Travis May, s/k/a, etc. v Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Baker, Annunziata and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
TRAVIS MAY, S/K/A
TRAVIS H. MAY MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 	0694-95-1 	JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES
MAY 7, 1996
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Alfred W. Whitehurst, Judge
Charles E. Jenkins, II, for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney
General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Travis H. May appeals his convictions for robbery and use of
a firearm in the commission of a felony. 	He contends that his
statements to the police were involuntary, and that the trial
court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence of the
statements. 	We disagree, and affirm the convictions.
On appeal, we must determine whether, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, the trial court was plainly wrong
in concluding that May's statements to Virginia Beach and Norfolk
detectives were essentially a free and unconstrained choice on
his part or if his will was overborne. 	See Rodgers v.
Commonwealth, 227 Va. 605, 318 S.E.2d 298 (1984). 	We must make
an independent evaluation of the evidence to determine whether
*Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not
designated for publication.

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the statements were voluntary. 	Id. 	In doing so, we may rely on
the observations of the trial judge and his findings of fact,
except as to the ultimate issue of voluntariness. 	See Goodwin v.
Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 249, 349 S.E.2d 161 (1986).
In his statements to the police, May implicated himself in
crimes that occurred in Virginia Beach and Norfolk. 	May raised
the identical issues which he now raises in his challenge to
convictions arising from the Circuit Court of the City of
Virginia Beach. 	We denied the petition for appeal in that case.
See May v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0841-95-1 (Va. Ct. App. Aug.
17, 1995). 	For the reasons stated in that order, we now affirm
the Norfolk convictions.
Although May was only seventeen years old, he had previously
been in trouble with the law and understood the ramifications of
speaking without a lawyer being present. 	He understood that he
was entitled to have a lawyer and, in fact, initially stated that
he wished to have counsel present. 	The trial judge found that
May changed his mind and initiated a second interview with the
police. 	Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), does not
prohibit use of May's confession because credible evidence
supports the trial judge's finding that May initiated the second
discussion. 	See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
The police read Miranda rights to May a second time before
he confessed to the Virginia Beach crimes. 	Thereafter, Norfolk
Detective Jackson arrived at Virginia Beach police headquarters

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and again read Miranda rights to May. 	May indicated verbally and
in writing that he understood his rights, that he waived these
rights and desired to make a statement, and that the statement
was freely and voluntarily made without threat or promise from
anyone.
Viewing the entire record, and based on the totality of the
circumstances, we find that the Commonwealth offered sufficient
evidence to support the trial court's determination that May
voluntarily, freely, and knowingly waived his Miranda rights.
The statements were essentially a free and unconstrained choice
on May's part and his will was not overborne. 	Accordingly, the
trial court's ruling did not constitute reversible error.
Affirmed.