State Of Washington, Respondent V Charles A. Cooper, Jr., Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59582-6-II
Respondent,
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHARLES ALFRED COOPER JR.,
Appellant.
PRICE, J. — Charles A. Cooper appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to possession
of a stolen firearm, first degree trafficking in stolen property, and first degree unlawful possession
of a firearm, arguing that the superior court improperly considered a victim impact statement in
violation of the real facts doctrine. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
On August 23, 2021, the State charged Cooper with second degree unlawful possession of
a firearm, four counts of possession of a stolen firearm, and first degree trafficking in stolen
property. Later, the State amended the information to include first degree unlawful possession of
a firearm.
The probable cause statement supporting the charges explained that the case began with a
storage unit burglary during which ammunition and numerous firearms were stolen. During law
enforcement’s investigation of the burglary, Sergeant Jeremy Brown was shot and killed by one
of the burglary suspects while he was conducting surveillance.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
October 28, 2025

No. 59582-6-II
2
Cooper was not implicated in the burglary or Sergeant Brown’s murder, but after the
shooting, Cooper agreed to receive and sell several of the stolen firearms. Cooper was arrested,
and he admitted not only that he agreed to sell some of the stolen firearms, but also that he knew
the firearms were related to Sergeant Brown’s shooting.
Cooper was released on conditions prior to trial. But while on release, Cooper was arrested
and charged with additional offenses, including first degree unlawful possession of a firearm and
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The new charges were assigned cause
number 23-1-02275-06.1
On February 23, 2024, Cooper pleaded guilty to possession of a stolen firearm, first degree
trafficking in stolen property, and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. Cooper also
separately pleaded guilty to first degree unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver in cause number 23-1-02275-06. Sentencing in both
cases was continued to allow Cooper to be evaluated for a mental health sentencing alternative
(MHSA), RCW 9.94A.695.
Prior to sentencing, Cooper submitted a memorandum and evidence in support of his
MHSA request. In addition to the MHSA pre-sentence investigation, Cooper submitted several
letters from family and mental health providers supporting his MHSA request. Cooper also
submitted treatment plans for his MHSA.
1 Cooper appealed that case in linked cause number 59592-3-II.

No. 59582-6-II
3
Before the parties made their arguments at Cooper’s sentencing hearing, the State offered
a victim impact statement from Sergeant Brown’s wife, Jennifer Brown. Cooper objected, arguing
that any statement from Ms. Brown violated the real facts doctrine because his trafficking crimes
were not sufficiently related to Sergeant Brown’s death. The superior court overruled Cooper’s
objection, stating it could consider the victim impact statement in terms of the impact on the
individual victims, but to the extent that the victim impact statement contained any “factual
material” that was not in the statement of defendant on plea of guilty or the probable cause
statement, it would not be considered. The superior court further explained,
I think that’s—when we talk about [the] real facts doctrine, I just—I had reason to
address this issue fairly recently in a different case. The Courts have been relatively
stringent on that issue. It’s—you know, the defendant is—needs to be punished for
those crimes that he has actually admitted or been convicted of. The Courts
certainly are concerned about defendants being punished for other things or the
State making arguments that he engage[d] in other conduct that he’s not pled guilty
to. So I can’t consider those types of things. But I can certainly consider the
information that’s contained in the statement of defendant on plea of guilty and in
the probable cause statements, I think that [the prosecutor] has referred to.
Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 33.
The parties then disagreed about whether an MHSA should be imposed. The State opposed
Cooper’s request for an MHSA and argued that the superior court should impose standard range
sentences in both of Cooper’s cases, to be served concurrently, resulting in 212 months’
confinement. Jennifer Brown addressed the superior court and spoke about the loss of her husband
and objected to the MHSA. Cooper, however, asked the superior court to impose an MHSA
because his long criminal history was directly related to untreated mental health issues and
concurrent substance abuse. In response to the superior court’s request for clarification, the parties

No. 59582-6-II
4
said that 212 months was an agreed recommendation, but that Cooper was also permitted to ask
for an MHSA under the plea agreement.
Following the presentations of the parties, the superior court observed that Cooper had
been diagnosed with a mental illness and his crimes qualified him for the MHSA. The superior
court also found that Cooper was willing to participate in the MHSA. However, the superior court
determined that the community would not benefit from Cooper engaging in the MHSA because
there was too great a risk of his continuing to engage in criminal activity. Specifically, the superior
court relied on the fact that Cooper committed additional drug and firearm related offenses while
on release for the original trafficking charges.
In denying the MHSA and imposing the recommended standard range sentence, the
superior court explained,
So while I appreciate, you know, [Cooper’s] comments here today that he was a
drug addict and that he was doing that because of his addiction and I really don’t
question that. The problem is that he was out doing that. And I think engaging in
drug dealing while you’re armed with firearms is a—is a highly dangerous activity.
I think it puts the community at a tremendous risk. So, you know, he was doing
that while he was out under court supervision. So I think that does raise [a]
significant question for the Court about what engage—what behavior he would
engage in if he was placed on the mental health sentencing alternative.
As I indicated earlier, I—you know, I appreciate the comments about the damage
that Mr. Cooper’s behavior and crimes have—have caused to the community. I
have to be careful, I think, in terms of sentencing here today, to confine the
punishment to the crimes that he’s pled guilty to. And he’s pled guilty to a whole
series of different crimes. And as [the prosecutor] indicated, you know, he faces
potentially 212 months. But I can’t sentence him for—for crimes that he’s not been
convicted of. And so, you know, some of the comments that are made by [defense
counsel] are appropriate. I have to confine the punishment to the crimes he’s been
convicted of here, [unlawful possession] firearm, unlawful possession with intent
to deliver, and the other crimes.

No. 59582-6-II
5
So I’ve thought about this in great detail. I think he qualifies for the mental health
sentencing alternative, but it simply is not appropriate. It’s not in the community’s
interest.
I can’t, with the magnitude and breadth of criminal activity that the defendant has
engaged in and his criminal history, as much as I’d like to see him get treatment, I
just cannot find it in the interest of the community to sentence him under the mental
health sentencing alternative. And so I accept the recommendation of the parties
of 212 months.
VRP at 56-57. Consistent with the plea agreement, the superior court imposed a standard range
sentence to run concurrently with the sentence in cause number 23-1-02275-06 for a total of 212
months’ confinement.
Cooper appeals.
ANALYSIS
Cooper argues that the superior court violated the real facts doctrine by allowing Sergeant
Brown’s wife to make a victim impact statement at sentencing. We disagree.
RCW 9.94A.530(2), known as the real facts doctrine, provides, “In determining any
sentence other than a sentence above the standard range, the trial court may rely on no more
information than is admitted by the plea agreement, or admitted, acknowledged, or proved in a
trial or at the time of sentencing . . . .” The doctrine prevents a sentencing court from imposing “a
sentence based upon the elements of a more serious crime that the State did not charge or prove.”
State v. Elza, 87 Wn. App. 336, 342, 941 P.2d 728 (1997). Its purpose “is to limit sentencing
decisions to facts that are acknowledged, proven, or pleaded, and to prevent sentencing courts from
imposing exceptional sentences when dissatisfied with the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 342. Further, the

No. 59582-6-II
6
real facts doctrine prohibits the sentencing court from considering uncharged crimes as a reason
for imposing an exceptional sentence. State v. McAlpin, 108 Wn.2d 458, 466, 740 P.2d 824 (1987).
Assuming, without deciding, that the real facts doctrine applies even when Cooper received
a standard range, rather than an exceptional, sentence,2 the superior court did not violate the real
facts doctrine. Although the superior court allowed Sergeant Brown’s wife to make a victim
impact statement, the superior court clearly stated multiple times that it was limiting its sentencing
decision only to those specific crimes to which Cooper had pleaded guilty. And Cooper points to
nothing in the record to suggest that the superior court failed to do so. The superior court
thoroughly explained its decision not to impose an MHSA, basing it on Cooper’s extensive
criminal history and, most importantly, the fact that Cooper had engaged in trafficking drugs while
armed with a firearm when he was already on bail for multiple firearm trafficking charges.
Cooper’s sentence was not improperly based on facts related to uncharged crimes and, therefore,
there was no violation of the real facts doctrine.
CONCLUSION
We affirm Cooper’s sentence.
2 The State argues that the real facts doctrine does not apply here because there is no limit on what
a sentencing court can consider when imposing a standard range sentence.

No. 59582-6-II
7
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
PRICE, J.
We concur:
LEE, P.J.
GLASGOW, J.