State ex rel. Z.C.

1 Throughout this opinion, we employ the term “consensual”
in its conventional, rather than its legal, sense. 	Children
under the age of fourteen cannot legally consent to intercourse
or sexual touching in the state of Utah. 	Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-406(9) (2003).
2007 UT 54
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
State of Utah, in the interest 	No. 20060096
of Z.C., a person under
eighteen years of age.
F I L E D
Z.C.,
Petitioner. 	July 17, 2007
---
Second District Juvenile, Ogden Dep’t
The Honorable J. Mark Andrus
No. 160553
Attorneys: 	Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Matthew D. Bates,
Asst. Att’y Gen., Salt Lake City, and Mark R.
DeCaria, Ogden, for the State
Randall W. Richards, Dee W. Smith, Ogden, for Z.C.
---
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
PARRISH, Justice:
BACKGROUND
¶1 	When she was thirteen years old, Z.C. engaged in
consensual 1 sex with a twelve-year-old boy and became pregnant.
The state prosecutor chose to file delinquency petitions against
both Z.C. and the boy for sexual abuse of a child under Utah Code
section 76-5-404.1, a crime that would constitute a second degree
felony if committed by an adult. 	The twelve-year-old boy was
adjudicated delinquent and given probation. 	Z.C. moved to
dismiss the delinquency petition filed against her on the grounds
that it violated her constitutional rights and that the

No. 20060096 	2
legislature could not have intended such a result. 	The juvenile
court denied Z.C.’s motion.
¶2 	Z.C. then entered an admission to the delinquency
petition on condition that she be able to appeal the denial of
her motion to dismiss. 	As a result of her admission, the
juvenile court adjudicated Z.C. delinquent for sexual abuse of a
child but imposed a relatively light punishment. 	The court
ordered her to obey the reasonable requests of her parents, to
write an essay regarding her child and the effect of her actions
on the child, to have no unsupervised contact with the father of
her child, to provide a DNA sample, and to pay a $75 DNA
processing fee.
¶3 	Z.C. appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which,
“with some reluctance,” affirmed the juvenile court. 	State ex
rel. Z.C., 2005 UT App 562, ¶ 1, 128 P.3d 561. 	We granted
certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision.
ANALYSIS
¶4 	Z.C. presents two arguments to this court. 	First, Z.C.
asserts that it was not the legislature’s intent that a child be
charged with sexual abuse of a child for engaging in consensual
sexual activity with another child. 	Second, Z.C. asserts that if
this were the legislature’s intent, Utah Code section 76-5-404.1
violates her state constitutional right to the uniform operation
of the law. 	See Utah Const. art. I, § 24.
¶5 	We address the statutory claim first because “‘this
Court should avoid addressing constitutional issues unless
required to do so.’” 	Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ¶ 10, 5 P.3d
616 (quoting World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency
Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1994)). 	In so doing, we find that
the plain language of Utah Code section 76-5-404.1 allows Z.C. to
be adjudicated delinquent for child sex abuse. 	However, we also
find that applying the statute to treat Z.C. as both a victim and
a perpetrator of child sex abuse for the same act leads to an
absurd result that was not intended by the legislature. 	As such,
we reverse the court of appeals and vacate Z.C.’s delinquency
adjudication. 	We therefore need not reach her constitutional
claim.
I. 	THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE SECTION 76-5-404.1
¶6 	“When interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to
evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature.” 	State v.
Martinez, 2002 UT 80, ¶ 8, 52 P.3d 1276 (internal quotation marks

2 “A person commits rape of a child when the person has
sexual intercourse with a child who is under the age of 14.”
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402.1(1) (2003). 	Z.C. admitted having
intercourse with a twelve-year-old boy and did, in fact, become
pregnant. 	Under the literal language of the statute, therefore,
both Z.C. and the twelve-year-old boy could have been adjudicated
delinquent for rape of a child, a first degree felony if
committed by an adult, which carries a minimum six-year sentence
without parole and may be punished by life imprisonment without
possibility of parole. 	Id. §§ 76-5-402.1(2), 76-3-406.
3 	No. 20060096
omitted). 	The first step of statutory interpretation is to
evaluate the best evidence of legislative intent: 	“the plain
language of the statute itself.” 	Id. 	“When examining the
statutory language we assume the legislature used each term
advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning.” 	Id.
¶7 	Utah’s child sex abuse statute, which deals with sexual
touching that does not amount to rape of a child, 2 reads as
follows:
(1) As used in this section, “child” means a
person under the age of 14.
(2) A person commits sexual abuse of a child
if, under circumstances not amounting to rape
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy
upon a child, or an attempt to commit any of
these offenses, the actor touches the anus,
buttocks, or genitalia of any child, the
breast of a female child, or otherwise takes
indecent liberties with a child, or causes a
child to take indecent liberties with the
actor or another with intent to cause
substantial emotional or bodily pain to any
person or with the intent to arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person
regardless of the sex of any participant.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(1)-(2) (2003) (emphasis added).
¶8 	Z.C. contends that children under the age of fourteen
cannot commit child sex abuse because they are not included
within the definition of a “person” under this statute. 	More
specifically, she argues that the juxtaposition of the definition
of the term “child” in subsection (1) with the statute’s use of
the term “person” in subsection (2) creates an ambiguity as to
whether children are included within the term “person.” 	A close

3 In Savage v. Utah Youth Village, we also recognized that
this court will disregard the plain language of a statute if it
is “‘unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant
contravention of the express purpose of a statute.’” 	2004 UT
102, ¶ 18, 104 P.3d 1242 (quoting Perrine v. Kennecott Mining
(continued...)
No. 20060096 	4
reading of the statute, however, belies the proposition that such
a limited definition of the term “person” is plausible.
¶9 	The statute itself defines a child as a “person under
the age of 14,” tacitly acknowledging that a child falls within
the definition of the more general term “person.” 	In addition,
excluding children under the age of fourteen from the definition
of “person” is problematic because the statute uses the term
“person” to discuss the victim of the crime. 	In order to convict
an adult of child sex abuse, the State must show that the
individual acted either with intent to sexually gratify any
person or with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily
harm to any person. 	Id. § 76-5-404.1(2). 	If children are
excluded from the definition of “person” under this statute, an
adult who sexually touched a child with the sole intent to
emotionally damage the child could not be held accountable
because the child would not be a “person.” 	Avoiding such a
patently absurd result while maintaining Z.C.’s interpretation of
the statute requires an unreasonably tortured reading in which
“person” means one thing at the beginning of subsection (2) and
quite another at the end of that same subsection.
¶10 	We accordingly find that Z.C.’s proposed interpretation
of the statute is untenable and instead read the statute pursuant
to the commonly accepted definition of “person,” which includes
children. 	Black’s Law Dictionary 1162 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a
person as “[a] human being”); Webster’s New Twentieth Century
Dictionary 1338 (2d ed. 1983) (defining a person as “an
individual human being . . . an individual man, woman, or
child”). 	Thus, under the plain language of the statute, a child
is a person and may be adjudicated delinquent for sexually
touching another child with the requisite intent.
II. 	ABSURD RESULT
¶11 	Normally, where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, our analysis ends; our duty is to give effect to
that plain meaning. 	However, “[a]n equally well-settled caveat
to the plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow
the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works an
absurd result.” 3 	Savage v. Utah Youth Vill., 2004 UT 102, ¶ 18,

3 (...continued)
Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996)). 	Because we hold that
Utah Code section 76-5-404.1 produces an absurd result in this
case, we do not address other exceptions to the plain meaning
rule.
5 	No. 20060096
104 P.3d 1242. 	The absurd results canon of statutory
construction recognizes that although “the plain language
interpretation of a statute enjoys a robust presumption in its
favor, it is also true that [a legislative body] cannot, in every
instance, be counted on to have said what it meant or to have
meant what it said.” 	FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 638 (1982)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
¶12 	In defining the parameters of what constitutes an
absurd result, we note the inherent tension in this canon of
construction between refraining from blind obedience to the
letter of the law that leads to patently absurd ends and avoiding
an improper usurpation of legislative power through judicial
second guessing of the wisdom of a legislative act. 	See West
Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982) (“[I]t is not
the duty of this Court to assess the wisdom of the statutory
scheme.”) 	As was recognized by Blackstone, this tension defines
the proper boundaries of the absurd result doctrine:
[A]nd if there arise out of [the acts of
parliament] collaterally any absurd
consequences, manifestly contradictory to
common reason, they are, with regard to those
collateral consequences, void. 	I lay down
the rule with these restrictions; though I
know it is generally laid down more largely,
that acts of parliament contrary to reason
are void. 	But if the parliament will
positively enact a thing to be done which is
unreasonable, I know of no power that can
control it: 	and the examples usually alleged
in support of this sense of the rule do none
of them prove, that where the main object of
a statute is unreasonable the judges are at
liberty to reject it; for that were to set
the judicial power above that of the
legislature, which would be subversive of all
government. 	But where some collateral matter
arises out of the general words, and happens
to be unreasonable; there the judges are in
decency to conclude that this consequence was
not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore

No. 20060096 	6
they are at liberty to expound the statute by
equity, and only quoad hoc disregard it.
William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries *91. 	Thus, as is common to
all rules of statutory construction, the guiding star of the
absurd results doctrine is the intent of the pertinent
legislative body, which limits the application of this canon of
construction. 	Rather than controverting legislative power, the
absurd results doctrine functions to preserve legislative intent
when it is narrowly applied. 	Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep’t
of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“When used in a proper manner, this narrow exception to our
normal rule of statutory construction does not intrude upon the
lawmaking powers of Congress, but rather demonstrates a respect
for the coequal Legislative Branch, which we assume would not act
in an absurd way.”); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“This is not the substitution of the
will of the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently
words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad
enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of
the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such
broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that
the legislator intended to include the particular act.”).
Therefore, in deference to Congress, the Supreme Court has noted
that this canon of statutory interpretation applies only where
the result is so absurd that “‘Congress could not possibly have
intended’” it. 	Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 470 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (quoting FBI, 456 U.S. at 640 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
¶13 	Other than the directive that a result must be so
absurd that the legislative body which authored the legislation
could not have intended it, there is no precise legal standard to
determine what legislatures would consider to be an absurd
result. 	See Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of
Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory
Interpretation, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 127, 128 (1994). 	This comes as
no surprise because the absurd, by definition, evades neat
categorization. 	The contours of the doctrine, therefore, are
best traced by referring to examples of what both the Supreme
Court and this court have deemed to be an absurd result.
¶14 	In one of its earliest applications of the absurd
result doctrine, the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret a
federal statute that made it a crime to “knowingly and willfully
obstruct or retard the passage of the mail.” 	United States v.
Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 482 (1869) (internal quotation marks

4 Veronica M. Dougherty, supra ¶ 13, at 139 & n.51.
5 A related but separate canon of statutory interpretation
states that when the statutory language plausibly presents the
court with two alternative readings, we prefer the reading that
avoids absurd results. 	State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, ¶ 12, 992
P.2d 986; Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 n.39
(Utah 1991). 	We avoid citing cases that utilize this form of
(continued...)
7 	No. 20060096
omitted). 	The statute was applied to a sheriff and his posse who
had boarded a steamboat and executed an arrest warrant for murder
against a mail carrier who was in the process of transporting the
mail. 	Id. at 482-83. 	The Court held that in order to avoid such
an absurd result, it is “presumed that the legislature intended
exceptions to its language.” 	Id. at 487. 	As such, “[g]eneral
terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to
injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence.” 	Id. at 486.
The Court supported this proposition with two frequently cited 4
historical illustrations of the principle:
The common sense of man approves the
judgment mentioned by Puffendorf, that the
Bolognian law which enacted, “that whoever
drew blood in the streets should be punished
with the utmost severity,” did not extend to
the surgeon who opened the vein of a person
that fell down in the street in a fit. 	The
same common sense accepts the ruling, cited
by Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward
II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks
prison shall be guilty of felony, does not
extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the
prison is on fire--“for he is not to be
hanged because he would not stay to be
burnt.” 	And we think that a like common
sense will sanction the ruling we make, that
the act of Congress which punishes the
obstruction or retarding of the passage of
the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply
to a case of temporary detention of the mail
caused by the arrest of the carrier upon an
indictment for murder.
Id. at 487.
¶15 	More recent examples of what has been considered absurd
can be found in the decisions of this court. 5 	In Tschaggeny v.

5 (...continued)
statutory interpretation because this canon of construction does
not necessitate the level of caution required when this court
interprets a statute contrary to its plain meaning.
6 It is undisputed that Z.C. and the boy engaged in more
than just sexual touching, but we must analyze the absurd result
question in the context of the law actually applied and the act
with which the State chose to charge Z.C., not the law that might
have been applied or the act with which the State could have
charged Z.C.
No. 20060096 	8
Milbank Insurance Co., 2007 UT 37, ¶¶ 26-28, 163 P.3d 615, we
were called upon to interpret a statute that requires the court
to grant the plaintiff interest on special damages awarded by the
jury “from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to
the cause of action to the date of entering the judgment.” 	Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-44(2) (2002). 	In that case, the defendant had
made a payment to the plaintiff well before the date of the
trial, which the trial judge had deducted from the final jury
award. 	Tschaggeny, 2007 UT 37, ¶ 7. 	Under the relevant statute,
however, the plaintiff sought interest on this pretrial payment
for the full statutory period, even for the time after the money
had already been remitted to her. 	Id. ¶ 27. 	We found that
“[b]ecause the clear purpose of section 78-27-44(2) is to
compensate wronged parties for delays in recovering damages, it
is absurd to require a defendant to pay interest on money that
has already been remitted to the plaintiff.” 	Id. ¶ 28.
¶16 	And in Savage, 2004 UT 102, ¶¶ 14, 19, we were called
on to interpret Utah Code section 78-12-25.1(2), which provides
that “[a] person shall file a civil action for intentional or
negligent sexual abuse suffered as a child . . . within four
years after the person attains the age of 18 years.” 	We noted
that the plain language of the statute would bar a minor from
pursuing a civil suit for sexual abuse until he attained 18 years
of age. 	Savage, 2004 UT 102, ¶ 19. 	Thus, a plain language
reading would have barred the three-year-old victim in that case
from filing a civil suit for fifteen years from the time of
abuse. 	Id. ¶¶ 5, 19. 	We simply noted that “[s]uch a result
would be absurd.” 	Id. ¶ 19.
¶17 	With these precedents in mind, we examine whether Utah
Code section 76-5-404.1 has been applied so as to produce an
absurd result in this case. 	Because we conclude that the
legislature could not possibly have intended to punish both
children under the child sex abuse statute for the same act of
consensual heavy petting, 6 we hold that applying the plain
language of the statute in this case produces an absurd result.

7 If one of several aggravating factors can be shown by the
State, a perpetrator can be convicted of aggravated sexual abuse
of a child, a first degree felony if committed by an adult, which
is punishable by a minimum of five years of imprisonment without
parole, and potentially life imprisonment without parole. 	Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-404.1(4)-(5), 76-3-406 (2003). 	Under the
State’s proposed application of the law, therefore, if Z.C.
committed more than five “separate acts” of sexual touching, she
could be adjudicated delinquent for aggravated sexual abuse of a
child. 	See id. § 76-5-404.1(4)(g).
8 Taking each delinquency adjudication separately, of
course, there is only one perpetrator and one victim. 	In the
twelve-year-old boy’s adjudication, he stood in the role of
perpetrator and Z.C. stood in the role of victim, while in Z.C.’s
adjudication, the State simply reversed these roles. 	In other
words, the children were alternatively treated as both victims
(continued...)
9 	No. 20060096
¶18 	Sexual abuse of a child is one of the most heinous
crimes recognized by our penal code. 	The gravity of this crime
is reflected by the fact that it is punished as a second degree
felony if committed by an adult. 7 	Child sex abuse merits serious
penalties because of the extreme psychological harm that the
perpetrator causes the victim. 	Therefore, like all forms of
sexual assault, child sex abuse presupposes that a single act of
abuse involves a victim, whom the statute endeavors to protect,
and a perpetrator, whom the statute punishes for harming the
victim. 	See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(4)(b)-(d), (f), (h), (i)
(2003) (describing the aggravating factors, which if perpetrated
against “the victim” merit an elevated charge of aggravated
sexual abuse of a child); id. § 76-5-406 (describing the
situations in which “the victim” has not consented for sexual
assault crimes); id. § 76-5-405(1) (describing the aggravating
factors, which if perpetrated against “the victim” merit an
elevated charge of aggravated sexual assault); id. § 76-5-402
(referencing “the victim” of rape); id. § 76-5-404 (referencing
“the victim” of forcible sexual abuse); id. § 76-5-402.2
(referencing “the victim” of object rape).
¶19 	The State, however, applies Utah Code section
76-5-404.1 in an unprecedented manner. 	By filing delinquency
petitions for child sex abuse against both participants for
sexually touching one another, the State treats both children as
perpetrators of the same act. 	In this situation, there is no
discernible victim that the law seeks to protect, only culpable
participants that the State seeks to punish. 8 	We know of no

8 (...continued)
and perpetrators for the same act. 	Because it would be
unthinkable to file even “civil” juvenile court proceedings
against a true victim of such a heinous crime, we conclude that
the State’s double prosecution of these children is best
characterized as charging both as perpetrators for the same act.
9 The primary fail-safe against the absurd application of
criminal law is the wise employment of prosecutorial discretion,
a quality that is starkly absent in this case. 	While the State
makes no attempt to defend the prosecution’s charging decision,
it suggests that the particular offense selected by the
prosecutor as the basis for the delinquency petition is not
significant because a juvenile delinquency adjudication is not a
criminal conviction, but merely a means to bring the juvenile
within the guiding supervision of the juvenile court. 	If this is
truly the case, it begs the question of why the prosecutor could
not have accomplished the intended result by basing the
delinquency petition on a victimless offense that more accurately
fits the conduct at issue.
No. 20060096 	10
other instance in which the State has attempted to apply any
sexual assault crime to produce such an effect. 9
¶20 	We acknowledge that the legislature has demonstrated
its intent to punish both participants in victimless,
extramarital sexual activity under Utah’s adultery and
fornication statutes. 	Id. §§ 76-7-103, -104. 	However, these
statutes differ from sexual assault crimes, such as child sex
abuse, in both the theory and degree of punishment. 	Rather than
punishing an actor who has perpetrated a crime against a victim,
these laws demonstrate the legislature’s disapproval of the acts
of both participants for violating a moral standard. 	Cf. State
v. Houston, 2000 UT App 242, ¶ 11, 9 P.3d 188 (noting that Utah
Code section 76-3-201(4), which allows a court to order
restitution to the victim of a crime, did not apply to a
conviction of fornication because it involves consensual sexual
conduct). 	Because these crimes do not involve a victim, they
involve a lesser degree of punishment. 	Both adultery and
fornication are punishable as class B misdemeanors. 	Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-7-103(2), -104(2) (2003). 	Thus, while the legislature
clearly could have intended some degree of simultaneous
culpability for both Z.C. and the twelve-year-old boy under the
fornication statute in order to discourage their admittedly
reckless and age-inappropriate behavior, it is absurd to conclude
that the legislature intended to simultaneously punish both
children for child sex abuse, a crime that clearly envisions a
perpetrator and a victim.

11 	No. 20060096
¶21 	A review of the floor debates regarding the 1983
enactment of the Child Kidnaping and Sexual Abuse Act, L. 1983,
ch. 88, § 24, which created Utah Code section 76-5-404.1, reveals
no evidence that the legislature contemplated application of the
statute to situations where the same child was both victim and
perpetrator. 	See House floor debate on H.B. 209, March 1, 1983;
Senate floor debate on H.B. 209, March 8, 1983. 	Although we
generally do not consult legislative history where the meaning of
the statute is clear, after finding that the plain meaning has
been applied in an absurd manner, we seek to confirm that the
absurd application was indeed unintended by the legislature. 	See
Green v. Block Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring), superseded by statute as stated in
United States v. Spencer, 25 F.3d 1105, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“I
think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materials,
including the background of Rule 609(a)(1) and the legislative
history of its adoption, to verify that what seems to us an
unthinkable disposition . . . was indeed unthought of, and thus
to justify a departure from the ordinary meaning of the word
“defendant” in the Rule. 	For that purpose, however, it would
suffice to observe that counsel have not provided, nor have we
discovered, a shred of evidence that anyone has ever proposed or
assumed such a bizarre disposition.”).
¶22 	Recent legislative developments bolster our conclusion
that the children’s simultaneous delinquency adjudications could
not have been intended by the legislature. 	In reaction to the
court of appeals’ disposition in this case, the legislature
passed a bill that amended the diversion statute to avoid the
application of the child sex abuse statute in similar cases. 	See
Juvenile Offenses Diversion Amendment, L. 2006, ch. 166, § 1
(codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-9(2) (Supp. 2006)).
Although the previous version of the statute forbade diversions
for crimes “involving a sexual offense against a victim who is
under the age of 14,” Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-9 (2003), the amended
version allows diversions for sexual offenses committed by
individuals under the age of sixteen as long as “the person did
not use coercion or force; there is no more than two years’
difference between the ages of the participants; and it would be
in the best interest of the person to grant diversion,” id.
§ 77-2-9(2) (Supp. 2006). 	The State argues that because the
legislature did not change the underlying child sex abuse
statute, it did envision the prosecution of victims as
perpetrators, as happened in this case. 	We disagree. 	The
underlying purpose of the amendment was undoubtedly to prevent
future delinquency adjudications similar to Z.C.’s. 	In fact, the
sponsor of the bill in the House stated, “I think most of us

10 Our analysis would likewise apply to all cases similar to
Z.C.’s even if the State elected to charge only one of the minors
involved. 	We hold that the application of Utah Code section
76-5-404.1 is absurd where no true perpetrator or victim exists.
And the State may not create a perpetrator and a victim through
(continued...)
No. 20060096 	12
would agree that when twelve and thirteen years olds get involved
in this kind of behavior it’s certainly not something we want to
allow or encourage. 	We also probably do not want to convict them
both of ‘rape of a child’ . . . .” 	Comments of Rep. Fowlke,
House floor debate on S.B. 167, March 1, 2006.
¶23 	We conclude that the legislature could not have
intended the child sex abuse statute to be applied to punish Z.C.
for the conduct at issue. 	And the fact that this is a juvenile
court disposition, in which the judge enjoys considerable
latitude in crafting punishments and assigning state services
designed to help the child, does not change our conclusion. 	No
amount of judicial lenity to compensate for the absurd
application of the law changes the fact that the application of
the law was absurd to begin with. 	Moreover, labeling Z.C. with
the moniker of “child abuser,” even within the juvenile court
system, can have serious consequences that were not intended by
the legislature. 	A delinquency adjudication for sexual abuse of
a child can lead to sentencing enhancements for any offenses Z.C.
might commit while she is a juvenile or even as an adult if her
juvenile record is not expunged. 	Such an adjudication also has
the potential to affect any civil proceedings related to the
custody of her child or any future attempts to seek child support
from the father.
¶24 	We therefore vacate Z.C.’s adjudication. 	We stress,
however, that our holding is narrowly confined to the application
of Utah Code section 76-5-404.1 in situations where no true
victim or perpetrator can be identified. 	Even among children
under the age of fourteen, there are unfortunately situations
where an older or more physically mature child abuses a younger
or smaller child. 	In cases where there is an identifiable
distinction between the perpetrator and the victim, it is
manifestly logical to conclude that the legislature intended to
include such acts within the scope of Utah Code section
76-5-404.1. 	In Z.C.’s case, however, where both children were
under the age of fourteen and were of similar age, where both
children met the intent requirement of the statute, and where
there was no evidence of any coercion or force, we conclude that
application of the child sex abuse statute produces an absurd
result. 10

10 (...continued)
selective prosecution. 	Rather, charges against the perpetrator
must be based upon a material gap in the maturity of the two
participants, evidence of coercion or force, or a wider age
differential than exists in this case.
13 	No. 20060096
CONCLUSION
¶25 	Even though the plain language of section 76-5-404.1
allows Z.C. to be adjudicated delinquent for sexual abuse of a
child, we conclude that the filing of delinquency petitions
against both participants produces an absurd result not intended
by the legislature because, like all sexual assault crimes, the
statute presupposes a perpetrator and a victim. 	We therefore
hold that the juvenile court erred in denying Z.C.’s motion to
dismiss the delinquency petition. 	We remand this matter to the
court of appeals with instructions to remand it to the juvenile
court to vacate Z.C.’s delinquency adjudication.
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¶26 	Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, and Justice
Nehring concur in Justice Parrish’s opinion.
¶27 	Associate Chief Justice Wilkins concurs in the result.