State of Vermont v. Christopher Marchese

VERMONT SUPREME COURT Case No. 25-AP-289
109 State Street
Montpelier VT 05609-0801
802-828-4774
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-
appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.

ENTRY ORDER

FEBRUARY TERM, 2026

State of Vermont v. Christopher Marchese* } APPEALED FROM:
} Superior Court, Bennington Unit,
} Criminal Division
} CASE NO. 24-CR-04761
Trial Judge: Jennifer L. Barrett

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Defendant appeals pro se from his conviction of two counts of criminal threatening
against a public servant following a jury trial. We affirm.

In May 2024, the State charged defendant with the crimes above based on alleged threats
he made to a Department for Children and Families (DCF) caseworker who was involved in a
juvenile proceeding concerning his child. Defendant was represented by counsel below. During
the jury draw, two prospective jurors indicated that they knew attorneys involved in the case but
stated that they could be fair and impartial. Defense counsel did not move to strike any juror for
cause, although he used a peremptory challenge to excuse one of the jurors who was familiar
with the attorneys. Defense counsel also successfully moved to exclude any mention of
defendant’s “character or personality” under Vermont Rules of Evidence 401-404 without
objection from the State.

On the morning of trial, defendant asked the court about the possibility of a bench trial
and requesting a new judge. While the State was willing to proceed with a bench trial at that
point, defendant chose to proceed with a jury trial after consulting with his attorney and engaging
in a colloquy with the court. The court informed defendant that any request to recuse the judge
must be in writing, supported by an affidavit.

A one-day jury trial was held in May 2025. The State presented evidence that on one
evening in January 2024, defendant sent the DCF caseworker 142 text messages that included
threats of physical violence and suggestions that he was surveilling her. In April 2024,
defendant’s wife called the DCF caseworker, and the caseworker could hear defendant yelling in
the background; he alluded to attacking the caseworker and her supervisor with a bat.

After the State rested and the court denied defendant’s motion for a judgment of
acquittal, defendant moved for a bench trial. The State objected on grounds that the jury trial
was ongoing. The court denied the motion. Defendant then filed a pro se motion to disqualify
the trial judge. His attorney would not sign the motion. The court took a recess and referred the
motion to the Chief Superior Judge. The Chief Superior Judge denied the motion. Trial then
resumed, and defendant testified on his own behalf. The jury convicted defendant of both
charges. This appeal followed.

Defendant appears to argue that his convictions should be reversed because: (1) the State
allegedly withheld unspecified evidence; (2) some jurors indicated, during voir dire, that they
knew the prosecutor and/or defendant’s attorney; (3) he received ineffective assistance of
counsel; (4) the court should have granted his request for a bench trial; (5) the court should have
recused itself; and (6) the court erred in admitting unspecified evidence of defendant’s other acts.

We reject these arguments. First, defendant does not identify any specific evidence he
alleges was improperly withheld or admitted. These claims of error are inadequately briefed, and
we do not address them. See State v. Brillon, 2010 VT 25, ¶¶ 5-7, 187 Vt. 444 (explaining that
Court will not address “inadequately briefed” claims). Defendant did not preserve his argument
regarding any challenges to jurors, and he does not claim plain error. See State v. Bruno, 2012
VT 79, ¶ 33, 192 Vt. 515 (stating that “[p]arties may raise for-cause challenges to prospective
jurors any time before the jury is impaneled,” and party waives “right to challenge a juror . . . by
a failure to object before the jury is impaneled if the basis for the objection is known or might,
with reasonable diligence, have been discovered during voir dire” (quotation omitted)).
Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised in a direct appeal. State
v. Orost, 2025 VT 15, ¶ 3 n.1 (explaining that ineffective-assistance claim “may not be presented
in a direct appeal”); see also State v. Lund, 168 Vt. 102, 105 (1998) (explaining that claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel “must be raised, if at all, in the context of a petition for post-
conviction relief”). Defendant’s vague suggestions of the trial court’s bias and prejudice lack
any support in the record, and he identifies no argument to undermine the rejection of his recusal
motion. See Ball v. Melsur Corp., 161 Vt. 35, 39-40, 45 (1993) (explaining that judges are
afforded “presumption of honesty and integrity,” “party seeking a trial judge’s recusal must
make a clear and affirmative showing of bias or prejudice,” and “contrary rulings alone, no
matter how numerous or erroneous, do not suffice to show prejudice or bias” (quotation
omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Demag v. Better Power Equip., Inc., 2014 VT 78, 197
Vt. 176. Finally, the court did not err in denying defendant’s request for a bench trial. The
request was made after the State rested its case, and the State did not consent to the request. See
V.R.Cr.P. 23(a) (providing that “defendant may in a signed writing or in open court, with the
consent of the prosecuting attorney and the court entered of record, waive a jury trial in offenses
not punishable by death” (emphasis added)); see also Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 10 (requiring “consent
of the prosecuting officer” before defendant may waive right to jury trial “in criminal

2
prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death”). We have considered all the arguments
discernable in defendant’s brief and reject them as without merit.

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice

Nancy J. Waples, Associate Justice

3