Jude I. Doty V. Department Of Labor And Industries, Et Al

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JUDE I. DOTY,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
INDUSTRIES OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON and JUDY SCHURKE,
in her capacity as Deputy Director,
Respondent.
No. 72021-0-
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: 	February 17,2015
Leach, J. — Jude Doty appeals the superior court order affirming an order
of the director of the Department of Labor and Industries (Department). 	The
director's order upheld citations the Department issued to Doty for violating child
labor 	laws 	by 	employing 	his 	sons, 	ages 	11 	and 	13, 	in 	Doty's 	construction
business. 	Because the Department did 	not exceed 	its rule-making authority
when it defined the word "employ," substantial evidence supports the director's
findings, and those findings support the conclusions that Doty employed his sons
and committed serious violations of child labor laws, we affirm.
FACTS
Jude 	Doty 	owned 	and 	operated 	a 	construction 	and 	house-moving
business in which he employed workers. 	Doty and his wife homeschool their

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children, and as part of "vocational training," Doty involved his sons Zachary, 13,
and Stephen, 11, in the business. 	For one project, he moved several houses
from a hospital property to different sites in the city of Yakima. Zachary worked
on 	the 	project from April 	2002 	through 	January 	2003, 	and 	Stephen 	from
November 2002 through January 2003.
Both Zachary and Stephen worked at the construction sites, working near
and operating heavy equipment such as backhoes, bulldozers, and tractors. 	At
times, Doty was not nearby supervising their use of the heavy equipment. 	The
boys performed many construction-related tasks, including jobs also performed
by adult subcontractors. This work benefited the business.
More than once, Zachary rode on the rooftop of one of the 	relocated
houses as a truck towed it down a public arterial at "approximately walking
speed." 	A videotape shows Zachary moving around on the roof, lifting overhead
wires and cables as a "spotter" to ensure the safe passage of the house down
the street. 	The roof of the house was approximately 22 feet above the ground.
Zachary did not wear a harness or other safety equipment. 	According to Doty,
he profited from using a spotter on top of the house because he has to pay if he
damages wires in transit. Zachary did not fall from the roof or suffer any injury.
At other times, both Zachary and Stephen acted as spotters by walking
alongside or in front of a moving house, making sure it did not hit signs, cars, or
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other obstacles. 	On one occasion, a Department investigator observed Zachary
jumping on and off the moving truck as he directed his father. 	The investigator
also saw Zachary walking only a few feet from a reversing backhoe.
On January 28, 2003, the Department cited Doty for 11 violations of child
labor laws under WAC 296-125. 	The citations assessed penalties of $6,5001 and
classified 5 of the violations as "serious." 	The Department also issued an order
of 	immediate 	restraint, 	prohibiting 	Doty from 	allowing 	his 	sons 	to 	work at
construction sites or in the proximity of heavy equipment.
Over the 	next two days, 	Doty 	continued 	to 	have 	both boys 	perform
construction work. 	On January 30, 2003, while Zachary operated a backhoe on
soft dirt, it tipped onto its side. 	According to an adult worker at the site, Zachary
operated the backhoe too fast for the conditions. 	He was not wearing a seatbelt
or harness. 	Doty was not nearby supervising him. 	Zachary crawled out from
under this machine, uninjured. 	Later, Doty had Zachary use a bulldozer to pull
the backhoe upright.
On 	January 	31, 	2003, 	the 	Department 	cited 	Doty 	for 20 	additional
violations, 	imposing 	$20,000 	in penalties. 	The 	Department classified all 20
violations 	as 	"serious-imminent 	danger-repeat" 	and 	issued 	another 	order of
immediate restraint.
1 After 	the 	Department 	amended 	the 	citation 	to 	eliminate 	6 	of the
violations, Doty's penalties totaled $5,000.
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Doty appealed, and the administrative law judge affirmed. 	Doty appealed
to the director, who affirmed the citations on August 31, 2004. 	The director found
that Doty had employed his sons in his house-moving business in violation of
child 	labor laws and that by permitting them to 	perform 	construction-related
activities, he exposed them to the risk of serious physical harm or death. 	Doty
appealed to the superior court, 	which 	affirmed 	the director, 	holding that the
Department may define "employ" for purposes of child labor laws and that these
laws are constitutional as applied to Doty.
Doty appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When 	reviewing 	an 	agency's 	decision 	under 	the 	Washington
Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA), chapter 34.05 RCW, this court sits in the
same position as the superior court2 and applies the review standards of the
WAPA directly to the administrative record.3 An appellate court reviews the final
decision of the director.4 	The party asserting the invalidity of an agency action
has the burden to demonstrate that invalidity.5 This court will grant relief from an
agency order only if it determines that the agency erroneously interpreted or
2 D.W. Close Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.. 143 Wn. App. 118, 125, 177
P.3d 143 (2008).
3 RCW 49.12.400; Tapper v. Emp't Sec. Dep't. 122 Wn.2d 397, 402, 858
P.2d 494 (1993).
4 RCW 49.12.400.
5RCW34.05.570(1)(a).
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applied the law, substantial evidence does not support the order, or the order is
arbitrary or capricious.6 Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a
fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted.7 	If this court determines
that substantial evidence supports the director's findings, it then decides if those
findings support the director's conclusions of law.8
This court reviews an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation de
novo, under 	an 	error of law standard.9 	In 	interpreting agency 	regulations,
regulatory definitions 	apply, 	and 	courts 	give 	undefined 	words 	their ordinary
dictionary definitions.10 	This court gives "substantial weight" to the 	agency's
interpretation of regulations within 	its area of expertise and will 	uphold that
interpretation if "'it reflects a plausible construction of the language of the statute
and is not contrary to the legislative intent.'"11
6 RCW 34.05.570(2)(d), 	(e), 	(i); 	Xenith Grp.. 	Inc. v. Dep't 	of Labor &
Indus., 167 Wn. App. 389, 393, 269 P.3d 414 (2012).
7 Mowat Constr. Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 148 Wn. App. 920, 925,
201 P.3d 407 (2009).
8 J.E. Dunn Nw., Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.. 139 Wn. App. 35, 42, 156
P.3d 250 (2007).
9 Roller v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 128 Wn. App. 922, 926, 117 P.3d 385
(2005).
10 Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 145 Wn. App. 52,
57, 185 P.3d 646 (2008).
11 Cobra Roofing Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.. 122 Wn. App. 402,
409, 97 P.3d 17 (2004) (quoting Seatoma Convalescent Ctr. v. Dep't of Soc. &
Health Servs., 82 Wn. App. 495, 518, 919 P.2d 602 (1996)).
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ANALYSIS
Child Labor in the Industrial Welfare Act
In 	the 	industrial 	welfare 	act, 	chapter 	49.12 	RCW, 	the 	Washington
legislature declared, "The welfare of the state of Washington demands that all
employees be protected from conditions of labor which have a pernicious effect
on their health."12 	The act contains provisions governing child labor. 	It states
that the Department "may adopt special rules for the protection of the safety,
health, and welfare of minor employees."13 	Courts construe remedial statutes
like this one liberally and its exceptions narrowly.14
The industrial welfare act defines "employee" as one "who is employed in
the business of the employee's employer whether by way of manual labor or
otherwise."15 	The statute defines "employer" as "any person, firm, corporation,
partnership, business trust, legal representative, or other business entity which
engages 	in any 	business, 	industry, 	profession, 	or 	activity 	in this 	state and
12 RCW 49.12.010.
13 RCW 49.12.121(1).
14 Pellino v. Brink's Inc., 164 Wn. App. 668, 684-85, 267 P.3d 383 (2011)
(quoting Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 46 v. City of Everett, 146 Wn.2d 29, 34,
42 P.3d 1265 (2002) (quoting Peninsula Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Pub. Sch. Emps. of
Peninsula, 130 Wn.2d 401, 407, 924 P.2d 13 (1996))).
15 RCW 49.12.005(4).
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NO. 72021-0-1/7
employs one or more employees."16 	Statutory provisions and WACs about the
employment of minors define "employ" as "to engage, suffer, or permit to work."17
Chapter 	296-125 	WAC 	prohibits 	all 	minors 	from 	engaging 	in 	many
occupations and activities. 	These activities include working as an outside helper
or flagger on any public road or highway;18 operating or working in proximity to
heavy equipment such 	as 	earth-moving 	machines, 	backhoes, 	bulldozers, 	or
tractors;19 	and 	working 	more 	than 	10 	feet 	above 	ground 	or 	floor 	level.20
Additionally, minors under 16 years old may not work in the construction industry
at all unless their work is limited to office duties.21
Washington statutes and regulations provide limited exemptions from the
child labor laws. 	The general definition of "employ" in the WAC excludes certain
limited types of work:
The term "employ" does not include newspaper vendors or carriers,
the use of domestic or casual labor in or about private residences,
agricultural 	labor as defined 	by RCW 50.04.150, 	or the 	use of
voluntary 	or 	donated 	services 	performed 	for 	an 	educational,
charitable, 	religious, 	or 	nonprofit 	organization 	and 	without
expectation 	or 	contemplation 	of 	compensation 	for 	the 	services
performed.1221
16RCW49.12.005(3)(a).
17 RCW 49.12.320(1); WAC 296-125-015(2).
18 WAC 296-125-030(2).
19 WAC 296-125-030(17).
20 WAC 296-125-030(28).
21 WAC 296-125-033(4).
22 WAC 296-125-015(2).
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The 	house-to-house 	sales 	provision 	contains 	the 	statute's 	only 	express
exemption for parent employers.23
WAC 296-125-043 provides an exemption from state minimum wage laws
when 	a 	minor 	student 	is 	in 	a 	work 	place 	to 	carry 	out 	an
occupational training experience assignment directly supervised on
the premises by a school official or an employer under contract with
a 	school 	and 	when 	no 	appreciable 	benefit 	is 	rendered 	to 	the
employer by the presence of the minor student.[24]
To be exempt as occupational training, a minor's work must meet six criteria:
4.1. The training, even though it includes actual operation of the
facilities of the employer, is similar to that which would be given in a
vocational school; and
4.2. The training is for the benefit of the trainee; and
4.3. 	The trainees do 	not 	displace 	regular employees, 	but 	work
under their close observation; and
4.4. The business that provides the training derives no immediate
advantage from the activities of the trainees, and may in fact be
impeded; and
4.5. 	The 	trainees 	are 	not 	necessarily 	entitled 	to 	a 	job 	at 	the
conclusion of the training period; and
4.6. The trainees understand they are not entitled to wages for the
time spent in the training.[25]
23 RCW 49.12.320(1).
24 WAC 296-125-043(4).
25 Wash. Dep't of Labor & Indus., Admin. Policy ES.C2 §§ 4.1-.6, at 6 (rev.
Sept. 2, 2008).
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Department's Authority To Define "Employ"
Doty 	contends 	that 	the 	Department 	exceeded 	its authority 	when 	it
"redefine[d] the meaning of employment." He asserts that the legislature granted
the 	Department only a 	narrow authority to 	adopt "special" 	rules, 	not broad
general authority.
We disagree. 	The 	legislature intended that the 	industrial welfare act
protect "all employees" from unhealthy work environments.26 	The "special rules"
of 	RCW 49.12.121(1) 	are 	rules 	for 	the 	protection 	of 	minor employees 	in
particular. 	As early as 1914, our Supreme Court recognized that preventing
"persons of immature judgment from engaging in hazardous occupations" and
preventing "employment and 	overwork of children during the 	period of their
mental 	and 	physical development" were 	part of the 	"objects, 	purposes, 	and
humane spirit of the law."27 	The Department does not exceed its authority by
adopting regulations that fall squarely within the legislature's mandate to protect
minor workers, and "'properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations have
26 RCW 49.12.010.
27 Hillestad v. Indus. Ins. Comm'n, 80 Wash. 426, 431, 141 P. 913(1914).
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NO. 72021-0-1/10
the force 	and effect of law.'"28 	The Department did not exceed its statutory
authority by adopting its definition of "employ."29
"Employ" as Applied to the Dotys
Because the statute and regulations do 	not expressly define the word
"employ," 	the 	director 	looked 	to 	ordinary 	dictionary 	definitions 	of 	"work" to
interpret it. The director concluded that one definition—"a labor, task, or duty that
is 	one's 	accustomed 	means 	of livelihood"30—did 	not 	apply to 	Zachary 	and
Stephen's activities. 	However, 	the 	director concluded 	that 	under a 	second
definition—"an activity in which one exerts strength or faculties to do or perform
something"31—"[Doty] permitted his boys to work."
Doty argues that the Department should have used one of a number of
common law tests, any of which would show he did not employ his sons. 	But the
tests he cites do not apply here. 	First, he cites Cotton v. Weyerhaeuser Timber
Co.32 to argue that because he did not "'expressly'" hire Zachary or Stephen or
"'suffer[ ] or permit[ ]'" them to work "'under circumstances where an obligation to
pay [them] will 	be implied,'" he cannot be their employer. 	Cotton, 	however,
28 Wingert v. Yellow Freight Svs., Inc., 146 Wn.2d 841, 848, 50 P.3d 256
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Manor v. Nestle Food Co., 131
Wn.2d 439, 445, 932 P.2d 628 (1997)).
29 An almost identical definition is found in federal labor statutes such as
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
30 Citing Webster's Universal Encyclopedic Dictionary 2130-31 (2002).
31 Webster's, at 2130-31.
32 20 Wn.2d 300, 312, 147 P.2d 299 (1944).
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NO. 72021-0-1/11
involved an adult bringing a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.33
The child labor laws do not require proof of an obligation to pay wages to prove
employment. 	Adopting this 	requirement would thwart the 	laws' 	purpose 	by
facilitating the economic exploitation of children.
Citing American Products Co. v. Villwock,34 Doty also argues that because
the record contains no evidence of a contract between him and the boys for a
"'fixed compensation which [they] may use as [they] see fit'" and the boys are not
emancipated, the Department cannot prove parental employment. 	But American
Products involves a different factual and legal context—workers' compensation—
and uses a "clear and convincing" test for a contractual relationship that is not in
the statute at issue here.
Doty cites Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.35 to argue that
the boys are economically dependent on him as children and that he directs and
controls the boys' activities as a father, 	not an employer. 	Anfinson, however,
does not 	involve child 	labor laws but the test to distinguish employees from
independent contractors.36 	The statutes and regulations governing child labor
include neither an economic dependence test nor a direction and control test. 	As
the director noted, the legislature acted to regulate the health, safety, and welfare
33 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1938).
34 7 Wn.2d 246, 266-67, 109 P.2d 570 (1941).
35 174 Wn.2d 851, 281 P.3d 289 (2012).
36 Anfinson, 174 Wn.2d at 866-71.
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NO. 72021-0-1 /12
of minor workers, "thus expressly acting to change the common law relationship
of employer-employee in RCW 49.12.121 	and the regulations under it."37 	We
conclude that the director did not err in using RCW 49.12 and WAC 296-125,
rather than any of the tests Doty cites, to interpret "employ."
Doty maintains 	that 	the 	boys 	worked 	as 	part 	of the 	vocational 	and
occupational training component of the family's homeschooling. 	But the boys'
activities do not meet the six-part test for a training exemption from the child
labor 	laws. 	Because the law prohibited the work the boys did, Doty cannot
characterize it as training similar to that provided in a vocational school. 	Doty
does 	not dispute that the 	boys' 	work benefited 	his business. 	Zachary and
Stephen at times displaced regular employees and did not always work under
Doty's observation. 	Because Doty did not use paid subcontractors for the tasks
the boys performed, his business derived an immediate economic benefit from
their activities. 	None of the other exemptions—house-to-house sales, casual or
domestic labor at a private residence, or agricultural work—apply to Zachary and
Stephen's work.
Doty does not dispute that he allowed the boys to help move houses,
operate heavy machinery, and do a variety of other construction-related tasks as
37 See Clausen v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 15 Wn.2d 62, 69, 129 P.2d 777
(1942) (courts apply common law rules unless rules modified by statute).
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part of Doty's business. 	We affirm the director's conclusion that Doty employed
his sons in work not exempt from the child labor laws.
Doty's Constitutional and Statutory Rights as a Parent
Doty 	also 	contends 	that 	the 	Department's 	citations 	violate 	both 	his
constitutional 	rights 	and 	his 	statutory 	right 	to 	direct 	their 	home-based
occupational education.38 	He cites 	In re Custody of Smith39 to support his
assertion 	that 	the 	Department 	violated 	his 	freedom 	under 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution to "'establish a home and bring up
children.'" 	But Smith does not support Doty's position. 	While our Supreme Court
in Smith recognized a parent's "constitutionally protected right to rear his or her
children without state interference,"40 the court also noted that "the state may
step in and override a decision of a parent where the decision would harm the
child."41 	The Smith court singled out child labor as an area in which the State
may exercise its authority, noting that the United States Supreme Court "found a
38 Doty cites RCW 28A.200.020 and RCW 28A.225.010(4), which pertain
to parents' rights and duties in conducting home-based education.
39 137 Wn.2d 1, 13-14, 969 P.2d 21 (1998) (quoting Mever v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923)). affd sub nom. Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000).
40 Smith, 137Wn.2dat15.
41 Smith, 137 Wn.2d at 15-16.
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narrow exception necessary in light of the 'crippling effects of child employment,'
'more especially in public places.'"42
Beyond his bare contentions, Doty does not explain how his constitutional
and statutory rights to raise his children and direct their occupational education
include a right to violate other statutes and regulations enacted to protect the
safety, health, and welfare of minors. This claim fails.43
Designation of Violations as "Serious"
Doty challenges the director's findings that the alleged violations were
"serious" and therefore justified higher penalties. 	The child labor laws define a
violation as serious
if death or serious physical harm has resulted or is imminent from a
condition 	that 	exists, 	or 	from 	one 	or 	more 	practices, 	means,
methods, operations, or processes that have been adopted or are
in use by the employer, unless the employer did not, and could not
with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of
the violation.'441
A serious or repeated violation subjects an employer to a penalty of up to $1,000
for each day the violation continues.45
42 Smith, 137 Wn.2d at 16 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 	U.S.
158, 168, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944)).
43 See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Boslev, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828
P.2d 549 (1992) (declining to review inadequately briefed assignment of error).
44 RCW 49.12.390(2).
45 RCW 49.12.390(2).
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Doty argues that because the regulations listing prohibited minor activities
do not use the terms "'serious,' 'harm,' 'injury,' or 'death' in a pertinent way," the
director's conclusion of law "finds no anchor in the regulations or statute and
floats unconnected to any authority." 	Doty also disputes that any danger to the
boys was "imminent."
We disagree. 	As the director points out, the activities prohibited to minors
are properly classified as "serious" as a matter of law because they are inherently
hazardous:
The list of occupations in WAC 296-125-030 and -033 identify work
activity which by their very nature 	are dangerous 	and 	pose 	a
substantial risk of harm which could result in serious physical injury
or death.. . . Further, the practices by [Doty] of having his 11 year-
old and 13 year-old children engage in activities known by law to be
inherently dangerous for children shows that serious physical harm
or death was imminent. 	Children 	11 and 	13 years of age are
generally 	inexperienced 	at 	exercising 	sound 	and 	independent
judgment necessary for work in inherently dangerous activities, as
Zachary demonstrated when 	he rolled over the backhoe he was
operating. 	The risk of harm is heightened when the children are
especially young as in the case here.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "imminent" as "ready
to 	take 	place: 	near 	at 	hand: . .. hanging 	threateningly 	over 	one's 	head:
menacingly near."46 	Contrary to Doty's assertion, the Department's use of the
word "imminent" is not "strikingly vague" or a "redefinition" of the word. 	Rather, it
46 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1130 (2002).
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aptly describes the risks involved when minors engage in inherently dangerous
work.
In challenging the Department's "serious" designations, Doty assigns error
to several findings of fact. 	First, he alleges that the Department did not prove
that Zachary's lifting of communication wires while on top of the moving house
created a danger of electrical shock from induced voltage, calling the director's
finding 	of 	fact 	"pure 	speculation." 	The 	director 	weighed 	testimony 	and
declarations from both parties' experts on this issue and found, "The opinions of
the Department experts, 	Miller, 	Ervin and 	Mcmurdie in this 	regard are more
credible than those of [Doty's expert] Carl Plumb." 	Substantial evidence supports
the director's findings, and "it is not the function of an appellate court to substitute
its judgment for that of the trial court or to weigh the evidence or the credibility of
witnesses."47
Doty also challenges the director's rejection of Plumb's opinion, based on
an unrelated regulation, that because Zachary was only "observing rather than
being 	engaged 	in activities," use 	of a 	safety 	monitor system 	in lieu of fall
restraints or warning lines would have complied with the law. 	But videotaped
evidence shows Zachary moving around on the roof and lifting traffic signals—
much more than simply inspecting or observing. 	And Plumb's opinion ignores
47 Davis v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.. 94 Wn.2d 119, 124, 615 P.2d 1279
(1980).
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the fact that the law prohibited 13-year-old Zachary from working on the roof at
all. Substantial evidence supports the director's finding that Plumb's opinion was
not credible.
Doty also disputes the director's finding that Plumb had an "erroneous
belief that lack of a WISHA [Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973,
chapter 49.17 RCW] violation precludes a serious violation of the child labor
standards." 	But 	in 	his 	declaration, 	Plumb fails 	to 	acknowledge the 	stricter
standards for minors, only observing that the boys' more dangerous activities, if
performed by an adult, would "not violate specific WISHA safety standards."
Substantial evidence supports this finding.
Next, Doty faults the director for not specifically listing the alleged missing
safety equipment. 	But substantial evidence shows that the boys did hazardous
work without safety harnesses, reflective vests, hard hats, or boots. 	And Doty
cites no authority supporting a contention that the Department's failure to exactly
itemize 	required 	safety equipment renders its finding erroneous or its action
arbitrary or capricious. This claim fails.
Doty also 	challenges 	the 	director's 	findings 	that 	Zachary 	drove 	the
backhoe on "uneven terrain," that drivers who tip over a backhoe "are thrown
from the seat," and that Zachary "hit a temporary electrical wire while operating a
backhoe." 	Doty does not dispute that Zachary, wearing no safety harness, tipped
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over the 	backhoe while driving 	over ground 	that was "soft" in places. 	The
director weighed testimony that Zachary drove too fast and in an unsafe manner.
Substantial evidence supports the director's findings here.
Doty does not dispute the director's findings that on the days named in the
Department's citations, 	he permitted 	(1) 	both Zachary and Stephen to drive
heavy machinery, (2) both boys to perform various tasks at the construction sites,
(3) Zachary to perform various activities more than 10 feet above ground level on
the rooftop of a house moving along city streets, and (4) Zachary to work as an
outside helper on city streets as part of Doty's house-moving business.
Substantial evidence supports the director's challenged findings of fact,
and unchallenged findings are verities on appeal.48 	These findings support the
director's conclusions of law that Doty employed his sons in work prohibited to
minors. 	The findings likewise support the conclusion that these violations of
state child labor laws were repeated and serious, warranting the penalties the
Department assessed. We affirm the director's order upholding the Department's
citations and penalties.
Dotv's Status as Judgment Debtor
For the first time on appeal, Doty argues that any judgment should have
been entered against him as a married man in 	his separate capacity. 	This
48 Kitsap County v. Kitsap Rifle & Revolver Club. 	Wn. App. 	, 337
P.3d 328, 334 (2014).
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argument fails. 	This court has declined to review a request to clarify the identity
of the judgment debtor where a party did not raise the issue before the trial
court.49 	Moreover, 	"[a] debt 	incurred 	by either spouse 	during 	marriage 	is
presumed to be a community debt,"50 and "[i]t is well settled that this presumption
may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence" that the parties have
renounced the 	marital community.51 	Doty does not attempt to overcome this
presumption, and our Supreme Court has overruled the case he cites for the
proposition 	that 	his 	interest 	in community property should 	be shielded from
execution to satisfy his separate obligations.52
Attorney Fees
Doty argues that he is entitled to attorney fees and costs. 	Because he has
not prevailed on any issue, he is not entitled to this relief under any authority
cited by him.
CONCLUSION
Because the Department did not exceed its rule-making authority when it
defined "employ," substantial evidence supports the director's findings, and those
49 Am. Disc. Corp. v. Shepherd. 129 Wn. App. 345, 347 n.1, 120 P.3d 96
(2005); RAP 2.5(a).
50 Oil Heat Co. of Port Angeles, Inc. v. Sweeney, 26 Wn. App. 351, 353,
613P.2d 169(1980).
51 Oil Heat Co.. 26 Wn. App. at 353-54.
52 Stockand v. Bartlett. 4 Wash. 730, 730-31, 31 P. 24 (1892), overruling
recognized by Halev v. Highland. 142Wn.2d135, 142, 12 P.3d 119 (2000).
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NO. 72021-0-1/20
findings support the conclusion that Doty employed his sons and committed
serious violations of child labor laws, we affirm. 	We decline to review Doty's
claim that any judgment should be entered against him as a married man in his
separate capacity and decline his request for attorney fees.
WE CONCUR:
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