In Re The Personal Restraint Petition Of Luis Alberto Rangel

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of:
LUIS ALBERTO RANGEL,
No. 56762-8-II
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner.
LEE, J. — Luis A. Rangel seeks relief from personal restraint following his guilty plea to
attempted first degree murder with a deadly weapon enhancement. Rangel was 17 years old at the
time of the crime and argues that he is entitled to resentencing so that the sentencing court can take
into account the mitigating qualities of youth. Because Rangel has failed to establish prejudice,
we deny Rangel’s petition.
FACTS
On July 20, 2007, Rangel stabbed Francisco Lopez in the chest with a knife. On June 5,
2008, Rangel pleaded guilty to attempted first degree murder with a deadly weapon enhancement.
The plea was reached as part of an agreement in which the State agreed not to file additional felony
charges, including an additional felony charge from a new incident that occurred while Rangel was
incarcerated.
The case proceeded to sentencing the same day Rangel pleaded guilty. The State
recommended a sentence of 216 months’ confinement. The sentence recommendation was based
on a standard range sentence of 192 months (12 months more than the low-end of the standard
sentence range) and 24 months for the deadly weapon enhancement. The State noted that the
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
July 5, 2023

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recommended sentence was one year longer than the sentence received by Rangel’s co-defendant,
which was in part because Rangel was the principal actor in the situation. Rangel agreed with the
recommended sentence of 216 months’ confinement. Rangel’s defense attorney explained:
This plea agreement calls for an 18-year sentence. Mr. Rangel just turned eighteen
the first part of May, so he’s a very young man. He’s not been in trouble before.
Unfortunately, he got linked up in the gang culture and environment and all the
things that happened here I think are an outgrowth of that culture. So he’s paying
a very severe punitive price for his behavior. He understands that. I think he does
regret getting involved in this incident. We would ask the Court to follow the plea
agreement because we think given his age, that’s a fair resolution of the case.
Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 8. Rangel declined to make a statement of his own.
The superior court agreed to follow the sentencing recommendation explaining:
[I]t is a shocking and sad situation for such young men as [Rangel’s counsel]
states to become involved in this activity, to have something so serious happen and
have your futures affected so seriously by that over what seems to be something
that’s very hard to understand why this would happen. It’s a very terrible thing in
the community, it’s a terrible thing for the individuals involved, and certainly here
almost involved the loss of a life of another young man. We can only hope that the
efforts of law enforcement and education in the schools and so on would convince
other young people not to become involved in this activity, but unfortunately it
seems to be increasing, rather than decreasing.
As this was a plea negotiated between the parties, I’ll follow the
recommendation here for 18 years in prison. It is a lengthy period of time. I
certainly hope that during that time you will not become involved in any activity
that may involve you in other penalties. As we see here, there was already an
incident that was taken into account here by the State . . . agreeing not to pursue
that incident. I think you’ll be facing a long time in prison if anything of that nature
continues to happen.
VRP at 8-9. The superior court imposed the agreed sentence of 216 months’ confinement.

No. 56762-8-II
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Rangel filed a CrR 7.8 motion seeking resentencing based on our Supreme Court’s opinion
in State v. Houston-Sconiers.1 The superior court transferred Rangel’s CrR 7.8 motion to this court
for consideration as a personal restraint petition.2
ANALYSIS
Rangel argues that he is entitled to a resentencing hearing because the sentencing court
failed to consider the mitigating qualities of youth when imposing its sentence. Further, Rangel
argues that the superior court’s failure to comply with the dual procedural mandates of Houston-
Sconiers is per se prejudice. Because Rangel fails to establish actual and substantial prejudice, we
deny his petition.
To obtain relief in a personal restraint petition, a petitioner must demonstrate either a
constitutional error resulting in actual and substantial prejudice or a nonconstitutional error that is
a fundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. In re Pers. Restraint of
Swagerty, 186 Wn.2d 801, 807, 383 P.3d 454 (2016).
As an initial matter, we note that recent cases from our Supreme Court have clarified the
distinction between the substantive and procedural rules announced by Houston-Sconiers. The
substantive rule that applies retroactively is “that courts may not impose ‘certain adult sentences .
. . on juveniles who possess such diminished culpability that the adult standard [Sentencing Reform
Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW] ranges and enhancements would be disproportionate
1 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017).
2 Rangel’s judgment and sentence became final on June 5, 2008, when it was entered. RCW
10.73.090(3)(a). Generally, a petitioner must challenge a judgment and sentence within one year
of it becoming final. RCW 10.73.090(1). However, the substantive rule announced by Houston-
Sconiers is a significant, material, retroactive change in the law that meets the RCW 10.73.100(6)
exception to the time bar. In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 236, 474 P.3d 507 (2020),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1754 (2021). Therefore, Rangel’s petition is not time barred.

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punishment.’” In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton, ___ Wn.2d ___, 525 P.3d 156, 161 (2023) (first
alteration in original) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 239, 474 P.3d 507
(2020) , cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1754 (2021)). However, the dual mandates of Houston-Sconiers—
that the superior court must meaningfully consider the mitigating circumstances of youth and
understand its complete discretion to depart from standard SRA sentences for juveniles—are
procedural and do not apply retroactively. Id. at 162-63.
Because the procedural rule from Houston-Sconiers does not apply retroactively, the
superior court’s failure to comply with the dual mandates is not error, much less per se prejudicial
error as Rangel asserts. Instead, the only possible constitutional error would be a violation of the
substantive rule from Houston-Sconiers: imposition of an adult SRA sentence on a juvenile with
diminished culpability resulting in disproportionate punishment.
Even assuming, without deciding, that Rangel has established a constitutional error under
Houston-Sconiers’s substantive rule, Rangel has failed to establish prejudice. See In re Pers.
Restraint of Forcha-Williams, 200 Wn.2d 581, 597-99, 520 P.3d 939 (2022) (“[W]e stress that the
Eighth Amendment is violated only when a juvenile who possesses diminished culpability is
mandatorily sentenced to an adult standard range or enhancement. . . . This court has long held a
petitioner alleging constitutional error on collateral review must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was actually and substantially prejudiced by the alleged error.”).
To demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice from a Houston-Sconiers error, “a
petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his sentence would have been shorter
if the sentencing judge complied with Houston-Sconiers.” Id. at 599. As relevant here, a petitioner
may meet this burden by showing that the superior court failed to consider the mitigating qualities

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of youth or failed to appreciate its discretion to depart from a mandatory adult sentence, and
imposed the lowest minimum adult sentence authorized by statute. Id.
Here, the superior court imposed a sentence based on the agreed recommendation of both
the prosecutor and defense counsel. All the parties and the superior court agreed that the sentence
was appropriate given the nature of the crime, the sentence of Rangel’s co-defendant, and the
additional conduct that was not being charged as a result of the plea agreement. Rangel has failed
to show that it is more likely than not that he would have received a shorter sentence if the
sentencing court had complied with Houston-Sconiers. Therefore, Rangel has failed to establish
actual and substantial prejudice.
Because Rangel has failed to establish actual and substantial prejudice, we deny Rangel’s
petition.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Lee, J.
We concur:
Glasgow, C.J.
Price, J.