In Re The Marriage Of Jill S. Calabrese, Appellant V. Jack A. Calabrese, Respondent

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of 	)
JILL S. CALABRESE, 	)
Appellant, 	)
and 	)
JACK A. CALABRESE, 	)
Respondent. 	)
No. 73439-3-1
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: March 7, 2016
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Trickey, J. — Jill Calabrese appeals a trial court order granting her former
husband's petition for modification of spousal maintenance. 	She contends Jack
Calabrese's 	reduction of income was voluntary and 	not taken 	in good faith.
Because substantial evidence supports the court's finding that the reduction in
income was involuntary and constitutes a substantial change in circumstances
justifying modification, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2010, Jill and Jack Calabrese1 divorced after 27 years of marriage.
Under their settlement agreement, Jill received just over 54 percent of the net
community assets, which totaled approximately $3 million. 	The agreement also
required Jack to pay Jill $10,000 a month in spousal maintenance. 	The decree
provided that this maintenance would continue for approximately eight years,
until 	Jack turned 65. 	And 	if Jack's income remained 	at its 	current level of
$300,000 annually, maintenance would continue for one additional year.
1 For clarity, we refer to the parties by their first names.

No. 73439-3-1 / 2
At the time of the divorce, Jack had operated his own business, NAPA
Insurance Center (NIC), for many years. 	As the endorsed provider of insurance
for NAPA Auto Parts, NIC markets business insurance programs to NAPA stores
nationwide. 	Because the sole focus of NIC is marketing insurance to 	NAPA
stores, the corporate leadership of NAPA Auto Parts has allowed NIC to use the
NAPA branding and logo. 	However, NIC has never had an ownership interest in
or 	contractual 	relationship 	with 	any 	NAPA 	stores 	or 	NAPA 	corporate
management. 	NIC functions as a "middleman" between NAPA stores and the
insurance companies that sell policies to the 	NAPA dealers. 	NIC generates
income from the commissions it receives from the insurance companies.
From 	1991 	to 	2012, 	Federated 	Insurance 	was 	the 	only 	provider 	of
business insurance that NIC marketed to NAPA dealers. 	Over 90 percent of
NIC's income from commissions came from Federated. 	For many years, this
was a consistently lucrative arrangement; 	at the time of the divorce, 	Jack's
income exceeded $25,000 a month.
At some point, Federated began losing NAPA policyholders because its
rates 	were 	no 	longer 	competitive. 	Around 	June 	2011, 	NAPA 	corporate
management met with Jack and Federated representatives to discuss ways to
improve NAPA participation in Federated programs. 	After "many weeks of no
improvements 	on the 	program," 	NAPA 	authorized Jack 	to 	"go 	a 	different
direction."2 	In September 2012, NAPA severed its relationship with Federated,
which stopped paying commissions to Jack.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1805.

No. 73439-3-1 / 3
Jack's first attempt to replace Federated and 	secure a 	new source of
income for NIC was an asset purchase agreement with a different provider, GMI,
Inc. 	Under 	this 	agreement, 	Jack 	and 	GMI 	formed 	a 	new 	limited liability
corporation, 	Newco, which would be known as NAPA Insurance Center, 	LLC.
GMI owned 67 percent of this new entity, and Jack owned 33 percent. 	As part of
the agreement, Jack also sold his goodwill in NIC to GMI for $800,000, to be paid
in monthly installments over two years. 	Jack and GMI executed the contract as
an asset purchase agreement in order for Jack to be able to declare capital
gains, not ordinary income, and thus gain a tax benefit in 2012 and 2013. 	The
agreement included an endorsement from NAPA. 	The agreement provided that
after two years, Jack would receive an annual base salary of $200,000 plus a
percentage of net profits. 	The parties projected that his annual income would be
approximately 	$400,000 	under 	these 	terms. 	NAPA 	reserved 	the 	right 	to
terminate its relationship with GMI at any time.
The business 	plan 	with 	GMI 	was not successful. 	There was a 	low
program adoption rate and NAPA corporate had received poor feedback from
customers. 	GMI wanted to end the agreement to avoid further losses, and Jack
wanted to maintain his relationship with NAPA. 	In October 2013, Jack agreed to
pay GMI $200,000 to repurchase his membership interest and noncompetition
agreement. 	He 	agreed 	to forgive 	the $100,000 	GMI 	still 	owed 	him 	of the
$800,000 in goodwill and to pay $100,000 in cash in two $50,000 installments.
In January 2014, Jack executed an agreement with Lockton Affinity, LLC.
Under this agreement, Jack would receive a monthly fee of $10,000 during 2014,

No. 73439-3-1/4
along with a percentage of premiums over $1.8 million. 	After 2014, Jack would
receive a percentage of collected premiums, but no monthly fee. 	The president
of Lockton projected that Jack's income from commissions would total $24,948
for 2014, $89,892 for 2015, $60,984 for 2016, and $73,656 for 2017. 	During
2014, 	Jack 	used 	savings 	to 	compensate 	for 	the 	reduction 	in 	income 	and
remained current in his maintenance payments to Jill.
On August 21, 	2014, 	Jack filed 	a 	petition for modification of spousal
support on the basis of a substantial change in circumstances, requesting that
the court reduce his monthly maintenance payments to $2,000. 	Jack proposed
that Jill also receive 30 percent of "net business revenue from NAPA Insurance
Center," with payments not to exceed $120,000 a year.3
On January 9, 2015, following 	a contested hearing, the superior court
commissioner entered findings 	of fact and conclusions of law and an order
granting Jack's petition. 	The commissioner found that Jack's loss of income
following 	NAPA's 	severance 	of its 	relationship with 	Federated constituted a
substantial and involuntary change of circumstances. 	The commissioner found
that the exclusive endorsement and business relationship with Federated "was
expected to continue because it had been longstanding," but that Federated's
loss 	of 	market 	share 	caused 	the 	end 	of 	the 	relationship 	and 	consequent
reduction in Jack's income.4
The commissioner found 	that Jack's agreement with GMI, subsequent
purchase of his noncompete, and his agreement with Lockton were "good faith
3 CP at 4.
4 CP at 1898.

No. 73439-3-1 / 5
efforts to maintain his income and to find a new insurance carrier for NAPA to
endorse."5 	The commissioner noted that Jack paid his maintenance throughout
2012 and 2013 in part by means of his capital gains from the original agreement
with GMI. 	And the commissioner found that Jack's 10 monthly bank deposits of
$14,679.88 in 2014 included Lockton's guaranteed payment of $10,000 a month
for that year, which would not continue in 2015.
The commissioner ordered that maintenance payments be reduced to
$2,500, to begin in January 2015. 	In addition, the commissioner ordered Jack to
pay 15 percent of all gross commission compensation above $100,000 a year.
The commissioner ordered Jack to deposit all income to one bank account, with
quarterly disclosures of bank statements.
Jill moved for revision of the commissioner's order. 	On March 20, 2015,
the trial court adopted the commissioner's findings and conclusions, revising the
order to include, "Should Mr. Calabrese's income be restored to historic levels to
$300,000 	annually, 	Ms. 	Calabrese 	may 	petition 	the 	court to 	reinstate 	the
maintenance amounts and schedule in the Decree."6
Jill appeals.
ANALYSIS
On a motion for revision, the superior court reviews the commissioner's
findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo, examining only the evidence and
issues before the commissioner. 	State v. Ramer, 151 Wn.2d 106, 113, 86 P.3d
132 (2004). 	Once the superior court rules on the revision motion, "the appeal is
5 CP at 1898.
6 CP at 1917-18.

No. 73439-3-1 / 6
from the superior court's decision, not the commissioner's." 	State v. Hoffman,
115 Wn. App. 91, 101.60P.3d 1261. rev'd on other grounds. 150 Wn.2d 536, 78
P.3d 1289 (2003).
Modification of spousal maintenance is appropriate where 	the 	moving
party presents evidence establishing that there has been a substantial change in
circumstances not within the parties' contemplation at the time the maintenance
was ordered. 	RCW 26.09.170(1 )(b); Waaner v. Wagner, 95 Wn.2d 94, 98, 621
P.2d 1279 (1980); In re Marriage of Ochsner. 47 Wn. App. 520, 524, 736 P.2d
292 (1987). 	A change in circumstances occurs upon a change in the financial
ability of the obligor spouse to pay in comparison with the need of the other
spouse. 	Ochsner. 47 Wn. App. at 524. 	A voluntary reduction in income will not
constitute 	a 	change 	in 	circumstances 	warranting 	modification 	absent 	a
"substantial showing of good faith." 	Lambert v. Lambert. 66 Wn.2d 503, 510, 403
P.2d 664 (1965).
We will not disturb the trial court's determination regarding substantial
change in circumstances absent an abuse of discretion. 	Lambert, 66 Wn.2d at
508. 	A court abuses it discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or
is based on untenable grounds or reasons. 	In re Marriage of Kovacs. 	121
Wn.2d 	795, 801, 854 P.2d 629 (1993). 	"A 	court's 	decision 	is manifestly
unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and
the applicable legal standard." 	In re Marriage of Fiorito. 112 Wn. App. 657, 664,
50 P.3d 298 (2002). 	A decision is based on untenable grounds if "the factual
findings are unsupported by the record; it is based on untenable reasons if it is

No. 73439-3-1 / 7
based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the
correct standard." Fiorito, 112 Wn. App. at 664. 	Substantial evidence supports a
factual determination if the record contains sufficient evidence to persuade a fair
minded, rational person of the truth of that determination. 	Bering v. SHARE. 106
Wn.2d 212, 220, 721 P.2d 918 (1986).
Jill argues 	that Jack's 	reduction 	in income was 	part 	of a 	retirement
strategy. 	She analogizes to two cases, Fox v. Fox. 87 Wn. App. 782, 942 P.2d
1084 (1997), and Lambert v. Lambert. 66 Wn.2d 503, 403 P.2d 664 (1965), to
argue that the reduction of income was voluntary and that Jack failed to carry his
burden to show good faith. 	These cases do not support her argument.
In Fox, the husband, a surgeon, paid spousal support after his divorce
from his wife of 37 years, who was disabled. 	87 Wn. App. at 783. 	After the
divorce, Fox sold his medical practice to a company whose registered agent was
his new wife. 	Following the sale, the company hired Fox on a part-time basis
and also hired his wife as the practice manager, at a substantial salary. 	Fox, 87
Wn. App. at 783-84. 	In affirming the trial court's rejection of the husband's
petition for modification of spousal support, this court noted that while Fox's
former wife's situation had worsened due to her increasingly debilitating multiple
sclerosis, Fox had "suffered no significant reduction of the income to which he
has access." 	Fox, 87 Wn. App. at 785-86. 	This court concluded, "Under the
circumstances, 	it was 	reasonable for the trial court to 	conclude that [Fox's]
reduction 	in individual income 	was 	part 	of a 	plan 	designed 	to 	create 	the
appearance of a worsened financial condition, while at the same time ensuring

No. 73439-3-1 / 8
that his household income and lifestyle remained unchanged." 	Fox, 87 Wn. App.
at 786.
Here, the record establishes that at the time of the divorce, the parties
reasonably 	expected 	the 	lucrative 	relationship 	with 	Federated 	to 	continue.
Following 	NAPA's severance 	of its 	relationship 	with Federated, 	Jack 	made
voluntary decisions to sell his interest to GMI, repurchase his interest when the
business plan did not succeed, and execute an agreement with Lockton. 	These
decisions 	were 	efforts 	to 	secure 	a 	replacement 	for 	the 	relationship 	with
Federated, 	which 	had 	accounted 	for 	90 	percent 	of 	Jack's 	income. 	Jack
presented evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the loss of income
from Federated was involuntary, resulting from decisions made not by Jack but
by the corporate management of Federated and NAPA.
Jill argues that Jack, like the husband in 	Fox, voluntarily reduced his
income in order to implement a retirement strategy. 	Jill points to a declaration in
the 	record, in which Jack explained the 	sale of his goodwill 	in NIC to GMI
investors: "At the time, it seemed like a good business proposition, as I am 61
and was trying to figure out a retirement strategy that would enable me to exit the
business."7 	But this single general statement in one declaration does not support
a finding that the sale to GMI was a voluntary retirement decision not made in
good faith, 	analogous to Fox's plan "designed to create the appearance of a
worsened financial condition." 	Fox, 87 Wn. App. at 786. 	The trial court rejected
CP at 326.
8

No. 73439-3-1 / 9
this argument, as do we. 	Nor are we persuaded by Jill's arguments that Jack's
lifestyle has "even improved" since the divorce.8
Lambert involved a husband whose optometry practice declined due to
the notoriety surrounding his divorce proceedings. 	66 Wn.2d at 505. While the
divorce was pending, 	he began working as an employee at another optometry
practice in a nearby city. 	Lambert. 66 Wn.2d at 505. 	After only one month of
employment, however, the employer fired Lambert for not discontinuing his own
optometry practice but essentially competing with his employer. 	Lambert. 66
Wn.2d at 505. 	Our Supreme Court noted that Lambert's employment "could
have continued and probably prospered." Lambert. 66 Wn.2d at 505. But in his
ill-fated 	efforts 	to 	revive 	his 	practice, 	Lambert 	incurred 	monthly 	expenses
exceeding 	his 	employee 	salary 	and 	remained 	delinquent 	in 	his 	support
obligations. 	Lambert. 66 Wn.2d at 505. 	The court held that such a "[vjoluntary
reduction in income or self-imposed curtailment of earning capacity, absent a
substantial 	showing 	of 	good 	faith, 	will 	not 	constitute 	such 	a 	change of
circumstances as to warrant a modification." 	Lambert. 66 Wn.2d at 510.
Here, by contrast, the record shows no analogous voluntary reduction in
income or self-imposed curtailment of employment. 	And unlike Lambert, Jack
never became delinquent in his support obligations, despite his reduced income.
Similarly, 	In 	re Marriage of Bucklin. 70 Wn. App. 837, 855 P.2d 1197
(1993), which Jill cites to argue that insufficient evidence supports the trial court's
findings, does not support her position. 	In Bucklin. the husband's evidence of his
allegedly reduced income came only from his own testimony and handwritten
8 Reply Br. of Appellant at 20.

No. 73439-3-1/10
notes. 70 Wn. App. at 839. 	He provided no independent records of his income,
despite "protracted discovery attempts." 	Bucklin. 70 Wn. App. at 839. 	Division
Three of this court concluded that the trial court "exercised its discretion in an
untenable 	and 	manifestly 	unreasonable 	way 	by 	essentially 	guessing 	at 	his
income. 	Without any clear idea of Mr. Bucklin's gross income, there was no way
to determine whether his circumstances had substantially changed." 	Bucklin. 70
Wn. App. at 841.
Here, 	Jack provided tax 	returns, 	bank statements, deposit summaries,
projections, interrogatory answers, business agreements including compensation
clauses, and a declaration from NAPA corporate leadership. 	These documents
support the court's finding of an involuntary reduction in income constituting a
substantial change in circumstances.
Finally, Jill asserts that the trial court's remedy is inadequate, given that
under the terms of the order on modification, monthly maintenance payments will
not 	increase 	to 	$10,000 	even 	if Jack's 	income 	reaches 	its former 	level of
$300,000 a year. 	But the trial court revised the commissioner's order, providing
that in the event Jack's income again 	reaches $300,000, Jill may petition the
court to reinstate the maintenance levels of the original decree.
The trial court properly considered the change in circumstances of the
obligor spouse relative to the necessities of the spouse receiving support and
both parties' financial situations. 	See Ochsner. 47 Wn. App. at 524; Lambert. 66
Wn.2d at 508; In re Marriage of Glass. 67 Wn. App. 378, 391, 835 P.2d 1054
(1992). 	Here, Jill's assertion 	that 	she 	is "virtually 	dependent 	on 	[spousal
10

No. 73439-3-1 /11
maintenance] for her survival"9 is undermined by the court's observation that her
net worth 	now exceeds $2 million. 	In light of the evidence and both parties'
situations, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that Jack's reduction in
income was involuntary and constituted a substantial change in circumstances
justifying modification. 	The court did not abuse its discretion.
Both Jill and Jack request an 	award of attorney fees on 	appeal. 	Jill
includes one sentence in her brief, purporting to "reserve[ ] the right to an award
of attorneys fees and costs."10 	Jack argues that RCW 26.09.140 supports an
award on the basis that Jill's briefing includes erroneous citations to the record
and 	that he 	has 	paid 	more in legal fees. 	RCW 26.09.140 gives this court
discretion to award attorney fees to either party based on the parties' financial
resources, balancing the financial need of the requesting party against the other
party's ability to pay. 	In re Marriage of Pennamen. 135 Wn. App. 790, 807-08,
146 P.3d 466 (2006). 	The trial court made no award of attorney fees below.
Under all the circumstances here, we decline to award fees and costs to either
party on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings, and those findings
support the court's conclusions of law. 	The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in 	finding 	that 	Jack 	met 	his 	burden 	to 	prove 	a 	substantial 	change 	in
circumstances warranting a modification of spousal support.
9 Br. of Appellant at 32.
10 Br. of Appellant at 34.
11

No. 73439-3-1/12
We 	affirm 	the 	trial 	court's 	order on 	revision. 	We 	decline 	to 	award
appellate attorney fees and costs to either party.
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WE CONCUR:
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12