Rickie Andrew Binns v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Elder, Frank and Humphreys
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
RICKIE ANDREW BINNS
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 1340-04-2 	JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
APRIL 19, 2005
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Robert W. Duling, Judge Designate
Gregory W. Franklin, Senior Appellate Defender (Office of the
Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.
John H. McLees, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W.
Kilgore, Attorney General; Alice T. Armstrong, Assistant Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Rickie Andrew Binns (appellant) appeals from his jury trial convictions for burglary and
grand larceny. On appeal, he contends the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions
because it failed to prove he was the criminal agent. We hold appellant’s own testimony,
coupled with other evidence, was sufficient to identify him as the perpetrator. Thus, we affirm.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we examine the record in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to the evidence all reasonable inferences fairly
deducible therefrom. Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418
(1987). The judgment will be disturbed only if plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
Id.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

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Circumstantial evidence is as competent as direct evidence to prove the elements of a
crime as long as the evidence as a whole excludes all reasonable hypotheses of innocence
flowing from it. See, e.g., Tucker v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 141, 143, 442 S.E.2d 419,
420 (1994). Where “[t]he circumstances . . . all concur to form an unbroken chain which links
the defendant to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” the circumstantial evidence is sufficient
to support the conviction. Bishop v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 164, 169, 313 S.E.2d 390, 393
(1984).
Unless we conclude a witness’ testimony must be rejected as a matter of law based on its
inherent incredibility, we must defer to the credibility determinations of “the fact finder[,] who
has the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses.” Schneider v. Commonwealth, 230 Va.
379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736-37 (1985). In its role of judging witness credibility, the fact
finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused, in whole or in part, and
to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt. Speight v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App.
83, 88, 354 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1987) (en banc). A trial court’s conclusion that the accused has lied is
not substantive evidence of guilt, Tarpley v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 251, 256-57, 542 S.E.2d
761, 764 (2001), but is “a circumstance, similar to flight from a crime scene, that a fact-finder
may properly consider as evidence of guilty knowledge,” Covil v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 692,
696, 604 S.E.2d 79, 82 (2004).
“Larceny is the taking and carrying away of the goods and chattels of another with intent
to deprive the owner of the possession thereof permanently.” Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va.
688, 691, 232 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1977). Under well-settled principles, the exclusive
“[u]nexplained or falsely explained possession of recently stolen goods is a fact sufficient for the
judge or jury to infer that the person in possession of the stolen goods was the thief.” Lew v.
Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 353, 358, 457 S.E.2d 392, 394-95 (1995); see Winston v.

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Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 746, 757, 497 S.E.2d 141, 147 (1998). This evidentiary device is
known as “the ‘larceny inference.’” Winston, 26 Va. App. at 757, 497 S.E.2d at 148.
A similar inference is available in a prosecution for burglary. It is equally well
established that:
upon proof of a breaking and entering and a theft of goods, and if
the evidence warrants an inference that the breaking and entering
and the theft were committed at the same time by the same person
and as part of the same transaction, “the exclusive possession of
the stolen goods shortly thereafter, unexplained or falsely denied,
has the same efficiency to give rise to an inference that the
possessor is guilty of the breaking and entering as to an inference
that he is guilty of the larceny.”
Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 201, 203, 169 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1969) (quoting Drinkard v.
Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1074, 1083, 178 S.E. 25, 28 (1935)).
Here, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, established
that appellant possessed Haley Hopson’s jar of coins, taken from the dresser in Bridget Branch’s
bedroom at 300 South Boulevard, within minutes after Branch and Hopson awoke to find an
unidentified intruder standing over the dresser with a flashlight. The trier of fact was entitled to
accept Hopson’s testimony that the jar appellant broke on the street as appellant fled and Hopson
gave chase was Hopson’s jar, and to reject appellant’s conflicting claim that he obtained the jar
from his friend Sheila as she attempted to purchase drugs from Hopson. See, e.g., Montgomery
v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 188, 190, 269 S.E.2d 352, 353 (1980) (involving claim of accused
that he found goods at trash dump near burglarized residence); see also Covil, 268 Va. at 695-96,
604 S.E.2d at 82 (“In cases of this kind, when a defendant’s ‘hypothesis of innocence’ is rejected
as unreasonable, evidence of his possession of recently stolen goods is sufficient to support a
conviction.”).
Appellant’s exclusive, falsely explained possession of the recently stolen jar, standing
alone, permitted the jury to conclude that appellant was the thief. However, additional evidence

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supported this conclusion. When Hopson awoke and saw the unidentified intruder flee from his
location beside the dresser where Hopson kept the coin jar, Hopson heard change rattling. When
Hopson ran outside after hurriedly pulling on his clothes, he saw only appellant as he walked
along the street. When Hopson called out to appellant to inquire whether appellant had seen
anyone running away, Hopson again heard the sound of change rattling, and appellant
immediately took flight and fell on the jar Hopson was later able to identify as his. Appellant’s
statements to police and testimony at trial unequivocally established that he was the person who
fell on the jar, fled from Hopson, and left a trail of blood around the abandoned building at 303
South Boulevard. Finally, when the police traced the blood trail appellant left when he
abandoned the broken jar and continued his flight from Hopson, they found four coats that had
also been taken from Branch’s apartment during the burglary. This evidence provided additional
proof that appellant was the thief of the coin jar, the coats, and the other items missing from
Branch’s apartment but never recovered.
This same evidence supported invocation of the inference that appellant committed
burglary. Branch and Hopson testified that the doors to the apartment were locked when they
went to bed but that they left their screened windows open because it was hot. No one else had
permission to be in the apartment, and immediately after Hopson chased the intruder out of the
apartment, they discovered that one of the screens had been lifted up. Thus, the evidence
established a breaking and entering and theft of goods committed at the same time by the same
person or persons as part of the same transaction, and appellant’s falsely explained possession of
some of the stolen goods shortly thereafter permitted the inference that he committed burglary as
well as larceny.
We hold the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions, and we affirm.
Affirmed.