State v. Robert Lee Daniels

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 10, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP1801-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF2667

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

ROBERT LEE DANIELS,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Milwaukee County: DAVID L. BOROWSKI and DAVID C. SWANSON, Judges.
Affirmed.

Before White, C.J., Colón, P.J., and Geenen, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 20204AP1801-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Robert Lee Daniels appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered on his guilty plea and an order denying his motion for
postconviction relief. Specifically, Daniels argues that trial counsel was
ineffective for not objecting to an alleged breach of the plea agreement. For the
following reasons, we conclude that the plea agreement was not breached.
Therefore, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Daniels pleaded guilty to first-degree reckless homicide, and the
parties stipulated that the facts in the criminal complaint could provide the factual
basis for the guilty plea. The complaint describes how Daniels came to a police
station to confess that he strangled his former romantic partner, Janet,1 to death
and tossed her body into a dumpster in an alley. Police found her body in the
dumpster to which Daniels referred them, and an autopsy confirmed that her death
was a homicide caused by asphyxiation.

¶3 The State charged Daniels with first-degree intentional homicide.
Daniels entered a negotiated plea agreement to one count of first-degree reckless
homicide. Under the terms of the plea, the State downgraded the homicide charge
and agreed to recommend a prison sentence without recommending a particular
length of time.

1
We adopt the pseudonym used by the State in its brief. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86(4)
(2023-24). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 20204AP1801-CR

¶4 Following the plea, the trial court2 held a sentencing hearing. Three
of Janet’s loved ones addressed the court. Janet’s mother expressed her profound
grief and anger, admitting that she wished she “could beat [Daniels] to death and
dispose of him in a dumpster.” Janet’s brother asked the trial court to impose the
maximum possible sentence. A family friend stated that Daniels should get “100
years ... and then get thrown in the garbage can.”

¶5 The prosecutor then reviewed Daniels’s criminal history. Daniels
had a felony conviction from 2002 and misdemeanor convictions from 2003,
2005, and 2010. In 2014, Daniels was convicted of first-degree recklessly
endangering safety, strangulation and suffocation, and substantial battery, all with
the domestic abuse enhancer, involving a different victim than Janet. Daniels was
on extended supervision in the 2014 case when he killed Janet.

¶6 In closing, the prosecutor offered the following remarks to
summarize the State’s position:

So, Your Honor, the State has left the sentence up to
the court. Well, obviously, we’re asking for a prison
sentence, but the number [is] up to the court. The family
has told you what they’re asking you to consider and,
obviously, the defense will have that opportunity, but I
guess what I would say in closing is that this type of crime,
this type of murder of someone that is so personal, so
violent is the worst type of crime in our community, and I
just ask that the court gives a sentence that reflects that for
the family of this victim.

2
The Honorable David L. Borowski took Daniels’s plea and sentenced him. We refer to
Judge Borowski as the “trial court.” The Honorable David C. Swanson denied Daniels’s
postconviction motion. We refer to Judge Swanson as the “postconviction court.”

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No. 20204AP1801-CR

The trial court sentenced Daniels to 42 years, bifurcated into 32 years of initial
confinement and 10 years of extended supervision.3

¶7 The trial court stated that “the sentence focuses primarily on
punishment, deterrence, [and] protecting this community.” It observed that the
State had overwhelming evidence with which to prove Daniels guilty of first-
degree intentional homicide and that a life sentence without parole would have
been appropriate had he been convicted of that offense.

¶8 Following sentencing, Daniels filed a postconviction motion seeking
resentencing before a different judge. He argued that trial counsel was ineffective
for not objecting to a material and substantial breach of the plea agreement by the
State at sentencing. Specifically, he asserted that the prosecutor breached the plea
agreement in her closing remarks by implicitly endorsing the statements from
Janet’s supporters advocating for the maximum possible punishment.

¶9 The postconviction court denied the motion without a Machner4
hearing. It found that the prosecutor complied with the State’s obligation not to
recommend a specific length of sentence. It rejected Daniels’s characterization of
the prosecutor’s closing remarks, determining that the prosecutor urged the trial
court to impose a prison sentence that reflected the heinousness of the offense for
the benefit of Janet’s supporters, not the exact sentence that the supporters desired.

¶10 Daniels appeals.

3
Daniels faced a 60-year maximum sentence. WIS. STAT. §§ 939.50(3)(b), 940.02(1).
4
State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).

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No. 20204AP1801-CR

DISCUSSION

¶11 Daniels argues that the State materially and substantially breached
the plea agreement by endorsing the recommendations of Janet’s loved ones that
Daniels receive the maximum possible sentence. Because trial counsel did not
object to the alleged breach at the sentencing hearing, any objection must now be
raised through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Carprue, 2004
WI 111, ¶47, 274 Wis. 2d 656, 683 N.W.2d 31. “In order to prove ineffective
assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient and that counsel’s errors or omissions prejudiced the defense.” State v.
Sprang, 2004 WI App 121, ¶25, 274 Wis. 2d 784, 683 N.W.2d 522. To prove
deficient performance, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.5 Id.

¶12 Whether the State engaged in conduct that constitutes a material and
substantial breach of the plea agreement is a question of law that we review
independently. State v. Bokenyi, 2014 WI 61, ¶38, 355 Wis. 2d 28, 848 N.W.2d
759. However, the terms of a plea agreement and the historical facts of the State’s
conduct that allegedly constituted the breach of a plea agreement are questions of
fact reviewed for clear error. Id., ¶37.

¶13 Because the postconviction court denied Daniels’s motion without a
Machner hearing, the issue to be decided on appeal is whether Daniels’s motion

5
We decide the case on the basis that trial counsel did not perform deficiently for failing
to object to the State’s alleged breach of the plea agreement. We therefore do not address the
State’s arguments related to prejudice, under what circumstances prejudice is presumed, or the
effect of Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009), on our supreme court’s holding in
State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997) that prejudice is presumed in cases
where the State breaches a plea agreement regardless of whether the objection was preserved.

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No. 20204AP1801-CR

alleged sufficient facts entitling him to a hearing. State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53,
¶51, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89. “If a defendant’s motion asserting
ineffective assistance ‘does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant to relief,
or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates
that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the circuit court has the discretion to
grant or deny a hearing.’” Id., ¶50 (quoting State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶23, 369
Wis. 2d 225, 880 N.W.2d 659).

¶14 Daniels argues that Janet’s loved ones unanimously recommended
that Daniels receive the maximum possible sentence, and the prosecutor’s closing
remarks specifically drew attention to this recommendation and asked the court to
impose a sentence that would satisfy them. Daniels claims that these remarks
deprived him of a substantial and material benefit for which he bargained, namely,
the State’s agreement to remain silent as to the length of the prison sentence the
court should impose.

¶15 The State argues, and the postconviction court concluded, that the
State did not breach the plea agreement. The State claims that the prosecutor’s
remarks were directed at the gravity of the offense and the effect of Daniels’s
crime on Janet’s loved ones. The State asserts that these are appropriate
sentencing considerations, and the prosecutor was not prohibited from calling
attention to them by her agreement not to recommend a particular prison sentence.

¶16 We agree with the State and the postconviction court. The
prosecutor was not required to disavow the statements and recommendations of
Janet’s loved ones, nor was it a breach of the plea agreement for the prosecutor to
comment on them. See State v. Liukonen, 2004 WI App 157, ¶10, 276 Wis. 2d
64, 686 N.W.2d 689 (explaining that plea agreements “in which a prosecutor

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No. 20204AP1801-CR

agrees to cap his or her sentencing recommendation” do not prevent a prosecutor
“from supplying information that supports a harsher sentence than the one
recommended by the prosecutor”); State v. Stewart, 2013 WI App 86, ¶¶16-19,
349 Wis. 2d 385, 836 N.W.2d 456. “A prosecutor can still inform the circuit court
of aggravating sentencing factors, including facts concerning the defendant’s
character and behavioral patterns.” Stewart, 349 Wis. 2d 385, ¶17.

¶17 That is what the prosecutor did here. The prosecutor’s
characterization of the offense as particularly severe and the “worst type” of crime
falls within the bounds of permissible advocacy to justify the State’s general
recommendation for a prison sentence. The prosecutor’s comments were aimed to
emphasize the gravity of Daniels’s conduct and its effect on Janet’s loved ones.
The plea agreement did not restrict the State from urging the trial court to consider
the full context of Daniels’s crime and its consequences when determining the
appropriate sentence.

¶18 Moreover, the prosecutor’s request that the trial court impose “a
sentence that reflects that for the family of this victim” did not constitute an
endorsement of the loved ones’ sentencing recommendations. The bolded word,
“that,” refers to the prosecutor’s preceding statement wherein she described the
homicide as “so personal,” “so violent,” and “the worst type of crime in our
community[.]” The prosecutor was not directly or indirectly asking the court to
give Daniels a sentence that reflected the loved ones’ wishes; she was asking the
court to give Daniels a sentence that reflected the very personal, violent nature of
his crime. Her statements fell within the permissible scope of advocacy under
Wisconsin law, focusing on the facts of the case and the gravity of the defendant’s
actions.

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No. 20204AP1801-CR

¶19 Because we conclude that the prosecutor did not breach the plea
agreement, trial counsel cannot be deemed to have performed deficiently for
failing to make a meritless objection. See id., ¶20.

CONCLUSION

¶20 We conclude that the prosecutor’s closing remarks at sentencing did
not constitute a breach of the plea agreement, and trial counsel was not deficient
for failing to object to the alleged breach. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
conviction and the order denying postconviction relief.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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