* State of Washington v. Cynthia Faye Thornton

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FILED
JUNE 16,2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, 	)
) 	No. 32478-8-111
Respondent, 	)
)
v. 	) 	PUBLISHED OPINION
)
CYNTHIA FAYE THORNTON, 	)
)
Appellant. 	)
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. - 	Cynthia Thornton was convicted of possession ofa
controlled substance-heroin. The sentencing court imposed a $100 deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) collection fee as a mandatory legal financial obligation (LFO) under
RCW 43.43.7541. Ms. Thornton appeals, contending the court erred in imposing the
DNA collection fee because she had already submitted a DNA sample for a prior
conviction. We find no merit to her contention and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
At Ms. Thornton's April 10, 2014 sentencing hearing, the court imposed certain
LFOs including the $100 DNA collection fee. The court then told Ms. Thornton she
would need to set up a time for DNA collection. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 206. In
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 32478-8-III
State v. Thornton
reference to a recent 2014 delivery of a controlled substance offense that was included in
Ms. Thornton's criminal history for current offender score purposes, the court asked her
if DNA collection had already been done on that case. RP at 206. The prosecutor
responded in the negative, and the parties agreed that Ms. Thornton would appear at the
jail on April 16 to submit a DNA sample. RP at 206-07. Her counsel presented an order
for DNA reporting, which the court signed along with the judgment and sentence.
RP at 207-08. The judgment and sentence recites RCW 43.43.7541 as authority for the
$100 DNA collection fee. 	Ms. Thornton appeals the imposition of that fee.
ANALYSIS
Two separate statutes pertaining to collection of DNA samples and the fee
imposed as an LFO inform our review in this case. First is the collection/submission
statute, RCW 43.43.754. It provides in pertinent part:
(1) A biological sample must be collected for purposes of DNA
identification analysis from:
(a) Every adult or juvenile individual convicted of a felony ....
(2) If the Washington state patrol crime laboratory already has a
DNA sample from an individual for a qualifying offense, a subsequent
submission is not required to be submitted.
RCW 43.43.754. Next is the fee collection statute, RCW 43.43.7541, which provides:
Every sentence imposed for a crime specified in RCW 43.43.754 must
include a fee of one hundred dollars. The fee is a court-ordered legal financial
obligation as defined in RCW 9.94A.030 and other applicable law. For a sentence
imposed under chapter 9.94A RCW, the fee is payable by the offender after
payment of all other legal financial obligations included in the sentence has been
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No. 32478-8-II1
State v. Thornton
completed. For all other sentences, the fee is payable by the offender in the same
manner as other assessments imposed. The clerk of the court shall transmit eighty
percent of the fee collected to the state treasurer for deposit in the state DNA
database account created under RCW 43.43.7532, and shall transmit twenty
percent of the fee collected to the agency responsible for collection of a biological
sample from the offender as required under RCW 43.43.754.
Citing only to RCW 43.43.754(1) and (2), Ms. Thornton contends that if the
Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory already has a DNA sample from her as
required in the prior 2014 felony drug case, collection of another DNA sample was not
necessary in the current case and the sentencing court therefore erred in imposing the
$100 DNA collection fee. 	The argument misses the mark.
The parties concurred at sentencing that Ms. Thornton had not yet submitted any
DNA sample. Collection ofa sample from her was mandatory under RCW 43.43.754(1).
The current sentencing court thus ordered her to provide a sample. Ms. Thornton
provides no facts to support her new argument on appeal suggesting a sample was already
collected and submitted to the Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory under the prior
cause number. See Bulzomi v. Dep't a/Labor & Indus., 72 Wn. App. 522, 525, 864 P.2d
996 (1994) (party seeking review has burden of perfecting record so reviewing court has
all relevant evidence before it; insufficient record on appeal precludes review of the
alleged errors). Ms. Thornton thus makes no showing that RCW 43.43.754(2) even
applies to her case, much less to support an argument that it precludes collection of the
$100 DNA fee as a mandatory LFO.
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No. 32478M 8M
III
State v. Thornton
Apart from collection of DNA samples and their submission to the Washington
State Patrol Crime Laboratory, collection of the DNA fee as an LPO is separately
governed by RCW 43.43.7541. Our goal when interpreting a statute is to carry out the
legislature's intent. See State v. Gonzalez, 168 Wn.2d 256,263,226 P.3d 131 (2010).
We must give effect to the plain language of an unambiguous statute. Id. 	We also
determine the plain meaning of a statutory provision from the general context of the
statute, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. 	Wash. Pub. Ports Ass 'n
v. Dep't o/Revenue, 148 Wn.2d 637,645,62 P.3d 462 (2003). 	If the plain language of
the statute is unambiguous, our inquiry is at an end and we enforce the statute "in
accordance with its plain meaning." State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d
201 (2007).
Such is the case here. 	The language in RCW 43.43.7541 that "[e]very sentence
imposed for a crime specified in RCW 43.43.754 must include a fee of one hundred
dollars" plainly and unambiguously provides that the $100 DNA database fee is
mandatory for all such sentences. See State ex rei. Billington v. Sinclair, 28 Wn.2d 575,
581, 183 P.2d 813 (1947) (word "must" is generally regarded as making a provision
mandatory); see also State v. Kuster, 175 Wn. App. 420, 424, 306 P.3d 1022 (2013)
(DNA collection fee is mandated by RCW 43.43.7541). 	The statute also furthers the
purpose of funding for the state DNA database and agencies that collect
samples and does not conflict with DNA sample collection and submission provisions of
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No. 32478-8-III
State v. Thornton
RCW 43.43.754(1) and (2). The court thus properly imposed the DNA collection fee
under RCW 43.43.7541 for Ms. Thornton's felony drug conviction.
Affirmed.
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
WE CONCUR:
5