Gloria Gayle Elkins v DSS for County of Campbell

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
GLORIA GAYLE ELKINS MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. 	Record No. 1878-98-3 	PER CURIAM
JANUARY 26, 1999
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMPBELL
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY
J. Samuel Johnston, Jr., Judge
(Grady W. Donaldson, Jr.; Schenkel &
Donaldson, on brief), for appellant.
(David W. Shreve, County Attorney, on brief),
for appellee.
(Aubrey J. Rosser, Jr., on brief), Guardian
ad litem for infant children.
Gloria Gayle Elkins appeals the decision of the circuit
court terminating her parental rights to her five children.
Elkins contends that the Department of Social Services for the
County of Campbell failed to present clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to meet the requirements of Code § 16.1-283.
Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude
that this appeal is without merit. 	Accordingly, we summarily
affirm the decision of the trial court. 	See Rule 5A:27.
"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."
*Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.

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Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Development, 13 Va. App.
123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). 	"Code § 16.1-283 embodies
'the statutory scheme for the . . . termination of residual
parental rights in this Commonwealth' [which] . . . 'provides
detailed procedures designed to protect the rights of the parents
and their child,' balancing their interests while seeking to
preserve the family." 	Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456
S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) (citations omitted). 	"'In matters of a
child's welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in
making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child's
best interests.'" 	Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463
(citation omitted). 	The trial judge's findings, "'when based on
evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" 	Id. (citation
omitted).
Code § 16.1-283(B)
Under Code § 16.1-283(B), parental rights to a child found
to be neglected or abused and placed in foster care may be
terminated if the trial judge finds, by clear and convincing
evidence, that termination is in the child's best interests and
that: 1. 	The neglect or abuse suffered by such
child presented a serious and substantial
threat to his life, health, or development;
and
2. 	It is not reasonably likely that the
conditions which resulted in such neglect or
abuse can be substantially corrected or
eliminated so as to allow the child's safe
return to his parent . . . within a

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reasonable period of time.
The statute allows proof of the following circumstances to
constitute prima facie evidence of the conditions set out in
subdivision (B)(2):
a. 	The parent . . . [is] suffering from a
mental or emotional illness or mental
deficiency of such severity that there is no
reasonable expectation that such parent will
be able to undertake responsibility for the
care needed by the child in accordance with
his age and stage of development; [or]
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
c. 	The parent . . ., without good cause,
[has] not responded to or followed through
with appropriate, available and reasonable
rehabilitative efforts on the part of social,
medical, mental health or other
rehabilitative agencies designed to reduce,
eliminate or prevent the neglect or abuse of
the child.
Code § 16.1-283(B)(2).
The trial judge found clear and convincing evidence that
termination of Elkins' parental rights was in the best interests
of the children, that the children were neglected and placed in
foster care by court commitment, that the neglect presented a
serious and substantial threat to the lives, health, and
development of the children, and that it was not reasonably
likely the neglect could be substantially corrected or eliminated
to allow the children's safe return to Elkins. 	The trial judge
also found that Elkins suffered from a mental or emotional
illness or mental deficiency of such severity that there was no
reasonable expectation that she would be able to care for the

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children and that Elkins failed, without good cause, to respond
to the appropriate and available rehabilitative services offered.
A psychological evaluation noted the following:
Elkins is not psychotic and not mentally
retarded, but she is emotionally unstable and
very limited in her intellectual resources,
significantly lacking in parenting skills and
emotional resources needed for effective
parenting and probably not very open to
improvement or change in part because of her
rigidity and in part because of limited
potential for learning.
The evidence further established that Elkins responded
inappropriately to the majority of hypothetical situations
requiring parental decision-making. 	Her responses indicated that
she had "a great deal to learn about effective parenting and
about safeguarding the welfare of any children in her custody."
Although Elkins received substantial assistance and
education through the Department since 1985, and intensively
since 1996, she failed to make significant improvement in her
parenting skills or in her ability to provide her children with
adequate housing and guidance. 	Despite the services provided, as
set out in the Written Narrative Statement, Elkins was "unable to
obtain stable employment, adequate housing or necessary skills to
parent a child."
Based upon the evidence of Elkins' emotional and mental
condition as it related to her ability to parent her children, we
hold that the record supports the trial judge's finding that the
Department presented clear and convincing evidence proving the

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requirements of Code § 16.1-283(B)(2)(a). 	The record also
supports the trial judge's finding that the Department presented
clear and convincing evidence proving the conditions of Code
§ 16.1-283(B)(2)(c). 	Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in
ruling that the Department proved the statutory requirements of
Code § 16.1-283(B) by clear and convincing evidence.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit judge is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.