* Daniel J. Watson, Respondent / X-pet. V. Northwest Trustee Services, Petitioner / X-res.

NOTICE: SLIP OPINION
(not the court’s final written decision)
The opinion that begins on the next page is a slip opinion. Slip opinions are the
written opinions that are originally filed by the court.
A slip opinion is not necessarily the court’s final written decision. Slip opinions
can be changed by subsequent court orders. For example, a court may issue an
order making substantive changes to a slip opinion or publishing for precedential
purposes a previously “unpublished” opinion. Additionally, nonsubstantive edits
(for style, grammar, citation, format, punctuation, etc.) are made before the
opinions that have precedential value are published in the official reports of court
decisions: the Washington Reports 2d and the Washington Appellate Reports. An
opinion in the official reports replaces the slip opinion as the official opinion of
the court.
The slip opinion that begins on the next page is for a published opinion, and it
has since been revised for publication in the printed official reports. The official
text of the court’s opinion is found in the advance sheets and the bound volumes
of the official reports. Also, an electronic version (intended to mirror the
language found in the official reports) of the revised opinion can be found, free of
charge, at this website: https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports.
For more information about precedential (published) opinions, nonprecedential
(unpublished) opinions, slip opinions, and the official reports, see
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions and the information that is linked there.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DANIEL J. WATSON and KETWARIN
ONNUM, husband and wife,
Respondents,
v.
NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVICES,
INC.,
Petitioner,
CITIMORTGAGE, INC.; NATIONAL
LEGAL HELP CENTER, INC.; and
JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
No. 69352-2-I
DIVISION ONE
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO PUBLISH OPINION
C=3
IK
3S»
—>_.
zo 	o-~
CO
T,^--,..
S>~g-„,,
3»>
~'cp
The respondents, Daniel J. Watson and Ketwarin Onnum, having filed a motion
to publish opinion, and the hearing panel having reconsidered its prior determination
and finding that the opinion will be of precedential value; now, therefore it is hereby:
ORDERED 	that 	the 	unpublished 	opinion 	filed 	January 	21, 	2014, 	shall 	be
published and printed in the Washington Appellate Reports.
DATED this 	Ifl^davof 	MflrcVl 	.2014.
For the Court:
Judge 	lj
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

c niv t
	Cr>':U\ HI- Am.? u> uiv i
STATE Or ViASHJHGfO!-;
2QIUAH21 	PH 	Is 26
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DANIEL J. WATSON and KETWARIN
ONNUM, husband and wife,
Respondents,
v.
NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVICES,
INC.,
Petitioner,
CITIMORTGAGE, INC.; NATIONAL
LEGAL HELP CENTER, INC.; and
JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
No. 69352-2-
DIVISION ONE
PUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: 	January 21, 2014
Leach, 	C.J. 	— 	Northwest 	Trustee 	Services 	Inc. 	(NWTS) 	seeks
discretionary 	review 	of 	the 	superior 	court's 	denial 	of 	NWTS's 	motion 	for
summary dismissal of the claim by Daniel Watson and Ketwarin Onnum (the
Watsons) for damages allegedly caused by NWTS's breach of the foreclosure
fairness act, chapter 61.24 RCW (FFA). 	The Watsons cross petition, seeking
review of the superior court's dismissal of their claims under the Consumer
Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW (CPA). 	Because the trial court committed
probable error and substantially altered the status quo when it dismissed the
Watsons' CPA claims, we grant the Watsons' petition and reverse the trial court's
decision. 	Because the trial court did not commit error when it denied NWTS's
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 69352-2-1 / 2
motion for summary dismissal of the Watsons' FFA claims, we deny NWTS's
petition.
Background
In April 2003, Daniel Watson and his wife, Ketwarin Onnum, financed the
purchase of a home by executing a promissory note payable to ABN AMRO
Mortgage Inc. and a companion deed of trust. 	Through various mergers and
business transactions, CitiMortgage acquired the note and a beneficial interest
under the deed of trust. 	It later appointed NWTS as successor trustee.
On February 5, 2011, NWTS sent the Watsons a notice of default. 	On
March 	22, 	2011, 	NWTS 	recorded 	a 	notice 	of 	trustee's 	sale, 	with 	the 	sale
scheduled 	for 	June 	24, 	2011. 	On 	June 	20, 	2011, 	the 	Watsons 	filed 	for
bankruptcy, which caused the trustee sale to be postponed and then canceled.
On July 22, 2011, the FFA amended the deeds of trust act, chapter 61.24
RCW (DTA).1 	Among other changes, the FFA changed the requirements for
preforeclosure notice2 and allowed 	recovery of damages for violations of the
CPA.3
On September 22, 2011, the bankruptcy court discharged the Watsons'
debts, including the note. 	On November 8, 2011, NWTS recorded an amended
notice of trustee's sale, with a new sale date of December 23, 2011. 	NWTS
mailed a copy of the notice by certified and first class mail to the Watsons and
1 RCW61.24.005-.177 (Laws of 2011, ch. 364, § 3).
2 RCW 61.24.030, .031, .040.
3 RCW 61.24.135.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 69352-2-1 / 3
posted a copy of the notice at the premises. 	NWTS did not send a new notice of
default or otherwise contact the Watsons before recording this notice.4 	A third
party purchased the Watsons' house at a trustee's sale on December 23, 2011.
The trustee's deed 	recorded 	by NWTS on January 10, 2012, 	referred to the
March 22, 2011, notice of trustee's sale, which described the notice of the sale
that was ultimately canceled, but did not mention the notice recorded November
8,2011.
The Watsons filed a 	lawsuit against NWTS and CitiMortgage, alleging
wrongful foreclosure and to quiet title. 	They later amended the complaint to
include additional claims for violation of the CPA. 	The amended complaint also
added National Legal Help Center as a defendant. 	NWTS and CitiMortgage filed
an amended joint motion for summary judgment. 	The court dismissed all claims
against CitiMortage and 	requested 	additional briefing 	on 	the 	claims against
NWTS, which the parties provided. 	The trial court dismissed the Watsons' CPA
claim, but not their claim for wrongful foreclosure for failure to comply with the
FFA.
Both NWTS and the Watsons seek discretionary review.
Analysis
Discretionary review is available in the following circumstances:
4 The Watsons attempted to seek legal help by contacting a California
entity called the "National Legal Help Center," but this entity is apparently not an
attorney or counsel approved by HUD (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development), and contrary to its representations to the Watsons, it did not stop
the foreclosure.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 69352-2-1/4
(1) The superior court has committed an obvious error which
would render further proceedings useless;
(2) The superior court has committed probable error and the
decision of the superior court substantially alters the status quo or
substantially limits the freedom of a party to act;
(3) The superior court has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such
a departure by an inferior court or administrative agency, as to call
for review by the appellate court; or
(4) The superior court has certified, or all the parties to the
litigation 	have 	stipulated, 	that 	the 	order 	involves 	a 	controlling
question 	of law as 	to 	which there 	is substantial 	ground 	for a
difference of opinion and that immediate review of the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.151
NWTS contends that by denying its motion for summary judgment as to
the wrongful foreclosure claim, the trial court "committed an obvious error which
would render further proceedings useless." 	The Watsons argue that the court
committed error warranting review by dismissing their CPA claims.
Wrongful Foreclosure under the FFA
The trial court denied NWTS's motion to dismiss the Watsons' wrongful
foreclosure claims on two alternative grounds. 	First, the court ruled that the FFA
is a remedial statute and, as such, should be applied retroactively. 	Alternatively,
the trial court ruled that it did not need to apply the FFA retroactively because the
"precipitating event" triggering the statute's application was not the February
2011 	notice of default but the amended notice of trustee's sale, 	recorded in
November 2011, after the effective date of the FFA.
RAP 2.3(b).
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 69352-2-1 / 5
Courts 	presume that statutory amendments operate 	prospectively and
generally disfavor retroactive application because "'individuals should have an
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly.'"6
A statute applies retroactively if it changes the legal effect of "'prior facts or
transactions"'7 or "'attaches new legal consequences to events completed before
its enactment.'"8 	But a statute does not apply retroactively "merely because it is
applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment or
upsets expectations based in prior law."9 "A statute operates prospectively when
the precipitating event for operation of the statute occurs after enactment, even
when 	the 	precipitating 	event 	originated 	in 	a 	situation 	existing 	prior 	to
enactment."10
NWTS argues that under the FFA, the preforeclosure requirements are
linked to the original notice of default sent in February 2011, before the FFA took
effect. 	NWTS contends that the process that culminated in the trustee's sale was
one continuous transaction. 	Therefore the trial court erred by applying the July
2011 FFA amendments to the sale process.
6 Loeffelholz v. Univ. of Wash., 175 Wn.2d 264, 272, 285 P.3d 854 (2012)
(quoting Landqrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 128 L
Ed. 2d 229 (1994)); In re Pers. Restraint of Flint, 174 Wn.2d 539, 546, 277 P.3d
657(2012).
7 Flint, 174 Wn.2d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State
v. Varna, 151 Wn.2d 179, 195, 86 P.3d 139 (2004)).
""Flint. 174 Wn.2d at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State
v. Pillatos. 159Wn.2d459.471, 150 P.3d 1130 (2007)).
^Tandgraf, 511 U.S. at 269 (citation omitted).
10 In re Estate of Burns, 131 Wn.2d 104, 110-11, 928 P.2d 1094 (1997).
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 69352-2-1 / 6
Because the 	DTA eliminates 	many 	protections enjoyed 	by 	borrowers
under judicial foreclosures, "lenders must strictly comply with the statutes and
courts must strictly construe the statutes in the borrower's favor."11 	Under the
FFA it "shall be requisite to a trustee's sale" that a written 	notice of default
containing specific information set forth in the statute first be transmitted by the
beneficiary or the trustee to the borrower.12 	A trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent may not issue this notice of default until 30 days after satisfying certain due
diligence requirements.13 	The beneficiary or agent first must send a letter that
includes information such as the borrower's right to meet with a HUD-approved
housing counselor or attorney who can help with mediation, assist in arranging a
meeting 	with 	the 	lender, 	or 	work 	toward 	a 	resolution 	such 	as 	a 	loan
modification.14 	This "Pre-Foreclosure 	Options 	Letter" 	or a 	"Notice 	of Pre-
Foreclosure Options" must provide toll-free numbers to help borrowers find HUD-
approved housing counselors or civil legal aid resources.15
Where the filing of a bankruptcy court petition has stayed a trustee's sale,
the trustee may set and give notice of a new sale date not less than 45 days after
the date of the bankruptcy court order permitting the sale.16 	RCW 61.24.130(5)
through (6) allow a trustee's sale "on any date to which such sale has been
11 Albice v. Premier Mortq. Servs. of Wash., Inc., 174 Wn.2d 560, 567, 276
P.3d 1277 (2012).
12 RCW 61.24.030(8).
13 RCW 61.24.031 (1)(a), (5).
14 RCW 61.24.031 (1)(c)(iii), (iv), (f), (2)-(4).
15RCW61.24.031(1)(c)(ii).
16 RCW 61.24.130(4).
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 69352-2-1 / 7
properly continued in accordance with RCW 61.24.040(6)." 	This statute allows a
trustee to continue the sale for a period or periods not exceeding a total of 120
days.17
NWTS claims its original March 22, 2011, notice of trustee's sale fulfilled
its obligations under the DTA. 	But this notice described a sale scheduled for
June 24, 2011. 	NWTS first continued and ultimately canceled this sale. 	RCW
61.24.040(6) allowed continuance of the June 24, 2011, sale date for no more
than 120 days, or until October 22, 2011.18 	After that date, the DTA required a
new notice. 	Therefore, although NWTS labeled its second notice an "amended"
notice of trustee's sale, this notice necessarily scheduled a new sale. 	Because
NWTS 	recorded 	the 	"amended" 	notice 	in 	November 	2011, 	the 	notice
requirements of the FFA applied.
Because 	NWTS failed 	to 	comply 	with the 	FFA's 	notice 	requirements
before recording its November 2011 notice of trustee's sale, the Watsons have
demonstrated 	issues 	of 	material 	fact 	regarding 	the 	lawfulness 	of 	NWTS's
nonjudicial sale of the Watsons' property. 	NWTS has failed to establish grounds
for discretionary review. We dismiss its petition for review.
Violation of the CPA
We next address the Watsons' petition for review. 	Because the trial court
committed 	probable 	error 	and 	substantially 	altered 	the 	status 	quo 	when 	it
17 RCW 61.24.040(6).
18 	See 	Rouse 	v. 	Wells 	Fargo 	Bank, 	N.A.. 	No. 	C13-5706, 	2013 	WL
5488817, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 2, 2013).
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 69352-2-1 / 8
dismissed the Watsons' CPA claims, we grant the Watsons' petition and reverse
the trial court's dismissal of this claim.
The FFA states in a section added in 2011,
It is an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce and an unfair
method of competition in violation of the consumer protection act,
chapter 19.86 RCW, for any person or entity to: 	(a) Violate the duty
of good faith 	under RCW 61.24.163; (b) fail to comply with the
requirements of RCW 61.24.174; or (c) fail to initiate contact with a
borrower 	and 	exercise 	due 	diligence 	as 	required 	under 	RCW
61.24.031.l19]
Relying on its retroactivity analysis, the trial court ruled that "creation of a
new cause of action (a per se violation of the Consumer Protection Act) affects a
substantive right and therefore the FFA is not retroactive with 	respect to the
Consumer Protection Act claim." 	Because we conclude that the FFA applied to
NWTS's 	November 2011 	notice, 	we 	also 	conclude that the 	FFA 	provisions
addressing the CPA apply. 	The trial court erred and substantially altered the
status quo when it dismissed the Watsons' CPA claims. 	We reverse the trial
court's 	dismissal 	of 	the 	Watsons' 	CPA 	claims 	and 	remand 	for 	further
proceedings.
Conclusion
Because the trial court did 	not commit error when 	it denied 	NWTS's
motion for summary dismissal of the Watsons' FFA claims, we deny NWTS's
petition. 	Because the trial court 	committed 	probable error and substantially
altered the status quo when it dismissed the Watsons' CPA claims, we grant the
19 RCW 61.24.135(2) (Laws of 2011, ch. 58, §14).
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 69352-2-1 / 9
Watsons' petition, reverse the trial court's dismissal of their CPA claims, and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/^^^, 	C .
WE CONCUR:
Sx>te/>
fi