In re adoption of A.M.O. (R.O. v. M.M.)

1. The Honorable Russell W. Bench and the Honorable Pamela T.
Greenwood, Senior Judges, sat by special assignment as authorized
by law. See generally Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6).
2014 UT App 171
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF A.M.O.,
A MINOR.
R.O.,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
M.M.,
Respondent and Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20120762-CA
Filed July 25, 2014
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy
No. 112900221
Jack M. McIntyre and Lori J. Cave, Attorneys
for Appellant
SENIOR JUDGE RUSSELL W. BENCH authored this Opinion, in
which JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME and SENIOR JUDGE PAMELA T.
GREENWOOD concurred.1
BENCH, Senior Judge:
¶1 R.O. (Stepmother) appeals the district court’s order denying
her petition to terminate the parental rights of M.M. (Mother) and
dismissing Stepmother’s petition for the adoption of A.M.O.

In re Adoption of A.M.O.
2. Mother was still in jail at the time. Mother’s motion to extend
was not filed in the district court until June 20, 2011, but she mailed
her motion to extend from jail on June 15, 2011.
3. Where no changes material to our analysis have occurred, we cite
the most recent version of the Utah Code Annotated.
20120762-CA 2 2014 UT App 171
(Child). Stepmother argues that the district court’s findings of fact
are insufficiently detailed. We agree and reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Stepmother is married to Child’s biological father (Father).
Since 2008, Mother, who is Child’s biological mother, and Father
have shared legal custody of Child, but Father has retained
physical custody of Child. Mother has a history of substance abuse,
and in November 2010, she was arrested and incarcerated for drug-
related offenses.
¶3 In May 2011, Stepmother filed a petition for adoption, in
which she sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights and to
become Child’s adoptive parent. On May 18, 2011, Mother was
served with notice of the adoption proceeding. The notice informed
Mother that she had thirty days to file a response if she intended to
intervene in or contest the adoption. Mother’s pro se Motion to
Extend Time for Answer was filed in district court on June 20,
2011. Shortly thereafter, Stepmother moved to strike Mother’s2
motion to extend for noncompliance with section 78B-6-110 of the
Utah Adoption Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-110(6) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2013). The district court denied Stepmother’s motion to3
strike and informed Mother that she had ten days to file an answer.
Mother filed a motion to intervene within those ten days and then
filed an answer the following week.
¶4 The district court held evidentiary hearings in 2012 and
announced its findings of fact and rulings from the bench. In
evaluating a petition to terminate parental rights, the court engages
in a two-step analysis. The first step requires the court to determine

In re Adoption of A.M.O.
4. Indeed, there is no dispute that Mother has not seen Child since
August 2010.
20120762-CA 3 2014 UT App 171
whether the petitioner demonstrated grounds to terminate parental
rights. In re Adoption of T.H., 2007 UT App 341, ¶ 11, 171 P.3d 480
(“First, the court must find that a specific ground for termination
exists, finding the parent unfit or incompetent based on a ground
enumerated in [section 78A-6-507] of the Utah Code.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). As to this first step, the district
court in this case found that Child lived with both families at one
point or another from 2001 to 2008. The district court found that for
the period from January 2009 to July 2010, it was undisputed that
Father and Stepmother had primary custody of Child and that
Mother did not pay child support during that time period. The
district court then noted that the amount of contact between
Mother and Child during this period was the subject of some
dispute. However, the district court found by clear and convincing
evidence that from July 2010 until Mother’s arrest in November
2010, Mother struggled with drug addiction and had no
meaningful contact with Child. Likewise, the district court
indicated that no evidence showed Mother had any meaningful
contact with Child from the time Mother was jailed until the date
the petition was filed. Based on these findings, the district court4
further found that Mother had failed to communicate with Child
for a period of more than six months, failed to show the normal
interest of a parent without just cause, and abandoned Child. See
generally Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-508(1) (LexisNexis 2012) (“[I]t is
prima facie evidence of abandonment that the parent . . . ha[s]
failed to communicate with the child by mail, telephone, or
otherwise for six months; [or has] failed to have shown the normal
interest of a natural parent, without just cause . . . .”).
¶5 At this point, the district court explained that the burden
shifted to Mother to demonstrate that during that period of time
there were not grounds for terminating her parental rights. See In
re K.J., 2013 UT App 237, ¶ 26, 327 P.3d 1203 (“While the petitioner
bears the ultimate burden of proving the grounds for termination
by clear and convincing evidence, once evidence is presented that

In re Adoption of A.M.O.
20120762-CA 4 2014 UT App 171
would justify termination, the burden shifts to the parent to
persuade the court that the [petitioner] had not established [the
ground for termination] by clear and convincing evidence.”
(alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)). The district court found that Mother had not met that
burden with respect to the period of November 2010 to May 2011.
¶6 The district court then turned to evaluating the second step
involved in a petition to terminate parental rights: whether it
would be in Child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental
rights. See In re Adoption of T.H., 2007 UT App 341, ¶ 11 (“Second,
after finding one of the enumerated grounds, the court must find
that termination of parental rights serves the best interests of the
child.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district
court found that Child “has a caring, loving family with whom he’s
permanently residing” and that Stepmother “has treated [Child] in
every respect as her own child.” The district court then explained
it would not decide whether Stepmother or Mother was a better
parent, but rather would decide whether it was in Child’s best
interest that Mother’s parental rights be terminated. The district
court stated that it had heard “very little evidence” on the issue of
best interest and had not heard testimony from any therapist
indicating how Child understood his relationship with Mother. In
addition, the district court viewed the evidence that Stepmother
presented on the issue as “understandably self interested.” As a
result, the district court declared that it “ha[d] not heard evidence
that would convince [the court] that it would be in [Child’s] best
interest to terminate [Mother’s] parental rights, at least so long as
she remains fit.” The district court further explained that there was
“no question” that Mother was not fit to be a parent “as long as she
was using . . . drugs and as long as she was incarcerated.”
However, the district court stated that it believed that Mother can
be a fit parent “[i]f she can maintain sobriety” and that Mother
could possibly have a relationship with Child in the future. After
conducting this analysis, the district court denied Stepmother’s
petition.
¶7 Thereafter, the district court entered a short written order
denying Stepmother’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental

In re Adoption of A.M.O.
5. Mother did not take the opportunity to file a brief in this court.
As a consequence, we have considered this matter on Stepmother’s
brief alone.
20120762-CA 5 2014 UT App 171
rights, dismissing Stepmother’s petition to adopt, and noting that
it had made its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the
record. Stepmother subsequently filed a motion to amend and for
a new trial, arguing that the district court did not make adequate
findings regarding Child’s best interest and that the court did not
state the standard it was using for evaluating best interest. Mother
did not file a memorandum in opposition. Nevertheless, the district
court denied Stepmother’s motion to amend and “[stood] by the
findings and conclusions previously made, based on the evidence
presented in the hearings.” Stepmother now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶8 On appeal, Stepmother contends that the district court erred
in denying her motion to strike Mother’s pleadings. “‘Motions to5
strike pleadings or parts thereof are addressed to the judgment and
discretion of the trial court.’” Midland Funding LLC v. Sotolongo,
2014 UT App 95, ¶ 8, 325 P.3d 871 (quoting Francis v. State, 2013 UT
65, ¶ 19, 321 P.3d 1089). Generally, “[w]e review a district court’s
ruling on a motion to strike a pleading for an abuse of that
discretion.” Id. However, Stepmother’s argument focuses on the
proper construction of the statutory provisions governing notice of
adoption proceedings. “[M]atters of statutory construction are
questions of law that are reviewed for correctness . . . .” In re
Adoption of A.F.K., 2009 UT App 198, ¶ 16, 216 P.3d 980 (alteration
in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
In re Baby Boy Doe, 894 P.2d 1285, 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(reviewing for correctness the denial of a motion to strike another
party’s motion to dismiss where the timeliness of the motion to
dismiss depended upon proper construction of the court rule or
statute under which the motion to dismiss was brought).

In re Adoption of A.M.O.
20120762-CA 6 2014 UT App 171
¶9 Stepmother also argues that the district court did not enter
findings sufficient to support its conclusion that it was not in
Child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. “We
review the legal adequacy of findings of fact for correctness as a
question of law.” Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, ¶ 15, 257
P.3d 478 (citation and internal quotation marks omittted). “Unless
the record clearly and uncontrovertedly support[s] the trial court’s
decision, the absence of adequate findings of fact ordinarily
requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial court.”
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. Motion to Strike
¶10 Stepmother argues that the district court erred in denying
her motion to strike Mother’s pleadings. According to Stepmother,
Mother was required by statute to file a motion to intervene within
thirty days after receiving notice of the adoption proceeding.
Stepmother further contends that by failing to file a motion to
intervene within that time frame, Mother forfeited her parental
rights to Child.
¶11 In support of her argument that Mother forfeited her
parental rights, Stepmother relies on section 78B-6-110 of the Utah
Adoption Act. Subsection (6)(a) of this section explains, “A person
who has been served with notice of an adoption proceeding and
who wishes to contest the adoption shall file a motion to intervene
in the adoption proceeding: (i) within 30 days after the day on
which the person was served with notice of the adoption
proceeding . . . .” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-110(6)(a) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2013). This section further provides,
A person who fails to fully and strictly comply with
all of the requirements described in Subsection (6)(a)

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20120762-CA 7 2014 UT App 171
within 30 days after the day on which the person was
served with notice of the adoption proceeding:
(i) waives any right to further notice in
connection with the adoption;
(ii) forfeits all rights in relation to the adoptee;
and
(iii) is barred from thereafter bringing or
maintaining any action to assert any interest in the
adoptee.
Id. § 78B-6-110(6)(b). On appeal, Stepmother asserts that because
Mother received notice of the adoption proceeding on May 18,
2011, Mother’s motion to extend, which was filed more than thirty
days later on June 20, 2011, was untimely. Stepmother argues that
Mother’s late filing constitutes a “fail[ure] to fully and strictly
comply” with the requirements of subsection (6)(a) and that
Mother has therefore “forfeit[ed] all rights in relation to [Child].”
See id.
¶12 “As an appellate court, our power of review is strictly
limited to the record presented on appeal. Parties claiming error
below and seeking appellate review have the duty and
responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate
record.” Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, ¶ 16, 17 P.3d 1110
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v.
Nielsen, 2011 UT App 211, ¶ 4, 257 P.3d 1103 (per curiam) (“An
appellant has the burden to provide an adequate record for
review.” (citing Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2))). As part of fulfilling this
duty, the appellant “must . . . provide the appellate court with the
parts of the record that are central to the determination of his
appeal.”Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 10, 194 P.3d 903; see also Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(11)(C) (requiring the appellant’s brief to contain an
addendum including “those parts of the record on appeal that are
of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as
the challenged . . . conclusions of law, memorandum decision, [or]
the transcript of the court’s oral decision”). When an appellant fails
“to designate critical portions of the record as part of the record on
appeal,” see State v. Johnson, 2012 UT App 290, ¶ 7, 288 P.3d 594,

In re Adoption of A.M.O.
6. Following the filing of Mother’s answer and motion to intervene,
Stepmother filed a second motion to strike Mother’s responses and
a motion to terminate parental rights on a summary basis. As with
her first motion to strike, Stepmother cited section 78B-6-110 of the
Utah Adoption Act. But in contrast to her first motion to strike,
Stepmother’s second motion to strike argued that Mother’s answer
and motion to intervene did not comply with the court’s prior
order, which had denied Stepmother’s first motion to strike and
which had given Mother ten days to file an answer. The district
(continued...)
20120762-CA 8 2014 UT App 171
this court presumes the regularity of the proceedings below, see
Gorostieta, 2000 UT 99, ¶ 16.
¶13 Here, Stepmother has not carried her burden to ensure the
record is adequate for review because she has provided us only
with the minute entry of the district court’s order that she claims is
in error. This minute entry simply states that Stepmother’s motion
to strike Mother’s responses is denied and does not indicate the
grounds for the court’s order. Stepmother has failed to include the
transcript of the motion hearing in the record on appeal. Without
a transcript of the hearing during which the court considered and
ruled on Stepmother’s motion, we have no way to ascertain the
district court’s basis for its ruling, especially in light of the concise
nature of the district court’s minute entry. See Summer v. Summer,
2012 UT App 159, ¶ 11, 280 P.3d 451. Moreover, in her briefing to
this court, Stepmother does not explain or address the reasoning
for the district court’s decision to deny her motion to strike. See
generally Duchesne Land, LC v. Division of Consumer Prot., 2011 UT
App 153, ¶ 8, 257 P.3d 441 (concluding that by failing to address
the actual basis for the district court’s ruling, the appellants failed
to demonstrate error).
¶14 Due to Stepmother’s failure to provide an adequate record
on appeal, we do not reach the merits of her argument regarding
the statutory requirements under the Utah Adoption Act. We
therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Stepmother’s motion
to strike.6

In re Adoption of A.M.O.
6. (...continued)
court denied both of Stepmother’s motions. The transcript from the
hearing during which the district court ruled on Stepmother’s
second motion to strike is in the record on appeal. However, on
appeal, Stepmother does not effectively challenge the district
court’s ruling on her second motion to strike. Instead, Stepmother’s
argument on appeal focuses on the issue presented in her first
motion to strike: whether Mother’s motion to extend complied with
statutory requirements. As we have explained, Stepmother has not
presented an adequate record for us to review the court’s ruling on
that issue.
20120762-CA 9 2014 UT App 171
II. Findings on Best Interest
¶15 Stepmother challenges the district court’s determination that
termination of Mother’s rights was not in Child’s best interest.
Specifically, Stepmother argues that after having found grounds for
termination, the district court failed to make adequate findings of
fact on the issue of whether termination of Mother’s parental rights
would be in Child’s best interest.
¶16 In order to terminate parental rights, the court must make
two separate findings supported by clear and convincing evidence.
In re Adoption of T.H., 2007 UT App 341, ¶¶ 11, 15, 171 P.3d 480; see
also In re A.C.M., 2009 UT 30, ¶ 23, 221 P.3d 185. “First, it must find
grounds for termination under Utah Code section 78A-6-507.” In
re A.C.M., 2009 UT 30, ¶ 23. See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-
506 to -508 (LexisNexis 2012) (setting forth the grounds for
termination and evidentiary presumptions and factors that shall be
considered in determining if grounds for termination exist).
“Second, [it] must find that termination of the parent’s rights is in
the best interests of the child.” In re A.C.M., 2009 UT 30, ¶ 23; see
also In re Adoption of T.H., 2007 UT App 341, ¶ 15 (instructing that
both findings are required when evaluating the termination of
parental rights even when the issue arises in the context of an
adoption proceeding). Here, the district court determined that
Stepmother had established by clear and convincing evidence that
grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights. See Utah

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20120762-CA 10 2014 UT App 171
Code Ann. § 78A-6-507(1) (listing grounds for termination). Even
though it found grounds for termination, the district court declined
to terminate Mother’s parental rights, reasoning that Stepmother
had not established that termination would be in Child’s best
interest because Mother could possibly be a fit parent going
forward. On appeal, Stepmother takes issue with the adequacy of
the district court’s findings to support its best interest
determination.
¶17 “[I]n every case, the best interest of the child is of paramount
importance in determining whether the child–parent relationship
should be permanently severed.” In re J.D., 2011 UT App 184, ¶ 26,
257 P.3d 1062. “[W]hile evidence of unfitness may be probative of
both factors of the termination analysis, the best interests analysis
includes consideration of the impact of termination on the child,
rather than simply on evaluating whether the statutory grounds for
termination have been met.” In re M.J., 2013 UT App 122, ¶ 26, 302
P.3d 485 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In
determining whether termination of a parent’s rights is in the best
interest of a child, the . . . court must, at a minimum, consider [the
statutory factors].” See In re D.R.A., 2011 UT App 397, ¶ 10, 266
P.3d 844. Those factors include
(a) the physical, mental, or emotional condition and
needs of the child and his desires regarding the
termination, if the court determines he is of sufficient
capacity to express his desires; and
(b) the effort the parent . . . [has] made to adjust [her]
circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in
the child’s best interest to return him to his home
after a reasonable length of time, including . . .
(i) payment of a reasonable portion of
substitute physical care and maintenance, if
financially able;
(ii) maintenance of regular parent-time or
other contact with the child . . . ; and
(iii) maintenance of regular contact and
communication with the custodian of the child.

In re Adoption of A.M.O.
20120762-CA 11 2014 UT App 171
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-509(1) (LexisNexis 2012). Further, “the
court may also consider any other evidence that is probative of
what is in the child’s best interest.” In re T.E., 2011 UT 51, ¶ 18, 266
P.3d 739 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-509(1) (LexisNexis Supp.
2011) (current version at id. (2012))).
¶18 Although we have “recognize[d] that only rarely will a
child’s best interests not be served by terminating the rights of an
unfit parent,” In re D.R.A., 2011 UT App 397, ¶ 21; see also In re
Adoption of A.F.K., 2009 UT App 198, ¶ 33, 216 P.3d 980 (“When a
party proves that the parental bond was destroyed under the
abandonment analysis, this showing ordinarily satisfies the best
interest requirement necessary to terminate parental rights.”), we
also have recognized that “[i]t is conceivable that grounds for
termination may exist, but termination nonetheless is not in the
best interest of the child[],” In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 13, 21 P.3d
680; see also id. ¶ 12 (“[A] situation may arise where there are
grounds for termination, and adoption would be the best goal for
the children, but at the time of the termination hearing, termination
may not be in the best interest of the children.”). Indeed, “Utah
courts have declined to terminate parental rights, even after finding
parental misconduct, where it is not in the child’s best interests.” In
re B.M.S., 2003 UT App 51, ¶ 18, 65 P.3d 639. For example,
termination may not be in the best interest of a child when it would
result in the loss of the child’s rights. See In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66,
¶ 13. The case of In re B.M.S., 2003 UT App 51, 65 P.3d 639,
illustrates such a circumstance. There, the juvenile court decided
not to terminate a father’s parental rights even after it found
abandonment and neglect as grounds for termination. Id. ¶¶ 15–16.
On appeal, we affirmed the juvenile court’s conclusion that
termination would not be in the child’s best interest, “because
termination would end all [the father’s] support obligations to his
legal child.” Id. ¶ 20. Thus, there are situations in which a finding
of a ground for termination does not inevitably lead to a finding
that termination is in the best interest of a child. See, e.g., In re
D.R.A., 2011 UT App 397, ¶ 19 (concluding that termination was
premature where the mother argued that “the continuity and
stability that flow from maintaining her visitation rights [was] in

In re Adoption of A.M.O.
20120762-CA 12 2014 UT App 171
Daughter’s best interest” and where “Daughter [had] an
established, loving relationship with Mother, [was] generally doing
well in her current placement, and object[ed] to termination and
adoption”); In re R.A.J., 1999 UT App 329, ¶ 24, 991 P.2d 1118
(affirming the juvenile court’s refusal to terminate parental rights
based on the failure of the petitioners to show that termination was
in the child’s best interest, and noting that “the court did not err in
failing to presume that, once it found grounds for termination,
termination was in the child’s best interests”).
¶19 In considering whether to terminate parental rights—and to
permit meaningful appellate review of the court’s ultimate
determination—the district court’s findings “must be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the
evidence upon which they are grounded.” In re S.T., 928 P.2d 393,
398 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,
477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (“In all
actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . , the court shall find
the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon . . . .”). However, the court need not “separately hear and
consider evidence pertaining to unfitness and best interests.” In re
S.T., 928 P.2d at 399. Similarly, the court need not render “two
different sets of findings and conclusions.” Id. at 399–400. And in
weighing the statutory factors, the court is not required to
expressly refer to the factors, but the court’s findings ought to be
sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that the court’s analysis
considered the substance of those factors. Cf. In re M.C., 940 P.2d
1229, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (“Once the trial court has found, as
it did in this case, that there has been an incident of serious child
abuse, it is incumbent upon the trial court to enter sufficiently
detailed findings of fact explaining why a parent’s rights are
nonetheless to be preserved.”); In re S.T., 928 P.2d at 400 (“While
the juvenile court did not expressly refer to the statute when
considering [the best interests] factors, the court’s findings are
replete with detailed discussion of the offered services, the
children’s conditions and needs, and appellants’ efforts.”).

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20120762-CA 13 2014 UT App 171
¶20 “[A]s a practical matter, where grounds for termination are
established, the conclusion that termination will be in the child[]’s
best interest follows almost automatically.” In re J.D., 2011 UT App
184, ¶ 34 (Orme, J., concurring specially); cf. In re J.R.T., 750 P.2d
1234, 1238 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (“If the parent–child relationship
has been destroyed by the parent’s conduct, or lack of conduct, it
is usually in the best interest of the child to terminate that
relationship and allow the child an opportunity to establish a
meaningful relationship with loving, responsible parents.”).
Nevertheless, the existence of grounds for termination is not
necessarily inconsistent with a finding that termination is not in a
child’s best interest. Cf. In re Adoption of T.H., 2007 UT App 341,
¶ 15 (explaining that the court is required to find both grounds for
termination and that termination is in a child’s best interest before
terminating parental rights); In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 14
(noting that “a permanency goal of adoption is not necessarily
inconsistent with ongoing parental rights”). In such cases, the
court’s “findings should . . . articulate[] the court’s reasoning where
it simultaneously declined to terminate parental rights” and found
grounds to terminate those rights. Cf. In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66,
¶ 14 (“[W]e vacate the permanency order and remand for further
findings articulating the reasoning behind simultaneously denying
the petition to terminate parental rights while setting a permanency
goal of adoption . . . .”).
¶21 In this case, we agree with Stepmother that the district
court’s best interest analysis is not sufficiently detailed.
Notwithstanding the district court’s stated intent to resolve
“whether given all of the facts and circumstances[, termination] is
in [Child’s] best interest,” the district court’s analysis does not
indicate which particular facts and circumstances it relied upon in
reaching its conclusion that terminating Mother’s rights would not
be in Child’s best interest. Rather, the district court’s best interest
analysis is conclusory and does not incorporate an on-the-record
consideration of the statutory factors involved in conducting a best
interest analysis. For instance, the district court stated that it heard
no evidence regarding Child’s wishes or the nature of his
understanding of his relationship with Mother, but the court

In re Adoption of A.M.O.
7. We also note that Stepmother argued to the district court that
termination would be in Child’s best interest especially if Father
were to have an untimely death. In that event, Child would be
returned to Mother, his surviving parent, even though the district
court had adjudicated the existence of grounds for termination of
Mother’s rights. Stepmother also argued that Child would be
returned to Mother in the event that Father, a member of the
United States Army Reserve, was deployed. The district court did
not make any findings relating to this argument, even though
Father’s potential deployment would appear to be relevant to the
issue of Child’s best interest.
20120762-CA 14 2014 UT App 171
otherwise did not address Child’s “physical, mental, or emotional
condition.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-509(1)(a). Instead, the
district court merely noted that Stepmother presented “very little
evidence” on the issue of best interest and then stated that the court
was not “convince[d]” by that evidence that it would be in Child’s
best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
¶22 Without more detailed findings, we cannot discern the basis
for the conclusion that this is one of those rare cases where
termination is not in the best interest of the child despite the
existence of grounds for termination. Because the district court’s7
statements “provide no insight into the evidentiary basis for the
trial court’s decision,” see Woodward, 823 P.2d at 478, and do not
explain why the two requirements for termination are not “satisfied
hand-in-glove” in this case, see In re J.D., 2011 UT App 184, ¶ 36,
257 P.3d 1062 (Orme, J., concurring specially), the district court’s
findings are inadequate. Accordingly, we reverse the district
court’s order denying the petition to terminate parental rights. “We
do not intend our remand to be merely an exercise in bolstering
and supporting the conclusion already reached.” Woodward, 823
P.2d at 479 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather,
upon remand, the district court should reassess whether
termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best interest
and shall enter findings and reasoning adequate to support its
ultimate decision to grant or deny Stepmother’s petition to
terminate.

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20120762-CA 15 2014 UT App 171
CONCLUSION
¶23 We affirm the district court’s denial of Stepmother’s motion
to strike Mother’s pleadings because Stepmother has not presented
an adequate record on appeal to permit us to consider this issue on
the merits. The district court’s findings regarding Child’s best
interest are not sufficiently detailed. We therefore reverse the
district court’s order denying the petition to terminate and remand
for further consideration and the entry of adequately detailed
findings.