State v. Reginald D. Hunter

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COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
eo ee
October 7, 2026 “—
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See Wis. STAT. § 80810
and RULE 809.2.
Appeal No. 2025AP2488-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2022CF840
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINIIFF-RESPONDENT,

Vv.
REGINALD D. HUNTER,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Kenosha County:
JASON A. ROSSELL, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded for further

proceedings.
Before Lazar, P.J., Gundrum, and LoCoco, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent
or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in Wis. STAT. RULE 809.233).

No. 2025AP2488-CR
2
¶1 PER CURIAM. A jury convicted Reginald D. Hunter of two counts
of child abuse and acquitted him of two counts of strangulation. Hunter seeks a
new trial based on the circuit court’s failure to provide jury instructions on
reasonable parental discipline and self-defense. We agree with Hunter that the
circuit court erred in failing to give each of those instructions. The evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to satisfy the low evidentiary bar in this state for
both instructions. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and
remand the matter to the circuit court for a new trial.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Hunter was charged with two counts of strangulation and two counts
of intentional child abuse after Hunter’s then 8-year-old son, Ian, and 13-year-old
daughter, Rebecca, alleged that he grabbed their necks and squeezed, hurting them
and making it difficult for them to breathe.1 Rebecca also said that Hunter hit her
in the face and hit Ian.
¶3 The scuffle between Hunter and his kids started when he confiscated
Rebecca’s electronic devices at bedtime. Hunter denied ever physically harming
his children, though he did state that he held Rebecca and Ian back to prevent them
from getting to their electronics. Hunter’s girlfriend, Felicia Williams, was
present during the altercation, though she was in a back bedroom for most of it.
Williams stated that she never saw Hunter physically harm the children, despite
the fact that she was the one who had called 911 during the event and reported that
Hunter was “beating his kids.”
1 We use the same pseudonyms as the parties to refer to the children. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.19(1)(g).

No. 2025AP2488-CR
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¶4 The case proceeded to a jury trial. Ian and Rebecca testified that
Hunter had strangled, shoved, punched, and grabbed them after he took Rebecca’s
electronic devices from her so that she could settle in for bed. Ian admitted to
having kicked Hunter “in the nuts” on the night of the alleged abuse, which
Rebecca confirmed on the stand. Rebecca testified that she had hit Hunter on the
back of the head with a rock that night, which caused Hunter to fall down.
Rebecca also testified that she had omitted the fact that she struck her dad from
her statement to law enforcement.
¶5 Hunter testified on his own behalf at the trial. Both he and Williams
testified that Hunter had struggled all day with the kids over their device-usage but
never physically injured them. Both admitted that Hunter held the children back
during the scuffle, however, to keep them separated and get the situation under
control.
¶6 At the close of the evidence, Hunter asked that the circuit court give
jury instructions on reasonable discipline of a child and self-defense. The court
denied the requests, concluding that Hunter failed to provide evidence to support
either privilege and thus was not entitled to either instruction. The court found
that neither Hunter nor Williams testified that Hunter physically harmed his
children in order to discipline them or as an act of self-defense, and the children’s
testimony indicated only that Hunter physically harmed them as an act of anger,
frustration, or retaliation, not as an act of reasonable discipline or self-defense.
¶7 After deliberation, the jury convicted Hunter of one count of child
abuse as to each Ian and Rebecca, but acquitted him on both strangulation counts.
Considering the evidence at trial, arguments of the parties, and the PSI report, the
circuit court sentenced Hunter to five years on each count, bifurcated as two years

No. 2025AP2488-CR
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of initial confinement and three years of extended supervision, consecutive to each
other and to any other sentence. Hunter appeals.
¶8 We include additional facts below as necessary to our discussion.
DISCUSSION
¶9 Hunter argues that the circuit court erred by denying his requests to
instruct the jury on reasonable parental discipline and self-defense. “A circuit
court has broad discretion in deciding whether to give a requested jury
instruction.” State v. Stietz, 2017 WI 58, ¶12, 375 Wis. 2d 572, 895 N.W.2d 796.
However, a court must “exercise its discretion in order ‘to fully and fairly inform
the jury of the rules of law applicable to the case and to assist the jury in making a
reasonable analysis of the evidence.’” State v. Neumann, 2013 WI 58, ¶89, 348
Wis. 2d 455, 832 N.W.2d 560 (citations omitted). The circuit court’s “discretion
is far more limited in some circumstances—including determining whether the
evidence presented supports instructing the jury on ... self-defense.” State v.
Johnson, 2021 WI 61, ¶16, 397 Wis. 2d 633, 961 N.W.2d 18.
¶10 When, as here, a defendant asserts that the controversy was not fully
tried due to a failure to instruct the jury as to the applicable law, we review that
challenge de novo, benefitting from the circuit court’s analysis. See Neumann,
348 Wis. 2d 455, ¶89. If we conclude that the circuit court erred by refusing to
give a jury instruction, we must then determine whether the error affected the
defendant’s substantial rights. Stietz, 375 Wis. 2d 572, ¶61; WIS. STAT.
§ 805.18(2) (2023-24).2
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

No. 2025AP2488-CR
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A defendant’s substantial rights remain unaffected (that is,
the error is harmless) if it is clear beyond a reasonable
doubt that a rational jury would have come to the same
conclusion absent the error or if it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.
Stietz, 375 Wis. 2d 572, ¶63. Whether a jury instruction error is harmless is a
question of law that we review de novo. Id., ¶62. We address each of the
requested jury instructions in turn below.
I. Reasonable Parental Discipline
¶11 Specified conduct that constitutes physical abuse of a child is a
felony in Wisconsin. WIS. STAT. § 948.03. As relevant here, “[w]hoever
intentionally causes bodily harm to a child is guilty of a Class H felony.”
Sec. 948.03(2)(b). “‘Bodily harm’ means physical pain or injury, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition.” WIS. STAT. § 939.22(4). However, there is a
complete defense in the form of a privilege when the accused was “responsible for
the child’s welfare” at the time of the offense and the conduct entailed “reasonable
discipline.” WIS. STAT. § 939.45(5)(b) (providing privilege for reasonable
discipline for a child by a person responsible for the child’s welfare); see also
State v. Teynor, 141 Wis. 2d 187, 200, 414 N.W.2d 76 (Ct. App. 1987) (stating
that “parental status affords only a privilege which may be asserted as a defense to
prosecution for any crime by a parent against his or her child if the conduct is
reasonable discipline of the child”). The “reasonable discipline” sufficient to
create this complete defense “may involve only such force as a reasonable person
believes is necessary.” Sec. 939.45(5)(b).
¶12 A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed as to an
affirmative defense where: “(1) the defense relates to a legal theory of a defense,

No. 2025AP2488-CR
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as opposed to an interpretation of evidence; (2) the request is timely made; (3) the
defense is not adequately covered by other instructions; and (4) the defense is
supported by sufficient evidence.” State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 212-13,
556 N.W.2d 701 (1996) (internal citations omitted).
¶13 Hunter argues that the circuit court erroneously denied his request to
instruct the jury as to the affirmative defense available when the charged conduct
constitutes reasonable parental discipline. See WIS JI—CRIMINAL 950; see also
State v. Kimberly B., 2005 WI App 115, ¶29, 283 Wis. 2d 731, 699 N.W.2d 641.
As we now explain, we agree with Hunter because we conclude that the evidence,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the defense, sufficiently supported
instructing the jury as to reasonable parental discipline.
¶14 The circuit court concluded that the evidence presented at trial did
not support presenting WIS JI—CRIMINAL 950 to the jury in this case. It
concluded that because strangulation poses a substantial risk of death, the defense
was not available to Hunter. To the contrary, we conclude that there was ample
evidence presented by both Hunter and the State to put this defense before the
jury.
¶15 To briefly recap, both Hunter and Williams testified that Hunter had
been trying, but struggling, to enforce his household rules regarding electronic
device usage by his children all day. Hunter testified that, in attempting to enforce
his rules, he confiscated Rebecca’s phone and placed it out of the children’s reach.
When both Rebecca and Ian refused to abide by their father’s rules, a scuffle
ensued. According to the children’s testimony, Hunter pushed, grabbed, struck,
and choked them. In contrast, Hunter testified that he held the children apart when
they “c[a]me at [him] to try to get the phone” back. A reasonable construction of

No. 2025AP2488-CR
7
this evidence was that Hunter used some force against his children to impose order
or otherwise discipline them for their disobedience of his electronics-usage rules.
See Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d at 213-14.
¶16 While it certainly is possible that a reasonable jury could have
concluded that the alleged conduct of strangling Rebecca and Ian was known to
cause or create a substantial risk of great bodily harm or death, as the circuit court
observed in declining to give the instruction, the evidence also supported a finding
that Hunter did not strangle either child, as evidenced by the jury’s refusal to
convict Hunter of either count of strangulation. Rather, the evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to Hunter, supported a finding that he only
pushed, grabbed, or struck the children during the incident. Therefore, when the
court denied the requested parental discipline instruction based on the severity of
the strangulation allegations, it improperly weighed the evidence, thereby invading
the province of the jury. See Stietz, 375 Wis. 2d 572, ¶¶16-18.
¶17 It also was not harmless error for the circuit court to deprive Hunter
of the requested discipline instruction. An error is harmless only when “it is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have come to the same
conclusion absent the error or ... it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id., ¶63. We cannot
reach this conclusion on the Record before us. The jury’s acquittal as to the
strangulation charges demonstrates that it had some doubts as to the children’s
credibility, and both Hunter and Williams testified that Hunter was trying to
enforce his household rules regarding electronic devices.
¶18 Hunter was entitled to have the jury consider whether his conduct
constituted reasonable parental discipline. We cannot conclude beyond a

No. 2025AP2488-CR
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reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have convicted Hunter if the circuit
court had properly instructed the jury to consider that privilege as an affirmative
defense. See id. Accordingly, we reverse the convictions and remand to the
circuit court for a new trial.
II. Self-Defense
¶19 We now turn to Hunter’s argument that the circuit court erred in
denying Hunter’s request for a self-defense instruction to the jury. See WIS JI—
CRIMINAL 800. Although this is a somewhat closer call than whether to instruct as
to reasonable parental discipline, we similarly conclude that the circuit court erred
in refusing to give that instruction.
¶20 “A jury must be instructed on self-defense when a reasonable jury
could find that a prudent person in the position of the defendant under the
circumstances existing at the time of the incident could believe that he was
exercising the privilege of self-defense.” Stietz, 375 Wis. 2d 572, ¶15. This
benchmark sets a low bar which only requires the accused to produce some
evidence in support of the privilege of self-defense. Id., ¶16. This standard is met
even if the evidence is “weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful
credibility[.]” Id., ¶17.
¶21 Regardless of how strong or weak the evidence supporting the
affirmative defense may seem, the instruction must be given “unless the evidence
is rebutted by the prosecution to the extent that ‘no rational jury could entertain a
reasonable doubt[.]’” State v. Schuman, 226 Wis. 2d 398, 404, 595 N.W.2d 86
(Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted). In reaching this conclusion, circuit courts must
not weigh the evidence; rather, the evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the defendant. Stietz, 375 Wis. 2d 572, ¶¶13, 18.

No. 2025AP2488-CR
9
¶22 Based on our review of the trial testimony, we conclude that there
was sufficient evidence presented at trial to warrant consideration of self-defense
by the jury. Ian and Rebecca testified that Hunter escalated the verbal
disagreement into a physical altercation by throwing Ian onto a couch or grabbing
his neck. Hunter, on the other hand, testified that the incident only became
physical when Ian kicked him “in the nuts.” Additionally, both children testified
that, at some point during the disagreement, Rebecca hit Hunter on the back of the
head with a rock, which caused him to fall face down on the floor. When, as here,
the evidence supports a finding that physical harm was inflicted in response to
physical harm, it is for the jury to decide whether the conduct constitutes
reasonable self-defense. See id., ¶¶15-16.
¶23 When Hunter requested that the circuit court instruct the jury as to
self-defense, his trial counsel argued that the children’s testimony established “that
it was reasonable for Mr. Hunter to believe that he was placed in imminent danger
and he needed to take steps to protect himself.” The court concluded that the
instruction was not warranted. Basing this decision on its “confus[ion] in its terms
of chronology” stemming from conflicting trial testimony, the court stated that:
[I]t makes it more difficult for the [c]ourt to see evidence
… in the defendant’s favor in the sense that I don’t know if
the choking occurred before or after the kicking in the shin
or in the groin area. If I take the testimony of [Ian] or if I
take the testimony of Mr. Hunter.
The court wrongly invaded the province of the jury by improperly weighing the
evidence presented at trial. See id.
¶24 In finding that Hunter’s alleged use of force was the type intended or
likely to cause great bodily harm or death, the circuit court noted that “[t]he
number one cause of death is the cessation of breathing. So it’d be hard for this

No. 2025AP2488-CR
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[c]ourt -- when people stop breathing they die. I mean, that’s the exact clinical
definition. People that are not breathing, blood is not being oxygenated, and then
[death] occurs.” The court’s conclusion rests on the finding that strangulation was
the only means of force Hunter used. The verdict belies this conclusion. The jury
obviously rejected the children’s testimony that Hunter had strangled the children
and instead accepted that he had used some other type of force against them.
¶25 The circuit court also concluded that the instruction was not
warranted because it found that Hunter testified “that he did not believe that any of
the actions complained [of] by the State ... were reasonable.” Based on its finding
that Hunter did not have a reasonable belief that his use of force was necessary,
the court concluded that self-defense had not been placed at issue by the
testimony. As Hunter correctly observes, however, contrary to the court’s findings
about his testimony, Hunter did not testify that he believed the alleged use of force
was unreasonable. Instead, Hunter merely testified that strangulation is not an
appropriate form of discipline for a child; he said nothing regarding whether
pushing, grabbing, shoving, or striking may have been appropriate in response to
the kicking and hitting from the children. To the contrary, he explained that when
his children “c[a]me at [him] to try to get the phone” he held them apart to
“stop[]” them.
¶26 In sum, the evidence presented at trial could well have supported a
finding that Hunter reasonably believed that his children were unlawfully
interfering with his person by kicking him in the groin and striking him with a
rock, and that he used force such as pushing, grabbing, or striking that he
reasonably believed was necessary to terminate the unlawful interference. The
instruction regarding Hunter’s privilege to use force in self-defense was supported
by the evidence and the circuit court thus erred in failing to so instruct the jury.

No. 2025AP2488-CR
11
¶27 We further conclude that the circuit court’s failure to properly
instruct the jury as to self-defense was not harmless. An error is harmless only
when “it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have come
to the same conclusion absent the error or ... it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id., ¶63.
As previously noted, the jury acquitted Hunter of strangulation. “The[se]
acquittals suggest that the jury believed all or some of the defendant’s testimony
and, if given the self-defense instruction, might have acquitted the defendant on
one or both of the two charges upon which they convicted the defendant.” Id. at
¶64. Accordingly, regardless of the strength of the evidence, we cannot conclude
that a reasonable jury would have reached the same conclusion as to child abuse if
given the self-defense instruction. See id., ¶63.
CONCLUSION
¶28 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Hunter is entitled to a
new trial, and we reverse his judgment of conviction and remand to the circuit
court for that purpose.
By the Court.—Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.