Anthony Frank Kapalczynski v. Bonnie Mae Krause-Kapalczynski

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 7, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP289 Cir. Ct. No. 2022FA1005

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

ANTHONY FRANK KAPALCZYNSKI,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

BONNIE MAE KRAUSE-KAPALCZYNSKI,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Waukesha County:
RALPH M. RAMIREZ, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer, and Grogan, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP289

¶1 PER CURIAM. Bonnie Mae Krause-Kapalczynski, pro se, appeals
from two circuit court orders related to the enforcement of the court’s judgment of
divorce involving Bonnie and her former husband, Anthony Frank Kapalczynski.
Bonnie argues that the court erroneously exercised its discretion in granting
Anthony’s motion to appoint a receiver to oversee the sale of the couples’ marital
residence and erred in signing a writ of assistance so the sheriff’s office could aid
the appointed receiver in carrying out its duties.1 We disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The facts pertinent to this appeal are not in dispute. Anthony
petitioned the circuit court for a legal separation from Bonnie. On the date of the
scheduled trial, Anthony converted the matter into a divorce action. At trial, the
court heard testimony from Anthony and from two experts—one testified
regarding her appraisal of the marital residence and was found by the court to be
qualified and credible; one provided testimony and calculations related to the
division of the marital estate and was also found by the court to be a credible and
competent witness. Bonnie opted not to testify at the trial and was not called as an
adverse witness.

¶3 Throughout the divorce proceedings, the circuit court commented on
Bonnie’s unwillingness to fully cooperate and explained that, without Bonnie’s
full participation, the court had “a one[-]sided story.” The court further stated that
“[i]n her decision not to testify or present evidence, [Bonnie] made an error as
well but that is her error.” Based on Bonnie’s track record to date, the court stated

1
Because the parties have the same last name, we refer to them by their first names for
the sake of clarity.

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in its oral ruling that if Bonnie was uncooperative with the sale of the marital
residence, Anthony was to return to the court for an order authorizing the sale of
the residence. The court ordered that any attorney’s fees attributable to Bonnie’s
noncooperation would be assessed against Bonnie and paid from her share of the
home-sale proceeds. The court also advised Bonnie that if she was uncooperative
in the exchange of titles, then attorney’s fees may be assessed against her for that
as well.

¶4 After hearing the testimony at trial and considering the documents
submitted by the parties, the circuit court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment of Divorce (collectively, the Findings). Of relevance to this
appeal, the court, in its Findings, awarded Bonnie three vehicles and two jointly
titled cash and deposit accounts. The court also ordered that the marital residence
be put on the market within sixty days of the signing of the Findings. Upon
Bonnie’s objection to the Findings, the court held a hearing, after which it
confirmed the Findings as appropriate based on the facts and law before it.

¶5 Over sixty days after the circuit court issued its Findings, Anthony
filed a motion with the court seeking to compel Bonnie’s cooperation with the
court-ordered property disposition. Anthony notified the court that Bonnie was
uncooperative with the selected realtor, that the realtor had received an offer to
purchase the marital home for well over the appraised value, and that Bonnie had
refused to entertain any offers to purchase, stating, “over [my] dead body.”
Anthony further informed the court that Bonnie had not taken the steps required to
assume sole ownership of the bank accounts awarded to her or to transfer title of
the vehicles awarded to her. The court held a hearing on Anthony’s motion at
which the realtor testified to having received four offers to purchase the marital
residence, including one cash offer for over $30,000 above the asking price with

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no contingencies. The parties did not have enough time to complete the hearing
on Anthony’s motion, so the court scheduled a second hearing.

¶6 Before the second motion hearing, Anthony requested that a receiver
be appointed pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 813.16 (2023-24)2 to assist in carrying out
the terms of the Findings and for Bonnie to pay for the appointed receiver from
her share of the sale of the home. Anthony called Bonnie to testify at the second
hearing. The court tried to keep Bonnie focused on the issues at hand, noting that
Bonnie was responsible for all attorney’s fees related to the hearings. In response,
Bonnie stated, “I’m not signing the house over. Whatever happens, happens. I’m
not signing it over ... .”

¶7 At the close of the second hearing on the motion to compel Bonnie’s
cooperation, the circuit court found that Bonnie had failed to cooperate with the
court’s Findings. It ordered that Bonnie sign any and all documents necessary to
effectuate the sale of the marital residence, the transfer of the motor vehicle titles,
and the transfer of the bank accounts by the end of the following week at 4:00 p.m.
In response to the court’s oral ruling, Bonnie stated, “Take me to jail because I’m
not signing anything. Take me to jail.” The court then informed the parties that it
will sign any orders required to effectuate the transfer of the marital property
consistent with the Findings. The court further informed them that “[i]f that
cannot be accomplished and you advise me in writing within twenty days after that
deadline next week, then I will appoint a receiver ... to effectuate the transfers. I
will assess attorney’s fees for all of these proceedings against Ms. Kapalczynski.”

2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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¶8 Bonnie remained steadfast in her refusal to cooperate. This resulted
in additional court hearings, as well as the appointment of a receiver to manage the
transfers necessary to divide the marital estate in accordance with the Findings.
The circuit court subsequently signed the recently-appointed receiver’s request for
a writ of assistance which required that the local sheriff’s department assist with
the peaceful transfer of the marital residence, including the personal property
contained therein. Bonnie appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶9 There are two issues before us on appeal: (1) whether the circuit
court erroneously exercised its discretion in appointing a receiver to manage the
sale of the marital residence; and (2) whether the court erred in signing the writ of
assistance ordering the sheriff’s department to aid the receiver in performing its
duties.3

¶10 Turning first to the circuit court’s appointment of a receiver, we
conclude that Bonnie has failed to show that the court erroneously exercised its
discretion with this appointment. Under WIS. STAT. § 813.16, a circuit court
“may” appoint a receiver under the following potentially pertinent circumstances:

(1) On the application of either party, when the applying
party establishes an apparent right to or interest in property
which is the subject of the action and which is in the
possession of an adverse party, and the property or its rents
and profits are in danger of being lost or materially
impaired.

3
Although Bonnie identifies 31 issues to this court in her appellate brief, our jurisdiction
review resulted in the issuance of an order dated April 30, 2024, limiting this appeal to the two
issues discussed in this Per Curiam. We therefore do not address the remaining issues briefed by
Bonnie.

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(2) By the judgment, or after judgment, to carry it into
effect or to dispose of the property according to the
judgment.

Further, WIS. STAT. § 816.04 specifically grants circuit courts discretionary
authority to appoint a receiver to help a creditor satisfy a judgment. As we have
explained:

The receiver acts as a collection agent for the specific
judgment creditor he or she represents. “A receiver in aid
of execution is authorized to collect those assets revealed
by the examination of the debtor, take possession of them,
apply them to the satisfaction of the judgment, and return
the excess to the judgment debtor.” Whether to appoint a
receiver is discretionary. Our review of a [circuit] court’s
discretionary decision is highly deferential. We search the
record for reasons to sustain the [circuit] court’s decision.

Dawson v. Goldammer, 2006 WI App 158, ¶34, 295 Wis. 2d 728, 722 N.W.2d
106 (citations omitted).

¶11 Bonnie’s primary argument regarding the receiver, as best as we can
ascertain from her appellant’s brief, is that the circuit court did not have the legal
or constitutional authority to appoint someone to assist in the sale of the marital
home. Bonnie provides no Wisconsin statutory, case law, or constitutional
provisions that support her position. Moreover, from the statements made by
Bonnie in the hearings and her actions creating the need for these hearings, it was
clear that she was unwilling to cooperate and would not sign anything to sell the
marital residence. These facts were stated on the record during the second hearing
on the motion to compel Bonnie’s cooperation and were repeated in the related
order signed by the court. The court also provided numerous opportunities for
Bonnie to cooperate, but she chose not to. Given these facts, combined with the
discretionary authority of the court to appoint a receiver as it deems necessary, it
was not unreasonable for the court to decide that the appointment of a receiver was

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required to effectuate the Findings. Based on our review of the record and the
governing legal authority, we conclude that Bonnie has failed to demonstrate that
the court’s decision was the result of an erroneous exercise of discretion.

¶12 We now turn to Bonnie’s argument that the circuit court erred in
signing the writ of assistance as requested by the receiver. Bonnie advances
constitutional arguments in her opposition to the writ which mirror those made in
her opposition to appointing a receiver—none of which have merit.

¶13 A writ of assistance is “[a] writ to enforce a court's decree
transferring real property whose title has been previously adjudicated.” Writ of
Assistance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1846 (12th ed. 2024). “When any order or
judgment is for the delivery of possession of property real or personal the party in
whose favor it is entered is entitled to a writ of ... assistance upon application to
the clerk.” WIS. STAT. § 815.11.

¶14 In this case, the circuit court’s prior orders mandated and confirmed
that the marital residence must be sold and the proceeds equally divided between
Bonnie and Anthony. The orders further terminated any rights Bonnie had in the
property. The hearings related to the orders supported the court’s conclusion that
Bonnie was refusing to cooperate with selling and vacating the marital home as
well as the need for a writ of assistance to protect the property and to ensure

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Bonnie’s cooperation. Bonnie fails to persuade us that the court erred when it
granted the receiver’s petition for a writ of assistance.4

¶15 In sum, Bonnie has failed to demonstrate, given the facts and
controlling law before us, that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion
in appointing a receiver to oversee the transfers of the marital home and other
property items. Nor has she demonstrated any error with the court signing the
requested writ of assistance.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

4
To the extent Bonnie intends to challenge the circuit court’s findings in support of the
two challenged orders, we conclude that her challenges amount to nothing more than a
disagreement with the court’s explicit credibility determinations. Evidence is incredible only
when it is in conflict with the uniform course of nature or with fully established or conceded
facts. Haskins v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 408, 425, 294 N.W.2d 25 (1980). Inconsistencies and
contradictions in the statements of witnesses do not render the testimony inherently or patently
incredible, but simply create a question of credibility for the trier of fact to resolve. See id. As
we have noted, the court resolved any potential inconsistencies Bonnie points to in Anthony’s
favor, due at least in part to Bonnie’s unwillingness to testify or present any evidence at trial.

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