State v. Andrew J. Bohn

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
February 18, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP2022-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2007CF788

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

ANDREW J. BOHN,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Winnebago County:
DANIEL J. BISSETT, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, Grogan, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP2022-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Andrew J. Bohn appeals from a circuit court order
denying his petition for conditional release. Bohn argues that the court erred in
considering “informational letters” regarding his institutionalization at the hearing
on his petition. Bohn also contends there was insufficient evidence on which the
court could conclude that he posed a significant risk to himself or others if granted
conditional release. See WIS. STAT. § 971.17(4)(d) (2023-24).1 We affirm.

¶2 The parties do not dispute the facts pertinent to this appeal. In 2007,
while Bohn was serving a commitment for another offense, the State charged him
with attempted first-degree intentional homicide after he stabbed a fellow institution
patient in the neck with scissors. Pursuant to an agreement with the State, Bohn
pled no contest in 2008 to an amended charge of mayhem, see WIS. STAT. § 940.21,
but the parties stipulated that Bohn should be found not guilty by reason of mental
disease or defect (“NGI”). Bohn was ordered to a maximum 25-year commitment
to institutional care. He is currently housed at Mendota Mental Health Institute
(Mendota).

¶3 In 2009, the circuit court granted Bohn’s first petition for conditional
release. See WIS. STAT. § 971.17(4)(d).2 However, Bohn reoffended while out on

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
2
As relevant to this appeal, WIS. STAT. § 971.17(4)(d) provides as follows:

The court shall grant the petition [for conditional release] unless
it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person would
pose a significant risk of bodily harm to himself or herself or to
others or of serious property damage if conditionally released. In
making this determination, the court may consider, without
limitation because of enumeration, the nature and circumstances
of the crime, the person’s mental history and present mental
condition, where the person will live, how the person will support
himself or herself, what arrangements are available to ensure that
the person has access to and will take necessary medication, and
what arrangements are possible for treatment beyond medication.

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No. 2024AP2022-CR

release when he repeatedly hit a man in the head with a crowbar. He was
subsequently convicted of first-degree reckless endangerment and substantial
battery and committed for nine years. Following that disposition, Bohn stipulated
to revocation of his conditional release in the present case, in which he was
convicted of mayhem.

¶4 Bohn subsequently filed his second, third, and fourth petitions for
conditional release, but he withdrew each one before the circuit court could rule on
it. In 2019, Bohn sought conditional release for a fifth time. Dr. Kevin Miller, PhD,
examined Bohn and concluded that Bohn qualified for conditional release because
he posed only a moderate risk of harm if released. The circuit court rejected
Dr. Miller’s risk assessment, instead finding that Bohn presented a significant risk
to the public if granted release. In support of its finding, the court cited Bohn’s
violent criminal history and his demonstrated inability to be on conditional release
without committing another violent crime. Bohn filed a postdisposition motion.
While the motion was pending, Bohn committed two separate attacks on individuals
at Mendota. The court denied the motion, and Bohn did not appeal.

¶5 In 2022, Dr. Miller reevaluated Bohn and concluded again that he
presented a moderate risk of harm to others if he were placed on conditional release
and, therefore, should be granted release. Dr. Miller stated that Bohn’s mental
condition had stabilized in late 2020 after a medication change following his violent
outbursts earlier that year. The circuit court disagreed with Dr. Miller’s assessment
and denied the petition. Bohn appealed, and we summarily affirmed. State v. Bohn,
No. 2023AP1-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App Mar. 6, 2024).

¶6 This brings us to the current petition, which Bohn filed in 2023.
Dr. Miller again filed a report indicating that Bohn posed a moderate risk of harm

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No. 2024AP2022-CR

if released. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHS) submitted a
letter to the circuit court providing “factual information” about “Bohn’s status at
[Mendota], his course of treatment, and his progress.” This letter also provided a
detailed account of the security protocols to which Bohn was subject at various
points of his commitment. The letter was signed by three members of Bohn’s
treatment team at Mendota. The team members declined to make a recommendation
regarding conditional release. Other similar “informational letters” had been filed
in conjunction with Bohn’s prior conditional release petitions.

¶7 Dr. Miller testified at the hearing on Bohn’s latest petition. He again
opined that Bohn was an appropriate candidate for conditional release because he
posed only a moderate risk of harm to himself or others if released into the
community. Bohn also testified on his own behalf, speaking of his general success
since his last violent episode in 2020. The State took no position as to whether the
circuit court should grant Bohn release.

¶8 After the hearing, the circuit court denied the petition. The court
observed its familiarity with Bohn, noting it “has heard [Bohn’s] conditional release
petitions a number of times through the years.” It based its decision in part on
Bohn’s prior violent behavior and further considered that Mendota still had not
granted Bohn privileges to leave the facility and spend time in the community. The
court found those factors provided clear and convincing evidence that Bohn posed
a significant risk of bodily harm to others. It explained that it wanted to see Bohn’s
actions when he has full privileges from the institution before granting release,
especially given Bohn’s previous violence when not institutionalized. Bohn
appeals.

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No. 2024AP2022-CR

¶9 Bohn first argues that the circuit court erred in relying on the most
recent informational letter, discussed above, as grounds to deny his petition. Citing
to WIS. STAT. § 908.01, he contends that “had [the letter] been offered into evidence,
it would have been excluded on hearsay and foundation grounds” because it “is an
out-of-court statement,” which “contains numerous detailed allegations about the
prior incidents without any indication of the letter-writers’ basis of knowledge.”
However, the State highlights the facts that Bohn did not object at the hearing to the
court’s reliance on the letter and he did not file a postdisposition motion lodging an
objection to the letter. Accordingly, the State asserts that Bohn has forfeited any
challenge to the court’s reliance on its contents in rendering its decision. See State
v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶29-30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612; State v. Klapps,
2021 WI App 5, ¶20, 395 Wis. 2d 743, 954 N.W.2d 38.

¶10 Bohn replied to the State’s argument stating he did not forfeit a
challenge to the circuit court’s reliance on the informational letter because he is
challenging it in the context of the sufficiency of the evidence, which cannot be
forfeited. See WIS. STAT. § 971.17(7). We disagree with Bohn’s framing of his
current objection to the court’s use of the letter as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence
issue, see Lhost v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 620, 646, 271 N.W.2d 121 (1978) (“An
objection is a means of invoking a rule of evidence by which admission of proof at
trial is regulated.”), but we resolve the issue on its merits rather than deem it
forfeited. As to the merits, however, we agree with the State that the court was
entitled to consider information from the letter because the rules of evidence do not
apply in court hearings related to a petition for conditional release. See State v.
Mahone, 127 Wis. 2d 364, 372, 379 N.W.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1985).

¶11 Mahone involved a challenge to a circuit court order revoking
Mahone’s conditional release and recommitting him to an institution. Id. at 367. In

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No. 2024AP2022-CR

considering Mahone’s appeal, this court compared hearings under WIS. STAT.
§ 971.17 to probation or parole revocation hearings. Id. at 372. We concluded that,
as in probation or parole revocation proceedings, “the formal rules of evidence” do
not apply to hearings held under § 971.17. Id.

¶12 Applying this principle from Mahone here, we are satisfied that the
circuit court did not err in relying on the informational letter submitted in
conjunction with this petition or, to the extent that it did so, on other similar letters
pertaining to earlier petitions. Even if Bohn had objected to the court’s reliance on
the letter at the hearing or filed a postdisposition motion on that ground, his
objections would have been without merit. The court was entitled to rely on the
letter. See id.3

¶13 We now turn to Bohn’s argument that there was insufficient evidence
presented at the hearing to support the circuit court’s conclusion that Bohn posed a
significant risk of harm to himself or others if granted conditional release. The
circuit court must grant a petition for conditional release “unless it finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the person would pose a significant risk of bodily harm
to himself or herself or to others or of serious property damage if conditionally
released.” WIS. STAT. § 971.17(4)(d). On appeal, the proper standard of review is
the sufficiency of the evidence test. State v. Randall (Randall III), 2011 WI App
102, ¶13, 336 Wis. 2d 399, 802 N.W.2d 194. We defer to the circuit court’s

3
We reject Bohn’s argument that State v. Mahone, 127 Wis. 2d 364, 379 N.W.2d 878 (Ct.
App. 1985) “is no longer good law.” Although the legislature has amended WIS. STAT. § 971.17
multiple times over the years, Bohn fails to point to any statement showing any of the various
changes to the statutes were intended to overrule Mahone in general or its declaration that the
formal rules of evidence do not apply in § 971.17 hearings, in particular. We further note that both
the Wisconsin Supreme Court and this court have cited Mahone favorably over the years, including
as recently as 2025. See, e.g., State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995); State v.
Schaefer, 2025 WI App 71, ¶¶49-50, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.3d ___.

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No. 2024AP2022-CR

“determination of credibility and evaluation of the evidence” and adopt its
reasonable inferences; if there are multiple reasonable inferences, we will adopt the
inference that the circuit court did. Id., ¶14. The “nature of the crime and that
person’s history of mental illness” remain appropriate factors for the court to
consider, along with any other factors it deems appropriate. State v. Wood, 2010
WI 17, ¶37, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63.

¶14 Based on our review, we conclude that sufficient evidence supported
the circuit court’s order denying Bohn’s petition. The court relied on Bohn’s
substantial history of violent offenses both in the community and in mental health
facilities. As the State notes in its briefing, “[i]n a span of seven years, Bohn
assaulted an elderly woman, choked his own mother, nearly killed a fellow patient
by stabbing her in the neck with scissors, and brutalized a man with a crowbar.”
Even after stabbing a patient in the neck while committed in December 2006, Bohn
obtained conditional release in May 2009. However, as described above, he
immediately began violating the rules and assaulted the man with a crowbar in
October 2010.

¶15 The circuit court properly considered Bohn’s serious and violent
criminal history. It also appropriately recognized Bohn’s limited experience with
minimal security restrictions while committed, noting that Bohn had “bounced
around from medium, minimum, and maximum placements” since his
recommitment in 2010. While Bohn argues that the evidence offered at the hearing
supported his petition for release, the examples he provides support competing
inferences, and we are bound to uphold the inferences the circuit court made. See
Randall III, 336 Wis. 2d 399, ¶14. The evidence was sufficient to support the
court’s denial of Bohn’s latest petition.

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No. 2024AP2022-CR

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

8