State v. Gerardo Reyes Medina

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
December 17, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP1493-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF782

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

GERARDO REYES MEDINA,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Sheboygan County: REBECCA L. PERSICK, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, Grogan, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2023AP1493-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Gerardo Reyes Medina appeals a judgment of
conviction and an order denying his postconviction motion for plea withdrawal.
He argues that he is entitled to withdraw his no contest pleas based on ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). He also argues that he should be allowed to
withdraw his pleas because he entered them based on the mistaken belief that he
could appeal the circuit court’s pretrial evidentiary rulings. See State v. Riekkoff,
112 Wis. 2d 119, 130, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983). We affirm.

¶2 Medina entered pleas to repeated sexual assault of a child and
second-degree sexual assault of a child after reaching a negotiated resolution
pursuant to which six additional felony counts were dismissed, and both parties
jointly recommended a sentence of eight years of initial confinement and eight
years of extended supervision. During the plea colloquy, Medina stated that he
understood the plea, the rights he was waiving, and the penalties he faced. The
circuit court did not follow the joint recommendation and sentenced Medina to
25 years of initial confinement and 15 years of extended supervision.

¶3 After sentencing, Medina sought plea withdrawal, asserting that
counsel incorrectly advised him that he could appeal the circuit court’s pretrial
evidentiary rulings concerning the scope of evidence allowed at trial. He argued
that he would not have entered pleas to the charges had he known his pleas waived
his ability to challenge those rulings on appeal. After an evidentiary hearing, the
court rejected that factual premise. The court expressly found that Medina was not
credible when he testified that he would not have pled no contest but for counsel’s
incorrect statement about his appellate rights. Therefore, the court denied
Medina’s motion to withdraw his no contest pleas.

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No. 2023AP1493-CR

¶4 It is well established that a defendant alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Because Medina’s trial counsel incorrectly advised Medina that he could appeal
evidentiary rulings after entering his pleas, our focus is on whether Medina was
prejudiced. To establish prejudice, a “defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Id. at 694. In the context of a case resolved by entry
of a plea, the prejudice determination “focuses on whether counsel’s
constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.”
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. “In other words, in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’
requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty [or no
contest] and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id.

¶5 At the plea withdrawal hearing, Medina testified that he explicitly
told his attorney that the only reason he was entering the pleas is because he
wanted to appeal his evidentiary issues. In contrast, Medina’s trial counsel
testified that Medina did not explicitly tell him that the ability to appeal the
evidentiary rulings was a decisive factor in his decision to enter a plea.

¶6 The circuit court concluded that Medina’s testimony was not
credible. The court explained:

Given the fact that the joint recommendation in this case
was for substantially less prison time than the maximum,
given the fact that an interlocutory appeal [on the
evidentiary rulings] was attempted and was denied, and
given the fact the defendant knew he might not succeed on
appeal; the Court does not find it credible that the only
reason the defendant entered a plea was [defense counsel’s]
representation that he could appeal after the plea[s].

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No. 2023AP1493-CR

¶7 The circuit court is the ultimate arbiter of witness credibility.
Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 2008 WI App 67, ¶28, 312 Wis. 2d 435, 752 N.W.2d 359.
The court found that Medina was not credible when he testified that he would not
have entered the plea had he known that he could not appeal the court’s
evidentiary rulings. Because prejudice under Strickland and Hill turns on whether
there is a reasonable probability the defendant would not have entered a plea, the
court’s credibility finding is dispositive; Medina was not prejudiced by counsel’s
error because there is no reasonable probability that he would not have entered
pleas had he known that he would be unable to appeal the court’s pretrial
evidentiary rulings. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

¶8 Moreover, on this Record, the circuit court’s factual finding about
Medina’s state of mind when he entered the pleas is well supported by the Record.
In addition to the circumstances noted explicitly by the court, the plea agreement
provided other strong reasons for Medina to enter his pleas. The agreement
dismissed 6 felony charges that added decades to Medina’s prison exposure, and
secured for him a joint recommendation for 8 years of initial confinement and
8 years of extended supervision, when his potential exposure on the 2 charges that
were not dismissed was 100 years of imprisonment. The court could reasonably
conclude that these tangible benefits, combined with the considerable risks of trial,
were far more plausible motivating factors than the prospect of an evidentiary
appeal.

¶9 This same credibility finding defeats Medina’s argument that his
pleas were not knowing and voluntary under Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d at 130, which
held that entering a plea waives the right to appeal evidentiary rulings made before

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No. 2023AP1493-CR

the plea, with exceptions not applicable here.1 While a plea entered under a
material misunderstanding of appellate rights may be invalid, the
misunderstanding must have actually induced the plea. See id. at 128-29. Here,
the circuit court found as fact that it did not. That finding is entitled to deference
and is fatal to Medina’s claim that his plea was unknowing or involuntary.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

1
For example, a defendant may appeal as a matter of right, an order denying a
suppression motion after entering a plea, WIS. STAT. § 971.31(10) (2023-24), but the pretrial
evidentiary rulings at issue here concerned the scope of the evidence allowed at trial, rather than
an order denying a suppression motion.

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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