State v. Troy A. Wry

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
February 3, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP561-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2021CT3

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

TROY A. WRY,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Rusk County:
BEVERLY WICKSTROM, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 STARK, P.J.1 Troy A. Wry appeals from his judgment of
conviction, entered pursuant to a no-contest plea, for operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated (OWI), third offense. Wry argues that the circuit court erred by

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2023-24). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2023AP561-CR

denying his motion to suppress evidence because law enforcement lacked
reasonable suspicion that Wry had committed, or was committing, an offense
sufficient to conduct an investigatory stop of his vehicle.2 For the reasons that
follow, we affirm Wry’s judgment of conviction.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On October 2, 2020, at approximately 11:35 p.m., Deputy Braden
Jilek, with the Rusk County Sheriff’s Department, was alerted by dispatch “that an
individual had called and stated that an individual [in a dark-colored pickup truck]
had showed up at their house potentially intoxicated and … was asked to leave and
did so.” Dispatch did not provide Jilek with any additional identifying details, nor
did dispatch relay why the complainant believed that the driver was intoxicated. It
is unknown if the complainant provided any further details to dispatch.

¶3 Jilek began heading toward the complainant’s residence. While
Jilek was en route, dispatch informed him that the driver of the pickup truck had
returned to the complainant’s residence again but had departed. As he neared the
residence, Jilek observed a vehicle matching the complainant’s description pass by
him, traveling in the opposite direction. Jilek turned around and began to follow
that vehicle.

¶4 While Jilek was following the pickup truck, he observed the vehicle
weaving within its lane of travel. Jilek explained that the road was “a dirt road so
there was not an actual centerline,” but he testified that he believed the vehicle “to

2
The Honorable Steven P. Anderson denied Wry’s motion to suppress. The Honorable
Beverly Wickstrom entered Wry’s judgment of conviction.

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No. 2023AP561-CR

be swerving in its own lane.” According to Jilek, the vehicle also “narrowly
missed a couple of mailboxes.” The pickup truck then turned onto Highway 27,
which had “full road markings and center and fog lines.” Jilek testified that while
on Highway 27, the vehicle “continued to swerve in its own lane,” but he did not
observe any other problematic driving. Jilek continued to follow the pickup truck
until it left Rusk County and entered Chippewa County, at which point Jilek ended
his pursuit.

¶5 Jilek then decided to run the pickup truck’s license plate number,
which returned an address for the vehicle’s registered owner in Rusk County.
Jilek traveled toward that address “in an attempt to potentially locate that vehicle.”
He parked near the corner of County Road VV and Spur Road, where he waited
“for approximately 10 to 15 minutes” before he observed a dark-colored pickup
truck. Jilek began following the pickup truck, and he noted that its license plate
number matched that of the pickup truck he had been following earlier. Jilek then
activated his vehicle’s emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. The driver of
the pickup truck was identified as Wry.

¶6 The State charged Wry with OWI and operating with a prohibited
alcohol concentration, both as third offenses. Wry filed a motion to suppress the
evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop on the ground that Jilek detained
Wry without possessing an objectively reasonable suspicion that Wry had
committed, or was committing, an offense. The circuit court held an evidentiary
hearing on Wry’s suppression motion, during which Jilek testified.

¶7 The circuit court, thereafter, issued an oral ruling denying Wry’s
motion. According to the court, the complainant was not an anonymous caller
because they called from a residence and “could be identified for purposes of later

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No. 2023AP561-CR

proceedings.” Further, the court found that Wry’s act of going to the
complainant’s home, being asked to leave, and then coming back, all “at 11:35 at
night, … is unusual behavior.” The court also noted that Jilek observed Wry
swerving in his own lane “and narrowly miss[ing] a couple of mailboxes.” Thus,
the court determined that Jilek had enough information at his disposal to conduct
an investigatory traffic stop. Wry appeals.3

DISCUSSION

¶8 Under Wisconsin law, a traffic stop must be supported by reasonable
suspicion. State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶¶19-20, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d
560. However, “[r]easonable suspicion is ‘a low bar.’” State v. Nimmer, 2022
WI 47, ¶25, 402 Wis. 2d 416, 975 N.W.2d 598 (citation omitted). “Reasonable
suspicion requires that ‘[t]he officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant the intrusion of the stop.’” Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶20
(alteration in original; citation omitted); WIS. STAT. § 968.24 (codifying the
reasonable suspicion standard for investigative stops). This standard requires that
the stop be “based on more than an officer’s ‘inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch.’” State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶10, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d
634 (citation omitted).

¶9 “The question of whether a traffic stop is reasonable is a question of
constitutional fact.” Id., ¶8. “We review the circuit court’s findings of historical
fact under the clearly erroneous standard, and we review independently the

3
An order denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed on appeal
notwithstanding the defendant’s guilty or no-contest plea. WIS. STAT. § 971.31(10).

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No. 2023AP561-CR

application of those facts to constitutional principles.” Id. “The determination of
reasonableness is a common sense test” that “is determined based on the totality of
the facts and circumstances.” Id., ¶13; State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, ¶22, 241
Wis. 2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 106 (“Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is
dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree
of reliability.” (citation omitted)). “The crucial question is whether the facts of the
case would warrant a reasonable police officer, in light of his or her training and
experience, to suspect that the individual has committed, was committing, or is
about to commit a crime.” Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13. The government carries the
burden of proving that a traffic stop was reasonable. Id., ¶12.

¶10 On appeal, Wry argues that “Jilek did not have an objectively
reasonable suspicion that Wry was under the influence of an intoxicant, nor that he
had committed or was committing any offense when Jilek required Wry to submit
to detention.” According to Wry, “there [was] no evidence in the record regarding
the caller’s basis for thinking Wry was intoxicated, and the details of the
complaint that Jilek was able to corroborate were relatively weak” because “Jilek
was merely able to corroborate that Wry’s pickup truck matched the complainant’s
limited description of the suspected vehicle’s body style and color.”

¶11 Although this is a close case, we conclude that the information
provided by the complainant in conjunction with Jilek’s own observations
provided reasonable suspicion to stop Wry’s vehicle. First, the complainant’s
report contained sufficient indicia of reliability. See Williams, 241 Wis. 2d 631,
¶¶31, 33-36. As the circuit court observed, the complainant did not provide an
anonymous report to the police. The individual was a citizen informant who
contacted law enforcement; identified themself by, at the very least, providing
their address; reported that an intoxicated driver had been at their home, twice; and

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No. 2023AP561-CR

gave a description of the vehicle in question. See State v. Miller, 2012 WI 61, ¶31
n.18, 341 Wis. 2d 307, 815 N.W.2d 349 (“[A] citizen informant—‘someone who
happens upon a crime or suspicious activity and reports it to police’—… is
generally considered among the most reliable informants.” (citation omitted));
Williams, 241 Wis. 2d 631, ¶¶35-36 & n.12, ¶38 (“[W]e view citizens who
purport to have witnessed a crime as reliable, and allow the police to act
accordingly, even though other indicia of reliability have not yet been
established.”); State v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, ¶20, 241 Wis. 2d 729, 623 N.W.2d
516 (“[The] threat of potential arrest … could lead a reasonable officer to
conclude that the informant would not provide a false tip.”).

¶12 Jilek then corroborated the limited information the complainant
provided and made his own observations. Importantly, Jilek located a vehicle
matching the complainant’s description near the complainant’s home, which
provides additional verification of the complainant’s report. See Williams, 241
Wis. 2d 631, ¶¶39-40 (discussing corroboration of innocent details of the tip).
Jilek also witnessed that the vehicle was swerving within its lane, both on a dirt
road and on Highway 27, and that the vehicle “narrowly missed [hitting] a couple
of mailboxes.” See Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24 (“[A] driver’s actions need not be
erratic, unsafe, or illegal to give rise to reasonable suspicion.”). We therefore
conclude that the complainant’s sufficiently reliable report in conjunction with
Jilek’s own observations provided reasonable suspicion to stop Wry’s vehicle, and
the investigatory stop did not violate Wry’s constitutional rights.

¶13 Wry challenges this conclusion on several grounds. First, he argues
that pursuant to Post, “weaving within a single traffic lane does not alone give rise
to the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigative stop of a
vehicle.” Id., ¶2 (emphasis added). But Wry fails to acknowledge our supreme

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No. 2023AP561-CR

court’s use of the words “alone” and “without more” to clarify its holding in Post.
See id., ¶¶2, 9, 26. Contrary to Wry’s argument, law enforcement may consider a
vehicle weaving within its own lane of traffic when deciding whether to conduct
an investigatory stop, but it must do so within the totality of the circumstances to
establish reasonable suspicion, and the weaving cannot serve as the sole basis for
the stop. See id., ¶¶14, 37. Here, as detailed above, Jilek had more information
than only that a vehicle was weaving within its own lane to determine that there
was reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop.

¶14 Next, Wry contends that there was a “complete lack of information
regarding the caller’s basis for thinking Wry was intoxicated,” which renders the
report “insufficient to be given much weight in the reasonable suspicion calculus.”
On appeal, the State concedes that “there was no testimony from the citizen
informant why [they] believed that Wry was intoxicated,” but we agree with the
State that the complainant was clearly concerned enough about their interaction
with Wry to contact police. Further, we agree with the circuit court that the fact
that Wry first came to the complainant’s house at almost midnight and later
returned after having been told to leave was “unusual behavior” that Jilek was not
required to ignore. See id., ¶36 (“[W]e note that the incident took place at 9:30 at
night. While this is not as significant as when poor driving takes place at or
around ‘bar time,’ it does lend some further credence to [law enforcement’s]
suspicion that Post was driving while intoxicated.”).

¶15 Wry’s next argument suggests that Jilek’s failure to execute a traffic
stop on him before he left Rusk County demonstrated that Jilek did not believe
that he had reasonable suspicion to stop Wry. According to Wry, “at the time of
the stop, [the officer must] know or reasonably believe that those facts actually
give rise to probable cause or reasonable suspicion.” See United States v.

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No. 2023AP561-CR

Hughes, 606 F.3d 311, 316 (6th Cir. 2010). Wry contends that “[i]f Jilek
reasonably believed that” a vehicle weaving within its own lane and almost hitting
mailboxes “actually gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle’s driver
was intoxicated, [Jilek] would have certainly initiated a traffic stop at that time,”
but he “made the decision not to initiate a traffic stop” and “allowed the pickup
truck to continue … onto Highway 27.” Further, citing State v. Newer, 2007 WI
App 236, ¶8, 306 Wis. 2d 193, 742 N.W.2d 923, Wry argues that because Jilek
“testified that while following the pickup truck on Highway 27, he did not observe
any dangerous or problematic driving, or any equipment-related traffic violations,”
his observations “dissipated any reasonable suspicion of impairment that existed,
even assuming for the sake of argument that it did exist at one point.”

¶16 Wry’s arguments do not persuade us. First, Jilek’s failure to stop
Wry immediately upon observing him weaving within his own lane of traffic is of
no legal significance. Wry’s argument improperly reframes the reasonable
suspicion inquiry as a subjective assessment of Jilek’s confidence in his
assessment of reasonable suspicion as inferred by his delayed enforcement
decisions. Reasonable suspicion is judged by an objective standard. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968); see also State v. Repenshek, 2004 WI App 229,
¶10, 277 Wis. 2d 780, 691 N.W.2d 369 (“[T]he legality of an arrest does not
depend on the subjective motivation of the arresting officer.”).

¶17 Although Wry cites Hughes in support of his position, that court’s
discussion fails to support his point. In Hughes, the court’s pronouncement that
an officer must “know or reasonably believe that those facts actually give rise to
probable cause or reasonable suspicion” was immediately followed by the court’s
clarification that “a police officer must know or reasonably believe that the driver
of the car is doing something that represents a violation of law” and that “[t]his

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No. 2023AP561-CR

rule might be better stated as saying that police officers may not look for
after-the-fact justifications for stops that would otherwise be impermissible.”
Hughes, 606 F.3d at 316. Hughes does not stand for the proposition that an
officer’s decision to delay a stop or continue observation negates the existence of
reasonable suspicion or that officers are constitutionally required to act at the
earliest possible moment suspicion arises.

¶18 Wry’s reference to Newer is equally unavailing. The question
before the Newer court was whether “an officer’s knowledge that a vehicle’s
owner’s license is revoked will support reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.”
Newer, 306 Wis. 2d 193, ¶2. The court determined that “[i]t is indeed a
reasonable assumption that the person driving a particular vehicle is that vehicle’s
owner”; however, “[i]f an officer comes upon information suggesting that the
assumption is not valid in a particular case, for example that the vehicle’s driver
appears to be much older, much younger, or of a different gender than the
vehicle’s registered owner, reasonable suspicion would, of course, dissipate.” Id.,
¶¶7-8. Thus, while reasonable suspicion may dissipate based on later observations
that undermine the initial basis for suspicion, Newer requires more than a
temporary absence of additional suspicious behavior. Simply because Jilek did
not observe further erratic driving on Highway 27 does not negate his earlier
observations of the vehicle weaving within its lane and nearly striking mailboxes.

¶19 Finally, Wry argues that any reasonable suspicion of impairment that
may have existed dissipated when Jilek lost sight of the pickup truck for a period
of time after deciding to break off his pursuit. In support of his position, Wry
provides the following quotation from the circuit court’s discussion of his
argument: “Anything could [have] happened. That drunk driver, who was not Mr.
Wry, could [have] gone some place; and Mr. Wry got in the truck and drove home

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No. 2023AP561-CR

stone cold sober. So you don’t know that the driver didn’t change. You don’t
know what happened.” Wry further argues that “[t]hese reasonable suspicion
problems arising from the pickup truck being unaccounted for for this extended
period are only compounded by Jilek confirming that he did not observe who the
driver of the pickup truck was despite following the vehicle for this extended
period.”

¶20 We disagree that reasonable suspicion dissipated under these
circumstances. Even if “anything could [have] happened,” such as Wry switching
places with the individual who had been driving when Jilek first encountered the
vehicle, an officer is not required to accept an innocent explanation where
competing reasonable inferences could be drawn. See State v. Kutz, 2003 WI App
205, ¶12, 267 Wis. 2d 531, 671 N.W.2d 660; State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, ¶36,
364 Wis. 2d 167, 868 N.W.2d 124 (“Although officers sometimes will be
confronted with behavior that has a possible innocent explanation, a combination
of behaviors—all of which may provide the possibility of innocent explanation—
can give rise to reasonable suspicion.”).

¶21 Moreover, as Jilek explained at the hearing, after losing sight of the
pickup truck, he waited near Wry’s address for 10 to 15 minutes before the truck
reappeared. Wry provides no legal support for his suggestion that the passage of
this short amount of time caused reasonable suspicion to dissipate. See State v.
Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that the
court of appeals need not address undeveloped arguments or arguments
unsupported by references to legal authority). He merely quotes the circuit court’s
summary of his argument, which the court rejected.

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No. 2023AP561-CR

¶22 Accordingly, we conclude that under the totality of the
circumstances, law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigatory stop of Wry’s vehicle, and we affirm his judgment of conviction.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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