In Re Pederzani Administrative Appeal (Dawna Pederzani, Appellant)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal
revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions by email at:.Reporter@vtcourts.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State
Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made
before this opinion goes to press.

2024 VT 82

No. 24-AP-074

In re Pederzani Administrative Appeal Supreme Court
(Dawna Pederzani, Appellant)
On Appeal from
Superior Court,
Environmental Division

October Term, 2024

Thomas G. Walsh, J.

Christian S. Chorba of Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Burlington, for Appellant.

Mark G. Hall of Paul Frank + Collins P.C., Burlington, for Appellees Kim Butterfield and Group
Designee Ron Bliss (“Neighbors”).

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Carroll, Cohen and Waples, JJ.

¶ 1. COHEN, J. Applicant Dawna Pederzani appeals the Environmental Division’s

decision denying her permit for a home business to operate a dog-rescue operation. Applicant

argues that the town zoning bylaw allows kennels in residential zoning districts and therefore

permits her to operate a dog-rescue operation from her home. We agree, and we reverse and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 2. The following facts were undisputed for purposes of summary judgment, unless

otherwise noted. For a number of years, applicant has operated the Vermont English Bulldog

Rescue (“Rescue”) out of her home in Williston, Vermont. Applicant provides temporary foster

care to rescued dogs. Applicant allows the dogs to be in her backyard and walks the dogs around
her neighborhood with help from unpaid volunteers. The backyard is enclosed by a fence but does

not currently contain any additional structures for the dogs.1

¶ 3. Applicant’s home is located in the residential zoning district of Williston and is

subject to the Williston Development Bylaw.2 Zoning permits are decided by a zoning

administrator, and any decision made by the zoning administrator may be appealed to the

Development Review Board by the applicant or an interested party. Town of Williston

Development Bylaw § 5.4 (2019)3 [hereinafter WDB], https://web.archive.org/web/

20201023161532/https://www.town.williston.vt.us/vertical/Sites/%7BF506B13C-605B-4878-80

62-87E5927E49F0%7D/uploads/WDB_Oct_15_2019_Complete_Document(1).pdf

[https://perma.cc/Z29R-PJZV]. The Board is empowered to uphold, modify, or overturn the

zoning administrator’s decision. Id. § 5.4.6. The Board’s findings and conclusions may then be

appealed to the Environmental Division. Id.§ 5.4.8.

¶ 4. In September 2022, applicant received a notice of zoning violation for operating

the Rescue out of her home without a permit. Applicant responded by applying for an “after-the-

fact” zoning permit for the Rescue as a “home business.” In November 2022, the zoning

administrator referred applicant’s application to the Board, which denied the permit. Applicant

1
Prior to 2023, applicant had six kennel structures in her backyard. The structures were
removed in accordance with her January 2023 permit application, which is the permit application
before this Court.
2
Neither party submitted a copy of the bylaw to the Environmental Division and is
therefore not part of the record on appeal. However, the parties do not dispute the contents of the
bylaw relevant to this appeal.
3
At the time of the events at issue here, this version of the bylaw governed in all relevant
aspects. Intervening changes to the bylaw have adjusted the section numbering, but the relevant
substantive language has not changed. See, e.g., Selectboard, Williston Development Bylaw
History of Amendments (2024), https://www.town.williston.vt.us/vertical/sites/%7BF506B13C-
605B-4878-8062-87E5927E49F0%7D/uploads/WDB_Jun_04_2024_Bylaw_
Revisons_Table.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT64-D6HV]. For consistency with the record on appeal,
we will refer to the WDB provisions by their original numbering at the time of the events at issue.
2
appealed the decision to the Environmental Division, but subsequently dismissed the appeal. In

January 2023, she filed a new application for a zoning permit. The new application stated that

applicant had scaled back her operations such that no adoptions were conducted at the house and

only one dog was allowed outside at a time.4 The zoning administrator approved the permit.

Applicant’s neighbors appealed the decision to the Board, which reversed the zoning

administrator’s approval of the permit. Applicant appealed to the Environmental Division and

neighbors cross-appealed.

¶ 5. The Environmental Division granted neighbors’ motion for summary judgment and

affirmed the denial of the home-business permit. The court reasoned that a home business, as

defined in the bylaw, must occur inside the home in the residential zoning district. It held that the

plain language of the home-business provision prohibited any outside uses for the purposes of the

business. The court declined to find a de minimis use exception to the home-business provision,

reasoning that the provision was already a de minimis exception allowing business use of a

residential property. The court rejected applicant’s argument that she was operating a “kennel,”

reasoning that the bylaw provision allowing kennels was limited by the outdoor restriction for

home businesses in the residential zoning district. Because it concluded that applicant’s outdoor

use prohibited her from obtaining a home-business permit, the court did not reach the other issues

raised by the parties. Applicant appealed to this Court.

¶ 6. We review a decision granting summary judgment de novo, using the same standard

as the trial court. Vt. Coll. of Fine Arts v. City of Montpelier, 2017 VT 12, ¶ 7, 204 Vt. 215, 165

A.3d 1065. “Summary judgment is appropriate when, construing the facts as alleged by the

nonmoving party and resolving reasonable doubts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,

there are no genuine issues of material fact and judgment is appropriate as a matter of law.”

4
The parties disagree as to the extent of the Rescue’s current and former operations.
Neighbors claim there are more dogs than applicant admits.
3
Sheldon v. Ruggiero, 2018 VT 125, ¶ 14, 209 Vt. 33, 202 A.3d 241 (citing V.R.C.P. 56). When

reviewing such a motion, we “regard as true all allegations of the nonmoving party supported by

admissible evidence and give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable doubts and

inferences.” Wood v. Wallin, 2024 VT 21, ¶ 8, __ Vt. __, 316 A.3d 266 (quotation omitted).

¶ 7. We review the interpretation of zoning bylaws without deference to the

Environmental Division. In re Confluence Behav. Health, LLC, 2017 VT 112, ¶ 17, 206 Vt. 302,

180 A.3d 867. The goal in interpreting a zoning ordinance is to effectuate the intent of the drafters

by examining the plain language of the ordinance at issue and the “whole of the ordinance.” In re

Tyler Self-Storage Unit Permits, 2011 VT 66, ¶ 13, 190 Vt. 132, 27 A.3d 1071 (quotation omitted).

We are bound by the plain language of the bylaws unless the language “leads to an irrational

result.” In re Wright & Boester Conditional Use Application, 2021 VT 80, ¶ 16, 215 Vt. 593, 267

A.3d 659 (quotation omitted). Any uncertainty must be resolved in favor of the property owner

because “zoning ordinances limit common law property rights.” In re Bjerke Zoning Permit

Denial, 2014 VT 13, ¶ 22, 195 Vt. 586, 93 A.3d 82.

¶ 8. The bylaw governing the residential zoning district in Williston allows certain uses

of property that are not solely residential, such as accessory uses and structures, childcare centers,

churches, elementary and middle schools, parks, and home businesses. WDB § 39.1.3. Home

businesses are defined in chapter 20 of the bylaw, which governs residential improvements

generally. Chapter 20 provides that “[a] home business is any commercial activity conducted in a

one- or two-household dwelling by the resident/s of that dwelling, whether for profit or not, and

that meets the standards established here.” Id. § 20.4.1. The standards for a home business are

outlined in Appendix G of the bylaw; of concern here are the provisions in Appendix G § 3(a) for

outdoor workspaces:

In the [residential zoning district], [mixed use residential zoning
district] and [village zoning district] [], the space used for the
proposed home business shall be within the dwelling or in an

4
accessory structure that complies with all requirements of this
bylaw. Outdoor workspaces and the outdoor storage of materials,
supplies, equipment, vehicles, or goods for sale are prohibited in the
[residential zoning district], [mixed use residential zoning district],
and [village zoning district].

¶ 9. Chapter 20 of the bylaw also contains a provision governing kennels, which are

defined as “any space used to confine dogs.” Id. § 20.9. The provision states that a kennel used

for commercial purposes may be permitted as a home business, and the kennel provision references

the home-business provision quoted above. Id.§ 20.9.1. The bylaw states that kennels must

comply with the standards for kennels for “accessory structures” and “fences” contained in chapter

20. Id.§ 20.9.2.

¶ 10. Applicant argues that the Rescue qualifies as a kennel and that a kennel as defined

by WDB § 20.9 may operate in the residential zoning district even if it requires outdoor use.

Applicant asserts that the provision for kennels is more specific because it allows exceptions for

accessory structures and fences—structures contemplating outdoor use—and therefore supersedes

the more general home-business provision. Finally, she argues that any ambiguity in the ordinance

should be resolved in her favor as the property owner.

¶ 11. As a threshold matter, we address whether the Rescue is a kennel under the bylaw.

To determine this, we look to the plain language of the provision at issue and the whole of the

bylaw. See Tyler Self-Storage Unit Permits, 2011 VT 66, ¶ 13. The bylaw’s definition of a kennel

is broadly worded: “any space used to confine dogs.” WDB § 20.9. The undisputed facts show

that applicant uses her fenced-in backyard and her home to confine dogs as part of her rescue

operation, which the parties agree is a commercial use, as the term “commercial” is used in the

bylaw. See WDB § 20.4.1. We therefore conclude that it falls within the definition of a kennel

under the bylaw, for which a home-business permit is required.

¶ 12. We accordingly turn to whether applicant’s outdoor kennel operations prevent her

from obtaining a home-business permit under the bylaw. As the Environmental Division observed,

5
the kennel and home-business provisions are in tension. The kennel provision, which applies to

residential properties in any district, clearly contemplates some outdoor use of a residential

property relating to the kennel, because it refers to accessory structures and allows for higher

fences. The home-business provision, meanwhile, generally prohibits outdoor workspaces and

storage. When there are two conflicting provisions in an ordinance, the specific provision is held

as an exception to the general provision. See In re Application of Lathrop Ltd. P’ship I, 2015 VT

49, ¶ 31, 199 Vt. 19, 121 A.3d 630. Between the home-business and kennel provisions, the kennel

provision is more specifically applicable to applicant’s operation.

¶ 13. Kennels are one of a few types of home businesses that are addressed in detail in

the bylaw, the others being at-home childcare businesses and residential care or group homes.

WDB §§ 20.7-20.9. The kennel provision provides guidance for the outdoor structures that may

be used when operating a kennel, such as accessory structures and fences. Id. § 20.9.2. The Town

could have specified in the outdoor-workspaces section of Appendix G that kennels are prohibited

in residential zoning districts. Instead, Appendix G broadly states that “the space for the proposed

home business shall be within the dwelling or in an accessory structure that complies with all

requirements of this bylaw” and that outdoor workspaces and storage of materials are prohibited.

Id. app. G § 3(a). It contains no reference to kennels or at-home childcare facilities, both of which

may be permitted as home businesses and both of which typically involve some outdoor use. Thus,

the kennel provision should be read as an exception to the home-business provision. See In re

Bjerke, 2014 VT 13, ¶ 22 (explaining if there is conflict between zoning provisions, we must

resolve uncertainty in favor of property owner).

¶ 14. Additionally, zoning ordinances should not be read in a way that “leads to an

irrational result” or renders the language meaningless. In re Wright & Boester Conditional Use

Application, 2021 VT 80, ¶ 16 (quotation omitted); In re Beliveau NOV, 2013 VT 41, ¶ 13, 194

Vt. 1, 72 A.3d 918 (applying statutory interpretation principle to “not construe a statute in a way

6
that renders a significant part of it pure surplusage” to zoning bylaws (quotation omitted)). An

interpretation of the home-business provision, WDB § 20.4.1, as prohibiting outdoor uses of

kennels in residential districts would render the provision permitting kennels as home businesses,

WDB § 20.9.1, virtually meaningless because the operation of a kennel typically requires use of

outdoor space for the proper care for dogs. This supports our conclusion that the kennel provision

should be read as an exception to the home business provision.

¶ 15. We conclude that the Environmental Division erred when it held that the Rescue

could not be permitted as a home business within the residential district due to applicant’s outdoor

use. Because the Environmental Division did not reach any of the other issues raised by the parties,

we reverse the award of summary judgment to neighbors and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOR THE COURT:

Associate Justice

7