* Chettie Mcaffee, Appellant V. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., Et Al., Respondents

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
CHETTIE MCAFEE,
Appellant,
SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING,
INC., NORTHWEST TRUSTEE
SERVICES, INC., MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC. a/k/a MERSCORP,
INC., JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA,
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA AS
TRUSTEE FOR THE
CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF
STRUCTURED ASSET MORTGAGE
INVESTMENTS II INC., BEAR
STEARNS MORTGAGE FUNDING
TRUST 2007-AR2 MORTGAGE PASS-
THROUGH CERTIFICATES
SERIES 2007-AR2,
Respondents.
NO. 71995-5-
DIVISION ONE
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO PUBLISH
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36-Of"
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Respondent Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. moved to publish the
court's opinion filed on March 7, 2016. 	Appellant Chettie McAfee has filed a response.
The court has determined that the motion should be granted. 	Therefore, it is
ORDERED that the motion to publish opinion is granted.
DATED this 	/flctey of April 2016.
FOR THE PANEL:
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
CHETTIE MCAFEE,
Appellant,
v.
SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING,
INC., NORTHWEST TRUSTEE
SERVICES, INC., MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC. a/k/a MERSCORP,
INC., JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA,
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA AS
TRUSTEE FOR THE
CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF
STRUCTURED ASSET MORTGAGE
INVESTMENTS II INC., BEAR
STEARNS MORTGAGE FUNDING
TRUST 2007-AR2 MORTGAGE PASS-
THROUGH CERTIFICATES
SERIES 2007-AR2,
Respondents.
NO. 71995-5-1
DIVISION ONE
PUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: March 7, 2016
I
2»
CO
Lau, J. — After Chettie McAfee's lender initiated nonjudicial foreclosure
proceedings following McAfee's default on her mortgage loan, McAfee filed suit,
>:< —
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71995-5-1/2
alleging violations of the deeds of trust act (DTA or act), chapter 61.24 RCW, and
Consumer 	Protection 	Act 	(CPA), 	chapter 	19.86 	RCW, 	fraud 	and
misrepresentation, and breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 	She 	appeals 	the 	trial 	court's 	dismissal 	under 	CR 	12(b)(6) 	of 	her
complaint for damages and equitable relief against Select Portfolio Servicing Inc.
(SPS), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. (MERS), and Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo). 	Because the trial court considered material outside
the pleadings, we review the dismissal of McAfee's claims under the summary
judgment standard. 	Because McAfee raises no genuine issue of material fact as
to any of her claims, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2007, Chettie McAfee borrowed $920,000 from Bear Stearns
Residential Mortgage Corp. to finance the purchase of real property in Seattle,
signing a promissory note and companion deed of trust. 	The deed of trust lists
Bear Stearns as the lender, Ticor Title as the trustee, and MERS, "a separate
corporation 	that 	is 	acting 	solely 	as 	a 	nominee 	for 	Lender 	and 	Lender's
successors and assigns," as beneficiary. 	Clerk's Papers (CP) at 176-77. 	The
deed includes a trustee's power of sale and provides that the note may be sold
one or more times without prior notice to the borrower. 	The note was endorsed
twice, first by Bear Stearns to EMC Mortgage Corporation, and then by EMC
Mortgage to Wells Fargo.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71995-5-1/3
Beginning September 1, 2009, McAfee failed to make her monthly loan
payments. 	On June 27, 2012, MERS recorded an assignment of deed of trust,
transferring its interest as beneficiary nominee to Wells Fargo. 	On June 28,
2012, 	Wells 	Fargo, 	by 	Northwest 	Trustee 	Services 	Inc. 	(NWTS), 	"its 	duly
authorized agent," sent McAfee a notice of default. 	CP at 200-02. 	The notice
identified Wells Fargo as the note owner "as Trustee for the Certificateholders of
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Inc., Bear Stearns Mortgage Funding
Trust 2007-AR2 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-AR2." 	CP at
202. 	The notice identified JPMorgan Chase Bank (Chase) as the loan servicer
and included contact information for Chase and NWTS. 	On October 16, 2012,
Wells Fargo executed a beneficiary declaration by Chase, its attorney in fact,
stating that it was the holder of the note securing McAfee's loan.
On January 11, 2013, Wells Fargo recorded an appointment of NWTS as
successor trustee. 	At some point, SPS notified McAfee in a letter that it would
replace Chase as servicer of her loan, 	effective August 	1, 2013. 	An SPS
supervisor stated later in a declaration that from the time service was transferred,
SPS was in possession of the note securing McAfee's loan.
McAfee 	did 	not 	cure 	her default, 	and 	on 	January 	29, 	2013, 	NWTS
recorded a notice of trustee's sale. 	By this time, McAfee's arrearages exceeded
$200,000. The notice set a sale for May 31, 2013. 	The sale was postponed four
times, to September 27, 2013.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71995-5-1/4
On September 3, 2013, 	McAfee filed a complaint for damages and a
motion to restrain the trustee's sale. 	The complaint named SPS, NWTS, MERS,
Chase, and Wells Fargo as defendants and alleged violations of the CPA, the
DTA, common law fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, and breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
On 	September 24, 	2013, 	the 	trial 	court 	granted 	a 	temporary 	order
restraining the sale. 	The court's order directed McAfee to deposit $4,569.24 into
the court registry every month beginning October 1, 2013, and to "provide all
proof of a valid offer of a trial loan modification from Defendants." CP at 141.
On October 8, all defendants filed a "declaration of non-compliance with
temporary restraining order," which stated that McAfee had made no deposit into
the court registry. 	CP at 135-36. 	The declaration also noted that while McAfee
had 	provided 	letters from 	EMC 	Mortgage 	Corp. 	documenting 	a 	forbearance
payment agreement, she had failed to provide the court with any documents
related to a loan modification.
In November, 	NWTS 	moved for summary judgment dismissal. 	SPS,
MERS, Wells Fargo, and Chase moved for dismissal under CR 12(b)(6).
On December 11, 2013, McAfee and NWTS stipulated to dismissal of the
action without prejudice as to NTWS. 	Two days later, the trial court granted
Chase's motion to dismiss with prejudice, and the parties later stipulated under
CR 	54(b) to the entry of partial final judgment dismissing all claims against
Chase.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71995-5-1/5
On January 8, 2014, NWTS recorded another notice of trustee's sale,
setting a sale for May 9, 2014. 	The sale occurred as scheduled.
On May 21, 2014, the court entered an order dismissing McAfee's claims
against SPS, MERS, and Wells Fargo. 	McAfee timely appealed.
McAfee moved for a stay of the subsequent unlawful detainer action and
on October 22, 2014, the court granted the motion pending appeal.
ANALYSIS
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6)
de novo, as a question of law. FutureSelect Portfolio Mqmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp.
Holdings, Inc.. 180 Wn.2d 954, 962, 331 P.3d 29 (2014). 	A CR 12(b)(6) motion
challenges the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. 	Contreras v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735, 742, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977).
Either party may submit documents not included in the original complaint
for the court to consider in evaluating a CR 12(b)(6) motion. 	Bavand v. OneWest
Bank. FSB, 176 Wn. App. 475, 485, 309 P.3d 636 (2013); Rodriguez v. Loudeve
Corp.. 	144 Wn. 	App. 	709, 	726, 	189 	P.3d 	168 	(2008). 	Such 	submissions
generally convert a CR 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment.
Bavand. 176 Wn. App. at 485. 	However, in a motion to dismiss, the trial court
may 	take 	judicial 	notice 	of 	public 	documents 	if their 	authenticity 	cannot
reasonably be contested, and the court may also consider documents whose
contents are alleged in a complaint but not physically attached to the pleadings.
Rodriguez. 144 Wn. App. at 725-26.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71995-5-1/6
Here, SPS, MERS, 	and Wells Fargo supported their motion to dismiss
with a request for judicial notice of McAfee's note and the notice of default. 	The
hearing record and court's orders show that the court considered these materials
but do not indicate if the court took judicial notice of them. 	In its May 21, 2014,
order granting SPS's motion to dismiss, the trial court stated that in addition to
the pleadings and the defendant's request for judicial notice, it considered the
defendant's declaration of SPS supervisor Rebecca Adelman. 	The court also
stated in this order and the order dismissing Chase that it "reviewed the files and
records of this case." 	CP at 344, 421. 	Accordingly, we review the challenged
orders 	under 	the 	summary 	judgment 	standard. 	Summary 	judgment 	is
appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 	As in the case of review
of an order under CR 12(b)(6), this court reviews an order on summary judgment
de novo. 	Michael v. Mosguera-Lacv. 165 Wn.2d 595, 601, 200 P.3d 695 (2009).
Foreclosure Under the Deeds of Trust Act
The DTA creates a three-party transaction, in which a borrower conveys
the mortgaged property to a trustee, who holds the property in trust for the lender
as security for the borrower's loan. 	Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp.. Inc.. 175 Wn.2d
83, 92-93, 285 P.3d 34 (2012); Albice v. Premier Mortg. Servs. of Wash.. Inc..
174 Wn.2d 560, 567, 276 P.3d 1277 (2012). 	If a borrower defaults, a lender may
nonjudicially foreclose by a trustee's sale. 	Bain. 175 Wn.2d at 93; Albice. 174
Wn.2d at 567. 	The act furthers three goals: (1) an efficient and inexpensive
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71995-5-1/7
foreclosure process, (2) adequate opportunity for interested parties to prevent
wrongful foreclosure, and (3) stability of land titles. Albice. 	174 Wn.2d at 567
(citing Cox v. Helenius. 103 Wn.2d 383, 387, 693 P.2d 683 (1985)). 	Because the
DTA 	eliminates 	many 	of 	the 	protections 	afforded 	borrowers 	under 	judicial
foreclosures, "lenders must strictly comply with the statutes and courts must
strictly construe the statutes in the borrower's favor." 	Albice, 174 Wn.2d at 567
(citing Udall v. T.D. Escrow Servs.. Inc.. 159 Wn.2d 903, 915-16, 154 P.3d 882
(2007); Koegel v. Prudential Mut. Sav. Bank. 51 Wn. App. 108, 111-12, 752 P.2d
385 (1988)). A trustee has a duty of good faith to all parties and "is not merely an
agent for the lender or the lender's successors." 	RCW 61.24.010(4); Bain. 175
Wn.2d at 93.
The DTA describes the steps a trustee must take to start a nonjudicial
foreclosure. 	A beneficiary or trustee must transmit a written notice of default to
the borrower at least 30 days before a notice of sale is recorded. 	Among other
requirements, 	a 	trustee may not 	schedule a 	sale before confirming that the
beneficiary of the obligation holds the note and thus has authority to enforce the
obligation. 	A trustee may rely on "a party's undisputed declaration submitted
under penalty of perjury that it is the holder of the note." 	Brown v. Wash. State
Dep't 	of 	Commerce. 	184 	Wn.2d 	509, 	544, 	359 	P.3d 	771 	(2015); 	RCW
61.24.030(7)(a), (b). 	A successor trustee is not vested with the powers of the
original trustee until the beneficiary's appointment of the successor trustee is
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71995-5-1/8
recorded with the auditor of the county where the property is located. 	RCW
61.24.010(2); Bavand. 176 Wn. App. at 487.
Deeds of Trust Act Claims
McAfee claims that the notice of default she received was invalid "because
Wells 	Fargo Bank as Trustee for SAMI 2007-AR2 is not the true beneficiary
because it only became the alleged beneficiary by an assignment from MERS
who 	was not the beneficiary and therefore not 	lawfully entitled to 	make the
assignment." 	Br. of Appellant at 19. We disagree.
Washington courts have long recognized that a security instrument follows
the note it secures. 	Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Slotke. No. 73631-1-1, 2016
WL 107783, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2016) (collecting cases). 	The deed
that McAfee executed states that MERS acts "solely as a nominee for Lender
and 	Lender's 	successors 	and 	assigns." 	CP 	at 	177, 	178. 	The 	note 	was
eventually endorsed to Wells Fargo, which subsequently received the deed of
trust via MERS's assignment as lender's nominee. 	Thus, the record does not
support McAfee's claim in her complaint that MERS "wrongfully claimed to be a
beneficiary under the deed of trust." 	McAfee raises no genuine issue of material
fact supporting an allegation that MERS's assignment of the deed to Wells Fargo
was unlawful or ineffective under the DTA. 	And Wells Fargo, as beneficiary, had
authority to issue a notice of default. 	McAfee's claim fails.
In her complaint 	and 	brief on 	appeal, 	McAfee 	makes two 	additional
erroneous claims: (1) MERS executed the appointment of NWTS as successor
8
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71995-5-1/9
trustee and (2) NWTS issued the notice of default. 	MERS did not execute the
appointment 	of 	successor 	trustee. 	As 	nominee 	for 	Bear 	Stearns, 	MERS
conveyed its interest in the deed of trust to Wells Fargo, which later appointed
NWTS. 	And contrary to McAfee's allegation, in issuing the notice of default,
NWTS 	acted 	as 	beneficiary 	Wells 	Fargo's 	"duly 	authorized 	agent," 	not 	as
successor trustee. 	This did not violate the act. 	See Bain. 175 Wn.2d at 106
("[Njothing in this opinion 	should 	be construed to suggest an 	agent cannot
represent the holder of a note").
By the time NWTS recorded the first notice of trustee's sale on January
29, 	2013, 	Wells 	Fargo 	had 	recorded 	the 	appointment 	of 	successor trustee
naming NWTS, in compliance with RCW 61.24.010(2). 	McAfee does not raise
any genuine issue of material fact supporting her DTA claims.
Consumer Protection Act Claims
McAfee also contends that the defendants violated the CPA. 	To prevail
on an action for damages under the CPA, the plaintiff must establish (1) an unfair
or deceptive act or practice (2) caused by the defendant (3) occurring in trade or
commerce (4) which impacted the public interest (5) and caused injury to the
plaintiff in his or her business or property. 	Hangman Ridge Training Stables Inc.
v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.. 105 Wn.2d 778, 780, 719 P.2d 531 	(1986). 	Failing to
satisfy any of the five elements is fatal to a CPA claim. 	Hangman Ridge. 105
Wn.2d at 793.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71995-5-1/10
McAfee alleges "a pattern and practice of unfair and unlawful servicing
and foreclosure activities that ultimately resulted 	in premature default and in
unfair, deceptive, and unlawful foreclosure proceedings." 	Br. of Appellant at 14.
She contends the respondents prevented her from seeking a loan modification, in
violation of the federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP).1 	She
also alleges that the unlawful assignment of the deed of trust and appointment of
successor trustee were unfair and deceptive acts, analogizing to this court's
decision in Walker v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp. of Washington Inc.. 176 Wn. App.
294, 308 P.3d 716 (2013). 	None of these contentions has merit.
Under Washington law, characterization of MERS as beneficiary on the
deed of trust "is not itself an actionable injury." 	Bain, 175 Wn.2d at 120. 	Nor
does 	Walker 	support 	McAfee's 	claims. 	In Walker, 	a 	party 	acting 	as 	"the
Beneficiary" recorded an appointment of successor trustee to start foreclosure
proceedings more than a 	month before it received its beneficiary interest via
assignment by MERS. 	This court noted that "when an 	unlawful 	beneficiary
appoints a successor trustee, the putative trustee lacks the legal authority to
record and serve a notice of trustee's sale." Walker. 176 Wn. App. at 306. Thus,
Walker pleaded facts sufficient to show violations of both the DTA and the CPA.
Walker. 176 Wn. App. at 313, 320.
1 HAMP, which offers financial incentives to mortgage lenders to modify
the home loans of borrowers in danger of foreclosure, was created under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 12 U.S.C. § 5201; CitiMortgage.
Inc. v. Bermudez. 2014 ILL. App. (1st) 122824, 6 N.E.3d 268, 271 	n.2, 379 III.
Dec. 191.
10
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71995-5-1/11
Here, facts the trial court considered show that Wells Fargo established its
rights as holder of the note before appointing a successor trustee and beginning
foreclosure proceedings. 	Although she alleges in her complaint that dismissed
defendant NWTS and Wells Fargo "wrongfully caused to be sent, [under the
CPA], notices of default and debt collection letters" that they "knew or should
have known" 	were "unfair and deceptive," she does 	not dispute the fact or
amount of her default. 	Nor does she identify procedural violations of the DTA
that could support any claim under either the DTA or CPA.
In her complaint, McAfee directly accuses only Chase of using unfair and
deceptive practices in the loan modification and short sale process, alleging that
Wells 	Fargo and Bear Stearns "acted in an 	unfair and deceptive manner in
colluding with and ratifying the acts of NWTS, Chase, and SPS." 	CP at 8. 	On
appeal, she appears to replace dismissed party Chase with Wells Fargo. 	She
analogizes to Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank. N.A.. 728 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2013) to
argue that the "[respondents unfairly and deceptively . . . attempted to thwart
every attempt by [a]ppellant to protect her interests in her home by seeking a
loan modification." 	Br. of Appellant at 15.
But Corvello does not support McAfee's argument. 	In Corvello. the lender
refused to offer a permanent loan modification to borrowers who had successfully
complied with a trial 	payment program. 	Thus, the lender violated contractual
obligations it had assumed under HAMP. 	Corvello. 728 F.3d at 883-84. 	Here,
McAfee does not allege she was ever offered a trial payment program, or that
11
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71995-5-1/12
she successfully fulfilled the terms of the forbearance agreement to qualify for a
modification, or that any respondent violated contractual obligations, such as the
court found 	in Corvello. 	To the extent that she alleges that any respondent
improperly denied her a loan modification under HAMP, McAfee's claim fails as a
matter of law because courts have consistently held that HAMP does not create
a private right of action. 	See, e.g.. 	Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank. NA. 673 F.3d
547, 555 (7th Cir. 2012); Miller v. Chase Home Fin.. LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1116
(11th Cir. 2012); 	Brosius v. Wells Fargo Bank. 	NA. No. 	13-10109, 2014 WL
2199627, 	at *8 (E.D. 	Mich. 	May 	27, 	2014) 	(court 	order) 	(collecting 	cases).
Because McAfee does not raise a genuine issue of material fact related to an
unfair or deceptive practice, her CPA claims fail.
Fraud and Misrepresentation Claims
McAfee contends that Wells Fargo and MERS committed fraud 	in the
assignment of the deed, and that MERS fraudulently executed an appointment of
successor trustee. 	These claims fail.
Under Washington law, a plaintiff claiming fraud must establish a number
of elements, and must plead the fraud claim with particularity. 	Eicon Const.. Inc.
v. E. Wash. Univ.. 174 Wn.2d 157, 166, 273 P.3d 965 (2012); CR 9(b). A plaintiff
alleging 	negligent2 	misrepresentation 	must similarly prove falsity, 	as well as
reasonable reliance, causation, and damages, by clear, cogent, and convincing
2 McAfee does not specify whether she is pleading negligent or intentional
misrepresentation.
12
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71995-5-1/13
evidence. 	Shepard v. Holmes. 185 Wn. App. 730, 742 n.2, 345 P.3d 786 (2014);
Ross v. Kirner. 162 Wn.2d 493, 499, 172 P.3d 701 (2007).
As explained, MERS was authorized as the lender's nominee to assign
the deed to 	Wells 	Fargo, 	which 	held the 	note. 	Following that assignment,
beneficiary Wells 	Fargo, 	not 	MERS, 	appointed 	a 	successor trustee. 	These
transactions complied with the terms of RCW 61.24.010(2) and the deed of trust.
In her complaint, McAfee makes general statements about the defendants'
"collusion," "material misrepresentations," and "fraudulent actions." CP at 10. 	But
"these conclusory assertions and general complaints do 	not provide the who,
what, when, where, and how of a properly pleaded fraud claim." 	Wilson v. Bank
of Am.. 	NA. No. C13-1567RSL, 2014 WL 841527, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 4,
2014) 	(court 	order). 	Contrary to 	her arguments, 	McAfee 	does 	not 	identify
"material 	representations 	that 	are 	false" 	on 	the 	recorded 	documents 	she
identifies. 	Br. of Appellant at 24. 	And she points to no specific fraudulent or
misleading information provided to her by Wells Fargo or SPS related to any loan
modification or short sale. 	Accordingly, she does not state facts supporting her
fraud claims with sufficient particularity. 	Nor does she raise any genuine issue of
material fact that would support a claim for either fraud or misrepresentation.
Breach of Contract Claims
Finally, McAfee contends that respondents breached the contract and the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 	McAfee appears to base this contention
mainly on the erroneous assertion that MERS "was a fraudulent party on the
13
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71995-5-1/14
Deed of Trust." 	CP at 11. 	McAfee also claims that the respondents were "less
than 	honest 	and 	did 	not 	exhibit 	lawfulness 	of 	purpose" 	and 	"engaged 	in
subterfuge and delay in hopes of ultimately foreclosing on the property." 	Br. of
Appellant at 26, 27. These claims fail.
McAfee does not dispute that she received the benefit of her bargain when
she received the proceeds from her loan, nor that she has continued to live in the
home for nearly seven years after defaulting on her mortgage. 	And she does not
point to any specific contract term that any of the 	respondents breached or
performed in bad faith. 	To the extent that she argues that respondents had a
duty to help her modify the terms of her loan, she identifies no contract term
supporting the existence of such a duty, and HAMP itself authorizes no private
right of 	action. 	She 	produced 	no 	proof 	of 	a 	trial 	payment 	plan 	or 	loan
modification offer, contrary to the terms of the trial court's restraining order.
Because the duty of good faith and fair dealing is not "free-floating" but "exists
only in relation to performance of a specific contract term," these claims also fail.
Badgett v. Sec. State Bank. 116 Wn.2d 563, 570, 807 P.2d 356 (1991). 	She
raises no genuine issue of material fact supporting a claim for breach of contract
or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
14
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71995-5-1/15
CONCLUSION
Because 	McAfee 	raises 	no 	genuine 	issue of material fact that would
support claims for DTA or CPA violations, fraud, misrepresentation, or breach of
contract, the trial court did not err by dismissing her complaint. 	We affirm.
WE CONCUR: 	7
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15