Hyekyung Kim St. Clair v Dallas B. St. Clair

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Lemons
HYEKYUNG KIM ST. CLAIR MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. 	Record No. 1743-98-3 	PER CURIAM
JANUARY 19, 1999
DALLAS B. ST. CLAIR
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY
Roy B. Willett, Judge
(Sam Garrison, on brief), for appellant.
(Arthur P. Strickland, on brief), for
appellee.
Hyekyung Kim St. Clair (wife) appeals the equitable
distribution decision of the circuit court. 	The trial court
found that the marital residence was the separate property of
Dallas B. St. Clair (husband). 	Wife contends that the trial
court erred by refusing to find that her contributions to the
marital residence transformed husband's separate property into
marital property. 	Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the
parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court.
See Rule 5A:27.
"Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the
sound discretion of the trial judge and that award will not be
set aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
*Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.

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support it." 	Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396
S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990). 	"Unless it appears from the record that
the trial judge has not considered or has misapplied one of the
statutory mandates, this Court will not reverse on appeal."
Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48, 56, 378 S.E.2d 626, 630
(1989).
Husband purchased the land at issue in 1985 and began
building the house which became the marital residence in 1992.
Husband paid for the home entirely from his separate funds, and
the property was titled in his name. 	When the parties married in
June 1994, the exterior construction of the home was largely
completed. 	The parties agreed that wife assisted with some
interior construction work, and helped wallpaper and paint the
interior. 	The parties separated in March 1997.
Code § 20-107.3(A)(1) provides that separate property
includes "(i) all property, real and personal, acquired by either
party before the marriage." 	Evidence supports the trial court's
finding that the residence was husband's separate property, as he
owned the land and completed a substantial portion of the
construction of the home prior to the parties' marriage. 	Code
§ 20-107.3(A)(3)(a) provides that property may be classified as
part marital and part separate:
In the case of the increase in value of
separate property during the marriage, such
increase in value shall be marital property
only to the extent that marital property or
the personal efforts of either party have
contributed to such increases, provided that
any such personal efforts must be significant

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and result in substantial appreciation of the
separate property.
The trial court awarded wife $4,662, which was one-half the value
by which the property appreciated during the marriage. 	Because
the trial court's decision complied with the statutory
requirements and was supported by the evidence, we find no error.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.