State v. Jason Daniel Hull

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
October 23, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP483 Cir. Ct. No. 2024TR4327

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

IN THE MATTER OF THE REFUSAL OF JASON DANIEL HULL:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JASON DANIEL HULL,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Dodge County:
MARTIN J. DE VRIES, Judge. Affirmed.
No. 2025AP483

¶1 KLOPPENBURG, J.1 After a refusal hearing under WIS. STAT.
§ 343.305(9), the Dodge County circuit court found that Jason Daniel Hull
improperly refused to consent to provide a sample of his blood for a chemical test.
On appeal, Hull argues that the court erred for two reasons. Specifically, Hull
argues that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the responding sergeant
lacked probable cause to believe that Hull had operated a motor vehicle while
under the influence of an intoxicant (referred to for ease of reading as “operated a
motor vehicle while intoxicated”). Hull also argues that his response to the
sergeant did not constitute a refusal to submit to chemical testing. I reject Hull’s
probable cause argument because the record establishes that the responding
sergeant had probable cause to believe that Hull had operated a motor vehicle
while intoxicated. I do not address Hull’s argument that he did not refuse to
submit to chemical testing because Hull forfeited it by not raising it in the circuit
court. Accordingly, I affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The following facts are taken from the testimony at the refusal
hearing by the responding sergeant of the Dodge County Sheriff’s Office, which
the circuit court credited.

¶3 Sometime before midnight on December 14, 2024, the sergeant was
dispatched to respond to a report of “a male and female fighting.” This report was
made by A.B., and A.B.’s phone call was determined to have been placed “on the

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(c) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2025AP483

roadway on Blackhawk Trail.”2 The sergeant and two deputies separately began
to drive to the site of the call, when dispatch received a second call from A.B.’s
residence. The sergeant arrived at the residence after one deputy had already
arrived, and made contact with Hull inside the front door of the house. The
sergeant estimated that it “would have been roughly a half an hour” between the
time that Hull arrived at the residence and the time that any law enforcement
personnel arrived. The sergeant “observed items thrown all throughout the
house,” and observed that Hull had “a cut on his face,” “bloodshot, glassy eyes, …
an odor of intoxicants coming from his person,” and “[a]t times … delayed and
slurred” speech. Neither the sergeant nor the two deputies on scene observed Hull
drinking anything.

¶4 When the sergeant began questioning Hull about the incidents
prompting the 911 calls, Hull said that he “doesn’t answer questions” but that A.B.
had “destroyed stuff and broke something inside of his truck.” The sergeant asked
if he had been drinking, and Hull said again that he “doesn’t answer questions.”
The sergeant accompanied Hull to inspect Hull’s truck and saw that the rear-view
mirror was “missing from the truck.” Hull “immediately pointed at the driver seat
and said, ‘Look at the driver seat location, I wouldn’t be able to fit there.’”

¶5 After inspecting the truck, the sergeant spoke with A.B. The
sergeant also spoke with one of the deputies, who relayed what A.B. had told him.
The following information comes from A.B.’s statements to the sergeant and

2
To protect the witness’s privacy, we refer to her using initials that do not correspond to
her own. Cf. WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86(4) (explaining rule regarding identifying victims by
initials or other appropriate designation).

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No. 2025AP483

deputy. A.B. said that she and Hull left a tavern in Fox Lake, that Hull was
driving, and that she and Hull “got into a disturbance while the [truck] was driving
on Blackhawk Trail,” at which time Hull pulled the truck over and A.B. called
911. A.B. said that Hull then got out of the truck, “walked home to the residence
and then he drove back on [a] UTV” (utility terrain vehicle). When Hull returned
to the truck on the UTV, A.B. “got in the driver seat” of the truck and drove it
“back to the residence,” while Hull drove back on the UTV.

¶6 The sergeant saw the UTV parked in the driveway of the residence.
The sergeant “attempted to” talk to Hull “about his operation of the [truck],” but
Hull “repeatedly” told the sergeant that he “doesn’t answer questions and didn’t
want to incriminate himself.” The sergeant then performed a Department of
Transportation check on Hull and learned that he had a .02 blood alcohol content
(BAC) restriction, that “he was required to have an ignition interlock device
installed in any vehicle he operated,” and that he had one prior conviction for
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

¶7 The sergeant asked Hull to perform field sobriety tests because “[i]t
became very clear to [the sergeant] that [Hull] was pointing out the seat position
right away to draw [the sergeant’s] attention away from [Hull] driving”; because
Hull’s bloodshot, glassy eyes, at times slurred speech, and the odor of intoxicants
led the sergeant to believe that Hull had consumed alcohol; and because it does not
“require a large amount of alcohol to reach a .02 [BAC].” The sergeant also relied
on A.B.’s statement that Hull had been driving after they left the tavern and before
she made the first 911 call. Hull refused to perform field sobriety tests or to
provide a preliminary breath test, and the sergeant placed him under arrest for
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Neither the sergeant nor the two
deputies observed Hull driving, but Hull “never outright told [the sergeant] that he

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No. 2025AP483

did not drive” when the sergeant questioned him, and the sergeant credited A.B.’s
statement regarding Hull driving both the truck and the UTV after leaving the
tavern.

¶8 After placing Hull under arrest, the sergeant read the Informing the
Accused form “word for word” to Hull. The Informing the Accused form states
that the law enforcement agency wants to chemically test samples of the person’s
breath, blood, or urine to determine the concentration of alcohol in the person’s
system, and that a refusal to submit to chemical testing will result in the revocation
of the person’s operating privileges. WIS. STAT. § 343.305(4). Hull responded
with “something to the effect of I don’t answer questions,” which the sergeant
took to mean “no,” and the sergeant indicated that response on the form.

¶9 Hull requested a refusal hearing regarding the propriety of his
refusal to submit to chemical testing, and the hearing was held on February 21,
2025. At the hearing, Hull argued that his refusal “was reasonable” because the
sergeant did not have probable cause that Hull had been operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated. The circuit court determined that Hull’s refusal was improper
because the sergeant had probable cause to believe that Hull had operated a motor
vehicle while intoxicated.

¶10 Hull appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶11 As stated, Hull argues that the circuit court erred in determining that
the sergeant had probable cause to believe that he had operated a motor vehicle
while intoxicated, and that the court erred in finding that he had refused chemical
testing. I conclude that the sergeant had probable cause to believe that Hull had

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No. 2025AP483

operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated and that Hull forfeited his refusal
argument by not raising the issue in the circuit court. I first set forth the applicable
standard of review and summarize the applicable statutory law, and then address
Hull’s arguments in turn.

I. Standard of Review

¶12 This court will uphold the circuit court’s findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous. State v. Baratka, 2002 WI App 288, ¶7, 258 Wis. 2d 342,
654 N.W.2d 875. Whether those facts constitute probable cause is a question of
law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶10, 317 Wis. 2d
118, 765 N.W.2d 569.

II. Wisconsin’s Implied Consent Statute

¶13 Wisconsin’s implied consent law, WIS. STAT. § 343.305, provides
that any person who drives or operates a motor vehicle on a public highway in
Wisconsin is deemed to have given the person’s “implied consent” to chemical
testing of the person’s blood, breath, or urine if the person is arrested for an
operating while intoxicated-related offense. § 343.305(2), (3)(a). A law
enforcement officer who arrests a person for an operating while intoxicated-related
offense and seeks chemical testing pursuant to the implied consent law is required
to read the Informing the Accused form to the person. § 343.305(4).

¶14 If the person refuses to submit to chemical testing, the person is
informed that the State intends to immediately revoke the person’s operating
privileges. WIS. STAT. § 343.305(9)(a). The person may request a refusal hearing
to challenge the revocation. § 343.305(9)(a)4. The issues that a person may raise
at a refusal hearing are limited to those set forth in § 343.305(9)(a)5. Pertinent

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No. 2025AP483

here, those issues include: “[w]hether the officer had probable cause to believe the
person was driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol … and whether the person was lawfully placed under arrest for violation
of” an operating while intoxicated-related statute; and “[w]hether the person
refused to permit the test.” § 343.305(9)(a)5.a., c. If the circuit court determines
that probable cause existed and that the person refused to submit to the test, then
the refusal was “improper” and the court shall order revocation. § 343.305(10)(a),
(b).

III. Probable Cause

¶15 Hull argues that the circuit court erred in determining, based on the
totality of the circumstances, that the sergeant had probable cause to believe that
Hull had operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Specifically, Hull argues that
“[i]f Mr. Hull operated a motor vehicle, there is nothing to support that Mr. Hull
was under the influence of any intoxicants when doing so.”

¶16 In the context of a refusal hearing, “[p]robable cause exists where
the totality of the circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge at the
time of the arrest would lead a reasonable police officer to believe … that the
defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an
intoxicant.” State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 35, 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986).
“‘The evidence need not reach the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or
even that guilt is more likely than not.’” Id. (quoted source omitted).

¶17 Here, the information available to the sergeant at the time of arrest
would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that Hull had been operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated. As explicitly or implicitly found by the circuit
court, that information includes the following. A.B. told officers that Hull had

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No. 2025AP483

been driving the truck after the two left the tavern, when A.B. first called law
enforcement, and that Hull drove the UTV to the truck and back to the residence,
when A.B. again called law enforcement. When the sergeant contacted Hull at the
residence “roughly a half an hour” after Hull returned to the residence, the
sergeant smelled an odor of intoxicants coming from Hull, and Hull had delayed
and slurred speech as well as glassy and bloodshot eyes. See State v. Kennedy,
2014 WI 132, ¶22, 359 Wis. 2d 454, 856 N.W.2d 834 (odor of intoxicants, slurred
speech, and bloodshot eyes are factors that support a finding of probable cause).
In addition, Hull had a prior conviction for operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated and was subject to a .02 BAC restriction, and Hull refused to perform
field sobriety tests or a preliminary breath test. See State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI
46, ¶36, 362 Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26 (prior convictions for operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated may support probable cause); State v. Babbitt, 188
Wis. 2d 349, 359-60, 525 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1994) (refusal to submit to field
sobriety tests may support probable cause).

¶18 Taken together, the circumstances known to the sergeant at the time
of arrest, along with reasonable inferences drawn from those circumstances,
suffice to support a reasonable officer’s belief that Hull had operated a motor
vehicle while intoxicated.

¶19 Hull argues that the State must “not simply establish that Mr. Hull
was impaired when they made contact, but … also establish probable cause that
Mr. Hull was impaired at the time he operated a motor vehicle.” This proposition
is sound, but, as explained above, the sergeant did have probable cause to believe
that Hull had operated the truck while intoxicated based on the totality of the
circumstances, including A.B.’s statement that Hull drove the truck after they left
the tavern, the timing of the sergeant’s contact with Hull after the driving reported

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No. 2025AP483

by A.B., and the signs of intoxication exhibited by Hull and observed by the
sergeant.

¶20 Hull also argues that the sergeant did not get the information directly
from A.B. and instead heard it from one of the deputies, that some of what Hull
told the sergeant was true, and that the sergeant never asked Hull if he had been
drinking after he allegedly drove. I do not consider these arguments because Hull
makes them for the first time in his reply brief. See Bilda v. County of
Milwaukee, 2006 WI App 57, ¶20 n.7, 292 Wis. 2d 212, 713 N.W.2d 661 (“It is a
well-established rule” that we generally “do not consider arguments raised for the
first time in a reply brief.”).

¶21 In sum, the sergeant had probable cause to believe that Hull operated
a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

IV. Refusal

¶22 “The implied consent law does not require a verbal refusal.” State v.
Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d 213, 234, 595 N.W.2d 646 (1999). Rather, “‘uncooperative’”
conduct or conduct that prevents an officer from administering the test is a refusal.
Id. (quoted source omitted). Here, the circuit court determined that, when Hull
responded to the sergeant’s request that Hull submit to chemical testing by saying,
“I don’t answer questions,” Hull refused the chemical testing.

¶23 Hull argues that his choice not to answer the sergeant’s questions did
not constitute a refusal to submit to chemical testing. More specifically, Hull
argues that he “refused to answer questions” but that this was not a refusal to
submit to chemical testing because his silence was “an assertion of his right to not
self-incriminate.” I do not address this argument because Hull forfeited it by not

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raising it in the circuit court, and he fails to provide a persuasive reason that I
should entertain the argument despite his failure to preserve it in the circuit court.
See State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (“The
party who raises an issue on appeal bears the burden of showing that the issue was
raised before the circuit court[,]” and “[i]ssues that are not preserved at the circuit
court … generally will not be considered on appeal.”).

CONCLUSION

¶24 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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