsel
time to prepare for trial, and accommodate the availability of a
defense 	expert. 	Counsel 	also 	requested 	continuances 	of 	the
preliminary hearing as well as the scheduled trial dates. Other
delays resulted from stipulated continuances. But nothing in the
record suggests that those delays resulted from bad faith by the
State. 	Indeed, 	they 	reflect 	ordinary 	scheduling 	and 	case-
management 	difficulties 	that 	carry 	comparatively 	little
constitutional weight. See id.
¶21 	The record also reflects additional scheduling disruption
after Counsel resigned in May 2023 and replacement counsel
appeared. Anderson personally asked for further delay over
conflicts with replacement counsel, requiring a third attorney to
appear. Anderson argues that this delay should be weighed
against the State because Counsel resigned prematurely and the
State or the district court should have required Counsel to
complete the jury trial scheduled for June. However, when
weighing delays caused by assigned counsel, only exceptional
delays resulting from a “breakdown in the public defender
system” can be charged to the State. Brillon, 556 U.S. at 85, 94
(quotation simplified). Anderson is correct that Counsel resigned
weeks before the June 2023 trial, but the resignation of one public
defender, even in a rural community, does not amount to a
systemic breakdown. And neither the court nor the State could

State v. Anderson
20240323-CA 	9 	2026 UT App 110
have forced Counsel to keep working as a public defender despite
his resignation.
¶22 	In short, the State bears responsibility for the initial ten-
month delay, and that delay weighs against the State. But the
remaining 	delays 	resulted 	largely 	from 	defense 	requests,
stipulated 	continuances, 	litigation, 	and 	ordinary 	scheduling
issues rather than deliberate prosecutorial misconduct or systemic
defense problems. Accordingly, this factor weighs only slightly in
favor of a speedy trial violation.
III. Assertion of the Right
¶23 	The third Barker factor examines when and how strongly
the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial. See Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972). “The defendant’s assertion of his
[or her] speedy trial right . . . is entitled to strong evidentiary
weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived
of the right.” Id. at 531–32. At the same time, courts consider the
timing and circumstances of the assertion when determining how
much weight to assign to this factor. See id.
¶24 	Here, while Anderson affirmatively asserted his desire for
court action and complained about the delays in this case, which
weighs in his favor, he did not do so right away. It was not until
May 	2023—eight 	months 	after 	his 	initial 	appearance—that
Anderson wrote a letter to the district court “requesting a court
appearance” and expressing frustration with the delays in the
proceedings. Seven weeks after that, Anderson filed his motion to
dismiss based on speedy trial grounds. Even if the May letter did
not expressly invoke the Sixth Amendment and failed to use the
phrase “speedy trial,” see id. at 528–29, the filing of the motion
made Anderson’s intent clear. See State v. Hintze, 2025 UT 3, ¶ 62,
567 P.3d 506 (recognizing that courts evaluate whether the
defendant’s conduct demonstrated a desire for prompt resolution,
not whether the defendant used specific words).

State v. Anderson
20240323-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 110
¶25 	But 	the 	timing 	and 	context 	of 	Anderson’s 	assertion
preclude this factor from weighing in his favor. Anderson did not
assert the right until approximately eighteen months after the
information was filed and after the case had already proceeded
through numerous hearings and continuances. And even after
Anderson sent his May 2023 letter, he personally requested a
continuance after conflicts arose with replacement counsel. The
extent to which a defendant is harmed by the deprivation of a
speedy trial can manifest itself in how strongly the defendant
asserts the right. “The more serious the deprivation, the more
likely a defendant is to complain.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Here,
Anderson did complain about how long the process was taking,
but he both took his time in making those complaints and
personally requested further delay after he finally made his
complaints.
¶26 	Thus, although Anderson did assert his speedy trial right,
his conduct throughout the proceedings reflected a continued
willingness to request his own continuances and accept additional
delays while the case remained active. Under these circumstances,
we view this factor as neutral.
IV. Prejudice to the Defendant
¶27 	The final Barker factor examines whether the defendant
suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 532 (1972). The Supreme Court has identified three interests
protected by the speedy trial right: “(i) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the
accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired.” Id. The last interest is the most serious because
impairment of the defense “skews the fairness of the entire
system.” Id.
¶28 	As an initial matter, we note that Anderson does not claim
that the delay impaired his ability to defend against the charges.

State v. Anderson
20240323-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 110
He identifies no lost witnesses, unavailable evidence, faded
memories, or diminished ability to prepare a defense. Nor does
the record suggest that the delay affected the reliability or fairness
of the proceedings themselves.
¶29 	Instead, Anderson argues that the delay prejudiced him in
two ways. First, he contends that these unresolved charges
negatively affected his parole proceedings before the Board.
Second, he argues that had he been aware of this charge earlier,
he could have resolved this case in the plea agreement he reached
with the State regarding the Uintah County cases, an event he
claims would have “result[ed] in less time incarcerated overall.”
¶30 	But under State v. Hintze, 2025 UT 3, 567 P.3d 506, such
speculative prejudice carries little constitutional weight. The
defendant in Hintze was charged while he “was serving a prison
sentence for a separate offense,” but he was not notified of the
newer charge until two years later, “when he claims he was being
considered for parole on the separate offense.” Id. ¶ 1. The
defendant asserted prejudice due to this two-year delay, claiming
that he would have been granted parole at the earlier point had
the 	pending 	charge 	been 	more 	timely 	resolved. 	See 	id. 	In
addressing 	this 	assertion 	of 	prejudice, 	our 	supreme 	court
explained that prejudice in the speedy trial context, “unlike
prejudice requirements in other contexts, . . . is not a component
of a claim that must be proven to secure relief.” Id. ¶ 79. Rather,
prejudice in the speedy trial context “exist[s] along a spectrum.”
Id. ¶ 80. “The more significant the prejudice and more certain the
proof, 	the 	more 	weight 	the 	factor 	should 	be 	given.” 	Id.
Conversely, 	“the 	less 	significant 	or 	more 	speculative 	the
prejudice, the less weight, if any, it deserves.” Id. In applying this
reasoning to the case before it, the court ultimately determined
that there was “nothing in the record upon which to conclude that
parole was anything more than a possibility” and that the
defendant’s claim was “too speculative to warrant weighing the
prejudice factor in his favor.” Id. ¶¶ 86, 88.

State v. Anderson
20240323-CA 	12 	2026 UT App 110
¶31 	The 	prejudice 	Anderson 	identifies 	also 	falls 	on 	the
speculative end of the prejudice spectrum. Although Anderson
points out that the Board continued several of his hearings while
this case remained pending, the record does not establish that
Anderson likely would have been released from incarceration
absent the delayed prosecution of this case. The Board retained
broad discretion regarding parole decisions. See Lancaster v. Utah
Board of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994). And Anderson
remained incarcerated throughout the relevant period because of
both the Uintah County matters and the alleged parole violations
stemming 	from 	his 	convictions 	on 	those 	cases. 	Thus, 	even
assuming that these charges would have been relevant to the
Board’s consideration, the record does not conclusively show that
the pendency of this case prolonged Anderson’s incarceration or
deprived him of earlier release. See Hintze, 2025 UT 3, ¶¶ 83–88.
¶32 	The same is true of Anderson’s global-plea argument.
Anderson contends that had he known about these charges
sooner, 	he 	might 	have 	negotiated 	a 	more 	favorable 	global
resolution involving not only the Uintah County cases but also
this case. But that argument depends upon multiple layers of
speculation, including assumptions about prosecutorial decision
making, 	plea 	negotiations, 	judicial 	approval, 	sentencing
outcomes, 	and 	parole 	consequences. 	Nothing 	in 	the 	record
establishes that earlier resolution of this case likely would have
reduced Anderson’s custodial exposure or altered the ultimate
outcome of the Uintah County matters.
¶33 	Indeed, 	the 	final 	resolution 	of 	this 	case 	substantially
undermines Anderson’s claim of concrete prejudice. Anderson
ultimately 	pleaded 	guilty 	to 	a 	reduced 	third-degree 	felony
offense, and the district court suspended his prison sentence and
placed him on probation. The State acknowledged that the
favorable plea deal and sentencing recommendation were based
partly on the delay in this case and the two-and-a-half years he
had already been incarcerated. Anderson therefore cannot show

State v. Anderson
20240323-CA 	13 	2026 UT App 110
that the delayed prosecution resulted in additional incarceration
attributable to this case or caused him to lose an opportunity for
concurrent sentencing.
¶34 	In short, under Hintze, speculative parole consequences
and 	hypothetical 	plea 	outcomes 	carry 	limited 	constitutional
significance absent concrete proof that the delay prolonged
incarceration or impaired the defense. Because Anderson failed to
make that showing here, the prejudice factor weighs heavily
against him.
V. Balancing the Barker Factors
¶35 	The final task for us in evaluating Anderson’s speedy trial
claim is to balance the relevant factors. Balancing the Barker
factors, we conclude that Anderson has not established a violation
of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
¶36 	The first two factors weigh somewhat in Anderson’s favor,
but only slightly. Because the delay was over one year, it was
sufficient to trigger constitutional review, but the case did not
extend an extraordinary amount of time beyond that triggering
amount. And the reasons for the delay weigh only slightly in
Anderson’s favor as well.
¶37 	But those factors do not carry substantial weight under the
circumstances 	presented 	here. 	The 	record 	does 	not 	reflect
deliberate prosecutorial delay or an attempt to gain a tactical
advantage. Once Anderson appeared before the district court, the
case remained active through repeated hearings, continuances,
motion practice, and substitution of counsel. Much of the post-
appearance delay resulted from defense requests, stipulated
continuances, 	scheduling 	issues, 	expert 	availability, 	counsel-
transition issues, and litigating the motion to dismiss rather than
prosecutorial inactivity or bad faith.

State v. Anderson
20240323-CA 	14 	2026 UT App 110
¶38 	Most 	importantly, 	Anderson 	failed 	to 	demonstrate
concrete prejudice resulting from the delay. As with the prejudice
claimed by the defendant in Hintze, Anderson’s claimed prejudice
depends 	largely 	on 	speculation 	regarding 	hypothetical 	plea
negotiations and release by the Board. See State v. Hintze, 2025 UT
3, ¶¶ 83–88, 567 P.3d 506. Although Anderson points to several
continued parole-violation hearings while this case remained
pending, the record does not establish that he likely would have
obtained 	release 	from 	incarceration 	absent 	this 	delayed
prosecution. Anderson remained incarcerated because he was
serving time on the Uintah County matters, which convictions
violated his parole. Moreover, the Board retained broad discretion
regarding any release decision. See Lancaster v. Utah Board of
Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994).
¶39 	Likewise, Anderson’s assertion that earlier notice of these
charges might have resulted in a more favorable global plea
agreement rests on conjecture rather than concrete proof. The
record does not establish that earlier resolution likely would have
reduced Anderson’s incarceration or altered the outcome of the
Uintah County matters. And the disposition of this case further
undermines Anderson’s prejudice claim because he was able to
negotiate a favorable plea agreement based partly on the delayed
prosecution and because ultimately the district court suspended
Anderson’s prison sentence and placed him on probation.
¶40 	In 	the 	end, 	this 	case 	presents 	a 	weaker 	showing 	of
prejudice than the showing rejected by the supreme court in
Hintze. Although the State’s initial negligence weighs against it,
the remaining Barker factors, viewed together and in light of the
speculative nature of 	Anderson’s claimed 	prejudice, 	do not
establish a constitutional speedy trial violation. The district court
therefore committed no error in denying Anderson’s motion to
dismiss.

State v. Anderson
20240323-CA 	15 	2026 UT App 110
CONCLUSION
¶41 	We conclude that the weight of the evidence in this case
does not support dismissal on speedy trial grounds. Although the
initial delay caused by the State’s negligence was significant,
Anderson’s claim that he suffered prejudice from the total delay
is speculative. Without more, the length and nature of the delay
are not sufficiently extraordinary to constitute a speedy trial
violation. Affirmed.